By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
Introduction:
Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan’s statement at the European Council on Foreign Relations conference on 4 July 2024—that Saudi Arabia supports deploying international forces in Gaza Strip (GS) under a UN mandate to support the Palestinian Authority (PA) after war. This statement has renewed discussions about potential Arab participation in these forces, following a period of Saudi reservation in recent months. However, he did not specify whether Saudi troops would be sent.
The idea of involving Arab forces in various capacities was proposed early in the Israeli war on GS. This was part of the broader consideration of the Strip’s future post-war, based on the premise that Israel, US and their Western allies had resolved to prevent Hamas from resuming control of the Strip in any form. This idea has remained one of the scenarios discussed over the past months, regardless of its seriousness, feasibility, or the level of support from Arab, Palestinian, Israeli or international actors.
However, there is US acceptance of the idea, a willingness to participate in its implementation, and practical efforts by various parties to promote it.
The Israeli Position:
The notion of involving Arab forces in the subsequent arrangements for managing GS emerged among the scenarios proposed by Israeli parties during the first month of the war and has remained under consideration. However, the Israeli government, led by Netanyahu, has not officially adopted this scenario to date. On the other hand, key figures within the government, most notably Benny Gantz and Yoav Gallant, have embraced the idea.
The significance of Gantz’s endorsement of this idea lies in his status as the most popular figure in Israel and his strong likelihood of succeeding Netanyahu as the head of the Israeli government. He outlined this proposal in a six-point plan, presented before he and his party withdrew from the Israeli government on 8/6/2024. His plan advocates for an international civilian administration for GS, involving US, European, Arab and Palestinian participation, while explicitly excluding Hamas and the PA in Ramallah.
As for Gallant’s proposal, it is significant because he is Israel’s Minister of Defense and a key member of the ruling Likud party. He initially presented his idea months ago and republished it in late June 2024 (The Washington Post and Yedioth Aharonoth). Gallant proposed a US-led steering committee involving “moderate” Arab states, including troops from Egypt, Jordan, the UAE and Morocco. This committee would oversee security while the US provide command, control and logistical services from outside GS. According to Yedioth Aharonoth, Gallant divided GS into 24 administrative regions, with a Palestinian force gradually assuming security control. The plan would be implemented in stages, starting in northern GS and expanding southward.
The extreme religious right (Smotrich and Ben-Gvir) rejects the idea, calling for the return of control over GS and the resettlement of Jewish settlers while displacing or creating conditions for the displacement of Palestinians from GS. Netanyahu has maintained a degree of ambiguity and refrained from committing to any specific future plans, except for asserting control over the future of GS. This ambiguity aids him to some extent in governing, but it has also sparked widespread dissatisfaction and pressure from military, security and opposition circles seeking a clear path forward for resolving the GS predicament.
The Arab Position:
Unofficial signals suggest that several Arab countries, particularly those within the so-called moderate bloc and those with normalized ties with Israel, desire the cessation of Israeli military actions in GS to result in the removal of Hamas from power and the cessation of resistance activities there. However, during the initial months of the war, no reports indicated that these countries were willing to participate in future security arrangements for GS. There was hesitancy or outright rejection of this idea. The Arab strategy primarily aimed to halt the aggression and secure an Israeli withdrawal from GS. Any prospective arrangements for GS were envisioned within the peace process, aiming for a two-state solution that would establish a fully sovereign Palestinian state in both the West Bank (WB) and GS, with the PA playing a crucial role in post-conflict GS affairs.
The Arab Summit statement issued in Manama on 16/5/2024, advocated for the deployment of international protection and peacekeeping forces in WB and GS to support the implementation of a two-state solution. It emphasized that these international forces should be part of arrangements aimed at ending the occupation, rather than enforcing its terms.
However, Arab countries seem to be increasingly considering the prospect of joining international forces. According to a report by the Financial Times on 6/5/2024, some Arab states, notably Egypt, are now receptive to the idea. However, “other regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar, were against deploying Arab peacekeepers.” On 27/6/2024, The Times of Israel reported that US Secretary of State Blinken informed regional counterparts that Egypt and the UAE “are prepared to participate in a postwar Gaza security force,” which “would work alongside local Palestinian officers.” Their willingness, however, depends on “a demand that the initiative be linked to the establishment of a pathway to a future Palestinian state.” Statements from the Saudi foreign minister on 4 July have further advanced this initiative.
