By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Introduction
In the field of international relations, the term “third party”[2] refers to entities that are not directly involved in a given conflict but aim to assist the two conflicting parties in reaching a settlement. This role is typically undertaken with the consent of both parties involved in the dispute. However, this does not exclude the possibility of a third party intervening militarily in international conflicts. Such intervention can occur either individually, by a single state, or collectively, through international organizations or armed groups. Nevertheless, this study focuses on “peaceful” intervention aimed at enhancing the prospects for achieving a peaceful resolution to conflicts.
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To understand this role, a Holistic Approach is necessary, as negotiating a settlement involves comprehending the psychological, social, economic and military dimensions, along with their individual, bilateral and collective interactions, sometimes viewed from a historical perspective. Consequently, examining the role of a third party in the resolution of international conflicts extends beyond the realms of politics and international relations, encompassing other fields of study, such as mathematical modeling, game theory, probability theory and futures studies.[3]
A third party can be an individual, an international or regional organization, a special international committee, or a state. In the context of mediation, the third party’s role hinges on being neutral and unbiased toward either party involved in the conflict. It is essential for the mediator to possess the trust and credibility of both parties. The role of the third party in mediation encompasses three forms:
1. Facilitating communication between the parties by conveying their positions, especially when direct communication is unavailable or limited due to various complications (for example, Israel and the US on one side, and the Palestinian resistance and the broader resistance axis on the other, both refuse direct communication with Israel).
2. Identifying the points of disagreement and each side’s exact stance on each issue, which requires expertise and a deep understanding of the conflict’s subject matter.
3. Legitimizing the parties’ demands by assessing their compatibility with international law and diplomatic norms to ensure the fairness of proposed solutions.
The literature on international relations agrees that effective third-party intervention requires skill, negotiation experience, and a thorough understanding of the dispute’s context, as well as the significance of each dimension of the conflict to the involved parties. The outcomes of mediation are assessed based on the form of the proposed settlement (e.g., agreement, statement, declaration of intent, etc.), the content of the settlement (e.g., reaching a solution, implementing interim measures as a step toward a future settlement, or achieving a comprehensive or partial resolution of certain aspects, etc.), and the degree of acceptance and satisfaction among the parties with the proposed results.
It is essential to recognize the limitations of the mediator or third party’s role. These limitations can take various forms, but they are generally defined by four fundamental boundaries:[4]
1. Conciliation: An effort to bridge differences by conveying and clarifying each party’s position to the other.
2. Fact-finding: Collecting information on specific issues or facts that help clarify the positions of the conflicting parties, allowing settlements to be based on accurate and verified data.
3. Good offices: Facilitating negotiations by arranging meetings and creating a favorable environment to support the successful pursuit of a settlement.
4. Arbitration: Hearing the parties’ arguments and delivering a judgment or decision, akin to a court ruling, which the parties have agreed in advance to accept once issued.
Accordingly, the third party plays a key role in creating favorable conditions for negotiation by facilitating communication, meeting the parties’ needs to initiate talks, organizing dialogue in a calm and respectful environment, and working toward a consensus on a mutually acceptable solution. Afterward, the third party monitors the implementation and adherence to the agreed terms during the post-agreement phase. The third party’s role ranges from the most limited function of offering good offices, followed by fact-finding and conciliation, with arbitration representing the broadest extent of their involvement. In the case of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the third party’s role was confined to “conciliation.”
First: Quantitative Indicators of Third-Party Roles
Specialized studies on evaluating the role of third parties indicate that:[5]
1. Currently, 56 international conflicts involve 92 countries, highlighting the limited success of international conflict resolutions. This means that 47.66% of UN member states are engaged in some form of international conflict.
2. The number of conflicts that ended in a decisive victory fell from 49% in the 1970s to 9% in the 2010s, while conflicts that ended through peace agreements fell from 23% to 4% over the same period.
