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By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).


Muslims comprise approximately 24.9% of the world’s population, totaling about 1.907 billion people. They are dispersed across 48 countries with a Muslim “majority,” while most countries globally harbor Islamic minorities. In some cases, such as India, these minorities surpass the populations of many Muslim-majority countries; in India, for instance, Muslims number around 211 million, constituting only 14% of the total population.[2] Among the notable activities of these significant minorities in India are the protests held by the Jamia Millia Islamia University in support of Palestine.[3]  The Southeast Asian and Pacific region hosts the largest share of Muslims, accounting for about 59.7% of the global Muslim population.[4] The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) comprises 57 member states, including 48 countries with Muslim-majority populations.

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The ten most populous Muslim countries, excluding those in the Arab world, are:

Table 1: Muslim Population of the 10 Largest Non-Arab Countries with a Majority Muslim Population[5]

(majority Muslim population)
“Muslim” population in millions (2021 census)
Indonesia 229.6
Pakistan 200.5
Bangladesh 153
Nigeria 104.7
Iran 80.9
Turkey 79.1
Afghanistan 40.6
Uzbekistan 30.8
Malaysia 22.1
Niger 21.7

The total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of OIC countries amounts to about 8% of the global GDP, and the non-oil GDP of the Muslim world is 4% of the world GDP.[6]

First: Muslim Countries and Societies’ Attitudes Towards Developments in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Operation al-Aqsa Flood

When Soviet forces intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979, Arab and Muslim countries responded from an Islamic perspective. They launched extensive media campaigns, called for volunteers to fight against the Soviet forces, and established popular and official donation funds to support the “mujahideen of Afghanistan.” This stance aligned with the US position, which aimed to defeat the Soviets.

However, the Islamic reaction to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath does not parallel the reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, despite the Islamic significance of Jerusalem. The main difference between these two situations appears to be the US position. In the case of Afghanistan, Washington sought to mobilize forces theoretically affiliated with Islamic movements and framed the conflict as an attack on the Islamic religious system. In contrast, the US stance on Palestine is entirely different.

According to some estimates, around 35 thousand Muslim volunteers joined the fighters in Afghanistan, with financial donations exceeding $400 million annually from the beginning of the invasion until 1989. This is in addition to widespread media support.[7] To emphasize this difference, it is enough to follow the Muslim countries’ reactions during Operation al-Aqsa Flood through the following points:

Official Policies of Non-Arab Muslim Countries

Although the OIC, formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference, was established in response to the Palestine issue, specifically the 1969 arson attack on al-Aqsa Mosque by a Zionist extremist, the level of Islamic interaction in OIC countries regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood raises questions about the influence and effectiveness of Islamic movements in these countries towards the Palestine issue, with all its religious significance.

The OIC’s role in addressing the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood has been limited to appeals and condemnations of Israeli actions in its statements and meetings of foreign ministers from member states, without implementing significant practical measures commensurate with the severity of Israeli violence and the sacredness and centrality of the Palestine issue, even in the literature of most of these countries. This brings to mind that out of the 57 Muslim countries in the OIC, only 10 non-Arab Muslim countries do not recognize Israel (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Niger and Pakistan). In contrast, 23 non-Arab Muslim countries recognize Israel. Thus, the recognition of Israel by official Muslim countries (both Arab and non-Arab) includes 23 non-Arab Muslim countries and 6 Arab countries,[8] amounting to 50.9% of the OIC membership. This is compared to the international recognition of Israel, which is about 85% of the total number of countries worldwide that are members of the United Nations (UN).[9] It is important to note that during the first three months of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Net favorability—the percentage of people viewing Israel positively after subtracting the percentage viewing it negatively—dropped globally by an average of 18.5 percentage points, decreasing in 42 out of the 43 countries polled. The US remains the only rich country that still had net positive views of Israel. Net favorability dropped just 2.2 percentage points.[10] These indicators raise the question: Why is the reaction from Muslim countries still substandard?

