Academic Paper: The Impacts of India’s “De-Hyphenation” Diplomacy on Operation al-Aqsa Flood: A Forward Look

Reading Time: 16 minutes

By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Introduction

Many futures studies agree that India is rapidly advancing toward a more significant role in international relations, with this trajectory accelerating dramatically. These studies draw on economic, technological, demographic, political and military indicators. According to specialized international measurement models, this shift is evident in the following:

1. India is ranked in the second category of democracy rankings, “flawed democracy,” with a score exceeding 70%. This position has been strengthening since 2017.[2]

2. India is among the countries with the highest real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates from 2014 to 2024, experiencing an annual percent change of 7%.[3]

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3. In 2023, India’s total overseas trade value (combining merchandise imports and exports) stood at slightly over $1 trillion, despite the growth of its trade deficit, which reached approximately $268 billion last year.[4]

4. India leads the world in remittances, with more than 35 million Indians abroad sending an estimated $129 billion annually.[5]

5. India ranks third globally in GDP size on a gross domestic product (PPP) basis, trailing only China and the United States, with a value exceeding $16 trillion.[6]

6. India ranks high and moves up quickly in the Global Innovation Index.[7]

7. India is ranked fourth globally in the Global Firepower Index.[8]

8. India is ranked sixth globally by the number of nuclear warheads.[9]

9. The political stability index, though negative (– 0.64), has improved significantly since 2018 and is nearing its equilibrium point.[10]

10. India is the most populous country in the world, with a population exceeding 1.45 billion people.[11]

11. India ranks fourth globally in alternative energy, meeting 42% of its energy needs from these sources.[12]

We are witnessing the emergence of a rising global power, completing the trajectory of Asia’s rise that began with Japan in 1964, followed by South Korea in 1967, and China’s clear ascent since 1994. This shift is reshaping the global geostrategic power structure. While the challenges associated with this rise are beyond the scope of this paper, they are the subject of extensive debate in both academic and practical circles.[13]

The Arab researcher and decision-maker must recognize the growing influence of this emerging power, which is garnering increasing attention from Israel, as will be demonstrated later.

First: The Strategic Importance of the Middle East in Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy

Contemporary Indian policy toward the Middle East has evolved through two distinct phases:[14]

1. The Indian National Congress (INC) phase: During which India’s stance was notably aligned with that of the Arabs, as demonstrated by its refusal to support the partition of Palestine at the United Nations in 1947. While India officially recognized Israel in 1950, diplomatic relations were not established until 1992. Throughout this period, India supported the Palestine issue, recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 and acknowledging the Palestinian state in 1988. The Non-Aligned Movement, which brought together Arabs, India and other countries, played a key role in shaping India’s position, making it more sympathetic to the Arab viewpoint compared to other non-Arab countries.

2. The second phase began in 2014 with the victory of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Narendra Modi’s rise to power. During this period, Indian politics adopted a more pragmatic stance, giving rise to a diplomatic approach referred to in Indian literature as “de-hyphenation diplomacy.”[15] This theory is grounded in the following principles:

a. Independent handling of two nations with an adversarial relationship.

b. Establishing a relationship with one nation while disregarding the complexities of its relations with the other.

c. Independent engagement with two rival or conflicting nations rather than viewing them through a single hyphenated lens.

d. Reducing expectations of partisanship from it in relation to the other two nations.

Under the influence of de-hyphenation diplomacy, India began to reduce its political distance from Israel without tying this shift to its stance on Palestine. Factors such as Hindu extremism, particularly in its religious dimension, the Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian disputes, and the waves of Arab normalization with Israel facilitated this realignment. The transformation gained momentum with Modi’s historic visit to Israel in 2017, marking the first time an Indian prime minister had taken such a step, followed by Benjamin Netanyahu’s reciprocal visit to New Delhi in 2018. The phrase “Friend Netanyahu” became a hallmark of Modi’s speeches and statements, reflecting the deepening ties between the two leaders. Furthermore, India’s vote in favor of a resolution moved by Israel at United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to bar a Palestinian rights organization called Shahed being given observer status at UN institutions in June 2019 signaled a shift in its stance. This development was followed by an agreement in May 2023 between India and Israel to address Israel’s labor shortage by bringing 42 thousand Indian workers to the country, a move that came after Israel restricted employment opportunities for workers from the occupied territories.[16]

