Strategic Assessment (143): Determinants and Prospective Scenarios of China’s Position Toward a Potential Israeli-US War on Iran

Reading Time: 12 minutes

By: Dr. Mohammad Makram Balawi.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Abstract:

This strategic assessment examines China’s approach to the ongoing US-Israeli war against Iran, operating on the central premise that Beijing is managing the crisis through a combination of economic, strategic and security considerations.

More specifically, China’s conduct reflects a complex balancing strategy. On the one hand, it seeks to safeguard its energy security through continued access to discounted Iranian supplies; on the other, it aims to preserve Iran’s role as a key geopolitical node and a critical Eurasian corridor for sustaining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Concurrently, Beijing endeavors to avoid jeopardizing its strategic relationships with its Arab Gulf partners.

At the diplomatic and operational level, this strategic assessment underscores the UN framework as a normative shield aimed at preventing the consolidation of precedents that could legitimize doctrines such as “pre-emptive strikes” or “regime change.” In this regard, China’s activity within the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the broader UN system is particularly significant. Concurrently, it seeks to internationalize the crisis through Global South platforms, notably BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), while also extending asymmetric technical and financial support designed to offset Western sanctions and reduce their coercive impact.

As events escalate, China’s room for maneuver is gradually narrowing. Although Beijing seeks to leverage the crisis to deplete US resources and divert attention away from East Asia, the prospect of regime collapse in Iran constitutes a critical red line that implicates core Chinese national security interests. Accordingly, this trajectory may compel Beijing to move, albeit reluctantly, towards a higher degree of direct strategic engagement in order to avert such an outcome.

Introduction

China’s reading of the contemporary Middle Eastern landscape is grounded in a long-standing tradition of pragmatism that began to crystallize in 1979. At a time when the international community was closely monitoring the trajectory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Beijing emerged as one of the first major powers to recognize the new regime. This move was informed by a strategic calculus that regarded the reduction of US influence in the region as a necessary objective; accordingly, the fall of the Shah’s regime was interpreted as a contraction of that influence.

Crucially, this stance did not reflect ideological alignment. Rather, it signaled an early Chinese effort to cultivate a regional partner that shared its concerns regarding unipolar dominance.

Over the ensuing four decades, bilateral relations deepened progressively, ultimately evolving into a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” a process that reached its apex in 2021 with the signing of a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement. China currently perceives the US–Israeli war on Iran as a direct threat to its strategic projects and core interests, not least because Iran constitutes a pivotal partner in China’s energy security. Under the prevailing sanctions regime, Beijing is estimated to absorb nearly 90% of Iran’s oil exports, while concurrently advancing extensive strategic investments in the country’s infrastructure and energy sectors.

More fundamentally, China’s regional posture has evolved beyond that of a mere “largest oil buyer.” Rather, through the Global Security Initiative (GSI), it increasingly positions itself as a consequential power that opposes regime change by force and frames unilateral sanctions as “economic terrorism” that undermines global stability.

In this context, China’s stance on this war emerges as a key determinant. On the one hand, Beijing seeks to secure energy flows from Iran under preferential terms and beyond dollar-based mechanisms. On the other hand, it may interpret the war as a potential drain on US military capacity, thereby opening a strategic window to advance the reconfiguration of a multipolar international order, with the Middle East as a central arena.

First: The Historical Trajectory of China–Iran Relations

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) position toward the Islamic Revolution in Iran was characterized by a pragmatic orientation. Notwithstanding the pronounced ideological divergence between Chinese communism and Iran’s revolutionary Islamic system, Beijing maintained diplomatic relations with Tehran. During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), it pursued a carefully balanced approach, engaging with both Iran and Iraq. Although China developed military ties with each side to varying degrees, it consistently articulated a discourse grounded in the principles of state sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and the preservation of stability. Moreover, Beijing sustained active channels of communication with Iran, opposed Western efforts to isolate or destabilize the Iranian regime, and continued to underscore its enduring commitment to the principle of “state sovereignty.”

Second: Structural Factors and Determinants of Chinese Behavior

China’s approach to the current military confrontation is shaped by a complex interplay of geopolitical and economic constraints, which, in turn, compel Beijing to adopt a carefully calibrated and balanced posture. These determinants may be outlined as follows:

1. Energy security and economic interests

Energy constitutes a central pillar of China’s strategic outlook toward Iran. In this regard, the “Comprehensive Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China” agreement, signed in March 2021, serves as the cornerstone of bilateral economic and strategic relations, with energy at its core. According to official statements, China is expected to invest approximately $400 billion in Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemical sectors. In return, it secures stable, long-term supplies of Iranian oil at discounted rates and under flexible payment arrangements, thereby reinforcing its energy security.

