By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
Israel is experiencing a condition of strategic disequilibrium that may escalate into an existential threat. This condition became particularly evident after the formation of the Likud government in coalition with Religious Zionism at the end of 2022, and especially after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. The disequilibrium reflects a structural problem, both internal and external, from which Israel finds it difficult to extricate itself, due to the nature of Zionist society and the dominance of extreme right-wing and religious currents within Israel’s governing system.
For decades, Israel had been able to manage the religious, ethnic and cultural diversity within its Zionist Jewish settler society with considerable efficiency. It succeeded in building modern and effective legislative, political and judicial institutions that enabled it to navigate numerous internal crises and contradictions. However, the past two years have been decisive in pushing it into a state of disequilibrium.
The strategic disequilibrium under discussion refers to a situation in which a state or actor becomes unable to maintain long-term strategic stability because of distorted calculations and a poor assessment of its capabilities. This drives it into a continuous state of turbulence, rendering it incapable of adaptation or of taking sound and effective decisions. As a result, it loses its strategic compass and generates catastrophic outcomes.
Strategic Disequilibrium Is More Perilous Than the Loss of Strategic Balance:
From a rigorously analytical standpoint, strategic disequilibrium constitutes a far more profound danger than the loss of strategic balance. The latter signifies a shift in the distribution of power, capabilities or resources among competing actors, such that one party acquires the ability to impose its preferences upon adversaries or rivals. This dynamic was evident, for example, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, when the US assumed leadership over a unipolar international order. Imbalances of this kind, however, can be mitigated over time by augmenting military and political capabilities, expanding alliance networks, and acquiring advanced and qualitative forms of power. By contrast, strategic disequilibrium is fundamentally rooted in internal dysfunction, within the decision-making apparatus, the structure of the state and its institutions, and the overarching strategic visions and trajectories guiding it. This may plunge the state into political, economic, security and social disarray; trigger internal conflicts; and draw it into external confrontations that exceed its capabilities or occur at profoundly ill-timed moments. In effect, the state’s leadership or governing system engages in a process of “self-destruction,” the catastrophic consequences of which are exceedingly difficult to overcome.
A Mindset Marked by Strategic Disequilibrium:
Netanyahu and his ruling circle can, at present, feel relieved, now that the US has rescued him from the “Gaza quagmire” and secured a UN Security Council resolution concerning the day after in Gaza Strip (GS). He can also indulge in a sense of triumph as he watches his army impose its arrogance in Lebanon, Syria and the wider region, and as he observes Arab and Muslim regimes adopting the US–Israeli vision of disarming Hamas and the resistance, and neutralizing them within the Palestinian political system.
However, none of this will resolve the problem of strategic disequilibrium within Netanyahu or his political system. At the core lies the nature of the exclusionary, isolationist and supremacist Zionist mindset, which is predicated on domination and power; it undermines the capacity for balanced thinking, causing oscillation between overestimating or underestimating one’s own capabilities or those of others. It tends to rely on an ideology rooted in religious or cultural frameworks, which leads to misperceptions of both the self and others. Moreover, the deep historical sense of insecurity, distrust and hostility toward others drives flawed decisions and policies, compelling Israel to impose humiliating and unequal conditions on others that make normal coexistence impossible. The formation of Netanyahu’s latest government, along with its internal agendas and its positions regarding the Palestine issue and the region, represents a significant leap toward strategic disequilibrium.
The Misperception Theory, of which Robert Jervis is the most prominent theorist, is applicable to the Israeli case. The theory emphasizes that misinterpreting the intentions of adversaries, misjudging their capabilities, or incorrectly reading strategic indicators can lead to negative decisions and actions, which may in turn have devastating consequences for the decision-maker.