This context helps illuminate Modi’s later condemnation of Operation al-Aqsa Flood as a “terrorist” act and his declaration of solidarity with Israel. Furthermore, his External Affairs Minister, Jaishankar, defended Israel’s response to the attack in an October 2024 conversation at the Carnegie Endowment, asserting that India understands “that Israel had a need to respond.” These positions align with India’s abstention from voting on a UN General Assembly resolution on 26/10/2023, calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza Strip (GS) after the UN Security Council failed to pass a similar resolution on 18/10/2023, as well as its subsequent abstention in November 2023 on a resolution supporting an investigation into Israel’s human rights violations in the occupied territories. Justifying these decisions, the Indian External Affairs Minister stated that “we are big victims of terrorism.” Jaishankar’s remarks came at a time when New Delhi abstained from a UN resolution that did not condemn Hamas terror attacks. In April 2024, India reinforced its stance by abstaining from voting on a Human Rights Council resolution that called “to cease the sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment to Israel.” This not to mention that in September 2024, the Indian Supreme Court refused to hear a case filed by Indian human rights committees and academics accusing Indian companies of being “complicit in genocide” for supplying arms to Israel, ruling that it was a “government matter.” Simultaneously, Indian authorities intensified their crackdown on Islamic movements engaged in pro-Palestinian resistance activities.[17]

India’s approach to Middle Eastern relations has shifted following the BJP’s loss of its parliamentary majority in the 2024 mid-term elections. This change reflects broader trends in India’s stance on the region, as Prime Minister Modi now depends on alliances with parties that may be less aligned with Israel. Additionally, the INC has continued to advocate for positions more sympathetic to the Palestine issue.[18] India’s shift toward a more moderate position became evident since December 2023. It also supported Palestine’s bid for full UN membership in May 2024 and condemned ongoing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories in November 2024.[19] This shift was further reflected in its consistent advocacy for a two-state solution through diplomatic efforts, as demonstrated by its vote for a UN General Assembly resolution on 4/12/2024.

Second: The Absence of the Impact of Arab-Indian Relations on the Indian Position

The historical ties between India and the Arab region, along with the geographic connection symbolized by the confluence of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, play a pivotal role in shaping their relationship. Furthermore, India serves as a key conduit for most Asian trade with the Arab world, underscoring the region’s significant value in India’s geostrategic outlook.

Beyond the historical context of Arab-Indian relations, modern Indo-Arab relations focus on the following key dimensions:

1. Trade

From the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 to the present, marked by Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its regional repercussions, this period has been one of significant instability. Its impact on India has been multifaceted, notably disrupting maritime trade and causing fluctuations in energy prices, as India relies heavily on oil from the region. Furthermore, the Kuwait crisis forced over 170 thousand Indian workers in the region to return home, adding to the challenges faced by their country.[20]

In 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh initiated a pivotal shift in Indo-Gulf relations by adopting the “Look West” policy, mirroring the country’s earlier “Look East” strategy. This approach aimed to strengthen ties with West Asia, with a key objective of finalizing a Free Trade Agreement between India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).[21]

Trade between India and Arab countries has witnessed rapid growth, reaching $240 billion in 2023, according to figures from various organizations.[22] The GCC countries alone account for 15.8% of India’s total trade, rising from $89.6 billion in 2015 to $184 billion in 2023, making them India’s leading trading partner.[23] Non-oil and gas products trade between India and Arab countries amounts to approximately $40 billion, while Arab imports of Indian goods represent 5.7% of total Arab imports in 2023.[24] Adding to this, remittances from Indian workers in the GCC countries total around $89 billion, constituting 74% of Indian remittances globally.[25] Furthermore, India relies heavily on Gulf energy sources, with 35% of its oil and 70% of its gas imports coming from the region, alongside Gulf investments in India reaching $22 billion in 2023.[26]

In 2023, the trade value between Israel and India (excluding defense trade) reached $10.7 billion, making India Israel’s second-largest trading partner in Asia and its seventh worldwide.[27]