3. The Middle East remains the least peaceful region in the world. In 2024, the global average stability rating is 2.216, while the MENA regional average is 2.423. Notably, the countries that are least peaceful and are directly involved in Operation al-Aqsa Flood are listed in the following table:[6]
Table 1: Peacefulness Rate in Countries Participating Militarily in Operation al-Aqsa Flood
| Country | Peacefulness Rate (Score of 5 is the least peaceful) |
| Yemen | 3.397 |
| Israel | 3.115 |
| Iraq | 3.045 |
| Syria | 3.173 |
| Palestine | 2.872 |
| Lebanon | 2.693 |
| Iran | 2.682 |
The instability among the parties involved in Operation al-Aqsa Flood complicates the role of any third-party mediator. Additionally, the general trend in international relations shows a diminishing role for third parties in mediation, with only one-third of international conflicts involving such a role.[7] This further heightens the complexities surrounding the Operation al-Aqsa Flood situation.
Second: The Third Party in Operation al-Aqsa Flood
1. Circumstances Surrounding the Formation of the Negotiating Body in Operation al-Aqsa Flood
Following the outbreak of confrontations between Palestinian resistance and Israeli forces on 7/10/2023, diplomatic efforts commenced to contain the violence and mitigate its repercussions. The United Nations provided a platform for these initiatives, but the primary roles in mediation were assumed by the US, Egypt and Qatar. These countries successfully brokered a four-day truce on 24/11/2023, during which some prisoners were exchanged, and humanitarian aid was allowed into the Gaza Strip (GS). Unfortunately, the truce was short-lived, leading to the resumption of war. The three mediating parties continued their efforts to halt the fighting and seek a resolution to the ongoing conflict.
2. Evaluating the Influence of the Mediating Team
When examining the structure of the mediating team in this conflict, significant disparities emerge among the three parties regarding their international or regional influence. The US stands as the most powerful actor globally, possessing a far greater array of hard and soft power tools than either Egypt or Qatar. In contrast, Egypt is experiencing a rapid decline in its international standing, as evidenced by various indicators reflecting international standing, and it is grappling with severe economic and social crises.[8] Furthermore, Egypt finds itself in a precarious geostrategic situation, surrounded by conflicts in Sudan to the south, Libya to the west, GS to the north, and the Red Sea to the east. Regarding Qatar, it is a small country with several soft power assets, including its wealth, energy resources and Al Jazeera. Additionally, it maintains a close relationship with the US, highlighted by the presence of the largest US military base in the Arab world. Furthermore, Qatar and the US have collaborated in proxy diplomacy for over a decade.[9]
3. The Nature of the Relationship Between Third-Party Components and the Parties Involved in the War
The primary parties in Operation al-Aqsa Flood are the Palestinian resistance in GS, supported by various allies within the resistance axis, including Iran, Ansar Allah in Yemen, the Popular Mobilization in Iraq, and Hizbullah in Lebanon. Israel, on the other hand, maintains extensive strategic and historical ties with the US, which is reflected in the US’s unwavering support for Israeli positions in international forums, continuous military and economic assistance during the war, and a tendency to adopt Israeli stances in negotiations. Moreover, Israel categorizes the Palestinian resistance as a “terrorist movement,” effectively denying its legitimacy and any associated political rights. This characterization also leads Israel to pressure both Arab and non-Arab entities to refrain from providing substantive support for the resistance’s demands.
As for Egypt, it has maintained a peace treaty with Israel since 1979, fostering a growing economic relationship between the two countries. However, Egypt perceives the Islamic faction of the Palestinian resistance in GS as an extension of the banned Muslim Brothers (MB) movement, reflecting a broader trend in its policy to distance itself from the Palestine issue. This is evident in the restrictions placed on the movement of Gazans and the entry of aid into GS, as well as in Egypt’s acquiescence to Israel’s reoccupation of the border area between GS and Egypt, despite its inconsistency with Egyptian-Israeli agreements. Additionally, Egypt has developed close ties with the US following the strategic shift in its policies after the peace treaty with Israel.
