By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
The Syrian revolution, often regarded as the first full-fledged uprising since the “Arab Spring,” holds the potential to bring about profound changes to the regime’s structure and pave the way for a major revival. However, it faces substantial challenges and risks, many of which are internal and compounded by Syria’s strategic location, wealth and the convergence of regional and international interests.
Strengths and Opportunities:
The new regime in Damascus is strengthened by the “golden trinity” of state leadership and the ability to build a new order: transitional justice, hard power and soft power. These key elements provide a solid foundation for the regime’s authority and governance. Additionally, there are opportunities that favor the success of the revolution, further supporting the regime’s potential for stability and progress:
First: Transitional Justice: which involves the establishment of revolutionary courts and a judicial system dedicated to dismantling the former “deep state,” while holding its key figures accountable or neutralizing their influence. This process aims to prevent these individuals from disrupting the revolution, undermining its goals, distorting its direction, or resurfacing under new forms and names.
A wise and firm approach is needed, one that fosters an atmosphere of tolerance and reconciliation, transcending sectarian and ethnic fanaticism. At the same time, this approach must dismantle the influence of the regime’s “criminals,” symbols of corruption, and the cadres within its security, military, political, economic, media and administrative systems
Second: Hard power: which involves the establishment of a national army that is inclusive of all those loyal to the new Syria, focused on protecting the homeland, as well as the nation’s faith, heritage and values. It embodies a sense of belonging and a commitment to defending the country’s causes. Furthermore, it includes the establishment of security services dedicated to safeguarding human freedom, dignity and rights, while shielding the country from external and internal threats. These forces would also protect values and morals, and confront corruption and social deviance.
Third: Soft Power: which refers to the ability to leverage political, economic, social, cultural and media opportunities to strengthen a new state. This power is supported by a constitution that upholds the new order and creates conditions conducive to creativity, development and the rotation of leadership. At the same time, it shields the state from opportunists, political corruption, foreign interference and adversaries of the revolution.
Fourth: Popular Will: The new regime reflects the overwhelming will of the people, while the former regime has few, if any, who lament its downfall. This presents a critical opportunity to implement radical and urgent changes and address numerous pressing issues in a short timeframe.
Fifth: Human Wealth: The Syrian people possess exceptional talents and skills. Despite their hardships in places of refugee, they have built extensive capabilities and expertise across various fields. Their return and reintegration, coupled with the creation of environments that foster freedom and creativity, will lead to significant advancements in the country’s revival and progress.
Sixth: Expatriates: There are significant opportunities to leverage the potential of those living abroad, particularly by transforming them into ambassadors and lobbyists for their home country. In addition, remittances can play a crucial role, provided there are transparent, efficient banking systems and a conducive environment for investment.
Seventh: Syria possesses valuable natural resources, a strategic location, numerous tourist and archaeological sites, and seaports, all of which provide significant potential for the country to recover rapidly if managed effectively.
Eighth: The leadership has a strong opportunity to eradicate corruption, particularly as it is closely tied to the previous regime and its mechanisms. As a result, establishing a new, clean and effective institutional and administrative system is not a difficult task.
Ninth: The experience gained by the rebels in administering the Idlib region for several years may serve as a valuable “test sample” that could help them transition to state administration. This contrasts with revolutions that move directly from rebellion to statehood, where members often lack the opportunity to develop the necessary skills and conditions for effective governance.
Challenges and Risks:
The Syrian revolution faces significant challenges and risks that could threaten its survival unless it develops a clear vision, the ability to act proactively, and effectively address emerging issues. To navigate these dangers, it must be prepared to fill the power vacuum and respond with seriousness, firmness and wisdom.
First: Rebuilding the Dilapidated and Destroyed State Institutions, which have been severely damaged and are plagued by corruption, deteriorating services and crumbling infrastructure, will require significant time and effort to restore their ability to function properly. This process comes at a time when the population will be under immense pressure to meet their basic needs. Opportunists and enemies of the revolution, taking advantage of this situation, will escalate demands and incite public dissatisfaction. They will amplify mistakes that were overlooked during the sixty years of Baathist rule, using them as a means to undermine the revolution if progress is not achieved quickly.
Second: The return of civil peace, the repatriation of millions of displaced persons and refugees to their homes, the restoration of their rights, and the reconstruction of their properties represent a significant and complex challenge, one that carries immense responsibility.
Third: Resolving the sectarian and ethnic divisions that were entrenched by both the previous regime (and, prior to that, French colonialism) is crucial. These divisions have severely damaged Syria’s social fabric, fostering deep-rooted suspicion and mistrust among its people. Some individuals who benefit from internal sectarian and ethnic polarization will try to exploit tensions between the Alawites, Druze, Sunnis and Kurds. External regional and international forces, particularly Israel, will seek to fuel discord and internal division, inciting crises and even fabricating incidents such as killings, bombings and assassinations to destabilize the country and push it toward further fragmentation. Moreover, efforts will be made to establish “sectarian symbols” that challenge state symbols, fostering a climate conducive to secession or the imposition of autonomy, which could weaken the state and undermine national identity.
