Summary
The US significantly bolstered its partnership with Israel during its operations in the Gaza Strip (GS), extending comprehensive military, political, media and financial support. This support hindered international efforts aimed at halting the war or condemning the occupation. The US views Israel as pivotal to its strategy in the Arab region, prioritizing the restoration of its deterrent capabilities and its functional role, which suffered a blow during Operation al-Aqsa flood.
The US administration and the Netanyahu government have several tactical differences, yet they align strategically on key points. Most notably, they both advocate for ensuring that GS doesn’t pose a threat to Israel in the future and that Hamas and other resistance forces should not regain control of the region.
This strategic assessment outlines three potential scenarios for US involvement in the GS war until the year’s end. It suggests that the strength, determination and steadfastness of the resistance movement may influence the US stance, potentially leading to continued support for Israeli aggression in the coming months, with the aim of securing the Gaza envelope by year-end. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the resistance on the ground will be pivotal in determining whether the US position shifts towards a more pragmatic approach or retreats altogether.
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This strategic assessment is the culmination of a panel discussion held by al-Zaytouna Centre on 27/3/2024, featuring the insights of ten experts specializing in Palestinian and US affairs, international relations and futures studies. The text was written by ‘Atef al-Jolani and edited by Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh. |
Introduction
Over the past six months, the United States has actively engaged in overseeing and closely monitoring Operation al-Aqsa Flood, emerging as a significant partner to Israel in its aggressive actions against GS. Despite being preoccupied with managing the confrontation with Russia in Ukraine and competing with China, the US found itself compelled to intensify its involvement in the conflicts within the region due to perceived threats to the regional security, military and economic arrangements it had been establishing.
While there were some disparities in positions between the administration of US President Joe Biden and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu, these primarily revolved around the specific tactics employed during the war rather than the overarching objectives, which enjoyed consensus between the two sides. Moreover, these discrepancies were largely temporary and, in certain instances, assumed a personal dimension between President Biden and Netanyahu, along with his more extremist allies in the government coalition, rather than representing fundamental divergences between the US and Israel.
What determinants influence US policy decisions that govern states’ behavior and attitudes toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and what are the expected near-future trends in US behavior until the end of this year, coinciding with the US elections?
First: US Response to the War
The US position and actions regarding the war on GS can be summarized as follows:
1. Offering complete and unwavering support to Israel, providing all necessary resources for the continuation of the war politically, militarily and economically, and aligning with Israel’s stated war goals.
2. Fully embracing Israel’s narrative, giving the green light for the initiation and prolongation of the war, justifying Israeli actions in GS, denying accusations of war crimes, genocide or violations of international humanitarian law, and challenging any allegations made against Israel in this regard.
3. Deploying warships to affirm full support for Israel, deter direct intervention by Iran, discourage regional allies from fully involving themselves, give Israel time to pursue its objectives in Gaza, and prevent the conflict from escalating into a broader regional confrontation.
4. Shielding Israel from condemnation and blocking Security Council resolutions that call for condemning Israel and committing to a lasting ceasefire; the US has thwarted three such resolutions.
5. Exerting pressure on the Palestinian Authority (PA) to make significant changes aligned with Israeli-US standards, aimed at rehabilitating it for eventual control over Gaza post-war.
6. Encouraging Arab and Muslim countries, as well as the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), to avoid issuing strong political resolutions against the war, and persuading various Arab parties to consider participating in future security arrangements in GS.
7. Repeatedly urging Israel to permit humanitarian aid into GS, refrain from targeting civilians and minimize civilian casualties, while refraining from direct criticism of Israel’s crimes against civilians and infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, mosques and churches, facilitated by US weapons and ammunition.
8. Carrying out occasional airdrops of aid in GS to enhance the humanitarian perception of the US, and initiating plans to construct a pier off the Gaza coast to facilitate aid delivery.
9. Advocating for a political resolution to the conflict based on the two-state solution, despite acknowledging the slim prospects for success due to Israel’s staunch opposition to a Palestinian state, as evidenced by resolutions passed in the Israeli Knesset.
10. Persisting in efforts to advance Saudi-Israeli normalization, addressing challenges arising from the crisis of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and seeking to negotiate a deal satisfying Saudi demands, including a joint defense agreement with the US, provision of a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes, and commitment to work towards establishing a Palestinian state within the framework of a two-state solution vision.