Concerning Qatar, it is a country that recognizes Israel de facto, a term used by legal scholars to describe such recognition. This is evident from the frequent visits by senior Israeli officials, including high-ranking figures from Mossad, to Qatar. Additionally, Israeli trade office sometimes opens and closes, and Israeli sports teams consistently participate in both bilateral and international competitions held in Qatari stadiums. Conversely, Qatar maintains a close relationship with the Islamic Resistance, particularly in GS and the West Bank (WB). This relationship deepened during the period of political upheaval in Arab countries from approximately 2010 to 2020 and is primarily focused on Qatari financial support for various sectors of the Gazan community.[10]
4: The Extent of Third-Party Adherence to Mediator Traditions
The data clearly indicate a significant political imbalance between the mediating parties and the two conflicting parties, heavily favoring the Israeli side. This suggests that the third party in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict falls short of the necessary conditions expected of a mediator in international disputes. Consequently, this creates a substantial gap in effectively managing negotiations aimed at resolving the crisis.
5: Managing the Negotiations
The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the most prominent international disputes that exemplifies the challenges of achieving successful political settlements. Numerous parties have engaged in efforts to resolve the conflict, both individually, bilaterally and collectively. A contemporary example of this is the role of the Quartet (comprising the US, Russia, EU and UN) in attempting to mediate and manage the peace process. This Quarter exemplifies the dysfunctional role of third parties in the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Since 2002, it has been tasked with resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict but has failed to achieve meaningful outcomes, largely due to the influence of the US. An academic study even described the committee as “Multilateral in Name, Unilateral in Practice,”[11] serving primarily as a tool for US interests. Despite Russia’s membership, the Quartet leaned closer to adopting Israeli positions under US pressure, which led to sharp criticism from Russia.[12] If this was the case with the Quartet, the imbalance of the third-party mediator during Operation al-Aqsa Flood negotiations is even more pronounced, significantly favoring Israel. The US is once again playing a similar role as it did with the Quartet, influencing both the tone and direction of the negotiations during the Operation al-Aqsa Flood phase.[13]
To effectively manage a negotiation, several key factors must be taken into account:[14]
1. The cultural systems of the conflict parties and the third party. In the case of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, there is a significant divergence between the cultural systems of the mediators and those of the conflicting parties. Furthermore, discrepancies also exist between the systems of the conflicting parties and some of the third-party mediators. These divergences complicate the task of reaching a successful resolution.
2. The balance of power significantly shapes the demands of conflicting parties and influences the third party’s ability to mediate in a way that addresses both justice and power dynamics. This presents a complex challenge for third-party actors, as the demands of those who perceive the power balance in their favor often undermine the principles of justice and equality, particularly in international relations and, more broadly, in politics. In the context of Operation al-Aqsa Flood negotiations, achieving justice (i.e., the rights of the Palestinian people as recognized by the UN General Assembly through its resolutions, supported by a substantial majority) while addressing the significant power imbalance favoring the Israeli side proves impossible. This imbalance is further complicated by the disproportionate influence exerted by mediators, who maintain closer ties with Israel compared to the resistance. In other words, the political distance, as measured by the Triads model, renders the likelihood of achieving a sufficiently fair settlement almost negligible.[15] The gap between the mediating parties and the resistance groups is larger than that between the mediators and Israel, suggesting any settlement will likely align with existing political structures.
3. The neutrality of the US as a dominant third party and its historical and contemporary relations with the conflict parties: Voting patterns at the UN, and the lack of diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict with a clear commitment to neutrality were particularly evident during Operation al-Aqsa Flood. The US has consistently obstructed efforts that seek to promote Palestinian rights and has publicly criticized international judicial bodies for their rulings that are supportive of these rights. In contrast, Egypt and Qatar appear to exhibit greater moral sympathy towards the Palestine issue, although their capacity to effectively advocate for Palestinian interests and secure a measure of justice remains limited.
