By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
(This article was written on Thursday, 19/9/2024, and published on the Arabi21 website the following day)
Escalation Factors:
The major security breakthrough achieved by the Israelis against Hizbullah, when they blew up thousands of radio receivers (pagers) owned by Hizbullah members and cadres, further fueled the conflict raging in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, intensifying confrontations between the Israel and Hizbullah. The breach was unprecedented, with estimates citing over 3,200 injuries, including 400 serious ones, and 32 killed. This raised more questions than ever about the likelihood of a large-scale war and the possibility of an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon.
Hizbullah’s participation in Operation al-Aqsa Flood, in support of the resistance in the Gaza Strip (GS), led to the displacement of about 100 thousand Israelis from northern Israel, negatively impacted tourism and the regional economy, and tied down a significant portion of the Israeli army on the northern front.
Following the assassination of its chief of staff, Fuad Shukr (Haj Muhsen), the assassination of Hamas leader Isma‘il Haniyyah, and increased Israeli escalation against Hizbullah and the resistance, Hizbullah enhanced its military operations by expanding the targeted areas in northern Israel. It employed precision missiles and drones that delivered effective strikes, further widening the battle zone and threatening an additional 100 thousand Israelis with displacement. This increased pressure on the Israeli government to shift more focus to the northern front.
Therefore, on Monday, 16/9/2024, the Israeli Cabinet approved the addition of a new objective to its declared war on GS, focusing on securing the northern front and ensuring the “safe” return of displaced Israelis to their homes in light of the Hizbullah threat.
This was accompanied by military and security assessments from senior officers and officials indicating that the military campaign in GS should conclude, as no further objectives can be achieved. They suggested it was time to reach a deal with Hamas and shift the military focus to northern Israel, making the war with Hizbullah and southern Lebanon the primary theater of the combat.
These assessments emphasized leveraging the momentum of the war to impose new conditions on Hizbullah to ensure the security of Israelis in the north—such as Hizbullah’s withdrawal and the prevention of any military or logistical presence of the resistance at a “safe distance” from the armistice lines, among other scenarios and guarantees.
Some Israeli military experts believe that ending the war with GS without addressing the issues in northern Israel and southern Lebanon is futile. They argue that the notion of the Israeli army needing about two years to rehabilitate and regroup (after halting the war in GS) before confronting Hizbullah is flawed. This is because Hizbullah’’s capacity to recover and enhance its capabilities, with support from Iran, is considered to be more dynamic and effective than the Israeli army’s ability to regain its strength. These experts believe it is essential to persist with the attrition and war, aiming to draw the US into the battle, and they are determined not to cease until their conditions are imposed on Hizbullah.
The elements of the Israeli escalation are reinforced by the state of “the arrogance of power” with the advanced military and intelligence capabilities of the Israeli side, strong US military support, and the inability of Arab, Muslim and international environments to curb Israeli aggression.
The Israeli success in carrying out grievous assassinations of leading military and security figures from Hizbullah and Hamas in Lebanon, as well as their success in executing a pre-emptive strike just before the large-scale attack that Hizbullah had planned in retaliation for the assassination of Fuad Shukr and Isma‘il Haniyyah, has further emboldened the Israelis. The harsh blow came with the explosion of the pagers, one of the most prominent means of internal communication among Hizbullah cadres and its security system, further fueling the Israeli appetite for war and their clear desire for escalation.
Based on these considerations, Israeli calculations aim to take pre-emptive action to prevent or weaken the chances of a response from Hizbullah and its allies, while not anticipating an overwhelming or decisive response that would lead to an all-out war. This assessment reflects both recent experiences and the political judgment that Hizbullah, Iran and the resistance forces outside Palestine do not wish to enter a regional war and prefer to maintain specific rules of engagement.
Restraining Factors:
On the other hand, despite the increased risk of escalation between Israel and Lebanon, influenced by the extreme religious and nationalist Zionist right which holds sway in decision-making, and despite Netanyahu’s efforts to involve the US in regional confrontations against Iran and resistance forces in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, there are significant challenges that hinder Israel from engaging in a large-scale regional war or a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, including logistical difficulties.
Israel remains entrenched in the GS quagmire and has yet to achieve any of its objectives. The resistance in GS remains strong and effective, while the Israeli army continues to be depleted and unable to control the Strip or “liberate” Israeli captives.
The Israeli army is experiencing a significant crisis in its human resources and combat personnel. In response, it has extended the service of reserve forces, trained naval personnel for ground roles, and has recruited African immigrants by offering financial incentives and permanent residence in Israel.
There is a significant shortage of equipment, particularly tanks, bulldozers and personnel carriers, many of which were destroyed by the resistance during the confrontations in GS.
There are widespread resignations from the Israeli army, with the most recent being one thousand officers expressing their desire to leave the army.
As such, it would be very difficult to launch a ground attack on Lebanon that would mobilize some 80–120 thousand Israeli soldiers.
On the other hand, the US, along with Israel’s Western allies, do not want the war to escalate into a regional war.
There are US and Western concerns about potential unrest in Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel.
These fears are intensified by the belief among opponents of expanding the war, both inside and outside Israel, that if Israel has struggled to address GS for 11 months, it is even less capable of initiating a regional war that it may start but cannot control. Such a war would expose numerous gaps and weaknesses, leading to increased losses, particularly if prolonged, in an already strained Israeli environment.
This situation enhances the prospects for the resistance’s victory and the potential beginning of the reverse countdown for the Zionist project. Consequently, they attribute Netanyahu and his extremist team’s desire to expand the war not to Israel’s higher interests but to their personal ambition to remain in power, driven by their arrogant mindset and a state of “denial” and reckless aggression.
Conclusion:
Therefore, Israel may seek more “calculated escalation” against Lebanon and might resort to using artillery and air force bombardments, including fighter jets and drones, and become more active in assassinations and intelligence operations. However, it seems that it has not yet approached the stage of a ground invasion or a declaration of total war.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 26/9/2024
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