By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
In 2026, the overarching trajectory of the Palestine issue is expected to revolve around Israeli, US and allied efforts to manage the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, rehabilitate Israel’s image in both the Arab and international arenas, and establish more conducive conditions for normalization and the advancement of the Abraham Accords. Central to this agenda will be efforts to remove Hamas from the Palestinian political equation and to neutralize its military capabilities. Simultaneously, the Palestinian Authority (PA) will seek to fill the political and administrative vacuum in Gaza Strip (GS), despite experiencing decline and attrition in the West Bank (WB), while Israel pursues measures aimed at engineering a political void there through escalating annexation and Judaization policies. Jerusalem will remain the principal focal point in the struggle over identity and Judaization. Nevertheless, the Trump plan is likely to encounter significant implementation challenges in GS, with a high probability of failure. Moreover, there is a strong likelihood that the Likud–religious Zionist alliance could falter in upcoming Knesset elections, compelling Israel to adopt more pragmatic policies. While Hamas will face intensified restrictions and targeted pressures, its cohesion and adaptability are expected to enable it to navigate these challenges and survive the current political bottleneck.
The Internal Palestinian Situation:
As long as Mahmud ‘Abbas remains at the helm of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the PA in Ramallah, meaningful progress in putting the Palestinian political house in order, rebuilding the PLO, and revitalizing its institutions is unlikely. Any measures taken by ‘Abbas, such as the election of a new Palestine National Council (PNC) or the renewal of representative and executive bodies, will continue to lack both popular legitimacy and legal credibility, so long as he persists in excluding Hamas and the resistance factions from any prospective elections. These elections, moreover, are unlikely to be permitted by Israel within the WB and GS and face an equally unconducive external environment.
In parallel, the PA will endeavor to assume Hamas’s role in managing the GS and present itself as a “suitable agent” for disarming the resistance. Nevertheless, despite its security cooperation with Israel and its extraordinary efforts to monitor and suppress resistance activity in WB, the PA will encounter significant obstacles in persuading Israel to entrust it with the Gaza’s governance. On one hand, it has yet to meet the standards demanded by Israel; on the other, Israel’s extremist government seeks to dismantle the PA itself as part of its annexation-related measures in the WB. Nonetheless, 2026 may see the deployment of Palestinian police under Ramallah’s authority within Israeli-imposed frameworks, with approximately 12 thousand officers from GS currently undergoing training and equipping for this purpose.
Meanwhile, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and numerous other Palestinian factions are expected to continue exerting pressure toward reforming the Palestinian political house, establishing coordination mechanisms to address the principal challenges confronting the Palestine issue, and revitalizing popular action both domestically and internationally.
The Resistance:
Hamas and the wider resistance movement are poised to confront sustained efforts at political and popular marginalization, coupled with extensive media campaigns in Arab, Israeli and Western outlets aimed at undermining their legitimacy. These efforts are likely to include persistent attempts to disarm them through various forms of pressure and to curtail their financial support. However, Hamas’s organizational cohesion, ideologically driven mission, historical experience, flexibility, adaptability, solid popular base, and track record of resistance, collectively provide it with a strong foundation to navigate these challenges and, as in the past, emerge even stronger.
Resistance-aligned forces in Iran, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq with significant military capabilities are also likely to face substantial pressure. While their capacities may be constrained or weakened, they retain the essential resources and resilience required to endure, persevere and confront emerging challenges. At the same time, grassroots forces and Islamic movements supporting the resistance within the Arab world are likely to experience intensified marginalization and hardship. This is a consequence of Israeli and US pressures on Arab and Islamic societies, aimed at imposing Israeli security standards on the region’s populations. Such pressures are likely to generate heightened anger, frustration and social tension, thereby exacerbating instability and creating conditions conducive to transformative change across the region.
Israel:
Israel remains preoccupied with security anxieties and a sense of military hubris, operating under an extremist mindset that lacks strategic equilibrium, particularly as it awaits Knesset elections.
Substantial resources will be allocated to enhancing the capabilities of the Israeli military, alongside concerted efforts to strengthen economic performance. Simultaneously, Israel will seek to rehabilitate its international image while mitigating the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, aiming to relegate the GS file to a secondary, procedural concern. By doing so, Israel intends to minimize its prominence in Arab and global discourse, assert unilateral control over the issue, and continue applying military, economic, security and political pressures to shape the Strip according to its own conditions. Withdrawal from GS is likely to be delayed under the pretext that Israel’s demands have not yet been fully met. However, the persistent suffering in GS, coupled with ongoing security measures and acts of aggression, is likely to generate widespread anger and resentment, potentially resulting in increased international pressure on Israel and threatening the viability of the Trump plan. This dynamic may compel Israel to exhibit limited flexibility and to respond selectively to certain demands.
Concurrently, the extremist Netanyahu government is expected to accelerate the Judaization of Jerusalem and the rest of the WB with heightened determination and efficiency. It will seek to institutionalize the temporal and spatial division of al-Aqsa Mosque while effectively undermining the Hashemite custodianship of the holy sites.
