By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
The “unanimous” re-election of Mahmud ‘Abbas as head of Fatah during its Eighth General Conference (May 2026) is both striking and revealing. At 91 years old (born in February 1935), ‘Abbas has now led the movement for about 22 years. Since Fatah’s establishment in 1957, it has had only two leaders: Yasir ‘Arafat until his death in 2004, followed by Mahmud ‘Abbas. What makes this outcome particularly striking, however, is that all public opinion polls conducted during 2024–2025 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), an independent institution based in Ramallah, consistently revealed overwhelming Palestinian dissatisfaction in both the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS) with ‘Abbas’s performance, alongside broad support for his resignation from the leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The proportion calling for his resignation ranged from 80% to 88%. Consequently, and given Fatah’s own level of popular support, it may reasonably be inferred that substantial segments within the movement itself also favor his departure.
A second noteworthy observation is that ‘Abbas has consistently lacked any realistic prospect of defeating Hamas candidates in a Palestinian presidential election, according to all previous polling data. Whether the challenger was Isma‘il Haniyyah, Yahya Sinwar during their respective leadership periods, or Khalid Mish‘al throughout 2025, Hamas candidates consistently outperformed him by substantial margins. Across these polls, Hamas contenders secured between 63% and 76% of the vote, whereas support for ‘Abbas ranged from only 20% to 27%.
By contrast, the imprisoned Marwan Barghouti remains the sole Fatah figure with a credible chance of defeating Hamas candidates in a potential election. Indeed, Barghouti’s broad appeal stems from his consensus-oriented image, his opposition to the Oslo Accords, his perceived affinity with the resistance camp, and his cross-factional national symbolism. Collectively, these factors position him as a uniquely viable presidential contender.
A third dimension concerns the widespread perception of corruption within the PA in Ramallah under ‘Abbas’s leadership. For instance, about 80% of respondents in an October 2025 survey expressed the view that corruption is pervasive. Moreover, when the sample is limited to residents of the WB, territories under the effective administration of ‘Abbas, that figure rises to 92%.
Against this backdrop, the “consensus” achieved by ‘Abbas appears, in the view of many observers, less the product of genuine internal agreement and more the result of prior “structuring” of the General Conference, including its composition and outcomes, under his direct oversight. Consequently, Fatah emerged from its Eighth General Conference having lost a historic opportunity to renew itself, restore its vitality and reorient its political compass as an effective national movement within the broader Palestine issue and its confrontation with Israel. As a result, the Fatah movement continues to grapple with a set of interrelated crises: a leadership deficit, a crisis of vision, structural and organizational weaknesses, and an absence of coherent strategic direction… an assessment that has been repeatedly voiced by numerous cadres and supporters within its own ranks.
Popular Support for the Palestinian Factions:
The five public opinion polls conducted in the WB and GS during 2024–2025 consistently showed Hamas maintaining a clear lead in Palestinian public support. Across these surveys, support for Hamas ranged between 32% and 40%, compared to 17%–24% for Fatah, while all other factions combined received between 7% and 12%. Furthermore, in hypothetical legislative elections held at the time of polling and contested by all political forces, Hamas was projected to secure between 42.9% and 46.4% of the vote, whereas Fatah’s projected share ranged from 21.5% to 30%. By comparison, all remaining factions collectively were expected to obtain only 5.8%–10%.
Taken together, these findings suggest that Hamas remained the leading force in Palestinian public opinion throughout the two years following Operation al-Aqsa Flood and was the faction best positioned to assume political leadership through free elections. Moreover, given that most other Palestinian factions, including Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and Palestinian National Initiative (PNI), support the resistance camp and reject the Oslo-based peace process, the data further indicate that a majority of Palestinians continue to align with the resistance option.
This dynamic, in turn, helps explain the persistent reluctance of Mahmud ‘Abbas—and, by extension, the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the PA and Fatah—to hold elections inclusive of all Palestinian factions. Indeed, ‘Abbas has consistently insisted that participation in any electoral process be conditioned on prior recognition of the Oslo Accords and adherence to the political commitments of the PLO. At the same time, this stance also explains his resistance to any serious national reconciliation initiative that could facilitate the restructuring of the PLO on genuinely democratic and representative foundations.
Blaming Hamas or Blaming the Israeli Occupation:
There is no doubt that the suffering inflicted on the Palestinian people, particularly in GS, during the Israeli aggression accompanying Operation al-Aqsa Flood has been immense and ongoing. Nevertheless, public opinion surveys consistently indicate that Palestinians overwhelmingly identify the Israeli occupation, and its US ally, as the primary party responsible for the war and its humanitarian devastation, with attribution rates ranging between 78% and 87%. By contrast, those blaming Hamas constituted only 7%–14% over the past two years. These findings undermine the claims advanced by Mahmud ‘Abbas and his supporters that Hamas alone “dragged” Palestinians into war and bears responsibility for the resulting devastation. At the very least, a distinction persists between the actor responsible for the killing, destruction and starvation, and the actor that mobilized its human and material resources in defense of its people, land and holy sites, irrespective of differing assessments of its strategic calculations. Similarly, there is a marked contrast between those who sought to defend al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem and those who remained passive, normalized relations, continued coordination with the enemy, and effectively stood by during Israel’s massacres.
Accordingly, a poll conducted after the ceasefire announcement between 22–25/10/2025 found that 36% of Palestinians reported increased support for Hamas to varying degrees, excluding the movement’s traditional support base.
Three Messages:
Finally, three key messages may be conveyed to Mahmud ‘Abbas and the Fatah leadership:
First: The struggle confronting the Palestinian people is fundamentally existential, as it seeks to erase and nullify the Palestine issue altogether. Consequently, the current moment demands a political posture commensurate with the scale of the challenge, one that transcends narrow factional interests and limited self-serving calculations.
Second: Hamas and the resistance factions represent an enduring political and social force deeply embedded within Palestinian collective consciousness. As such, they cannot realistically be bypassed or marginalized. The Fatah leadership should therefore abandon ineffective strategies aimed at excluding or diminishing the role of the resistance.
Third: Just as Hamas and the resistance factions are being systematically targeted, the Fatah leadership is likewise being targeted, while both the PLO and the PA face ongoing pressures of fragmentation and dismantlement. Accordingly, the priority at this stage should be the establishment of a genuine national partnership capable of mobilizing the full political and societal capacities of the Palestinian people in confronting the Zionist project. This, in turn, requires abandoning the persistent reliance on appeasing Israel or the US, as well as the attempt to present the PA as a substitute for the resistance that satisfies the conditions imposed by the Israeli occupation.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 23/5/2026
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