Manifestations of Israel’s Strategic Disequilibrium:
The manifestations of Israel’s strategic disequilibrium can be summarized as follows:
1. The widespread protests of 2023, particularly against judicial reforms, revealed the depth of political and societal divisions and the fragility of the social contract within Israeli society, especially between secular and religious currents. These protests also exposed competing visions regarding the state’s institutional structure and strategic trajectories. Some manifestations of this crisis appeared in debates over the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews (Haredim), culminating in the withdrawal of Shas and United Torah Judaism (Yahadut HaTorah) ministers from the government in mid-July 2025.
2. An unprecedented crisis of leadership and contention emerged between the government, the military, the Shabak and the judiciary, particularly during the past two years amid Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This included the dismissal or resignation of key figures such as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, and the government’s legal advisor Gali Baharav-Miara. Conflicting perspectives regarding the release of Israeli hostages, post-GS strategy, and control over the Rafah Crossing and Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor exacerbated the crisis. This divergence in strategic vision also prompted the withdrawal of Benny Gantz (former Chief of Staff of the Israeli army) and his Blue and White party (or National Unity) from the government after approximately eight months of participation.
3. Israel faces a structural contradiction between its ideological drive for settler expansion and regional hegemony and its strategic need for stability and the establishment of environments conducive to political settlement and normalization. Initiatives such as the Judaization of al-Aqsa mosque and Jerusalem, the annexation of the West Bank (WB), the displacement of Palestinians, the vision of “Greater Israel,” occupation of Lebanese and Syrian territories, and displays of military arrogance are all destabilizing factors in the region. These policies push Palestinians toward armed resistance and heighten the perception among regional states and populations of real threats to their national security and vital interests. They also underscore the Israeli side’s lack of seriousness regarding equitable peaceful coexistence, which in turn increases hostility toward Israel, undermines normalization initiatives, strengthens conditions for the resumption of resistance and confrontation, and reinforces Israel’s inward focus.
4. Confidence in the government and the military has declined significantly, resulting in the loss of a substantial portion of “internal legitimacy.” Throughout the past two years, opposition parties have consistently led most opinion polls.
5. The collapse of Israel’s traditional deterrence framework, which had underpinned its security since the state’s founding, coupled with the adoption of a new deterrence model based on direct preemptive retaliation, brute force, large-scale destruction, and acts of genocide, has eroded Israel’s image as a stable and measured actor and exposed an inherently unmanageable character, fundamentally incompatible with coexistence.
The failure of all deterrence mechanisms, coupled with the sustained resilience of the resistance until the end of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, engendered a “complex” that further destabilized Israel’s governing system, as it exhausted its tools in futile attempts to eliminate the resistance.
6. Netanyahu takes pride in the existence of seven or eight fronts of confrontation; however, this multiplicity generates a state of military and economic exhaustion and deprives Israel of strategic equilibrium and balance. Indeed, the proliferation and overstretching of multiple fronts has historically been a primary factor in the collapse of states and empires.
7. Israel’s governing apparatus has misjudged the capabilities of Hamas and the resistance, underestimating their capacity to endure for two consecutive years. It relied on security assumptions that proved erroneous and adhered to the flawed theory that “what cannot be achieved through force can be achieved through greater force.” Its operations produced counterproductive outcomes, increasing sympathy for the Palestinian people and the resistance while intensifying anger against the Israeli occupation.
8. Israel’s loss of strategic disequilibrium has led to a decline in both popular and official international support, the collapse of the Israeli narrative, and the erosion of slogans such as “self-defense,” “democratic oasis,” “monopoly on victimhood,” and “anti-Semitism”… It has also produced an unprecedented global isolation of Israel, subjected it to scrutiny by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and expanded international sympathy for the Palestinian people, alongside growing recognition of the Palestinian state.
