By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
Netanyahu and his government’s approach to the war in Gaza Strip (GS) suggests that it will persist, potentially dragging on indefinitely.
The Mindset of the Israeli Ruling System:
There are several indicators that reflect the mindset and nature of the Israeli government:
First: Netanyahu’s relentless desire to remain in the prime minister’s office and extend the lifespan of his government for as long as possible stems from his attempt to secure a victory or any achievement that might allow him to exit with some dignity. This comes in the face of his failure to achieve his stated objectives of crushing Hamas and the resistance, “liberate” the captives held by Hamas, and impose his vision for the post-war situation in GS. He is also trying to evade the consequences, knowing that any deal on the resistance’s terms would likely signal the end of his political career—and possibly lead to his imprisonment.
Second: The mentality of Likud and Religious Zionism is rooted in a sense of superiority, viewing others with arrogance and refusing to engage with them as equals. They believe that what cannot be achieved through force can be accomplished with even greater force.
Third: There are calls within the ruling system to displace as many Gazans as possible and to revive settlement projects, particularly in the northern GS.
Fourth: Netanyahu’s “state of denial.” With his overbearing personality and his conviction that he is the uncrowned “King of Israel” and a towering figure in Jewish history, he has yet to grasp that both he and his forces have been shaken, and that a seemingly “insignificant entity” like GS has withstood eleven months of war against the “greatest power” in the Middle East, backed by a global coalition. Therefore, Netanyahu will persist in his war with a gambler’s mindset, even if it drains his resources, clinging to the hope that some opportunity will emerge to escape his dilemma.
Fifth: The “state of allure” in which Netanyahu and his extremist government operate is characterized by a favorable environment. This environment includes a weak official Palestinian leadership and an authority in Ramallah that collaborates with Israel, suppresses resistance in the West Bank (WB), and anticipates the fall of Hamas in order to take over in GS. Additionally, the Arab and Islamic environment is weak and ineffective; many hope for Israel’s victory over Hamas, with some normalizing relations and supplying Israel’s needs, while others contribute to the blockade, impede support for the resistance, and distort the resistance’s positions both politically and in the media. Internationally, despite the expressed sympathy and growing isolation of Israel, there remains an inability to prevent the ongoing brutal massacres and systematic destruction.
Being aware of all this, Netanyahu and his extremist clique still believe there is an opportunity to exploit. They continue to pursue a “mirage” in their attempts to suppress the resistance and subdue GS.
Indicators Related to the Management of the War:
Certain indicators suggest that the manner in which the war in GS is being managed may be contributing to its prolongation:
First: Deliberately obstructing negotiations to reach a deal with Hamas and the resistance and introducing new conditions, such as the establishment of the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor and the refusal to withdraw from it, Netanyahu has set a condition designed to be rejected. This demand, opposed by the resistance, the Ramallah Authority, Egypt and other Arab regimes, and facing global disapproval—even from the Israel’s allies—will likely derail any forthcoming negotiations. Essentially, Netanyahu’s intention is for this condition to be rejected!! which would enable him to continue the war.
Second: Pursuing a deal for the release of captives while maintaining the current level of military engagement and not fully withdrawing from GS would effectively separate these two issues. This approach would relieve the Israeli army of the complexities and pressures related to the captives’ release, allowing it to focus more effectively on targeting and neutralizing resistance over an extended period.
Third: On 28 August 2024, Israel announced the appointment of Brigadier General Elad Goren as the GS military commander, designated as the “head of the humanitarian-civil efforts.” This role is similar to that of the head of the civil administration in WB and focuses on overseeing civilian aspects of life, including humanitarian aid, relief efforts, management of crossings, and long-term initiatives such as the return of displaced persons, restoration of civilian infrastructure, and reconstruction efforts. The appointment suggests that the occupation could persist for years, aiming to establish an alternative local authority to Hamas.
Between Israeli Terms and Resistance Terms:
While Israel seeks to crush the resistance and “liberate” the captives on its terms, it also aims to prolong the war and remain in GS until its objectives are met. Israel wants to impose its vision for post-war Gaza’s governance, ultimately installing a local puppet administration that disarms the resistance and ensures security for the GS envelope. Meanwhile, the resistance rejects any deal that does not guarantee a complete end to the war, full withdrawal from the Strip, and an honorable prisoner exchange. This means Israel’s maximum offer falls short of the resistance’s minimum demands, ensuring the war will continue. The resistance, with no other option, will persist in its efforts to wear down Israel until Netanyahu is forced to accept its terms.
Assessment of the Situation:
The points discussed above highlight Netanyahu’s intent to continue the war and extend his tenure as prime minister. However, they do not necessarily reflect his ability to implement these objectives on the ground. An analysis of several parameters reveals that, while framed as strategic moves, they are, in practice, temporary tactical pressure points.
Here are five key considerations when assessing the situation:
First: Israel aims, through its stringent measures on the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor, the appointment of a military governor for GS, and the suggestion of an extended stay, to undermine Gazan popular support and demoralize it. This strategy is intended to foster, among Gazan people, an environment of “abandonment” of the resistance and acceptance of Israeli conditions and standards, thereby pressuring the resistance to secure the best possible outcome in any negotiations with Israel.