The OIC statements following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, issued in November 2023 in Saudi Arabia and May 2024 in Gambia, included calls for a ceasefire, the provision of aid and condemnation of genocide by Israel. However, these statements do not include any practical measures against Israel, such as cutting diplomatic relations or a clear pledge to provide specific “informal assistance” to the Palestinian people.[11]

If we consider the official positions of non-Arab Muslim countries in general, these countries can be divided into six regions:

• Southeast Asia and the Pacific (including five countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Maldives and some researchers include Bangladesh in this group)

• Central Asian countries (six countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan)

• West Asian countries (Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey)

• Non-Arab Muslim African countries that are OIC members (17 countries: Nigeria, Uganda, Mozambique, Niger, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Chad, Senegal, Guinea, Benin, Togo, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Gabon and Mali)

• The Latin American region includes Guyana (7% of its population is Muslim) and Suriname (14% Muslim), which are OIC members.

• Balkan countries (Albania).[12]

Some Muslim-majority countries can be added, that are not OIC members, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (an observer to the OIC) and Kosovo, where both maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel. Notably, Kosovo was among the first countries to move its embassy to Jerusalem. Additionally, there appears to be a trend in the Kosovar government seeking to join the OIC.[13]

When examining these Muslim-majority geopolitical regions, a notable disparity emerges in political perspectives regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath. In Southeast Asia, surveys conducted in this area reveal that 46.5% of Asean respondents perceive the Israel-Hamas conflict the region’s top geopolitical concerns. This percentage surpasses the proportion of respondents who prioritize the South China Sea crisis or the Russia-Ukraine war, despite the latter two being pressing issues with ramifications in Southeast Asia. However, this also implies that the Muslim community in this region expresses concerns that seem to outweigh the Arab-Israeli conflict by more than 54%, despite its inherent importance.[14]

As for Bangladesh, considered by some as part of this region, we find that the official stance emphasizes a pro-Palestinian position. However, the government’s removal at the end of 2020 of a phrase on Bangladeshi passports stating, “This passport is valid for all countries of the world, except for Israel,” has raised questions about the implications of this change. This is especially noteworthy since subsequent articles in the Bangladeshi media have suggested there may be no harm in recognizing Israel.[15]

In general, the official positions of non-Arab Muslim countries can be categorized into three:[16]

• Countries that have expressed full support for the Palestinian side (such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Brunei, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Mali, and Niger, etc.). Some, like Chad, recalled their ambassadors from Israel, while Bangladesh joined other countries in filing a case in the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Israel for genocide.

• Countries aligned more closely with Israel’s position: This alignment is notably observed in the stances of Muslim countries in Central Asia. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan stand out as the most supportive in this regard, whereas Tajikistan opted not to condemn Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and Uzbekistan leaned towards advocating for de-escalation. It’s worth noting that all countries in this region maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, making them more aligned with Israeli positions compared to other regions.

• Countries endeavoring to maintain equilibrium between opposing sides have been observed, with certain African countries, notably Nigeria, generally embracing this stance. Another notable occurrence was Turkey’s announcement that “Export and import transactions related to Israel have been stopped, covering all products,” knowing that their trade volume was $6.8 billion in 2023. This is particularly significant considering Turkey’s position as Israel’s primary trading partner in the Middle East. Furthermore, the ongoing diplomatic relations between the two countries, alongside reports of Turkey facilitating oil shipments to Israeli ports from Central Asia or Iraqi Kurdistan, amplify the importance of this decision.[17]

Second: Trends in Muslim Public Opinion and Public Protests

Numerous countries worldwide, particularly in the West, experienced a notable surge in anti-Israel protests following Operation al-Aqsa Flood. These protests primarily highlighted concerns over civilian casualties, infrastructure destruction and the hindrance of aid entry into Gaza Strip (GS). A comprehensive analysis of these protests unequivocally indicates a rise in support for Palestine, as illustrated in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Comparative Analysis of Protests Worldwide: Pro-Palestine versus Pro-Israel, October 2023–April 2024[18]

Month Oct 2023 Nov 2023  Dec 2023  Jan 2024 Feb 2024 March 2024 April 2024
Pro-Palestine 4,000 3,116 1,773 1,505 1,505 1,773 1,281
Pro-Israel 402 186 29 36 7 7 13
Pro-Israel to Pro-Palestine % 10.05 5.9 1.6 2.3 0.46 0.39 1