The Role of the Palestinian Resistance:
During the confrontations of Operation al-Aqsa Flood over the past two years, the Palestinian resistance, particularly Hamas, played a significant role in driving Israel toward strategic disequilibrium. The resistance in undermining Israel’s deterrence apparatus, inflicting a sustained military, economic, social and political drain. This disrupted Israeli decision-making, forcing leaders to shift from long-term strategic planning to “crisis management,” operating under pressure, and focusing on “firefighting.” The resistance thus emerged as a pressure factor both regionally and internationally, exposing the fragility of Israel’s internal situation and the leadership’s flawed perceptions. Had Netanyahu and his team pursued the confrontations in an attempt to achieve a decisive conclusion, their internal and external crises would have intensified, as there exists no realistic horizon for defeating the resistance. Meanwhile, Israel’s assaults on civilians, campaigns of starvation, displacement and destruction only generated greater domestic outrage and international condemnation, broadening the circles of pressure and potential sanctions against it.
Trump’s Plan as a Lifeline
Trump was accurate when he stated that the war placed Israel in its worst international position and that he wanted to restore Israel to its standing, while political affairs analyst Yossi Verter of Haaretz observed that Trump saved Israel from political self-destruction. In practice, Israel had effectively lost its strategic equilibrium and its capacity to make sound decisions.
Trump’s plan for the day after in GS (30/9/2025), together with UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (17/11/2025), positioned Israel as the victorious party and provided global legitimacy for a new form of colonial imposition on the Palestinian people. This plan implements Israel’s agenda by disarming resistance, consolidating the occupation, alleviating international pressure on Israel, and reducing its military, security, economic and human exhaustion.
A Forward-Looking Assessment:
The cessation of hostilities in GS, together with the UN Security Council’s resolution regarding the administration of the territory over the coming two years, provided a partial outlet for Israel. However, it did not resolve all of Israel’s problems, as the core elements underpinning its “strategic disequilibrium” remain intact.
Israel continues to suffer from a profound misperception of the Palestinian people, the broader region and its societies, and the deep religious, civilizational and historical dimensions that shape them. It underestimates their steadfast commitment to their rights, as well as their capacity for resilience, renewal and resurgence.
We face three possible future trajectories:
First: Israel would partially restore its strategic equilibrium by capitalizing on the cessation of hostilities, support from the US administration and Trump’s plan, and the regional dominance it currently wields. This could allow Israel to hold Knesset elections, form a new government, reorganize relations between the government, the military and the judiciary, reduce internal divisions, and reach regional understandings while making breakthroughs in the normalization process, thereby expanding its maneuvering space. However, this “equilibrium” would remain fragile, as the prevailing Israeli mindset is unwilling and incapable of making genuine concessions to the Palestinian people. It insists on normalization relations grounded in dominance rather than equality, compounded by the profound impact and deep wounds inflicted by the aggression in GS.
Second: The continuation of strategic disequilibrium in its current form would result from internal Israeli divisions, the weakening of the state’s institutional structures, the persistent misreading of adversaries and the strategic environment, and the pursuit of aggressive policies that would fuel widespread resentment and anger, laying strong foundations for renewed resistance, alongside the erosion of Israel’s deterrence apparatus.
Third: A widespread collapse of strategic equilibrium could occur as a result of the domination of extreme Religious Zionist and nationalist currents and the emigration of large segments of secular society from Israel. This could lead to misguided decisions regarding the expansion of the war and the use of direct influence tools in the region, undermining the normalization process, widening the scope of conflicts, and plunging Israel into a state of exhaustion and overextension beyond its capacities, especially if the US and the West retreat from supporting Israel, funding its wars, or covering for the miscalculations of its leadership.
The most likely scenarios lie between the first and second trajectories, with the results of the upcoming Israeli elections potentially playing a significant role in favoring one over the other. The third scenario remains unlikely at present, yet it is a possibility that could gain strength over the medium to long term.
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In any case, Israel’s political system and ideological mindset render it a state lacking strategic equilibrium. Furthermore, crises within its institutional structures, combined with the fragility of its deterrence and control apparatus, contain potential triggers for explosive developments.
Consequently, the euphoria witnessed in the aftermath of the war on GS represents only a temporary and fragile “respite,” which will soon reveal the chronic and ongoing state of strategic instability.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 1/12/2025
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