Strategic Assessment (141): The Future of the Palestinian Authority in Light of Operation al-Aqsa Flood

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By: Wael ‘Abdul Hamid El Mabhuh and Rabi‘ Amin Abu Hatab.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Summary

Operation al-Aqsa Flood of October 2023 marked a pivotal turning point in the history of the Palestine issue. Its repercussions extended beyond the local and regional levels, reaching the international arena. In response, Israel launched a campaign of genocide, destruction, and starvation against the Gaza Strip (GS), aiming to crush the resistance and pressure the popular base in order to impose its dominance, conditions and terms. This places a significant responsibility on Palestinian forces to urgently reorganize their internal affairs, confront the threats of annexation and displacement, and resist efforts to dismantle the Palestinian political system and erase the Palestine issue.

This assessment outlines five scenarios for the future of the Palestinian Authority (PA): maintaining the status quo, reverting to the pre-2006 elections arrangement, dismantling the PA by Israel, reforming the Palestinian political system, or establishing a new political system under Israeli control. It discusses these scenarios and assesses their relative likelihood, before offering recommendations to Palestinian decision-makers on how to address the resulting challenges.

Introduction

The PA was established in 1994, following the Oslo Accords signed the previous year, with primary backing from Fatah, which effectively leads and dominates the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Since its inception, the PA has failed to achieve its core objective: the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967—namely, the West Bank (WB) and GS. Over time, it has evolved into a functional entity that serves the interests of the Israeli occupation more than those of the Palestinian people. The occupation has remained entrenched, expanding its presence in WB while maintaining a suffocating blockade on GS, all against the backdrop of deepening internal Palestinian schism. Operation al-Aqsa Flood battle marked a turning point in the history of the Palestine issue, confronting the PA, the Palestinian political system, and the Palestinian people with profound historical reckonings, compounding an already acute existential crisis.

First: The PA Amid Operation al-Aqsa Flood

The main characteristics of the PA, its political trajectory, and institutional structure at the time of Operation al-Aqsa Flood can be summarized as follows:

1. The continued dominance of Fatah over the PA in Ramallah and the PLO, along with its monopoly over what is referred to as “Palestinian legitimacy.”

2. The PA’s ongoing commitment to the peace process, the Oslo Accords and the two-state solution.

3. Despite widespread Palestinian opposition, and in defiance of resolutions passed by the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and the Palestinian Central Council (PCC), the PA in Ramallah continues its security coordination with Israel and its pursuit of resistance forces.

4. The PA’s administrative and security control over only about 20% of WB, areas that, nonetheless, remain consistently vulnerable to Israeli incursions.

5. The PA continues to suffer from Israeli economic and financial control, including restrictions on tax revenue transfers, regulation of imports and exports, the ability to destroy infrastructure, and land confiscation, among other measures.

6. The PA also faces internal challenges, notably corruption, nepotism and the dominance of a single political faction.

7. The Palestinian political schism, entrenched since 2007, remains unresolved. Fatah maintains control over the PA in WB, while Hamas governs GS. The official leadership of the PA and the PLO has consistently avoided holding free and transparent elections or forming a representative Palestinian leadership that reflects the people’s will. The recent appointment of a new PA government under Muhammad Mustafa took place without consultation with Hamas or resistance factions outside the PLO.

8. Hamas continues to govern GS as the de facto authority, while expressing a willingness to engage with the PA leadership in Ramallah to form a national unity government capable of leading both the WB and GS.

9. On 7/10/2023, al-Qassam Brigades launched Operation al-Aqsa Flood, shaking Israel and marking a watershed moment in Palestinian history. This was followed by a brutal Israeli assault on GS, characterized by genocide, massive destruction of infrastructure, a suffocating siege, starvation tactics, and an unprecedented attempt to forcibly displace the population of the Strip. While Hamas and the resistance forces (enjoying overwhelming Palestinian support) viewed Operation al-Aqsa Flood as a necessary act to halt aggression against al-Aqsa Mosque, prevent its Judaization, block Israel’s decisive plan in the WB, secure the release of prisoners, and preempt Israeli efforts to dismantle the resistance in GS, the PA saw it differently. It regarded the operation as a unilateral move that bypassed its authority, entangled the Palestinian people in greater peril, and destroyed what remained of their resources, particularly in the absence of the necessary readiness to deal with its consequences.

10. With the formation of the most extreme Israeli government in Israel’s history in late 2022, led by Netanyahu in partnership with Smotrich and Ben Gvir…, the government adopted a far more radical policy aimed at determining the fate of al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and WB; crushing the resistance in GS; ending the two-state solution and the peace process according to the Oslo Accords; dismantling the PA into cantons and village clusters; pursuing policies of annexation and displacement in WB and GS; and closing the Palestinian file. Consequently, it has imposed even harsher measures on the Ramallah-based PA, seeking to further subordinate it and reduce it to a temporary functional tool serving Israeli objectives.