Moreover, the statements of Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto in early June 2024 about Indonesia’s willingness to send peacekeeping troops to GS supported the proposal.
Solving the Israeli or the Palestinian Problem:
All proposals aimed at managing GS with Arab involvement post-war seem to be geared towards a transitional phase. Here, Arab forces are envisioned to play a crucial role in facilitating Israeli withdrawal and establishing governance aligned with Israeli and US criteria. This framework aims to prevent Hamas and other resistance factions from reasserting control, while also gradually disbanding their military and civilian capabilities. Ultimately, the goal is to establish a Palestinian civil administration that either satisfies or aligns with the Israel’s agenda. The initial Arab proposal diverges from this overarching framework.
The primary issue is that the Arab side might seem to be addressing the problems and challenges faced by the Israeli side rather than the suffering and difficulties experienced by the Palestinian side, almost as if the initiative came about under the shadow of an Israeli tank.
Second, it appears to perpetuate the occupation (through proxies) rather than being a step towards ending it. Third, it perpetuates the mentality of guardianship over the Palestinian people and their will, as if they have not matured after more than a century of resistance, steadfastness and sacrifices in their pursuit of self-determination. The administration of GS is an internal Palestinian matter to be decided by Palestinians themselves, without imposition by Israelis or the need for proxies on their behalf. Fourth, there are genuine concerns in Arab countries regarding Hamas’s rejection and the potential for their entry into GS to provoke a violent or armed response, further damaging these governments’ image among their people.
The Palestinian Position:
The PA appears to be in a state of confusion and faces a “flood” of criticism for its poor performance and failure to fulfill its national responsibilities. It has also been accused of suppressing resistance and popular mobilization in WB, while simultaneously criticizing Hamas and other resistance movements. At the same time, and despite asserting the independence of Palestinian decision-making and claiming Gaza’s future as an internal Palestinian matter, the PA’’s recent formation of Mohammed Mustafa’s government without agreement from Hamas and other resistance factions suggests preparation for a post-Hamas scenario in GS that aligns with Israeli and US preferences. These actions have sparked widespread public dissatisfaction.
Hamas and other resistance factions oppose the involvement of Arab forces in the proposed US-Israeli arrangements, viewing it as aiding the occupation and hostile behavior. They argue that decisions regarding post-war GS arrangements are solely the internal affairs of Palestinians, with openness towards the PA and PLO leadership guided by Palestinian national consensus, aimed at rebuilding the PLO.
Palestinian Public Opinion:
Palestinian public opinion, as reflected in opinion polls by the Palestinian Center for Political and Survey Research based in Ramallah, shows strong support for Hamas. Hamas’s popularity has doubled among Palestinians, potentially leading to a significant victory in future elections. There is increasing popular support for the resistance movement, coupled with a widespread rejection of the peace process and the Oslo Accords. On 12/6/2024, more than 60% of respondents supported the PA dissolution.
In latest June 2024 poll, consistent with previous surveys conducted during Operation al-Aqsa Flood war (December 2023 and March 2024), 61% prefer Hamas to control GS after the war. Merely 1% supported the idea of one or more Arab states assuming control. Additionally, 6% favored the PA under ‘Abbas, while another 6% preferred the PA without ‘Abbas. These results underscore continued public support for the resistance.
Complicating matters for Arab countries’ participation, 86% expressed dissatisfaction with Saudi performance, 80% with Egyptian performance, and 72% with Jordanian performance. 67% expects Hamas to emerge victorious in this war.
Conclusion:
It is clear that the idea of Arab forces participating in the upcoming arrangements faces significant complications, making it unlikely, at least for now. The current Israeli government, under Netanyahu’s leadership, remains hesitant to commit to Gaza’s future and prefers to retain control.
The Palestinian resistance, led by Hamas, is demonstrating significant strength on the ground and opposes any Arab intervention aligned with Israeli interests. There is a widespread Palestinian agreement that the future of GS is an internal Palestinian issue. Moreover, there is overwhelming popular support for Hamas and its resistance agenda, rejecting Arab intervention aimed at quelling the resistance and undermining it, as well as dismissing the PA in Ramallah in its perceived weak form.
The participation of Arab forces remains hypothetical, contingent on the “defeat of Hamas” as envisioned by normalization proponents. However, ground realities demonstrate the resistance’s enduring capacity to persist indefinitely and even dictate terms ultimately.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 1/8/2024
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