Academic Paper: Security Theory in the Israeli Settler Colonial System Background, Transformations, and Foundations (Arabic)

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Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations has published an academic paper entitled “Security Theory in the Israeli Settler Colonial System Background, Transformations, and Foundations,” by Ashraf Bader.

In his paper, Badr aims to analyze the Israeli security doctrine and its latest developments. First, he reviews related literature and primary sources, starting with Ze’ev Jabotisnky’s Iron Wall doctrine, dated before the establishment of Israel. He discusses David Ben-Gurion’s national security doctrine, formulated in the 1950s, which was based on “three pillars,” deterrence, early warning, and military decision. It considered the reserve forces fundamental for Israel’s security. Afterwards, in 2006, the Committee for Formulating Israel’s National Security Doctrine, headed by Dan Meridor, submitted its report, and in 2018, the Israeli Army Strategy of 2018 was written. In 2019, Chief of General Staff Gadi Eisenkot presented the Guidelines for Israel’s National Security Strategy, and lately Major General Yaakov Amidror authored a new National Security Doctrine for Israel.

The study reviews and analyzes primary sources that most of the published literature did not address. It argues that due to the effectiveness of the resistance and the influence of regional powers, there have been changes and transformations in the Israeli security theory, hence, new and various security strategies and plans were adopted, based on strengthening deterrence. Furthermore, it argues that internal contradictions weaken the prevailing assumption that the settler colonial system is a fixed structure. The study asserts that settler colonialism is a changing process and an evolving trajectory, subject to internal and external factors and internal contradictions, however, it always seeks to control.

Badr points out that settler colonialism and national security are related to the Israeli security theory. The effectiveness of resistance and the change from fighting regular armies to irregular armies have led to changes in the victory doctrine, despite the qualitative superiority of the Israeli forces.

The researcher explains that the Israeli army adopted strategies that contribute to having sufficient victories, not decisive ones, hence achieving deterrence; such as the Inter-War Campaigns doctrine, Mowing the Grass strategy and the Dahiya doctrine. The army has also added other defense tools like the Iron Dome, building shelters and building cyber defense capabilities.

Badr explains that the Dahiya Doctrine was not only for deterrence, or to restore eroded one, but rather due to weak intelligence and weak early warning, and the inability of the Israeli security forces to provide accurate information about the resistance, which reduces the target bank for the Israeli Air Force.

He adds that the strategic security environment of Israel has changed whether externally with the Arab Spring uprisings or normalization agreements, or internally with the increasing social, economic, political and internal cracks. That’s why Gadi Eisenkot mentioned the importance of social resilience as basis of national security, while Dan Meridor recommended the strengthening of the standing Israeli army and maintaining the “people’s army” model and strengthening the feeling of security among the population. This way the gap between the religious and the secular would be bridged, and it would be in response to calls for an “equal burden” between the religious who do not serve in the army, and the secular who bear the burden of conscription.

The study concludes that the Israeli settler colonial system is governed by the logic of control, and the amendments of Israel’s security doctrine is to achieve deterrence, minimize threats, postpone conflicts, adopt the offensive military concept, influence the balance of power in the region, and strengthen the strategic position of Israel.