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By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Experts in political systems agree that while individual differences among senior leaders play a role in any political system, the type of system—whether institutionalized, semi-institutionalized, or authoritarian—determines the extent of that influence. In more institutionalized systems, the structured framework limits the impact of individual differences, whereas less institutionalized or authoritarian systems allow greater scope for personal influence.

The US political system is deeply institutionalized, limiting leaders’ differences primarily to tactical policies rather than strategic visions. Over 150 years (1870–2020), US presidents engaged in wars 47% of the time under Democrats and 53% under Republicans. In the Middle East, since the 1967 defeat, eleven presidents—five Democrats and six Republicans—have pledged “a just settlement of the Palestine issue” in official statements and international forums, yet none of these promises have been fulfilled. Between 1914 and 2020, 182 international blockades were imposed, either unilaterally by the US or jointly with other countries—95 during Republican administrations and 87 under Democratic ones, a split of 52.2% to 47.8%.

Regarding US vetoes protecting Israel, the veto was used 45 times from 1972 to 2024, starting under Republican President Richard Nixon, with 33 under Republicans and 12 under Democrats, including the last three under Democrat Joe Biden. Comparatively, the US has issued a total of 89 vetoes on global matters, with more than half supporting Israel. These indicators suggest the limited influence of individual leaders compared to the power of establishment. US foreign policy, whether under Democrats or Republicans, remains largely consistent, underscoring the restricted role of individuals—especially when the president aligns with the congressional majority, as is expected for the next four years.

Trump’s Orientations:

A report by 35 US psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, along with observations of Donald Trump’s behavior during his first term (2016–2020), and the influence of institutionalism in US decision-making, all highlight the following:

First: Trump’s governing philosophy is deeply rooted in a merchant culture and extreme pragmatism, shaping his future orientations within the bounds of institutional limits. Psychologically, he aligns with traits of pathological narcissism, showing little regard for principles, morals, values or international law, except where they offer utilitarian benefit. While most US presidents do not significantly differ from Trump in policy content, he stands apart by not cloaking his actions in the rhetoric of human rights and democracy. Such slogans are notably absent from his political discourse. Trump presents himself without this pretense, embracing a starkly pragmatic, if opportunistic, approach. His stance on international law is analyzed in the recent study, “The Trump Administration and International Law,” by Harold Hongju Koh.

Second: During his election campaign, Trump presented three key slogans. The first, “The future belongs to patriots, not globalists,” emphasized that US interests should take precedence over human rights, the interests of allies, or even global capitalism. The second slogan called for abandoning military interventionism, except in extreme cases (reflecting his promise to end wars during his new term).

Third: Prioritizing the economy over political, military or other factors.

In light of the above, it appears his stances will be as follows:

1. He views NATO negatively, considering it an economic burden due to its reliance on US defense spending, which covered 71% of NATO’s expenditures during Trump’s first term. Throughout his term and election campaigns, Trump repeatedly urged major European countries to increase their military spending to at least 2% of GDP. However, most of these countries (10 out of 32) spend less than 2%, with Trump accusing them of cutting their NATO contributions instead of meeting the target, potentially sparking a US-European conflict over the issue.

2.
Trump believes US spending on Ukraine now exceeds Europe’s total contributions; a situation he finds illogical. He argues that the US should reconsider its unique responsibility in bearing this burden. During his campaign, he even claimed he could end the war in Ukraine within a day, implying that this would allow Russia to gain more ground and solidify its position on the Ukrainian front.

3.
The large trade deficit between the US and China, which favored China, is a significant concern for Trump. By the end of 2023, it had surpassed $279 billion. To address this, Trump plans to further reduce the deficit by imposing tariffs, financial restrictions, and other trade measures. During the final two years of his first presidency (2018–2020), the deficit decreased from approximately $418 billion to $307 billion, suggesting that he will revert to the policies he pursued in the latter half of his first term in his approach to China.

4.
He seems poised to leverage Iranian political trends to intensify Gulf concerns, using this to blackmail Gulf Arab regimes. He had previously warned them that without US support, Iranian forces could reach their capitals within minutes, implying that these Gulf states must contribute to the revenue stream of the US military-industrial complex. During Trump؛s first term, Saudi defense spending was 9.6%, of GDP, but it fell to 7.5% in the subsequent years, reflecting a 2% higher defense spending ratio during Trump’s tenure compared to his predecessor.

On the other hand, any new efforts by Iran to revive the nuclear deal canceled by Trump during his first term are likely to be ignored. As Kamal Kharazi, advisor to the Iran’s supreme leader, stated on 1/11/2024, this may lead Iran to “review its nuclear doctrine,” which could complicate Trump’s position by undermining his attempts to avoid direct involvement in Middle East conflicts.

5.
Egypt: In his first presidential term, Western media reported that the Egyptian president paid $10 million to support Trump’s campaign (The Washington Post), a topic revisited by Democratic lawmakers during the recent US election. It seems that Egypt is Trump’s least favorite country, as he views it primarily as a poor nation surrounded by turmoil in Libya, Sudan, Gaza and the Red Sea. For Trump, Egypt is more of a burden than an ally. It is unlikely to capture his attention except as a market (with trade between the two sides amounting to $6.9 billion) or as an investment area (currently valued at $13.7 billion). There are over a thousand branches of American companies in Egypt, and military sales total about $2.5 billion. It’s more likely that Gaza will become the subject of a quid pro quo between Egypt and the US, leading to increased political and economic pressure on Gaza’s resistance.

6.
Trump is fully aware of the Arab bloc’s position of significant vulnerability, which fuels his disregard for Arab rights. He flouted international law by recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital and relocating the US embassy there, as well as by endorsing Israel’s annexation of the Syrian Golan. He sees no need for an independent Palestinian state with Arab specifications and even called for Israel to swiftly eliminate the resistance in Gaza.

However, Trump will not need Jewish support in the future, as he will not be running for office again, and he views Israel as a burden, much like Ukraine. Nevertheless, he will continue to leverage Israel to blackmail Arab countries commercially and in terms of investment, with the Arab countries likely purchasing weapons from the US and manipulating oil prices as he sees fit. It is likely he will exploit the Iranian-Israeli conflict for his own benefit. His focus will be on two main areas: accelerating the Saudi-Israeli normalization process and tightening the economic blockade on Iran. Additionally, he may support Israel’s stance on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), given that he had already ended US funding for it during his first presidency.

Conclusion

The upcoming developments in the region after Trump’s return are not tied to a stable US position, as we’ve noted since the beginning of the conflict, but rather to two Arab factors:

1. The cohesion of the resistance axis and its ability to influence Israeli and Western adversaries to shift their strategies.

2. The level of ongoing official and popular Arab complacency, where decision-makers in both major and minor countries feel no fear of repercussions for their policies in the region.

The key methodological issue in analyzing Arab policies is that the primary factor shaping settlements is the non-Arab party, particularly the US. In fact, it is the continuation or shift in Arab policies that determines the form of future settlements.

Therefore, the central question arises: What changes in the Arab structure could prompt leaders like Trump or others to alter their positions? This pragmatic president will only act when it benefits him, as he is unconstrained by value-based considerations. This leads to the central question: Do Arabs and Muslims use their many resources to either force or persuade this pragmatist to shift his stance toward the region? This is the crux of the matter. The US stance on expelling Taiwan from the United Nations was not driven by a subjective change in US attitudes but by Chinese pressures and inducements that exploited the gaps in US pragmatism… And that is our problem.


[*] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.


Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 9/11/2024


The opinions expressed in all the publications and studies are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of al-Zaytouna Centre.



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