Fourth: Identity: One of the most significant challenges in shaping Syria’s future is defining its identity. The majority of the Syrian population are Arab Muslims (with Arabism and Islam often intertwined; those who may not identify with one of these elements are often united by the other. Additionally, both groups share a common homeland, history, civilization and language). The revolution was also largely led by Islamic factions. However, decades of secular, sectarian dictatorship and the millions of Syrian refugees in the diaspora have given rise to diverse visions for Syria’s future, including Islamic, secular or hybrid approaches. These dynamics have opened the door for Syria to define itself within its Arab, Islamic and international contexts, while also determining its stance on national issues, such as its level of local isolation or regional engagement. This is particularly important given that the challenges facing Syria will persist, regardless of its desire to retreat inward. Regional and international powers will use all available means of influence to shape governance in line with their own interests and criteria.
As we have seen, this issue was among the first to be used as a rallying point to mobilize public protests. Just days after the revolution’s victory, demonstrations emerged advocating for secular state principles. Such calls provided an ideal opportunity for counter-revolutionary forces to intervene, trying to gain both regional and international support and resonance.
Maintaining a state of ambiguity may seem advantageous to some, but it poses a significant risk of undermining the revolution, steering it off course, and allowing others to hijack its objectives. Clearly defining the identity and direction of the revolution within a civilized, participatory, inclusive and tolerant framework is far more effective in mobilizing the majority, strengthening the foundation of the new state, safeguarding the revolution, and silencing skeptics. The new regime should establish early on the Arab-Islamic identity of the state, aligning it with its religion, heritage, civilization and the central causes of its people, particularly the Palestine issue.
Fifth: Regional and International Political Blackmail: The new leadership will face significant political blackmail in its pursuit of “legitimacy,” international recognition and normal relations with the Syrian state. Various powers are likely to impose conditions on the structure and nature of governance, including demands to shape the constitution and integrate their proxies or aligned figures into the government and key state institutions. Navigating these challenges will require the leadership to exercise considerable wisdom and firmness.
Sixth: Soft Foreign Intervention: As the region trends toward “democratization,” political pluralism and expanded freedoms, some regimes fear the “contagion” of freedom and the influence of “political Islam” on their populations and governance structures. To counter this, they employ political funding, provide strategic support, and leverage media to elevate certain symbols and forces, often amplifying them to hijack revolutions or fuel counter-revolutions. This tactic re-subjugates populations under the same corrupt and oppressive systems they initially opposed, as seen in several “Arab Spring” countries, ultimately serving Western and Israeli interests in the region.
Seventh: The Israeli Challenge: Israel’s military and security interference, both direct and indirect, through various hard and soft tools, poses a significant threat to the new leadership. Israel aims to weaken the regime and limit its capabilities by imposing its own standards and security restrictions. These measures are designed to eliminate potential risks to Israel and prevent Syria from developing the elements of progress and strength. In Israel’s view, the rise of any state in its surrounding environment constitutes a strategic threat, even if that state avoids confrontation with Israel.
Eighth: Haftarism: There are growing concerns that regional and international powers may back the rise of a “new Haftar” in Syria by providing logistical, financial and military support, potentially fueling further division and instability in the country. To counter such threats, the revolution must respond decisively and swiftly, leveraging soft tools to raise public awareness and prevent the emergence of such phenomena under any pretext.
Ninth: The US and Russian presence on Syrian soil presents a significant challenge. Addressing this issue should be a priority for the new regime, focusing on the removal of these foreign forces and resolving the underlying causes of their presence.
Tenth: Remnants of the Regime: The remnants of the regime, its beneficiaries, and those who regret its downfall may currently be in a vulnerable and unstable position, even fleeing from the anger of the masses and the regime’s victims. However, over time, they will likely attempt to regroup and reintroduce themselves through parties, symbols, organizations and networks of interest, aiming to infiltrate and align with the new system… It is important not to overlook the presence of hundreds of thousands of military and security personnel, Baath Party cadres, and former regime beneficiaries who became “orphans” after its collapse and will likely seek to reposition themselves or find new patrons.
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Finally, the Syrian people have made tremendous sacrifices and deserve to reap the fruits of their efforts. A new experience has emerged that warrants encouragement, with high risks but unprecedented opportunities. Syrians, however, do not have the luxury of easy choices, and the process must be guided by an atmosphere of support and faith in Allah, coupled with caution, rather than one of frustration and discouragement.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 25/12/2024
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