When comparing the overall monthly average of protests, it becomes evident that there is a significant disparity. Globally, there are an average of 2,133 pro-Palestine protests compared to just 97 pro-Israel ones. When specifically examining the numbers in Turkey (1,082 protests) and Iran (895 protests) and contrasting them with other Muslim countries like those in Central Asia or Southeast Asia, we find that the monthly average in these regions ranges from 0 to 3 protests since the beginning of the conflict. It’s worth noting that based on the monthly average, the average global percentage of pro-Israel protests to pro-Palestine ones stands at only 3.10%.[19] Furthermore, in universities, the anti-Israeli events average around 97 per month.[20] However, such proportions are notably absent in most non-Arab Muslim countries.

A comparison of global and Muslim societies’ interactions, gauged through mass demonstrations in the latest available data, reveals intriguing patterns. Until the conclusion of April 2024, a total of 14,931 pro-Palestine protests have been documented worldwide. Notably, 8,762 of these occurred in four Muslim and Arab countries: Yemen, Morocco, Turkey and Iran. Conversely, protests in other Muslim countries are largely absent, particularly in Central Asian Muslim countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, where very few protests occurred. Kyrgyzstan, whose official stance tends to favor Israel, saw limited participation in protests. Surprisingly, even in Azerbaijan, protests leaned in favor of Israel. The combined number of protests in “non-Arab Muslim” countries until April 2024 did not exceed thirty.[21]

In Southeast Asia, protests were marked by small turnouts and limited participation, except for a few notable ones. However, these protests occurred infrequently, such as in Indonesia (the world’s most populous Muslim country) and Malaysia, where a decision was made to prevent Israeli ships from docking in ports, and a symbolic public engagement in Brunei. In non-Arab Muslim Africa, Nigeria boasts the largest Muslim population (comprising over one hundred million Muslims, approximately 50–52% of the total population). Yet, the number of protests remained limited, with instances of clashes between Nigerian security forces and pro-Palestine demonstrators. Senegal witnessed only a few small-scale protests. Meanwhile, in Asia (excluding Turkey and Iran), Pakistan saw approximately five protests, Bangladesh three, and Afghanistan three.[22]

Moreover, non-Arab Muslim movements and organizations have also varied in their political discourse towards Operation al-Aqsa Flood. While the Pakistani Taliban, the Indonesian Muhammadiyah Movement and the Pakistani Student Association expressed their full support for the operation, ISIS (a hybrid Islamic movement in terms of national affiliation) focused in its statements on criticizing Hamas for its focus on the Palestine issue on the one hand and its relations with Iran on the other, while Uyghur Islamic organizations (the Muslim minority in China) differed from the rest of the movements, as some of these organizations (such as the Uyghur Human Rights Project and the World Uyghur Congress) described the operation as “horrific attacks by Hamas against Israeli civilians.”[23]

Furthermore, when analyzing the stances of non-Arab Muslim countries and societies, three notable points emerge:[24]

• Israel satisfies 62% of its oil requirements from two Muslim countries: Kazakhstan (93 thousand barrels per day) and Azerbaijan (45 thousand barrels per day), totaling 138 thousand barrels per day.

• The volume of Israel’s merchandise trade with “non-Arab” Muslim countries that are OIC members, until the end of 2021 reached about $7 billion.[25]

• Support for the Palestinian resistance is limited to rhetorical appeals, as is the case in some Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, where Jamaat-e-Islami leader Sheikh Sirajul Haq appealed to his government, as an ideological government, to support the Palestinians.