Second: Areas of Agreement and Disagreement Between Israel and the US
Since the start of the war, the US has been closely supporting Israel’s objectives, mainly aiming for a military victory, neutralizing Palestinian resistance to prevent future threats to Israeli security, securing the release of Israeli captives held by Palestinian resistance, reshaping the political landscape in GS and ending Hamas control and rule there.
However, there have been disagreements between the two sides regarding certain aspects of managing the conflict. Officials within the US administration and the Democratic Party have criticized the actions of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government, as well as the leaders of the far-right in Israel. President Biden notably stated that Netanyahu is “hurting Israel more than helping Israel,” particularly criticizing his handling of the war on GS. Additionally, Democratic Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer criticized Netanyahu during a Senate speech on 14/3/2024, calling him a “major obstacle to peace… who has all too frequently bowed to the demands of extremists,” adding that “the Netanyahu coalition no longer fits the needs of Israel after October 7” and that five months into this conflict, he believes that “a new election is the only way to allow for a healthy and open decision-making process about the future of Israel.”
Several points of contention between the US administration and the Netanyahu government have emerged, with the most significant ones being:
1. Disagreement over the administration of the GS post-war: The US administration favored a revitalized PA to govern GS, considering it the most qualified Palestinian party for the task. It also supported the idea of deploying an Arab security force to maintain security in the area. However, the Netanyahu government opposed any future role for the PA in Gaza’s affairs and aimed to sideline it. Instead, a plan was put forth to establish a local governance system for GS, involving tribal leaders from Gaza. Security officials held meetings with several of these elders, but their efforts were unsuccessful as they insisted that any new management plan for the Strip must be approved by the Gaza administration led by Hamas.
2. Dispute arises over the volume of aid entering GS. The US administration continues to urge Israel to address the humanitarian issue and allow more aid into GS. However, Israel has practically ignored these appeals, persisting in its policy of starvation by withholding aid and preventing its entry. This tactic aims to exert pressure on the resistance, politically blackmail it, and stir up opposition from the public in GS.
3. Disagreement over the extent of military operations in GS and the need to transition to a third phase with fewer operations to reduce civilian casualties. The Israeli side procrastinated for several weeks before advancing to this stage, and despite a decrease in operations and casualties, Israel continued its harsh actions, targeting hospitals, relief teams and aid workers. All without criticism or pressure from the US administration to halt these atrocities. This failure to condemn Israel’s actions raises doubts about the sincerity of the stated US position and fuels a perception that US statements lack seriousness, merely aiming to mitigate losses resulting from its clear bias towards Israel. This is evidenced by the selective portrayal of certain media positions in favor of the US narrative.
4. Disagreement regarding the management of the captive and prisoner exchange issue and the negotiation of partial agreements to secure the release of more Israeli captives persists. Netanyahu’s actions and stances did not demonstrate a willingness to reach a new agreement for releasing Israeli captives in exchange for the proposed six-week ceasefire. He maintained hardline positions that hindered progress on the deal and declined to empower Israeli negotiating teams with broader negotiation authority. On the contrary, the US side was eager to finalize the agreement and exerted pressure on Qatari and Egyptian mediators to persist in their efforts.
5. The dispute between the two sides revolves around Israel’s reoccupation of GS and its prolonged presence there. The US administration has voiced its opposition to the scenarios proposed by the Netanyahu government regarding this matter. However, it does not oppose a temporary Israeli presence aimed at achieving the objectives of the war, as long as it does not escalate into a complete reoccupation of the Strip.
6. Disagreement over the scale and timing of a significant military offensive in the Rafah area. The Netanyahu government expressed eagerness and insistence on launching the attack, arguing that it would cripple Hamas’s military capabilities and achieve the war’s objectives. It warned that failing to do so would result in Hamas emerging victorious in the war. However, the US administration sought to delay the offensive, insisting that Israel provide assurances to minimize civilian casualties in Rafah, given its dense population. It also proposed alternative strategies to target Hamas, the resistance and its leaders while avoiding the potential significant consequences of a large-scale assault.