All academic studies on power-based negotiation affirm that “it involves the strategic utilization of both material and moral power variables to attain desired outcomes, rather than solely relying on theoretical argumentation.”
4. The timing of third-party intervention and the degree of coordination among mediators, particularly when the third party consists of multiple entities (such as individuals or states), are critical factors to consider.
5. The extent to which historical precedents are utilized by the parties involved in the conflict, particularly regarding conflict resolution, warrants examination. Notably, the mediating parties consist of three countries with complex and often ambiguous relations. The relationship between the US and Qatar is predominantly characterized by proxy diplomacy, while the US-Egyptian relationship is defined by dependency. Furthermore, the relations between Egypt and Qatar are marked by mutual rivalry and suspicion, which escalated to the point of severing diplomatic ties and engaging in media wars several years ago.
A quantitative model can be developed to estimate the likelihood of successfully resolving the conflict between the Axis of Resistance (in Operation al-Aqsa Flood) and Israel as follows:[16]
Table 2: Evaluation of Third-Party Variables During Operation al-Aqsa Flood
| Indicator | Strong | Medium | Weak |
| Convergence in the demands of the conflicting parties | * | ||
| Third-party interests | * | ||
| Third-party negotiating persistence | * | ||
| Conflict intensity helps the third party | * | ||
| Conflict Duration helps the third party | * | ||
| Third-party relationship balance | * | ||
| Third-party negotiation skills | * |
The evaluation of the third party’s role, as shown in the previous table, indicate that the primary factors contributing to failure are the inability to balance power dynamics and achieve political justice. Failure is evident in four distinct variables, while success is linked to only two variables. Additionally, one factor pertains to the third party’s level of commitment and persistence in fulfilling its role.
Third: Evaluating the Results
The negotiation rounds among the parties involved in the tripartite mediation exposed a significant disparity between the broader international consensus, as reflected in the UN General Assembly vote, and the actual outcomes of the third party’s involvement in the GS war. This highlights the considerable influence of the US on the mediation process, largely due to the power imbalances within the mediation committee. Additionally, the differing relationships between the mediators and the two conflicting sides (the resistance and Israel) further contributed to this dynamic.
The divergence in the priorities of the mediators (the third party) may contribute to increased complexity in the negotiation process, as illustrated by the following:
1. The US
The declared US objectives are, first, to ensure the security of Israel; second, to secure the release of Israeli captives; and third, to maintain a stable environment that does not disrupt the ongoing normalization process between Arab states and Israel.[17]
Given the US prominent role within the third-party group, its actions during negotiation processes reveal the following key insights:
a. The inconsistency between its theoretical positions and actual behavior can be illustrated by referring to two examples.
• Focusing on the humanitarian dimension in theory, criticizing the International Court of Justice’s condemnation of Israel, and avoiding pressure on Egypt and Israel to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.
• While claiming to support the Palestinians’ right to statehood through a two-state solution, it voted against Palestine’s admission as a full UN member.
b. The active involvement in military operations, the provision of over $26 billion in financial aid, along with approximately $14 billion in military assistance, and participation in efforts to repel various attacks on Israel undermines any claim of neutrality in the mediator’s role.[18]
2. Egypt
Egypt’s primary objectives encompass preventing the emigration of the GS population into Egypt and thwarting the successful resistance in Gaza, led by its religious faction, from becoming an attractive model that could influence Egypt’s position on jihadist movements. Additionally, Egypt seeks to ensure regional stability, especially in light of the adverse effects on its economy caused by disruptions in maritime navigation through the Red Sea. Finally, Egypt aims to maintain a strategic disengagement from the Palestine issue in order to preserve its relations with the US, even if this entails compromising Palestinian interests.[19]
3. Qatar
Its primary objectives include effectively engaging in proxy diplomacy, which involves politically and financially strengthening its relations with Hamas. This strategy aims to preserve its central role in US policy regarding the Gulf region while safeguarding its security against two significant threats: first, the ambitions of certain Gulf states toward Qatar, as demonstrated during the 2017 crisis; and second, the necessity of defending itself against potential conflicts with Iran.[20]
All the variables discussed contribute to the likelihood of failure for the third party to achieve the desired outcomes in this ongoing war, which has persisted for a year and has resulted in significant humanitarian consequences.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The resistance needed to reject the framework imposed by the third party (the mediator). Instead, it should have actively sought the involvement of additional stakeholders who could contribute to a more balanced negotiation process. These parties would play a critical role in formulating proposals and identifying the party that is most evasive in addressing solutions or engaging meaningfully with the negotiation outcomes.