Third: Contributing to the UNRWA

If we exclude Arab countries from the list of member states among Muslim countries, Turkey emerges as the leading contributor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) among Muslim countries. However, in comparison to non-Muslim countries, Turkey ranks 13th among donor countries for the year 2023. Following Turkey are Indonesia (33rd), Malaysia and Kazakhstan (35th). When considering the total aid from non-Arab Muslim countries, their combined contributions amount to less than 1.5% of the total UNRWA budget.[26] In fact, comparing the GDP, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) at current prices, with the aid provided by Muslim countries to UNRWA, reveals a notable divergence, illustrated in the table below:[27]

Table 3: Contributions of a Sample of Muslim Countries to UNRWA (2023)

Country GDP (PPP- current prices) ($billion) Contributions to UNRWA ($thousand)
Indonesia 4,720.54 600
Bangladesh 1,619.8 50
Malaysia 1,305.94 200
Kazakhstan 693.415 10
Uzbekistan 401.838 0
Azerbaijan 199.195 0

After Israeli accusations against some of the UNRWA’s employees for their participation in Operation al-Aqsa Flood, several countries suspended their contributions. However, most resumed payments, especially since the Israeli accusations did not reach a convincing level. Until the end of April 2024, seven major countries have restored funding, while eleven other countries, including the European Union, are still considering their stance. Notably, none of these countries are Muslim countries.[28] In other words, non-Arab Muslim countries have not committed to cutting their aid to the Agency, but their contributions are quite modest, as we have noted.

Fourth: Voting in the UN General Assembly on Issues Related to Operation al-Aqsa Flood[29]

When comparing the votes of member states on the resolutions regarding the war in GS, it is evident that all Muslim countries supported the position favored by the resistance on 12/12/2023. However, three Muslim countries (Albania, Iraq and Tunisia) abstained from voting on the General Assembly resolution on 27/10/2023. This demonstrates a significant consensus among Muslim countries in their official UN voting positions, although most of these resolutions remain non-binding “recommendations.”

Fifth: The Foreign Policy of Indonesia, the Most Populous Muslim Country

The key factors influencing Indonesia’s foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict can be outlined as follows:[30]

1. Despite the geographical distance between Indonesia and Palestine, Islam serves as a central link to the Arab region. Indonesia, being the largest Muslim-majority country, constitutes about 13% of the global Muslim population, with a total population of 279 million. Its GDP, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) at current prices, is approximately $4,720 billion, placing it seventh in the world.

It is important to note the constitutional amendments in Indonesia, where the explicit provision related to Islam has been removed from the constitution, but the value of Sharia remains implicit, as indicated in Articles 29(1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution and paragraph 3 of its preamble.

2. All Middle Eastern countries are like Indonesia, members in the Non-Aligned Movement, except for Turkey and Israel.

3. The principle of being free and active: It means not siding with any party in international conflicts while still supporting peaceful settlements. According to some reports, Indonesia is considering trading its recognition of Israel in exchange for Israel’s support for Indonesia’s membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).


The previous data regarding the support of the non-Arab Muslim bloc for the Operation al-Aqsa Flood indicates the following:

1. Their population size, economic power, geographical area and voting bloc in the UN are not commensurate with their very limited influence in the interactions resulting from Operation al-Aqsa Flood.

2. It is evident that the influence of Islamic movements and parties in these countries is limited in shaping their governments’ policies toward the Palestine issue. This suggests that Islamic culture in these societies has not translated into significant political action.

3. The level of material contribution (such as humanitarian aid or contributions to the UNRWA budget) and moral support (through demonstrations or political activities) for the Palestinian struggle is not commensurate with the resources these countries possess.

4. It is evident that Arab normalization with Israel has alleviated the embarrassment most Muslim countries felt regarding their relationship with Israel. This is reflected in the growing number of Muslim countries that recognize, semi-recognize or are preparing to recognize Israel.

5. Central Asian Muslims are the least sympathetic to the Palestine issue, highlighting the need for research on how to address this issue.

6. Iran has the most advanced stance on the Palestine issue among non-Arab Muslim countries.

7. The Islamic reaction to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan was significantly more severe than the response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood.