7. Disagreement persists regarding the duration of the war. While Netanyahu insists on prolonging the conflict indefinitely until achieving complete victory and meeting all objectives, the Biden administration increasingly believes that Netanyahu’s personal considerations and his apprehension of being held accountable for the failure of the October 7 offensive are driving him to prolong the war, irrespective of the feasibility of attaining its goals. Recently, a slight shift in the US stance towards the idea of achieving a permanent ceasefire has been observed. The US-proposed resolution, rejected by Russia, China and Algeria on 22/3/2024, emphasized “the imperative of an immediate and sustained ceasefire,” departing from previous US rhetoric which advocated for a temporary ceasefire |”as soon as practicable.”
8. Disagreement persists over the arming of settlers in the West Bank (WB) and their continued assaults on Palestinians. Despite criticism from the US administration and Western governments, the Netanyahu government, led by the extremist Internal Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, remains steadfast in its plans to arm more settlers and shield them from accountability for their actions in the region. In February and March 2024, the US Treasury Department enacted sanctions against several settlers in WB, viewing their actions as “a serious threat to the peace, security, and stability” of the region.
9. The explicit opposition voiced against the proposal to forcibly relocate Palestinians from GS. The Israeli government initially pursued plans for such relocation early in the war, but these were hindered by Egyptian refusal and the closure of the Rafah crossing. Initially, the US did not take an explicit stance against Israeli plans for forced displacement. However, in response to Egyptian and Jordanian opposition to displacement, as well as Arab and Muslim countries’ support for this stance, US rhetoric has shifted towards opposing forced displacement plans. It’s important to note that this opposition does not extend to Israel’s concept of voluntary displacement.
Third: Determinants of US War Policy
The US stance regarding the conflict in GS was shaped by a combination of enduring strategic determinants and evolving immediate circumstances tied to the progression of the war and its impact on US interests and those of the Democratic Party.
1. Strategic Determinants
These are the determinants that have shaped US approaches and stances towards Israel, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the region over past decades, predating Operation al-Aqsa Flood. These determinants are anticipated to persist in influencing US policies in the foreseeable future. Among the most significant are:
a. The US aims to maintain its unique position and hegemony in the region, safeguarding its influence and preventing any foreign superpower from challenging its interests in the Middle East—an area it deems vital and crucial for its strategic objectives.
b. Additionally, the US seeks to retain dominance over the oil trade and its supply zones in the Arab region, ensuring they remain impervious to the influence of rival powers. This includes stipulating that oil transactions are conducted in dollars, thereby channeling dollar interest rates back into the US economy. With Arab investments in the US economy totaling around $1.7 trillion, these nations often encounter restrictions on withdrawing significant amounts of money without US approval.
c. Ensuring Israel’s security and protection, maintaining its qualitative military superiority over Arab countries, and promoting normalization between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries remain steadfast strategic objectives, unaffected by changes in US administrations or political fluctuations. The US continues to provide Israel with $3.8 billion in annual aid and grants it unrestricted access to US military technology.
d. Preventing the rise of local forces that pose a threat to US interests, whether they are Arab or Muslim entities, movements or countries, remains a consistent strategic goal. Consequently, restraining Iran and containing any faction advocating for liberation and independence persist as key aspects of US policy in the region.
e. Maintaining US military bases in the region, with at least 63 US military bases spread across 12 Arab countries.
f. Ensuring the ongoing sale of weapons and technology to US allies in the region.
In addition to these strategic determinants shaping the current US administration’s approach to the GS war and impacting successive administrations’ stances towards Israel and the Palestine issue, there exists another crucial element tied to the active presence of Jewish groups in the US, a robust and influential Israel lobby, sympathetic media outlets, and pro-Israel businessmen wielding considerable influence in the economy and financing electoral campaigns. This determinant has consistently played a significant role in shaping US policy regarding the GS conflict and all matters pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
2. Dynamic and Immediate Determinants
These are transient determinants and motivations linked to shifts in the US domestic landscape and changes in the regional and international arenas. They influence the handling of the US stance on the war, with the most significant ones being:
a. The looming pressure of the November 2024 US elections and the concerning signals arising within the Democratic Party from the punitive voting during the party’s presidential candidate selection process. In Michigan alone, more than 100 thousand voters cast their ballots as “uncommitted,” with tens of thousands doing so in numerous swing states—whose number has risen from 6 to 8 in recent elections, as evident in the Democratic Party primaries. This occurs amidst fierce competition from Republican candidate Donald Trump, who holds leads in 7 states that favored him. Notably, the Palestine issue has emerged as a significant domestic electoral concern in the US for the first time. Despite ongoing discussions, most opinion polls suggest Biden may face challenges in the upcoming presidential election in terms of electoral votes, with the Democrats also facing potential losses in congressional elections.