Furthermore, the agreement is oriented toward guaranteeing sustained energy flows over the long term, rather than functioning as a series of immediate investment commitments. At present, China accounts for roughly 90% of Iran’s total oil exports, importing between 1.2 and 1.5 million barrels per day at discounted rates.

The agreement further incorporates Iran into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), notably through the development of strategic ports such as Jask and Chabahar, alongside the expansion of railway and highway networks connecting Iran to Central Asian states and, ultimately, to China. In doing so, it effectively positions Iran as a pivotal logistical hub within Chinese trade routes extending toward Europe and the Middle East. Moreover, the agreement encompasses the transfer of Chinese technology and the upgrading of Iran’s telecommunications infrastructure. In addition, it includes select military and security dimensions, particularly intelligence-sharing arrangements and cooperation in counterterrorism.

At the same time, Beijing has developed parallel financial mechanisms based on the use of the Chinese yuan for settlements, designed to circumvent US sanctions. Taken together, these measures both reinforce China’s energy security and help mitigate the risk of a severe deterioration of the Iranian economy.

2. The geopolitical determinant and the “Eurasian land bridge”

In order to fully appreciate Iran’s centrality within Beijing’s strategic calculus, geography must be understood as a primary structuring force of Chinese foreign policy. Accordingly, China has consistently sought to secure stable continental transit routes that reduce its structural dependence on maritime corridors largely shaped by Western control. Within this context, the “Eurasian land bridge” denotes a strategic railway component of the BRI, linking eastern China to Europe via Central Asia. This overland corridor not only shortens shipping times relative to maritime routes but also strengthens trade flows and deepens logistical interdependence between the two continents.

Against this backdrop, Iran emerges as a pivotal “geopolitical node” connecting Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia and Europe, while simultaneously enabling China to bypass sea lanes subject to US dominance. This consideration is further underscored by China’s vulnerability to key maritime chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Malacca, which constitutes a strategic threat to its national security in the event of conflict or a US-led blockade. Iran, by contrast, offers an alternative trans-regional corridor that integrates land and sea routes, thereby facilitating the flow of energy and goods outside Western-controlled maritime space.

Consequently, China’s position is shaped by the imperative of safeguarding this corridor within the BRI, thereby ensuring the continuity of trade flows toward Europe while mitigating exposure to strategically sensitive maritime chokepoints

3. The regional balance determinant (The Chinese-Pakistani-Iranian triangle)

China recognizes that any collapse of Iran would entail significant strategic costs, including disruptions to energy supplies, risks to BRI projects, and wider instability along Pakistan’s borders, which constitute a key axis of its regional influence in Asia. Accordingly, its approach is shaped by the imperative of maintaining a delicate equilibrium between its long-standing security partner, Pakistan, and its critical energy partner, Iran.

In this context, Beijing has increasingly positioned itself as a stabilizing actor in the region, deepening cooperation with Tehran within a non-confrontational framework while simultaneously expanding its engagement in multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. At the same time, it remains cognizant that any overt military alignment with Iran could strain its ties with Islamabad and generate concerns among Gulf states. Therefore, it has opted for a flexible, connectivity-driven strategy centered on linking strategic ports such as Gwadar and Chabahar and reinforcing border stability, rather than entering into formal military alliances that could trigger opposing regional alignments and ultimately undermine its broader strategic interests.

4. Determinants of relations with Washington and Israel

China’s approach to the current war is primarily framed within the broader context of its strategic competition with the US. Accordingly, it views the war as a potential arena for the attrition of US resources and, simultaneously, for diverting Washington’s attention away from its “Pivot to Asia” strategy, which is designed to contain China’s influence in the South China Sea and in relation to Taiwan.

Within this framework, Beijing calibrates its relationship with Iran on the basis of preserving regime stability and averting state collapse, while carefully avoiding direct confrontation with the US or any form of overt military involvement. This balancing act enables China to sustain its role as an influential external actor without becoming a direct party to the escalation.

In parallel, Beijing maintains a carefully managed relationship with Israel in order to protect its sensitive technological and economic interests. To this end, it relies primarily on indirect and “soft” instruments, including mechanisms for circumventing sanctions and the use of alternative currencies in trade, thereby sustaining Iran’s economic resilience while avoiding military entanglement.