Israel is likely to continue imposing its security paradigm on the surrounding strategic environment, striving to reshape the Arab region (the Middle East) according to Israeli standards rather than adapting itself to regional realities. It will persist in leveraging political, military and security influence over Lebanon and Syria, maintaining a security belt in southern Lebanon and southwestern Syria through both direct and indirect means. Concurrently, Israel is expected to continue its policies of fragmentation, including support for minority groups and the deliberate cultivation of their insecurities.
Although it remains premature to draw definitive conclusions regarding the upcoming Knesset elections (expected in October 2026, though potentially to be held earlier) current opinion polls indicate a high likelihood of an opposition victory. They suggest the potential collapse of the Likud–Religious Zionism alliance and the emergence of Naftali Bennett as a strong alternative to Netanyahu. In any case, Bennett is widely regarded as at least as right-leaning and uncompromising as Netanyahu.
The Arab and Muslim World:
Egypt and Qatar are likely to continue their mediating role in the implementation of the second phase of Trump’s plan, while Arab states will endeavor to introduce modifications to the plan to enhance its realism. This could include transforming the mandate of the Board of Peace (BoP) into a supervisory role focused on ensuring a cessation of hostilities, facilitating humanitarian assistance and overseeing reconstruction efforts; redefining the mission of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) to align with ceasefire lines rather than the disarmament of Hamas; expanding the role of the PA within GS; preventing displacement; and advancing a peace process aimed at achieving a two-state solution.
At the same time, Arab states are expected to exert sustained pressure for Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanon and Syria. Simultaneously, normalization states are likely to pursue strategies designed to weaken the resistance axis within the Arab environment and to neutralize Iranian influence. They may also apply pressure on Hamas, carefully avoiding direct or overt confrontation.
Saudi Arabia is likely to approach the peace process and its relations with Israel with caution, insisting on conditions that Israel is unlikely to accept. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia, together with other Arab states, will seek to avoid direct confrontation with the US, striving to absorb and mitigate pressures from Trump wherever possible. Moreover, it may accelerate efforts to diversify its military capabilities, as both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have done, to reduce dependence on the US and Western powers.
Iran is expected to continue advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities while preparing to respond to any potential large-scale Israeli aggression. It will maintain support for resistance forces in a calculated manner, while simultaneously endeavoring to avoid confrontation with the US, pursue negotiations concerning its nuclear program, and focus on economic development and strengthening domestic infrastructure.
Türkiye is likely to sustain its public stance on the Palestine issue, particularly with regard to Jerusalem, while continuing to critique Israeli actions. It will aim to achieve a strategic balance that allows it to play an active role in Syrian affairs without provoking Israel. At the same time, gradual signs of cautious normalization with Israel may emerge as conditions in the GS show relative improvement.
The International Landscape:
Trump is likely to advance the second phase of his plan for GS; however, he will face considerable challenges due to the presence of impractical elements such as the BoP, ISF and the disarmament of resistance factions. He may adopt a pragmatic approach, seeking to adjust the plan and facilitate its implementation by securing or imposing “concessions” and greater flexibility from Israel, the PA and Arab states. Nonetheless, the imperative of appeasing Israel is expected to remain the overarching determinant of his policies.
Furthermore, Trump is likely to pursue a breakthrough in the peace process and to bring Saudi Arabia into alignment with his strategy. Achieving this, however, will require exerting pressure on Israel to make concessions and to moderate its aggressive posture in GS, WB, Lebanon and Syria. Yet the current Israeli ruling establishment appears neither willing nor prepared to offer such concessions. Consequently, Trump may be compelled to intensify pressure on Gulf states and the broader Arab environment in order to achieve at least partial gains or incremental steps forward.
The work of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are expected to remain largely procedural, producing few tangible outcomes; nonetheless, their continued engagement will be crucial for sustaining legal pressures on Israel and reinforcing mechanisms of accountability.
China and Russia are likely to persist in their traditional policies toward the Palestine issue, endeavoring to play calculated roles without directly confronting or challenging the US and Israel. Simultaneously, they will seek to capitalize on the gaps arising from Trump’s regional policies, particularly in economic, military and security domains.
European countries, for their part, are expected to maintain their conventional approach, promoting a two-state solution, seeking to ease the blockade on GS, supporting the PA, and advocating for the disarmament of resistance groups. However, in the near term, they are unlikely to impose meaningful measures or sanctions on Israel, concentrating instead on articulating positions that are largely symbolic and lack substantive practical effect.
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In brief, the course of 2026 will primarily revolve around the post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood phase. The year is expected to witness intense contestation and a clash of wills, particularly concerning the implementation of Trump’s plan in GS, the future of Jerusalem and WB, the fate of the PA, and the future of the resistance and its armaments. The Palestinian people, who have long endured, and continue to endure, considerable suffering, and whose cause faces repeated attempts at erasure, remain capable of navigating this period and reasserting their collective will, particularly if the various Palestinian factions cooperate to safeguard the fundamental interests of the Palestinian people.
These projections are derived from currently available data and analyses. Scenarios commonly referred to as “black swans,” characterized by their rarity, unpredictability, and potentially profound impact (such as a sudden political regime change or the death of a major leader) have not been incorporated into these projections. Nonetheless, they must be acknowledged, especially in an environment defined by instability, flux and ongoing processes of formation and reformation.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 29/12/2025
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