b. The US image among the Arab and Muslim populace has suffered due to its perceived bias and unwavering support for Israeli aggression against GS, leading many to view it as complicit in the genocidal acts perpetrated there. This bias has not only tarnished the US reputation but has also undermined Western values of civilization and its professed ideals of freedom, human rights and the rights of women and children, which it has championed for decades.
c. US concerns about exhaustion from prolonged and open-ended wars, compounded by the ongoing confrontation in Ukraine, have been exacerbated by Russia’s exploitation of US distractions surrounding the Gaza conflict. This has allowed Russia to intensify its assaults against Ukrainian forces and make military gains on multiple fronts.
d. US aim to restore stability in the region, following the disruption caused by the Gaza war, which undermined the US strategy of de-escalation and minimizing involvement in regional armed conflicts.
e. The intention to contain the confrontation in GS between the Palestinian resistance and Israeli forces, coupled with concerns about the escalation of the conflict and the risk of being dragged into an undesired regional war.
f. The escalation of operations by the Yemeni Ansar Allah group targeting ships bound for Israel in the Red Sea has heightened concerns over navigation safety. These actions have disrupted international trade, posed threats to US and Western interests, and impacted Israel. Calls for airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen failed to deter their continued maritime attacks.
g. Internal divisions within the Democratic Party have become apparent, particularly in the contrast between President Biden and the progressive wing of the party, alongside young Democrats who are increasingly critical of Israeli policies.
Criticism within the party of Biden’s pro-Israel stance, which appears to overlook international humanitarian law and Palestinian rights, has surged. Pressure from the party’s base has intensified, urging a reassessment of the administration’s positions on the conflict. A March 2024 Gallup poll revealed a significant shift, marking the first time a majority of Democratic constituents sympathized more with Palestinians than with Israel. Regarding AIPAC’s role in the US, opposition within the Democratic Party to these groups and their involvement in US political affairs is mounting. Approximately 25 advocacy groups or progressive organizations within the party oppose such interference.
h. The decision-making corridors of the US National Security Council remain heavily influenced by a singular vision, prioritizing the fulfillment of Israeli objectives while suppressing any potential victory for Palestinian resistance. The Republican Party consistently aligns itself with Israeli positions, with 82% of current Congress members endorsing Israel’s actions in the Gaza war and opposing ceasefire initiatives.
i. Increasingly, the US expresses apprehension towards the policies of Netanyahu and the extremists within his government coalition, recognizing the growing political, societal and ideological divisions that threaten Israeli unity. The US administration is further troubled by Netanyahu’s defiance of US positions and his disregard for both US interests and those of the Democratic Party.
j. The increasing influence of the Christian Zionist movement in the US, comprising tens of millions of Americans who endorse Israel for religious reasons. Primarily aligned with the Republican Party, they form a significant portion of its electoral support base.
k. American apprehension regarding the potential ramifications of prolonged warfare on the stability of certain regional governments allied with the US. This stems from mounting public discontent with the perceived ineffectiveness of these governments in addressing Israeli war atrocities, posing a threat to their stability.
Fourth: Future US War Position Scenarios
Considering the strategic determinants and the factors influencing the US administration’s stance, along with the interests of the Democratic Party leading up to the elections, several potential scenarios for the evolution of the US position on the GS war until the end of the year emerge:
First Scenario: The US will likely maintain its support for the prolonged continuation of the war until the end of the year. It may provide extensive political, military and economic assistance to Israel without applying significant pressure to alter the trajectory or duration of the conflict.
Second Scenario: The US escalates its involvement in the conflict, taking a more active role due to the regional expansion of the war involving other parties.
Third Scenario: The US backs initiatives for a lasting ceasefire, aiming to restore stability in the region and pave the path for Saudi-Israeli normalization.