5. Determinant related to the Gulf

China prioritizes the preservation of its extensive network of interests with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states as a central determinant of its approach to the current war. Accordingly, it continues to avoid any configuration in which its partnership with Tehran could alienate its principal economic partners in the Gulf.

In this context, Beijing recognizes that an unequivocal alignment with Iran would entail significant economic costs, particularly in terms of trade and investment with GCC states, whose combined exchange exceeds $300 billion. Notably, Saudi Arabia and the UAE constitute far more consequential commercial and technological partners than Iran’s sanction-constrained market. Furthermore, the Arab Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, remains China’s most stable and largest external energy supplier. Consequently, any disruption of Gulf maritime routes as a result of the war would directly threaten China’s energy security and industrial stability. Against this backdrop, China has sought to position itself as a mediator, as reflected in the “Beijing Agreement” of March 2023, which facilitated the resumption of Saudi–Iranian relations and aimed to reduce geopolitical risks surrounding China’s energy lifelines.

Accordingly, China’s stance on the current war is shaped by a dual imperative: preventing the collapse of Iran without jeopardizing relations with the Gulf states, thereby balancing access to Iranian energy supplies with the protection of its broader commercial and investment interests in the Gulf region.

6. Prospects for a new international order

China’s approach to the crisis is embedded in a broader strategic vision aimed at restructuring the existing international system, which it has long criticized as being grounded in Western hegemony. In its view, the current order is characterized by double standards, hierarchical relations, the marginalization of Global South interests, and a limited capacity to manage or resolve international crises.

Against this backdrop, China seeks to leverage its management of the Israeli–US war on Iran as a catalyst for accelerating multipolarity. It interprets US disarray in conducting the war as evidence of the decline of unipolarity, thereby reinforcing China’s positioning as an alternative balancing pole. This is reflected in growing official discourse calling for a reconfiguration of global governance structures in line with its own values and interests, with the aim of promoting more equitable and effective approaches to global crisis management. It is further evidenced in the accelerated expansion of yuan-denominated trade settlements and the strengthening of alternative financial infrastructures, most notably the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). Taken together, these mechanisms are intended to facilitate partner access to global markets while reducing dependence on Western sanctions regimes.

At the same time, China aims to position itself as a leading contender for post-war reconstruction in Iran, particularly in the energy, transport and communications sectors. This ambition rests on the assumption that major infrastructure projects have already been embedded within the framework of the “Comprehensive Cooperation Document,” including port modernization, railway electrification, and 5G development. Consequently, any future reconstruction process is expected to align closely with these pre-existing arrangements.

Third: Official Position and Diplomatic Performance

Chinese diplomacy approaches the war on Iran through a cautious strategy that avoids direct confrontation while carefully balancing legal discourse with restrained diplomatic engagement. This approach can be traced across several interrelated dimensions:

1. Contestation of legitimacy in the UN Security Council (UNSC)

Beijing has consistently used the UN as a principal arena for challenging Western narratives, grounding its position in the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty, as well as in the GSI launched by Xi Jinping in 2023, which rejects regime change and opposes the abuse of unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction.

Central to this stance is China’s concern that any UN endorsement of pre-emptive US–Israeli strikes against Iranian facilities could establish a “legal precedent” later invoked by Washington to justify similar actions against Chinese interests in the South China Sea or Taiwan under the logic of “potential threat.” Consequently, during UNSC deliberations on the right to self-defense, the Chinese Permanent Representative has repeatedly argued that Article 51 of the UN Charter must not be interpreted as a blanket authorization for pre-emptive strikes or violations of state sovereignty. In parallel, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on 2/4/2026 that US–Israeli actions were responsible for the escalation of maritime insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz, while on 19/3/2026 it condemned the targeting of Iranian leadership as “unacceptable.”

2. Framing sanctions as “economic terrorism”

Beijing categorically rejects unilateral sanctions. In its official discourse, it has repeatedly characterized US economic pressure on Tehran as “economic terrorism,” arguing that it directly undermines civilian livelihoods. Concurrently, China has accelerated the expansion of CIPS as a functional complement to the Western SWIFT system.

Although still in the process of broader consolidation, CIPS provides Iran with an alternative channel for settling oil trade in yuan, thereby partially circumventing US sanctions and sustaining economic transactions outside the dollar-dominated financial order.

