Political Analysis: Five Files on the Agenda of the Trump–Netanyahu Meeting

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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

Five key files are expected to feature prominently on the agenda of the anticipated meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and US President Trump on 29/12/2025.

First: Implementation of the Second Phase of Trump’s plan and the UN Security Council Resolution

The implementation of the second phase of Trump’s plan and the UN Security Council resolution concerning the Gaza Strip (GS) is expected to constitute a central and critical item on the agenda. This file encompasses several contentious sub-issues that could lead to the collapse and failure of the plan unless Israel demonstrates sufficient flexibility in addressing them. Foremost among these is the nature of the Board of Peace (BoP), particularly with regard to its composition and mandate. Palestinians reject external tutelage and colonial-style governance, and the BoP is therefore likely to fail unless its substance is either stripped down or its powers revised so as to limit its role to ensuring a ceasefire, facilitating the entry of humanitarian assistance and overseeing reconstruction. A second contentious issue concerns the disarmament of Hamas and the resistance. No state in the world is willing to undertake this task on behalf of Israel, which itself failed to achieve this objective over two years of genocidal war marked by starvation, destruction and displacement.

Consequently, this reality necessitates redefining the mandate of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), limiting its functions to monitoring ceasefire lines and preventing a return to hostilities. A third contentious issue concerns Israel’s withdrawal from the Yellow Line to newly proposed lines. This remains a particularly sensitive matter, with Israel displaying pronounced intransigence.

Israeli positions link any withdrawal to the disarmament of the resistance, the recovery of the final body of an Israeli captive, and the establishment of on-the-ground security guarantees to prevent Hamas and the resistance from reconstituting their capabilities. Moreover, Israel seeks to preserve a security regime in GS that would enable it to conduct assassinations, incursions and bombardment at will. In addition, some Israeli officials advocate transforming the Yellow Line from a temporary demarcation into a permanent “border line.” Finally, a fourth issue is directly connected to this file, namely the West Bank (WB), its future status, and how to address Israeli measures aimed at its annexation.

At a time when Trump is seeking to accommodate Israel, he nevertheless confronts the reality that the Israeli threshold does not permit him to effectively promote his plan. Furthermore, he is unlikely to secure meaningful Palestinian cooperation, from the PA in Ramallah, nor robust Arab or international support. Consequently, the continuation of the status quo would entail the prolonged suffering of Palestinians, heightened global anger and resentment, and increasing pressure leading to the further isolation of Israel. This dynamic is compounded by Israel’s inability to disarm the resistance, as well as its own unwillingness to assume responsibility for administering the lives of more than 2.2 million Palestinians in GS. Against this backdrop, Trump is expected to seek to persuade Netanyahu to demonstrate increased flexibility regarding withdrawal from the “yellow line,” potentially to revised demarcations while retaining control over strategic points. This would be accompanied by facilitating the movement of individuals and goods through the crossings, enabling the entry of humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials, and formulating politically marketable arrangements related to the BoP and ISF, including the permanent decommissioning of weapons from Hamas and resistance groups. Simultaneously, this approach would aim to ease the work of the governmental committee tasked with administering GS and grant a more substantive role to the PA in its governance.

Second: The Iranian File

Available reports suggest that Iran is undertaking a process of reconstruction and reconfiguration of its nuclear program, while simultaneously restoring and upgrading its missile capabilities. Furthermore, Tehran continues to extend support to resistance forces in Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine. Consequently, proposals to tighten sanctions and further constrain Iran, as well as to provide US political and strategic cover for a large-scale Israeli military strike, are likely to constitute central topics in the anticipated discussions between Netanyahu and Trump. Nevertheless, US strategic calculations regarding Iran remain highly intricate, reflecting an effort to contain Iranian influence while avoiding direct military confrontation or the escalation of broader regional instability.

Third: Between Normalization and Security Requirements

This file concerns the “engineering” of regional relations and the establishment of more conducive environments for the peace process and normalization. It encompasses Israel’s efforts to obtain security guarantees from Lebanon and Syria, sustained pressure to disarm Hizbullah, and the provision of political and security cover for the security zone under Israeli control in southwestern Syria. It also includes the potential for US backing of an Israeli military operation targeting Hizbullah and the resistance in Lebanon.

By contrast, the US appears inclined to manage priorities in a different manner. Israel’s reliance on an iron-fist approach and coercive instruments, coupled with top-down methods aimed at subjugating and humiliating regimes and their societies, is inherently uncertain in its outcomes. Indeed, such an approach risks undermining the peace process, obstructing the Abraham Accords, and generating widespread popular anger and resentment, thereby adding fuel to the fire in an already unstable and potentially explosive region. Accordingly, the US may seek to press for de-escalation and to secure security guarantees from regional regimes without resorting to Israel’s hardline tools.

Within this context, this file also includes US efforts to reinvigorate the peace process, particularly with Saudi Arabia, as well as attempts to reorder and further develop Israeli–Turkish relations.

Fourth: Israel’s Rehabilitation in the International Arena

This dossier aims to repair the severely damaged image that Israel has projected through its military campaigns in GS, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and against Iran. In pursuit of this objective, it encompasses efforts to exert diplomatic and legal pressure on both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), with the goal of having charges withdrawn and cases filed against Israel and its leadership dismissed.

Fifth: Israeli–US Relations

This dossier aims to secure the continued provision of US military aid, strengthen commercial ties, and address challenges related to tariffs on Israeli goods. It further encompasses a set of measures designed to “polish” Israel’s image within American society and to counter the ongoing shift in the US away from the traditional Israeli narrative toward greater empathy for the Palestinian people. This shift is particularly alarming for Israel, as a majority of the Democratic Party’s base has become increasingly sympathetic to the Palestinian people. Simultaneously, the Republican Party is witnessing, for the first time, internal divisions over support for Israel, with an emerging—but still minority—faction asserting that an “America First” policy necessitates conditions and constraints on US assistance to Israel. Moreover, a substantial segment of university students and young Americans is gravitating toward the Palestinian narrative, offering strong critiques of Israeli conduct.

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Netanyahu, who is preparing for the upcoming Knesset elections, faces a challenging and uncertain situation, as most opinion polls favor the opposition. Naftali Bennett represents a formidable rival to Netanyahu for the premiership. According to October 2025 survey, approximately 52% of the Israeli public oppose Netanyahu’s candidacy. Consequently, Netanyahu is in urgent need of achieving political gains or extricating himself from current dilemmas through the leverage of the US, which underscores the particular significance of this visit.

As for Trump, he faces the US midterm elections in November 2026, with recent polls indicating a Democratic lead in the race for the House of Representatives. Consequently, he is not only intent on securing the support of the pro-Israel lobby but also driven to achieve tangible political and economic breakthroughs. To prevent the collapse of his plan in GS and to advance his ambition of bringing Saudi Arabia into the orbit of normalization with Israel, he must exert multifaceted pressure, some of which directly involves Israel. Achieving these objectives, however, will require Netanyahu to moderate his demands and cooperate in advancing Trump’s agenda on the key issues outlined above.