11. The Palestine issue gained increased international support during Operation al-Aqsa Flood, becoming a top global priority. The Israeli narrative collapsed, while the Palestinian narrative rose prominently. Israel became widely condemned internationally, and global support for a two-state solution grew. Several European countries, for the first time, recognized the State of Palestine. This development gave the PA renewed hope for the real possibility of transforming itself into a state on the ground.

Second: Potential Scenarios

The following presents a range of possible scenarios concerning the future of the Palestinian political system after Operation al-Aqsa Flood

1. Stalemate and preservation of the status quo. The war on GS ends without any change to the GS governance arrangement; in other words, the same ruling authority remains in place the day after the war.

2. A return to the pre-2006 elections arrangement, with governance of GS reverting to the PA, restoring a centralized system under the authority of Ramallah (effectively Fatah), with no role for Hamas in governing institutions.

3. Dismantling the Palestinian political system by Israel, through full reoccupation of GS and WB, accompanied by policies of annexation and displacement, or by integrating GS with Egypt and the WB with Jordan.

4. Reforming the PA’s political system to ensure inclusive participation based on proper political norms and democratic principles.

5. Establishing a new political system, both in form and function, supported, directly or indirectly, by Arab states, the US and Israel.

Third: Determinants Shaping the Potential Scenarios

A range of key factors is likely to play a significant role in either strengthening or weakening the likelihood of potential scenarios, both in the short and long term. The most important of these determinants include:

1. Hamas’s ability to adapt to the current situation and maintain its presence in the Palestinian political landscape.

2. The possibility that Hamas may concede to the status quo, succumb to regional pressures, and respond to the dire humanitarian conditions in GS by stepping down from political leadership and relinquishing governance of the Strip.

3. The degree of international intervention aimed at ending the campaign of genocide and starvation, and rejecting the policy of forced displacement.

4. The potential for opposition pressure and public sentiment within Israel to halt the war on GS and facilitate a comprehensive deal without preconditions regarding the post-war phase.

5. The extent to which US pressure on Arab states, particularly Egypt and Jordan, may lead them to accept Palestinian migration or the imposition of a political arrangement annexing GS to Egypt and the WB to Jordan.

6. The success or failure of the talks between Hamas and the US regarding a ceasefire and prisoner exchange deal.

7. The ability of the current Israeli government to achieve concrete gains on the ground with regard to the annexation of the WB.

8. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and the subsequent obligations and orientations of the new regime.

9. Hizbullah’s withdrawal from active participation in Operation al-Aqsa Flood, following its signing of a Cessation of Hostilities agreement with Israel.

10. The potential dissolution of the PA and the establishment of a new governing structure in the WB and GS.

11. The position of the popular base in GS toward Hamas and the resistance, in light of the massacres and destruction, and under the pressure of hunger, genocide and threats of forced displacement.

Fourth: Weighing the Scenarios

The first scenario: “Stalemate and preservation of the status quo, in which the war on GS ends without a change in governance” appears unlikely. This is especially true given international and Arab efforts to exclude Hamas from any role in governance or political participation, due to the threat the movement poses to Israel. These efforts were evident before, during and after Operation al-Aqsa Flood.

However! despite the low likelihood of this outcome, the need for a stabilizing force to prevent chaos and keep GS disengaged from confrontation with Israel could bring Hamas back into the picture. Hamas is capable of playing that role, if certain objective conditions are met: opening all crossings, lifting the GS blockade, and ensuring protection for political figures. At the same time, this scenario would allow Israel to argue that there is no credible Palestinian partner for “peace,” especially if internal Palestinian schism continues.

Regarding the second scenario: “A return to the pre-2006 election status, with Gaza’s administration returning to the PA, resulting in a single-headed system ruled by Fatah, with no presence of Hamas in the governing institutions.” This scenario closely aligns with Israel’s demand to exclude Hamas and remove it from Gaza’s governance, while ensuring that another authority manages GS according to Israeli desires for security and stability, whether that authority is Israel itself or an Arab or Palestinian entity that fulfills Israeli interests and gains acceptance.
The push towards this scenario stems from the intense pressures Hamas faces domestically, regionally and internationally, especially given its weakened resistance capabilities after more than 19 months of war, as well as the government’s limited control on the ground in Gaza amid Israel’s targeting of any political, administrative or security component. This objectively aligns with Hamas’s stance on many occasions before Operation al-Aqsa Flood, when it was willing to relinquish governance in Gaza provided it was not excluded, its government employees’ issues were resolved, and it could collaborate with all organizations and factions to reform the Palestinian political system; the PLO and the PA with all their institutions and components.

What hinders this scenario, however, is Hamas’s condition, up to the time of this assessment, that it must not be excluded. Moreover, the post-war phase is considered a purely Palestinian matter to be addressed by Hamas and the Palestinian factions in a way that serves the general interest of the Palestinian people. Any imposition of a new reality or external dictate is unacceptable.

