Political Analysis: US Efforts to Advance the Second Phase of Trump’s Plan

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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

The US administration is moving to advance the second phase of Trump’s plan for the Gaza Strip (GS). In this context, advisers Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner visited Israel, and the US submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council.

Moreover, US follow-up regarding the post-war phase in the GS encompasses several key tracks, foremost among them:

– Promoting Trump’s plan for the future of the GS, a proposal framed in economic terms that overlooks the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, imposes external guardianship, and seeks to disarm the resistance through the deployment of external Arab and international forces.

– Reviving the peace process and advancing regional normalization, with a particular focus on Saudi Arabia as the principal gateway through which additional states may subsequently be drawn into normalization efforts.

– Shaping post-war arrangements toward the “Axis of Resistance,” including efforts to establish regional alliances or mechanisms designed to weaken this axis, especially in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, while intensifying pressure to neutralize and marginalize Iran’s regional role.

– Rehabilitating Israel’s image in the region, aiming to restore and “sanitize” its standing after the atrocities and mass killings it committed in the GS, and to reinsert it as a “natural” regional partner.

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Trump’s plan deliberately set an exceptionally high ceiling, thereby making even the most basic Palestinian rights appear as significant “sacrifices” and major concessions on the part of the US and Israel.

The main obstacles are clear: Palestinians, Arab states and many other countries reject the proposed trusteeship council (Board of Peace) and instead seek to affirm the authority of the Palestinian Authority (PA) over the GS and to embed the two-state solution within the plan or the draft resolution submitted to the UN Security Council. Furthermore, a fundamental dispute concerns the mandate of any external forces. The Palestinian and Arab position holds that, if such forces are deployed, they must serve as international separation forces responsible for overseeing ceasefire arrangements and verifying Israel’s withdrawal from the GS, rather than forces tasked with disarming the resistance or attempting to achieve what Israel itself failed to accomplish.

Given that the current US administration neither supports a two-state solution nor endorses the PA assuming governance of the GS, and is disinclined to grant Palestinians political rights, it faces significant obstacles in implementing the plan. Accordingly, it is likely to coordinate with Israel to:

– Continue enabling Israel to exert pressure on the GS through occupation measures, closure of crossings, control over aid, targeted assassinations and destruction, and the promotion of collaborator networks.

– Seek to persuade select Arab and Muslim countries to participate in international forces and contribute to GS reconstruction in exchange for specific bilateral incentives.

– Urge certain Arab countries to pressure the resistance and the PA to comply with Trump’s plan.

– Signal a potential withdrawal of support for the ceasefire track, thereby allowing Israel to resume hostilities and pursue its campaign of starvation, displacement and annexation.

Nonetheless, the US recognizes that such measures are unlikely to secure Palestinian concessions, particularly regarding external control over the GS population, and that it will be extremely difficult to persuade any state to deploy forces tasked with disarming the resistance on Israel’s behalf.

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Consequently, in subsequent stages, the Trump administration may seek to advance more moderated proposals, potentially granting the PA in Ramallah a greater role, curtailing or even eliminating the security functions of international forces, and offering a series of guarantees concerning the timing of Israeli withdrawal, the reopening of crossings, and the entry of humanitarian aid. However, at the same time, it is likely to pursue the consolidation of at least two core objectives:

First: To establish a mechanism, even a joint Palestinian-Arab one, to withdraw, neutralize or otherwise disarm resistance weapons.

Second: To isolate Hamas and other resistance forces from the Palestinian political scene.

These two objectives may find some support within the PA in Ramallah and among Arab states, particularly as their core elements were already referenced in the New York Declaration endorsing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

For the Trump administration, this may have been acceptable in light of the perceived need to advance the peace process and normalization, rehabilitate and promote Israel, and weaken resistance forces in the region.

Nevertheless, Palestinian factions and the Palestinian people must insist on the independence of Palestinian decision-making, affirm that the administration of the GS is an internal Palestinian matter, and recognize that the issue of weapons is intrinsically linked to ending the occupation and to post-liberation arrangements. Accordingly, this highlights the urgent priority of putting the Palestinian political house in order based on the fundamentals and the supreme interests of the Palestinian people, while establishing effective representative and executive institutions capable of advancing the project of liberation and return.