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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

Since the onset of the war in Gaza Strip (GS), Netanyahu and his extremist team have shown no interest in negotiating an end to the war or compelling Israeli forces to withdraw from GS until his stated objectives are met. These include the destruction of Hamas, the retrieval of Israeli captives on his terms, and the imposition of his vision for Gaza’s governance. He understood that failing to achieve these objectives would signify a victory for the resistance, and any agreement that conceded to their minimum demands would effectively end his political career and possibly lead to his imprisonment. Netanyahu and his Likud party had been losing popularity for months, making it evident that he and his potential allies would be defeated in any upcoming elections.

Therefore, Netanyahu’s continuation of the war was an attempt to remain at the forefront of the political scene for as long as possible, hoping for an opportunity to shift the balance in his favor. Simultaneously, it reflected his “internal state of denial,” as he could not fathom a humiliating conclusion. He views himself as the uncrowned “king of Israel” and aligns himself with the “great” founders of Israel.

Netanyahu sought to manage negotiations in a way that would buy time, reduce internal and external pressures on him, and give the impression of being open to a settlement. However, each time, he introduced new obstacles, just enough to keep the process going.

When Hamas accepted the proposal put forth in May and early July 2024—a proposal backed by the US, Qatari and Egyptian mediators and welcomed by a broad popular and partisan base in Israel—Netanyahu openly resorted to delaying tactics, adding new conditions in a blunt manner that effectively undermined several previously agreed-upon points.

Emerging Information:

Over the past few weeks, several new factors have prompted Netanyahu to adopt more hawkish positions. First, his visit to the US, including his speech in Congress and meetings with various US leaders, where he received support that bordered on “vulgarity.” Upon his return, he was reassured by the strength of the pro-Israel lobby and its significant influence on US decision-makers across both Republican and Democratic parties. Second, the success of Israeli intelligence in assassinating Hizbullah’s military commander Fuad Shukr “Hajj Muhsen” and Hamas political bureau chief Isma‘il Haniyyah sent Netanyahu into a state of unprecedented euphoria. Third, this newfound confidence was reflected in the domestic Israeli landscape, where his popularity surpassed that of Gantz for the first time since 7/10/2023, placing him back at the top of the list of preferred prime ministerial candidates, with the Likud party leading the latest public polls. Meanwhile, the momentum of the Israeli opposition has waned, reducing its influence and leaving Netanyahu in a more secure position compared to recent months.

New Conditions:

Netanyahu reportedly refuses to end the war or fully withdraw from GS. He insists on maintaining control over the Netzarim corridor to secure the northern GS, and seeks to retain a presence at the Rafah crossing and along the Philadelphi corridor to ensure control over all border crossings, including the one connecting GS to Egypt. Netanyahu is also imposing restrictions and conditions on the return of displaced persons to the northern GS and is aiming to maximize his share of Israeli captives in any exchange. Furthermore, Netanyahu wants to wield greater authority in determining which Palestinian prisoners are released, with the intention of expelling them from GS. In essence, Netanyahu’s primary interest is not in ending the war but in securing a deal that serves his interests, deprives the resistance of a critical bargaining chip, and positions him to continue his military campaign and massacres.

The Stance of the Resistance:

Hamas and other resistance forces that previously agreed to draft agreements accused the Israeli side of stalling, evading its commitments and imposing new conditions. They urged the American sponsors of the negotiations and prior agreements to set a timeline for implementing the agreed-upon terms and to refrain from enabling the Israeli attempts to delay and use the situation to further obstruct and blackmail.

The resistance underscored four key principles governing any agreement: ending the war, a complete Israeli withdrawal from GS, a dignified prisoner exchange, and lifting the siege to allow for the reconstruction and fulfillment of all the GS’s needs.

The US as Partner and Agent:

The US, a key partner of Israel in its war on GS, provides military and financial support and international backing while also playing the role of an agent that promotes Israeli positions and justifies its crimes. Even when the Israeli side “embarrasses” the US with its arrogance, erratic behavior and shifting demands, the US realigns itself to accommodate Israeli requirements, as seen when Netanyahu imposed his new conditions. Rather than holding the Israeli party accountable, the US instead exerts pressure on Hamas and the resistance to make further concessions to the Israeli occupation.

A Fruitless Negotiation Process

It was unsurprising that the Doha negotiations failed on 15/8/2024 due to Israeli demands. The US spoke of progress in the talks, attempting to justify negotiations that were doomed from the start. This effort served to cover up the actions of the occupation, buy time, and delay potential retaliation by Iran, Hizbullah, and the resistance axis for the assassination of Isma‘il Haniyyah and Fuad Shukr.

In the coming days, Netanyahu is expected to focus on the following objectives:

1. Prolonging the war until the US elections, aiming to secure the best possible military outcomes on the ground.

2. Establishing new facts on the ground in GS, particularly by asserting control over the Netzarim and Philadelphi (Rafah crossing) corridors.

3. Maximizing the time available to secure the release of as many Israeli captives as possible from the hands of the resistance.

4. Targeting Hamas and other resistance leaders with the goal of assassinating as many as possible.

5. Enforcing his vision for the post-war situation in GS.

The resistance will reject Israeli dictates, maintain its robust military operations, and persist in draining Israeli forces and resources until Netanyahu and the entire Israeli leadership realize that achieving their goals is impossible, that time is not on their side, and that the cost of continuing the war far exceeds the cost of ceasing hostilities and meeting the resistance’s demands.

What’s Next?!

The “euphoria” of Netanyahu and his allies will soon fade as Israel’s challenges in GS become increasingly evident. The failure will persist as the exhaustion of the Israeli army intensifies, with commanders who have previously advocated for reaching a deal with Hamas at all costs likely to reiterate this stance. Israel’s internal crisis will deepen as its economic situation worsens, leaving it too weak to engage in a regional war. The Israeli government will face difficult and complex decisions, particularly if Iran and its allies deliver significant blows.

Sooner or later, Netanyahu will face a choice between two paths: continuing in denial and arrogance, ignoring reality, and pursuing the war—thereby leading his army and state to prolonged bleeding and exhaustion, as several Israeli leaders, thinkers, and experts have warned could eventually result in Israel’s collapse. Or, he may acknowledge reality, step down from his high horse, and respond to the resistance’s demands. In practice, this would signify the victory of the resistance and the end of Netanyahu’s political career.



Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 4/9/2024


The opinions expressed in all the publications and studies are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of al-Zaytouna Centre.