By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
Although Hamas and the resistance factions accepted the Egyptian-Qatari plan for a 60-day temporary truce with Israel, and despite the plan’s close resemblance to that of US envoy Steve Witkoff, Israel’s prime minister proceeded with measures to approve and implement the “Gideon’s Chariots II” plan for the occupation of Gaza City. The declared aim was to “defeat Hamas,” while seeking to displace nearly 900 thousand residents of Gaza and the northern Gaza Strip (GS) toward the south. The strategy also sought to leverage massacres and destruction as a means of pressuring for the release of Israeli hostages and to impose Israel’s own vision for the future of the GS.
At the same time, Netanyahu maintained a high degree of “ambiguity” and deliberate concealment regarding Israel’s official stance on the ceasefire plan, intentionally keeping most of his ministers in the dark about his true intentions. Concurrently, a trend emerged favoring the resumption of “negotiations under fire,” while deliberately complicating the prospects of reaching an agreement.
The Israeli army, which has occupied approximately 75% of GS and seeks to complete the occupation of the remainder, has called up 60 thousand reservists and extended the service of another 20 thousand, in addition to its regular forces. It aims to “reinvent the wheel” in realizing the goal of crushing Hamas and rescuing the hostages.
Complexities and Major Challenges:
Operation Gideon’s Chariots II faces significant complexities and challenges, most notably:
• What new objectives can Israel’s assault on GS possibly achieve after more than 22 months of failure to realize its declared aims, despite committing massacres and acts of genocide that have claimed the lives of over 62 thousand Palestinians, wounded 157 thousand others, and destroyed more than 350 thousand homes, along with critical infrastructure, hospitals, schools, universities, mosques and churches?! The same elements of failure remain firmly in place.
• The Israeli army previously conducted large-scale incursions, destruction and forced displacement in northern GS, most notably through the “Generals’ Plan,” followed by the First Operation Gideon’s Chariots… Despite the atrocities and massacres that marked these campaigns, they ultimately ended in failure.
• The Israeli army was inclined toward a truce and a prisoner-exchange agreement, assessing that the military effort had run its course. Several former chiefs of staff and senior military and security officials likewise considered further continuation of the war of little value. Nevertheless, the army ultimately deferred to Netanyahu and the political leadership.
• A majority of the Israeli public leans toward a truce, amid increasing pressure to seize this opportunity.
• With Hamas’s agreement to the deal, there is no longer any basis to blame it for obstructing the agreement; responsibility now rests solely with Netanyahu and his government.
• International pressure is mounting, including from Western states, to halt the war and allow humanitarian aid, alongside a general trend toward official recognition of the Palestinian state. Consequently, Netanyahu’s launch of a new military campaign lacks global justification, further isolates Israel, and reinforces its status as a pariah state, particularly as the US increasingly signals a desire to bring the war to an end.
• Even Israeli reports themselves remain pessimistic regarding the prospects of eliminating Hamas or securing the release of hostages. Some assessments suggest that these objectives may require many months, if not years, to achieve. The reports further indicate that Hamas has largely succeeded in restoring its ranks following battlefield losses, with the number of Al-Qassam Brigades fighters estimated at around 30 thousand (some estimates raising this figure to 40 thousand). Despite the full force and destructive capacity of the Israeli military, supported by US weapons of mass destruction, it has been unable over a span of 22 months to weaken Hamas’s effective combat structure. Moreover, Israeli military forces and experts remain astonished at the sustained operational effectiveness of Al-Qassam Brigades, the Al-Quds Brigades affiliated with the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ), and other resistance forces, even in the wake of massive massacres, widespread destruction and deliberate starvation. It follows, then, that Israel is even less likely to succeed in the current round.
Potential Scenarios:
Netanyahu and his extremist government face three potential scenarios:
First: Continuing reliance on the “zero option,” which entails rejecting a truce plan and launching a large-scale ground military offensive, in line with Operation Gideon’s Chariots II. This would aim to occupy GS and displace its people, seeking to achieve what no previous effort has succeeded in accomplishing, i.e., the complete destruction of Hamas and the recovery of hostages. Such a course would likely prolong the war and increase the risk of hostage casualties. While it could result in massacres and severe suffering for the people of GS, indicators suggest that the offensive would almost certainly fail, particularly amid escalating global condemnation of the Israeli government and mounting internal and external pressure to end the war.
Second: Implement the limited-duration military assault (Operation Gideon’s Chariots II) while simultaneously initiating the “negotiation under fire” strategy, aimed either at securing tangible results on the ground or at strengthening the negotiating position. The duration of the assault will depend on the resistance’s performance, internal and external dynamics, and the extent of US support.
Third: Offer a positive response to the plan by slowing or suspending the assault, ultimately paving the way for a 60-day truce agreement.
Current developments appear to favor the second scenario, although Netanyahu would not hesitate to pursue the first should he find a suitable environment to continue the offensive, or should he deem the various pressures tolerable or manageable.
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Finally, the ruling Israeli mindset still fails to recognize the potential failure of overwhelming force, as such a failure strikes at the very core of the Zionist project. Accordingly, Israel will seek to buy time, advance its agenda, and remain in a persistent “state of denial.” Even if it were to enter a temporary ceasefire, it is unlikely to remove from its agenda the objective of defeating Hamas, disarming it and neutralizing it politically. Consequently, maintaining GS under pressure and siege, and subjecting it to ongoing security and military targeting, will remain central to its policy. This implies that Israel will continue to incur escalating costs while facing mounting internal and international pressures compelling it to climb down from its intransigent position.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 25/8/2025
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