By: ‘Atef al-Joulani.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
On 29/9/2025, the US formally unveiled President Donald Trump’s plan to end the war in Gaza Strip (GS), which, under Article 15, envisages the deployment of a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) within the territory. Subsequently, on 18/11/2025, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, authorizing the establishment of a temporary ISF in GS. The force is to operate under a unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace (BoP), with forces contributed by participating States. The ISF shall “help secure border areas; stabilize the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of the military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups; protect civilians…”[2]
First: Determinants of the Arab Position on the International Force
Several factors shaped the Arab stance toward the international force in GS, the most significant of which include:
1. The nature of the tasks assigned to the force: Arab states consistently supported the force’s role in maintaining “peace” and stability and in monitoring the ceasefire; however, they opposed granting it executive powers to enforce security and stability by force.
2. Arab countries, in line with the broader international position, emphasized that the force must operate under the authority of the UN, which should serve as its primary reference institution.
3. The position of the US administration and the pressures it exerted: The US sought to shape the force and persuade Arab states to participate in it.
4. The Palestinian public strongly opposed the deployment of a force assigned to pursue the resistance and disarm it.
5. Arab countries were apprehensive that the forces could be targeted by the Palestinian resistance or by Israel, which continued its attacks on GS and maintained control over extensive areas of the territory.
6. Any involvement in pursuing the resistance and disarming it could trigger internal backlash, given the widespread Arab support for the Palestinian resistance and strong solidarity with the Palestinian people.
Second: Arab States’ Declared Positions on Participation in the International Force
Arab states adopted a cautious stance regarding participation in the proposed international force in GS and opposed assigning it a mandate to enforce security by force. The most prominent declared positions to date include:
1. Egypt
The Egyptian position emphasized that the international force in GS should be temporary and transitional, aimed at achieving stability, consolidating the ceasefire, and ensuring the delivery of aid. Indicating caution regarding direct participation, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel-Atti stated on 11/11/2025 that Egypt supports the deployment of the international force in GS, but participation by Egypt is not necessarily required.[3]
2. Jordan
Jordan explicitly rejected participation in the international force and emphasized that it should serve to maintain “peace,” not impose it. On 27/10/2025, King Abdullah II stated, “we hope that it is peacekeeping, because if it’s peace enforcing, nobody will want to touch that.” He further added, “If we’re running around Gaza on patrol with weapons, that’s not a situation that any country would like to get involved in.”[4]
3. United Arab Emirates (UAE)
On 10/11/2025, UAE Presidential Advisor Anwar Gargash declared that “The UAE does not yet see a clear framework for the stability force, and under such circumstances will probably not participate in such a force.”[5]
4. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia announced its support for the deployment of a UN-mandated international force in GS, tasked with supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA). Saudi Foreign Minister Hamad bin Farhan emphasized the importance of this step in strengthening the PA and promoting stability in the region.
5. The Palestinian Position
The PA accepted the principle of deploying multinational forces in GS, provided that the Palestinian police are included and that public order is maintained under Palestinian national supervision. The PA welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 2803 and expressed its readiness to cooperate with its implementation. In contrast, Hamas and other resistance factions opposed the resolution, with Hamas asserting that granting any stabilization force “tasks and roles inside the Gaza Strip, including disarming the resistance, strips it of its neutrality and turns it into a party to the conflict.”[6]
6. League of Arab States (LAS)
LAS has not issued a clear position regarding the proposed ISF. However, its Secretary-General, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, welcomed, like most Arab states, UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which addressed the ceasefire, the end of the war and the establishment of a stability force in GS.
At the same time, alongside the cautious Arab stance advocating that the force’s role be limited to maintaining stability rather than imposing it by force, similar reservations appeared in the positions of several Muslim countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan and Azerbaijan, which were reluctant to send troops tasked with disarming or dismantling the Palestinian resistance.
Third: Expectations
Arab caution regarding participation in the ISF was expressed prior to the adoption of Resolution 2803. Although the Arab states endorsed the resolution, no indications have yet emerged suggesting any change in their refusal to participate, particularly if the US continues to assign the force tasks related to enforcing security and disarming the resistance.
Although the US administration is expected to apply additional pressure following the Security Council resolution to persuade some Arab states to reconsider their refusal, many are likely to maintain their opposition to participation in the international force. This stance aims to avoid domestic backlash and adverse effects on their relations with the Palestinian people.
It is therefore crucial to formulate a unified Arab position among the states considered for participation in the proposed force. This position should reaffirm their declared stance and condition their involvement on restricting the force’s mandate to maintaining “peace,” monitoring compliance with the ceasefire, and ending the war. Such a collective stance would strengthen the ability of Arab states to resist US pressure and prevent them from being isolated individually.
| Political Insights: A periodic series that provides brief and condensed political analyses and position assessments, issued by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Al-Zaytouna Centre. |
| Click here to download: >>Political Insights (19): The Stance of Arab States on Joining the International Stabilization Force in Gaza Strip  (4 pages, 600 KB) |
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