[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] See details in: Top 25 countries with the largest number of Muslims in 2022 (in millions), site of statista, 13/10/2023, ; and Countries in the world by population (2024), site of Worldometer, 16/7/2023,
[3] Where pro-Palestinian university protests are happening around the world, site of Cable News Network (CNN), 3/5/2024,
[4] Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050, site of Pew Research Center, 21/12/2022,
[5] Muslim Population by Country 2024, site of World Population Review,
[6] Muslim states make thin contribution to global economy, site of The Express Tribune newspaper, 21/9/2016,
[7] Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, 2000), p. 129; Darryl Li, “ “Afghan Arabs,” Real and Imagined,” Middle East Report magazine, No. 260, Fall 2011,; and Michael Rubin, “Who is Responsible for the Taliban,” Middle East Review of International Affairs journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2002, p. 8.
[8] Countries that Recognize Israel 2024, World Population Review,
[9] Bruno Venditti, Mapped: Recognition of Israel by Country, site of Visual Capitalist, 10/11/2023,; and Chris Dickert, Mapped: Which Countries Recognize Israel or Palestine, or Both?, Visual Capitalist, 24/11/2023,

Some non-Arab Muslim countries have cut ties with Israel and then restored them, such as Chad and Guinea, an issue that raises controversy in its implications, especially the issue of recognizing a state or a political system, see Michael Rossi and Jaume Castan Pinos, “Introduction to Inconvenient Realities: The Emergence and Resilience of Parastates,” Nationalities Papers journal, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48, special issue, January 2020, pp. 12-23.
[10] New Polling Shows How Much Global Support Israel Has Lost, site of TIME magazine, 17/1/2024,
[11] Resolution on the Issue of Palestine and al-Quds Ash-Sharif, Adopted by the 15th Session of The Islamic Summit Conference, Under the Theme: “Enhancing Unity and Solidarity Through Dialogue for Sustainable Development”, Banjul, Republic Of The Gambia, OIC/SUM-15/2024/PAL-RES/FINAL, 4-5/5/2024, site of Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),
[12] Names of Muslim countries in Africa, site of Mawdoo3, 6/10/2022,; see also, Member States, OIC,
[13] For information on Kosovo policies, see Kosovo’s Membership into OIC: An Opportunity or a Dangerous Road?, Prishtina Institute of Political Studies, No. 4, November 2018, pp. 22-27; OIC Secretary-General Receives the Ambassador of Kosovo to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, OIC, 26/1/2023,; and OIC Rejects Opening of Embassies in Occupied Al-Quds, site of United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), 14/9/2020,
[14] Israel-Hamas conflict top geopolitical concern in S-E Asia: ISEAS survey, site of The Straits Times newspaper, Singapore, 2/4/2024,
[15] Sabyasachi Karmaker, Israel’s infatuation with Bangladeshi recognition, site of The Business Standard, 25/5/2021,
[16] For these positions, see Summer Said, Israel-Hamas War: Chad Recalls Its Ambassador From Israel, site of The Wall Street Journal, 6/11/2023,; Is the relationship between the US and South Africa strained due to Israel’s actions in Gaza?, site of globe echo, 28/3/2024,; Nigeria Reacts To Israel, Palestine Hostilities, Calls For De-escalation, site of LEADERSHIP newspapers,; UN News (@UN_News_Centre), site of X (Twitter), 27/10/2023, 10:47 p.m.,; Bangladesh, 4 other nations charge Israel of committing war crimes in Palestine, The Business Standard, 18/11/2023,; Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Kyrgyzstan calls on the parties to cease hostilities, site of AKIpress News Agency, 9/10/2023,; and The enemy within: Arab states that trade with Israel, site of The Cradle, 31/1/2024,
[17] Turkey halts all trade with Israel, cites worsening Palestinian situation, Reuters News Agency, 2/5/2024,
[18] Swords of Iron: An Overview, Data Analytics Desk, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS),
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Excluding Turkey and Iran, the non-Arab Muslim countries saw relatively few protests. In Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria, the number of protests ranged from 2 to 4, while other countries typically held one or two protests each (such as Senegal, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Kyrgyzstan). India experienced two protests, one notably occurring at Jawaharlal Nehru University. The majority of these protests across Muslim countries were organized by political parties or student unions. However, Central Asian countries (former Soviet republics) showed limited meaningful activity in this regard, with Azerbaijan’s stance leaning closer to that of Israel, see Israel–Hamas war protests, site of WIKIPEDIA,; and Richard Seymour, The pro-Palestine movement has exposed the cynicism of political elites. Where will that energy go next?, site of The Guardian, 19/3/2024,