Balancing Between Scenarios
1. The likelihood of success in the first scenario, advocating for the prolonged continuation of the war, appears substantial given the significant influence of strategic factors on the US stance, coupled with the administration’s capacity to manage and mitigate the effects of certain immediate factors.
This scenario presents an opportunity to fulfill the objectives of the GS war and pave the path for undermining Iran and diminishing its regional allies. The US’ initiation of a relief port off the Gaza coast, with an estimated completion time of about two months (following the arrival of logistical support vessels), suggests preparedness to engage in a protracted conflict in GS, potentially spanning several months. This initiative may transcend mere temporary measures linked to the conflict’s conclusion and evolve into a long-term strategic positioning. It could potentially supplant the Rafah crossing to exert pressure on Egyptian policies, serve as an outlet for Palestinian displacement from the Strip, or serve as a military and logistical instrument facilitating Israel’s strategic repositioning in the northern GS.
However, this scenario encounters several challenges that impede its likelihood of achieving the US and Israeli objectives for the war. The most significant obstacles include:
• The formidable task of defeating and disarming the Palestinian resistance, given its resilience and capacity to sustain the fight six months into the conflict.
• The challenge of establishing an alternative governing authority in GS, capable of replicating the security coordination model seen in WB. This is compounded by the loss of popular support for the existing PA and Israel’s failure to devise a viable local replacement.
• The uncompromising stance of the Netanyahu government, which hampers efforts to initiate a political process aligned with the two-state solution. This reluctance diminishes the prospects of persuading Arab countries to engage in security arrangements for the future of the GS post-war.
• Escalating international pressure to cease hostilities and address the humanitarian crisis in GS.
2. The likelihood of the second scenario, involving US engagement in a broad regional confrontation, appears less probable compared to other potential outcomes based on current indicators. The US, primarily focused on monitoring the Russian war in Ukraine and managing its rivalry with China, seems disinclined to broaden the scope of conflict and deepen its involvement, as this would entail additional strains not aligned with US interests. Nonetheless, the US reluctance to expand the theater of war does not necessarily preclude such escalation, especially considering the divergence between US calculations and those of the Netanyahu government. The Netanyahu administration has shown increased boldness in contradicting directives from the Biden administration and prioritizing Israeli considerations.
3. The likelihood of the third scenario is increasing, evidenced by growing indications of a gradual and steady shift in the US administration’s willingness to entertain the idea of a permanent ceasefire in GS. This is contingent upon ensuring the realization of US and Israeli objectives, including the cessation of Hamas’s rule, establishment of acceptable arrangements for the future governance of the Strip, and prevention of potential threats to Israeli security. A notable signal of the relative shift in the US stance was its abstention in the Security Council regarding the draft resolution proposed by the ten non-permanent members, which demanded “an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan respected by all parties leading to a lasting sustainable ceasefire.”
This scenario aligns with the US’s ambition to construct a new regional order, reshape the region, and navigate its rivalry with China by promoting normalization and incorporating Israel into the regional framework. This approach emphasizes economic dimensions, such as the establishment of an economic corridor stretching from New Delhi through regional countries to Europe, intended to compete with Chinese supply chains. This strategy aims to maintain US hegemony over the region and assert its influence through various regional proxies, with Israel positioned as the cornerstone and hub of the regional system.
From the aforementioned analysis, it becomes apparent that the US may incline towards supporting either a prolonged Israeli offensive on GS or endorsing a permanent ceasefire that aligns with US objectives. Concurrently, there’s a likelihood that the US will strive to evade the prospect of escalating regional conflict, thereby avoiding heightened involvement in regional crises.
Fifth: Prospects for Future Courses of Action by the US Administration
Given the current behavior of the US administration and the evolving strategic and immediate factors influencing its stance on the war, the following options and potential future directions of the US position leading up to the year-end elections are probable:
1. Despite the longstanding strategic alliance between the US and Israel, and the ongoing US support for Gaza war objectives, along with its commitment to safeguarding Israel and its interests, it is probable that the disagreement and gradual escalation between the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government will persist. This is primarily due to the high costs associated with Netanyahu’s policies and the influence of the Israeli right on the Democratic Party and its electoral interests. This dynamic is exacerbated by the divergence between the strategic and geopolitical priorities of the US and the political and electoral considerations of the Democratic Party, coupled with the increasing US interventions in Israeli affairs and Israeli influence on US domestic politics.