The resistance should strive to engage additional stakeholders in the diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the conflict in GS. It is crucial that any new participant possesses a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making while maintaining relations with both parties involved in the war. For instance, Turkey, which maintains political, economic and security ties with Israel, could potentially exert greater influence than the two Arab parties, due to its demonstrated independence in decision-making, as evidenced by various instances of diplomatic confrontations with the US.
Furthermore, the international community has the potential to involve additional parties beyond the two Arab countries, which may offer a more impartial, neutral and independent perspective. Certain Nordic countries, known for their significant experience in mediating conflicts in the Middle East, could make valuable contributions in this regard. Additionally, the roles of Russia, China, and Brazil should not be overlooked.
Despite these considerations, negotiation is still constrained by the prevailing balance of power. While the physical and moral dimensions of power are critical, the skillful management of the negotiation process is equally significant. This necessitates a concerted effort to engage additional parties that align with the criteria established for the third party in this conflict.
[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] For details, see Ronald J. Fisher, “Methods of Third-Party Intervention,” in B. Austin, M. Fischer and H.J. Giessmann (eds.), Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II (Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011), https://berghof-foundation.org/files/publications/fisher_handbookII.pdf
See also the following study that deals with topics related to the Arab-Zionist conflict: “The impact of Third-Party: Mechanisms in conflict resolution,” site of Norwegian Refugee Council, https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/tiph/tiph-report.pdf; and Jacob Bercovitch, “Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions of Effective Mediation in International Relations,” International Journal, vol. 4, no. 4, 1985, pp. 736–752.
[3] Sylvia Lafair, Game Theory and Conflict: Unraveling the Prisoner’s Dilemma, site of LinkedIn, 28/10/2023, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/game-theory-conflict-unraveling-prisoners-dilemma-sylvia-lafair-fa6jc
[4] Jean-Sébastien Rioux, “Third Party Interventions in International Conflicts: Theory and Evidence,” Presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, NS, 30/5–1/6/2003, pp. 3–7 and 15–16.
[5] GLOBAL PEACE INDEX: Highest number of countries engaged in conflict since World War II, site of Vision of Humanity, 11/6/2024, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/highest-number-of-countries-engaged-in-conflict-since-world-war-ii/#:~:text=Highest%20number%20of%20countries%20in,most%20since%20the%20GPI’s%20inception; and Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World (Sydney, June 2024), https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf
[6] Ibid.
[7] Magnus Lundgren and Isak Svensson, “The surprising decline of international mediation in armed conflicts,” Research and Politics journal, vol. 7, no. 2, 2020, pp. 3-4.