Recent negotiations, mediated by the US, Qatar and Egypt, show that Israel has agreed to withdraw from the Netzarim Corridor, the northern GS and most of its occupation points. Consequently, issues of displacement, settlement, and preventing displaced persons from returning lose their significance if the resistance and popular steadfastness persist.
Second: The Israeli focus on maintaining control over the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor, as insisted upon by Netanyahu, is essentially a tactical pressure tool rather than a strategic asset. Netanyahu himself did not recognize the Corridor’s significance until the eighth month of the war. By then, Egypt had already effectively sealed the tunnels, and numerous alternative Arab and international methods and tools were available for Israel. Notably, Israel has been unable to find a Palestinian, Egyptian or Arab party willing to cooperate in managing the Rafah crossing and remaining in the region. Furthermore, most of its international allies oppose its presence there. US proposals for a deal with the resistance include withdrawing Israeli forces from the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor. The army leadership, headed by Yoav Gallant, and the security establishment do not see the need to remain at the crossing. This perspective is also supported by senior military commanders, including former chiefs of staff Ehud Barak and Gadi Eisenkot.
Third: The continued strong performance of the resistance and the significant attrition experienced by the Israeli army in GS, combined with Israeli and international assessments of the resistance’s ability to endure and the challenges, if not impossibility, of eliminating it in the foreseeable future. Additionally, there are growing concerns that the army may struggle to maintain control over key areas, such as Netzarim and Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridors, as Netanyahu desires, potentially leading to increasing gaps within the Israeli forces over time. All of these factors enhance the resistance’s chances of maximizing its effectiveness and imposing its terms.
Maariv newspaper (29/8/2024) reported that August 2024 was the deadliest month for the Israeli army during the war, highlighting the effectiveness of the resistance. Conversely, Israeli radio cited military officials claiming that the army’s operations in GS have largely concluded and that the political leadership has been advised that it is time to negotiate a deal with the resistance. This sentiment was echoed by Defense Minister Gallant, who initially voted against staying in the Philadelphi Corridor and later requested a re-vote in favor of withdrawing from it. Retired General Yitzhak Brik, in an article published by Haaretz on 22/8/2024, warned that “Israel will collapse within a year if the war of attrition against Hamas and Hezbollah continues,” adding, “All of the paths chosen by Israel’s political and military leadership are leading the country down a slippery slope.”
Fourth: After the Qassam Brigades were forced to execute six Israeli prisoners on August 30 before the Israeli army could intervene, the temporary “honeymoon” period Netanyahu experienced following his return from the US, buoyed by strong American support and his success in assassinating Hamas leader Isma‘il Haniyyah and Hizbullah Chief of Staff Fuad Shukr, effectively ended. The internal sentiment shifted against Netanyahu, with the prevailing belief that his approach would only return the captives in coffins. This led to massive demonstrations, with approximately 750 thousand participants demanding negotiations with the resistance. The intensity of both popular and political opposition to Netanyahu grew. Opinion polls indicated that Gantz had regained the lead over Netanyahu, with 61% of respondents dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s performance. Additionally, 53% supported the withdrawal from the Rafah crossing, and a large majority preferred that Netanyahu not run in the next elections.
Fifth: A significant challenge confronts Israel if it insists on remaining in GS and administering it militarily. It would bear direct responsibility (both in practice and under international law) for the welfare of the population, including providing relief, rebuilding infrastructure, and maintaining essential services such as schools and hospitals. Additionally, it would find itself operating in a hostile environment characterized by resistance and strong public support for it, making it impossible to perpetuate massacres indefinitely. Most Israelis believe that the last thing the Israeli leadership wants is to directly manage GS and address the civilian and daily needs of its inhabitants.
Conclusion:
By prolonging the conflict and signaling his intent to remain in GS, Netanyahu aims to cling to power and project an image of victory over the resistance and suppress popular support. However, various pressures on Netanyahu and his government undermine these efforts, especially as the resistance maintains its strong performance and continues to garner widespread support.
For over thirty years, Israel has failed to suppress resistance in WB or diminish public support, despite extensive cooperation with the Ramallah Authority. Hamas remains strong and popular in WB. Consequently, its strategies and efforts in GS are destined to fail.
The indicators suggest that the GS war is likely to be prolonged. However, Netanyahu may not fully grasp how the arrogance of power blinds him to the ongoing attrition and the substantial costs—military, security, political, economic and social—that he and his government are incurring. This situation could be interpreted as a form of divine retribution for the occupation, potentially signaling the beginning of a countdown to the decline of the Zionist project and the Israeli occupation. Conversely, this does not absolve those who are in a position to support GS from their significant responsibilities. Individuals, nations, movements and organizations must each contribute according to their capacity. It is crucial for everyone to acknowledge the critical historical juncture that the Palestine issue is experiencing, to prevent Israel from isolating GS, to stop the bloodshed and destruction, and to intensify efforts toward liberation and ending the occupation.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 17/9/2024
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