3. Leveraging global and regional frameworks (BRICS and SCO)

China has sought to recast the war issue from a “bilateral” confrontation into a “global” concern for the Global South. Through platforms such as BRICS and SCO, both of which now include Iran as a full member with Chinese support, Beijing has aimed to foster a collective stance against unilateral sanctions and the militarization of maritime routes by the US.

More broadly, China advances the principle that Middle Eastern security should be regionally owned and cooperatively managed, as consistently emphasized by its foreign policy leadership. In this context, it rejects Western military alliances, which it views as reinforcing instability. This approach has been partially operationalized through China’s mediation of the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement.

4. Indirect technical and informational support

Although China refrains from overt military involvement, its official posture provides Iran with significant scope for “security and technical cooperation.” This is reflected in intelligence sharing and cyber defense collaboration, and, most importantly, in access to China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) as an alternative to the US-operated Global Positioning System (GPS). Such access enhances the autonomy of Iran’s missile and drone capabilities while mitigating their vulnerability to Western electronic warfare and jamming.

From Beijing’s standpoint, the strengthening of Iran’s defensive capacity, particularly within the framework of the 25-year cooperation agreement, is framed as a legitimate act of self-defense. In effect, this approach constitutes an indirect response to the unconditional US support for Israel in the ongoing confrontation.

Fourth: Future Scenarios

It is not feasible to delineate fixed scenarios for Beijing’s behavior without situating them within the scale of threats to its core interests, strategic initiatives and broader trajectory as an emerging global power. Accordingly, and contingent upon the evolution of a war against Iran, three principal scenarios can be identified, each reflecting varying degrees and modalities of Chinese engagement.

Scenario One: Non-Engagement

In this scenario, China confines itself to non-involvement in the crisis, avoiding military entanglement while maintaining diplomatic backing for Iran at the UNSC. Simultaneously, it sustains economic engagement with Tehran, particularly through continued purchases of Iranian oil at preferential rates. This scenario is most likely if the war remains limited to reciprocal strikes and does not escalate into large-scale destruction of Iranian infrastructure or a ground invasion, thereby avoiding any existential disruption to Chinese supply chains.

From Beijing’s standpoint, this is the most favorable outcome, insofar as it enables the gradual erosion of US resources and international standing, while preserving China’s relations with Arab Gulf states and Israel, and averting the collapse of the Iranian regime.

Scenario Two: Moderate Engagement

In this scenario, China would increase its level of support for Iran without moving toward direct military involvement. This would likely entail expanded technological assistance, including full access to the BDS to enhance Iranian missile and drone guidance, alongside the provision of satellite imagery and strengthened cyber capabilities. Concurrently, Beijing could leverage BRICS and SCO to apply coordinated economic pressure.

Such a shift would become more probable were the US and Israel to pursue regime change or to effectively neutralize Iran’s oil sector, which Beijing would interpret as a direct threat to its Eurasian connectivity agenda and a significant disruption to its energy security and broader economic interests.

Scenario Three: Maximum Engagement

In this scenario, China would depart from its traditionally cautious and calibrated posture and become substantially engaged in the war. This would not necessarily entail direct military intervention; rather, it could involve the deployment of naval forces in the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Hormuz under the pretext of “safeguarding Chinese commercial shipping.” Concurrently, Beijing could activate direct security cooperation mechanisms and employ economic leverage to expedite a cessation of hostilities.

Such a shift would likely occur only if China’s core economic interests were severely threatened, particularly in the case of a full-scale war resulting in a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Arabian Sea and the Bab al-Mandab. In this context, the disruption of over 50% of China’s energy imports, coupled with financial market instability, would generate acute domestic vulnerabilities and pose a direct threat to China’s internal national security, including electricity shortages and potential industrial collapse.

Conclusion

China is expected to avoid direct involvement in the war; however, the ongoing escalation and the fluid nature of the battlefield may nonetheless generate a clear upward trajectory in Beijing’s strategic posture toward the crisis.

In this context, it is increasingly plausible that China could gradually shift toward higher, albeit still indirect, levels of engagement, particularly if the war becomes protracted and develops into a war of attrition that risks the structural collapse of the Iranian regime. Under such conditions, the fall of Tehran would not represent a mere loss of a regional partner; rather, it would signify the dismantling of the “Eurasian bridge” and the disruption of a critical energy corridor, both of which constitute red lines with direct implications for Chinese national security. Nevertheless, any such adjustment would remain tightly constrained by caution and complex strategic calculations, as Beijing would seek to preserve its doctrine of “peaceful rise” while avoiding direct confrontation with major powers.