[22] Swords of Iron: An Overview, Data Analytics Desk, INSS,; and Thousands in Muslim countries around the world demonstrate over Israeli airstrikes, site of EL PAÍS, 20/10/2023,
[23] See the details of these positions in: Al-Qaida and IS call on followers to strike Israeli, US and Jewish targets, The Guardian, 22/10/2023,; Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Urges Muslims Worldwide To Aid Palestinians, Hails Hamas Attack On Israel: ‘This Is An Extremely Joyous And Encouraging News About The Oppressed Muslim Ummah’, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 8/10/2023,; Uyghur groups condemn Hamas’s terror attacks on Israeli civilians, site of Uyghur Times, 10/10/2023,; An Israeli is stabbed in Beijing, while Uyghurs slam Hamas violence, site of AsiaNews, 14/10/2023,; Indonesia’s MER-C condemns Israeli strikes killing its staff in Gaza, site of ANTARA News Agency, 8/10/2023,; and Mercy Malaysia on high alert as Gaza conflict intensifies, aiming to alleviate suffering, site of New Straits Times, 7/10/2023,
[24] Hypocritical Arab and Muslim countries help Israel kill more Palestinians while condemning it, site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 18/4/2024,; JI calls upon Muslim countries to support Palestine, The Express Tribune, 8/10/2023,; Thousands in Muslim countries and beyond demonstrate over Israeli airstrikes, site of The Associated Press (AP), 21/10/2023,; Anti-Israel demonstrations held across Muslim world amid Israel-Hamas war, site of The Times of Israel, 21/10/2023,; Muslims protest around world to demand end to Israel’s Gaza campaign, Reuters, 21/10/2023,; Protesters in Malaysia, Indonesia Come Out in Support of Palestine, site of The Diplomat, 16/10/2023,; Pro-Palestine protests held around the world as Gaza war nears 100 days, site of Al Jazeera, 13/1/2024,; Nigeria: a pro-Palestinian demonstration leaves one dead, site of africanews, 17/11/2023,; Senegal: people demonstrated in support of Palestinians, africanews, 6/11/2023,; Indonesia to Send Rp31.9 Billion Additional Aid to Palestine, site of, 6/10/2023,; Kyrgyzstan: Authorities sanction Palestine solidarity, while keeping lid on pro-Israel sentiment, site of Eurasianet, 31/10/2023,; and The enemy within: Arab states that trade with Israel, The Cradle, 31/1/2024.
[25] Israel trade balance, exports and imports by country 2021, site of World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS),
[26] Excluding certain private donors or sub-state and supra-state entities from the ranking, see 2023 Confirmed Pledges to UNRWA’s Programmes (Cash and In-kind), Overall Donor Ranking as 31 Dec. 2023, site of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA),
[27] 2023 Confirmed Pledges towards UNRWA’s Programmes as 31 December 2023, UNRWA,; World Economic database: April 2024, site of International Monetary Fund, Click here
[28] UPDATED: List of Countries Suspending and Reinstating UNRWA Funding, site of UN Watch, 30/4/2024,
[29] UN News, (@UN_News_Centre), X (Twitter), 12/12/2023, 11:28 p.m.,; and UNGA calls for humanitarian truce in Israel-Gaza war: How countries voted, Al Jazeera, 27/10/2023,
[30] Siti Mutiah Setiawati, “The role of Indonesian government in middle east conflict resolution: consistent diplomacy or strategic shifts?,” The Policy and Practice Review, Vol. 6, March 2024, pp. 1-5; and World Economic database: April 2024, International Monetary Fund,,&s=NGDP_RPCH,NGDPD,PPPGDP,NGDPDPC,PPPPC,&sy=2023&ey=2029&ssm=0&scsm=1&scc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=0&sort=country&ds=.&br=1; and Indonesia agrees to normalize ties with Israel: Report, The Cradle, 11/4/2024,

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>> Academic Paper: Non-Arab Muslims and Operation al-Aqsa Flood … Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay (15 pages, 4.3 MB)

Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 4/6/2024

The opinions expressed in all the publications and studies are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of al-Zaytouna Centre.

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