In terms of geopolitical calculations, the security and military setback experienced by Israel on 7/10/2023 has sparked initial discussions, which could potentially amplify over time, regarding the US perception of Israel’s strength. There is a growing sentiment that Israel may not be as robust as previously believed, potentially posing a strategic burden on US interests. Rather than effectively fulfilling its role in safeguarding US interests in the region, Israel has increasingly relied on substantial and ongoing political, military and economic assistance from the US to counter existential threats.
There are growing indications of a divergence between US geopolitical interests and the electoral calculations and agendas of President Biden and the Democratic Party. This tension is exacerbated by the intransigence of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his far-right coalition. The issue isn’t about the US forsaking Israel but rather attempting to distinguish Netanyahu’s policies from those of Israel. This stance aligns with the schism within the US Jewish community regarding Netanyahu’s administration, as well as the internal divisions within Israel over his government’s political and ideological directions.
Regarding the societal shift in the US, particularly among American youth, and the decline in support for Israel from 64% to 38% in 20232024, it appears that this decline may not be merely a temporary response to the events of the GS war. The erosion of Israel’s image, cultivated over 75 years, is unlikely to be swiftly reversed. Rebuilding this image, especially among young Americans, may prove to be a formidable challenge.
2. In parallel with ongoing efforts to contain and isolate Iran, the next phase is expected to see heightened US pressure on resistance movements aimed at weakening and dismantling them across all levels. Simultaneously, there will likely be a concerted effort to reshape Arab consciousness, exacerbating sub-issues such as sectarian and ethnic conflicts to destabilize the region and alleviate pressure on Israel.
3. It is probable that the US will persist in its efforts to assert influence in the region and thwart attempts by Russia and China to exploit the confrontation to bolster their own presence. This may involve maintaining control over initiatives aimed at resolving the ongoing crisis.
4. The US is anticipated to prioritize restoring calm and de-escalating tensions in the region. This approach aims to prevent the escalation of conflicts on multiple fronts, enabling it to focus on its commitments in Ukraine and strategic competition with China. Additionally, there’s a concerted effort to prevent the Gaza war from spiraling into a broader regional confrontation. This is particularly crucial given concerns about Prime Minister Netanyahu’s inclination towards prolonging and expanding the conflict, potentially dragging the US into a direct confrontation with Iran.
5. The US is expected to persist in its Palestinian and Arab initiatives in the foreseeable future to facilitate a shift in the political landscape of GS, aiming to sideline Hamas from its governance in the post-conflict era. This may involve bolstering the PA within the Strip and persuading Arab stakeholders, potentially including Turkey, to engage in forthcoming security arrangements.
6. The US administration is poised to persist in its endeavors to bolster Arab-Israeli normalization, particularly Saudi-Israeli normalization, in the upcoming period. Efforts will likely focus on dismantling barriers obstructing this path.
7. It is probable that the US administration will persist in embracing a media narrative that demonstrates concern for humanitarian issues and adherence to international humanitarian law. This may entail refraining from targeting civilians in GS to mitigate adverse impacts on the US’s global and regional perception. Such actions aim to prevent shouldering full responsibility for Israeli actions and policies.
Sixth: Recommendations
In anticipation of the forthcoming evolution in the US administration’s approach to the GS conflict, the following recommendations are proposed:
1. Applying maximum pressure on the US to sway its stance on the war, recognizing its pivotal role and significant influence in shaping the conflict’s trajectory. Leveraging various factors that are influencing the position of the Democratic administration both domestically and internationally, especially amidst the election period.
2. Taking a balanced approach to understanding US behavior towards the war and predicting its future directions is crucial. It’s important to avoid exaggerating expectations and overestimating the impact of differences between the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government on the war’s course or US policy options. Also, we shouldn’t ignore the influence of current variables on the Biden administration’s behavior due to electoral and political interests, and while immediate political factors are easier to influence, historical and strategic determinants pose greater challenges.
3. Continuing to bolster the resistance and fortify the steadfastness of its popular support, as this remains the most influential factor in shaping the course of the war and influencing the positions of regional and international parties involved in the conflict.
The Arabic version of this Assessment was published on 8/4/2024 
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