Regarding the third scenario: “The dismantling of the PA through Israel’s full reoccupation of GS and the WB, accompanied by annexation and displacement policies, or the incorporation of GS into Egypt and the WB into Jordan,” this represents the most extreme outcome. The likelihood of this scenario increases as Israel intensifies its pressure on GS through continued bombardment, tighter blockades, increased starvation and threats of forced displacement. The possibility grows further as long as Hamas refuses to relinquish power, dismantle its military infrastructure, and surrender its weapons, leaving military action as the only option. This could lead to the full reoccupation of GS and potentially extend to the WB, especially in light of current developments and escalating Israeli military activity there. It is worth recalling that one of the stated objectives of the current extremist Israeli government is to “resolve the conflict” with the Palestinians, widely interpreted as a plan to occupy the WB and expel its population.

Several factors, however, make such a scenario difficult to realize. Chief among them is the steadfastness of the Palestinian people, their resilience, and their refusal to abandon their land despite immense suffering and sacrifice. Egypt and Jordan also continue to firmly reject the idea of accepting Palestinian migrants or resuming civil administration over the WB and GS, as was the case from 1948 to 1967. Another significant counterweight is the potential success of efforts to implement a two-state solution and establish an independent Palestinian state in the PA-administered areas.

Israel’s current use of military pressure and a starvation policy in GS serves to intensify the hardships faced by Palestinian civilians. At the same time, it deliberately fosters chaos and works to undermine internal solidarity and social cohesion by obstructing the work of civil institutions and targeting aid distribution teams. In parallel, it supports the formation of armed gangs to loot aid and confront the resistance, in coordination with the Israeli army. While there is still strong reliance on the people’s steadfastness, growing calls for migration, should the war persist, suggest that many Palestinians may be compelled to leave in search of safety, and, secondarily, a life of dignity free from fear and hunger. The absence of a clear, near-term plan for the reconstruction of GS only reinforces this possibility, potentially paving the way for the dismantling of the Palestinian political system to enable such a scenario. This trajectory is further supported by the ongoing stagnation in WB: the relative weakness of both popular and armed resistance, the PA’s passivity and inaction toward aiding GS, and its continued security coordination with Israel against the resistance.

The fourth scenario: “Reforming the PA’s political system to ensure inclusive participation” has arguably been the most pressing demand since the 2006 legislative elections. Despite numerous attempts to bridge internal Palestinian divisions, it remains unfulfilled to this day.

The urgency to implement this scenario stems from a shared recognition among all parties of the looming risk of the PA’s political collapse, alongside broader threats to the Palestinian people, including displacement and Israel’s annexation plans. Palestinian factions also fear for their own survival and relevance, which could push them to accept previously rejected compromises in order to safeguard national achievements, even in their most basic form.

An additional factor that could strengthen this scenario’s prospects is the success of Arab and international efforts to revive the two-state solution, especially as some Arab countries have tied normalization with Israel to tangible progress on this front. Such developments would necessitate reforming the Palestinian political system and unifying all Palestinian efforts in preparation for the long-anticipated establishment of a Palestinian state.

Regarding the fifth scenario: “A new political system in form and tools, supported by the Arab states, the US and Israel.” This scenario assumes that Israel succeeds in crushing or silencing the Palestinian resistance, dissolving the PA, and reasserting full control over its territories. In this context, efforts would begin to establish an alternative leadership—such as village leagues, clans, tribes, or prominent individuals, an outcome Israel had long pursued prior to the establishment of the PA.

What could pave the way for this scenario is Israel’s ability to reoccupy GS in particular, annex the WB according to its plans, and suppress the resistance in GS.

However, the resilience and continued presence of the resistance, along with successful efforts to implement the two-state solution and establish an independent Palestinian state, would effectively rule out this scenario.

***

However, matters remain unresolved, and all potential scenarios remain open. Yet one constant has endured throughout every development and emerging idea related to the Palestine issue: the unwavering will, determination, and sacrifices of the Palestinian people. These have always been, and continue to be, the safeguard of their hopes and aspirations, a steadfast mountain resisting all attempts to erase their rights or undermine their dreams of liberation and the establishment of an independent state.

Fifth: Recommendations

1. Emphasize that the future of GS and WB is an internal Palestinian matter, in which the supreme interests, principles and choices of the Palestinian people must be fully respected.

2. Stress the necessity of unifying the Palestinian position in the face of the fierce Israeli assault during Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which aims to end the Palestine issue and forcibly uproot the Palestinian people from their land.

3. Establish a unified Palestinian national front to lead both the war and ceasefire processes based on the principles of political participation and inclusion, avoiding exclusion.

4. Promote a culture of participation and citizenship within Palestinian movements and institutions, elevating their ability to resist the attempts by Israel to divide and fragment.

5. Reject the criminalization of armed Palestinian resistance or any accusations against it; resistance remains a legitimate national act at all times, a fundamental right that the Palestinian people have preserved throughout their history.

6. Continue efforts to end the war on GS, stop the crimes of genocide, displacement and destruction, hold Israel globally accountable by criminalizing its actions, imposing sanctions, isolating it, and forcing its withdrawal.