[8] Egypt ranks among the most fragile countries according to 12 indicators encompassing various aspects of political, economic, social and military life. As per the specialized model, Egypt’s fragility rate stands at 68% in 2023 and is projected to rise to 69% in 2024, see details in: Nate Haken et al., “Fragile States Index 2023 – Annual Report,” site of Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace (FFP), 14/6/2023, https://fragilestatesindex.org/2023/06/14/fragile-states-index-2023-annual-report, and https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/FSI-2023-Report_final.pdf; and Luca Ventura, World’s Most Peaceful Country 2024 Global Peace Index, site of Global Finance, 12/6/2024, https://gfmag.com/data/most-peaceful-countries
[9] The phrase “proxy diplomacy” was first introduced in a thesis at Atlanta University in 1989, where the researcher defined the concept as a “form of diplomacy in which one party carries out a mission, ostensibly for its own interest, but overall serves another party’s interest.” See details in Frederick Wafula Okumu, “Diplomacy through proxies? The superpowers’ involvement in Angola 1989” (M.A Thesis, Atlanta University, 1989), pp. 34–37; Fact Sheet: The U.S.-Qatar Strategic Partnership, Office of the Spokesperson, site of U.S. Department of State, 5/3/2024, https://www.state.gov/the-u-s-qatar-strategic-partnership; Analysis: Qatar’s Complex Role Seen as Critical to US Foreign Policy, site of Voice of America (VOA), 26/10/2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/analysis-qatar-s-complex-role-seen-as-critical-to-us-foreign-policy-/7328765.html; and Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio and Leticia Rodriguez GarCia, The foreign policy of Qatar: From a mediating role to an active one, Revista Española de Ciencia Política, No. 56, July 2021, pp. 105–110.
[10] About the relationship see Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “Sport Diplomacy: World Cup Qatar as an Example,” site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 3/1/2023, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2023/01/03/academic-paper-sport-diplomacy-world-cup-qatar-as-an-example/
[11] Nathalie Tocci, “The EU, the Middle East Quartet and (In) effective Multilateralism,” MERCURY, E-paper No. 9, June 2011, pp. 15, 19, 23 and 26–27.
[12] Site of tass— Russian News Agency, 13/12/2023, https://tass.com/politics/1720127
[13] Belén Fernández, The US is Israel’s accomplice, not a ceasefire mediator, site of Al Jazeera, 28/8/2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/8/28/the-us-is-israels-accomplice-not-a-ceasefire-mediator
[14] On the role of culture in the negotiation process and its influence on patterns of dialogue, goal expression, acceptance of bargaining, and the mental images held by the parties involved, see Kai Lucke and Aloys Rigaut “Cultural Issues in International Mediation,” site of University of Nottingham, June 2002, https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/groups/ctccs/projects/translating-cultures/documents/journals/cultural-issues-mediation.pdf; Simon A. Mason, “Mediation and Facilitation
in Peace Processes,” International relations and security network, Center for Security Studies, site of ETH Zurich, 2007, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30542/dossier_Mediation_and_Facilitation.pdf; and Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds.), International Conflict.
Mediation: New approaches and findings (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), https://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/server/api/core/bitstreams/b69bd3f6-4843-466a-a018-5ba11c05302e/content
[15] Klingberg’s concept of triads posits that in a tripartite relationship during warfare, conflict occurs between “two of the parties,” while the role of the third party is determined by the political distance (degree of hostility) between all three actors. See details in Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Al-Dirasat al-Mustaqbaliyyah fi al-‘Alakat al-Duwaliyyah (Futuristic Studies in International Relations), 2nd edition (Morocco: ‘Uyun al-Maqalat, 1993), pp. 45-49. And see Frank L. Klingberg, “Studies in measurement of the relations among sovereign states,” Psychometrika journal, no. 6, 1941, pp. 335–352.
[16] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches (University of Michigan Press, 2009), pp. 19–46.
[17] Jang Ji-Hyang, “U.S. Strategy for the War in Gaza: Changes and Prospects,” Issue Briefs, site of Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 13/5/2024, https://en.asaninst.org/contents/us-strategy-for-the-war-in-gaza-changes-and-prospects
[18] Swords of Iron: An Overview, site of The Institute for National Studies (INSS), https://www.inss.org.il/publication/war-data
[19] Egypt’s Gaza Dilemmas, Briefing 91, site of International Crisis Group, 16/5/2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/egypt-israelpalestine/b91-egypts-gaza-dilemmas
[20] Qatar and the Gaza War, site of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 5/8/2024, https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/51964/qatar-and-the-gaza-war
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