The 2023 announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) aimed to strengthen ties between the three regions through a 4,800-kilometer network of shipping and railway routes connecting India to Europe via the Persian Gulf, traversing the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. This corridor facilitates access to European and Indian markets for consumers and producers, and the participants intend to extend electricity and digital communication cables along railway routes, in addition to pipes to export clean hydrogen. By accelerating trade flows between the regions, the corridor bypasses US influence often tied to human rights, democracy and international law, etc. Meanwhile, the US views the initiative as a “competitor” to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, India is leveraging the ongoing trade disputes between China and the West (including the US and EU) to position itself as an attractive alternative for new technologies and investments.[28] However, the Indian project poses a potential challenge to the US ally Egypt, as it could impact the strategic significance of the Suez Canal.[29]

The corridor extended earlier initiatives, including the I2U2 project launched a year prior, involving the US, the UAE, Israel and India. This project aims to strengthen investment partnerships across sectors such as water, energy, transportation, space, health, food security and technology.[30]

India, facing a shortage of domestic energy resources, relies on imports for 87.9% of its oil consumption. Among the top suppliers, Russia accounts for 40%, followed by Iraq (20%) and Saudi Arabia (15%). In addition to energy trade, India has strengthened security and defense cooperation with these countries, particularly in combating extremist organizations in South Asia. Furthermore, India has shifted its focus toward Israel, becoming its fourth largest partner in the arms industry, after the US, Russia and France.[31]

The size of the Arab-Indian relationship does not appear to influence India’s stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood, due to a lack of coherence in Arab diplomacy between its economic and commercial priorities on one hand and the political ramifications of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on the other. In contrast, during the Ukrainian war, the initial European and US responses to Russia’s position focused on using economic tools (such as oil, gas, trade, customs, monetary reserves and remittance systems) to achieve political objectives. In this regard, it is sufficient to note that between 1945 and 2005, economic tools were employed to achieve political objectives 1,412 times across 164 countries. Of these, 78% were trade sanctions, with the remainder being financial sanctions. Various strategies were used to establish this linkage, many of which could be applied to Arab economic policies toward other countries.[32]

2. The Duplicity of the Indian Position on the Deluge

India’s position has maintained a quiet alignment with Israel, despite its significant economic and trade relations with the Arab region and the historical ties that underpin this relationship, as reflected in the following indicators:[33]

a. India’s declaration of support for Israeli operations in GS, describing them as “self-defense,” overlooks the ongoing siege of GS and the more than fifty-five years of occupation of Palestinian territories, which India recognizes as occupied.

b. Indian social media networks, particularly those with a right-wing Hindu orientation supporting the ruling party, have played a significant role in presenting a biased portrayal of the GS conflict. Rumor-mongering was prevalent in these networks, particularly through the promotion of content shared by Israeli media outlets and officials. These networks did not republish all the threatening and extremist statements made by Netanyahu and his government, which contributed to a more moderate response from the Indian community regarding the policy of genocide against the people of GS. This moderation was reflected in the voting patterns on draft resolutions for a GS ceasefire, as discussed above.[34]

c. Providing Israel with components for rockets targeting GS. Spain even banned Israeli ships from docking at its ports due to their transport of weapons to Israel, which faces international accusations of genocide. Additionally, some of the shrapnel from rockets Israel used to strike various areas in GS were found to be labeled “Made in India.” All of this is connected to joint military projects between Israel and India, with the Adani Elbit Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Complex in Hyderabad, inaugurated in 2018, serving as a prime example. The products of this military collaboration have been used against GS and Lebanon, as confirmed by reports from Human Rights Watch. Some sources estimate that 37% of Israel’s arms exports are directed to India.[35]

d. Pakistan’s failure to support the Gulf states in the war against Ansar Allah (aka Houthis) in Yemen led these states to shift closer to India in retaliation, while also turning a blind eye to the plight of Muslims in India, who number around 172 million. This resulted in a lack of Arab response to the Indian government’s support for Israel.

3. Variables to Constrain De-Hyphenation Diplomacy

Indian political literature indicates that the impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood is starting to influence India’s interests in the region, despite the country’s ongoing focus on its relations with the GCC countries and Israel. India continues to rely on its de-hyphenation diplomacy, which separates its interests with the Arabs from those with Israel, and believes this approach can endure. However, the impact is still evident through:

a. Yemen’s intervention in support of GS has disrupted maritime trade, a crucial aspect of India’s commerce with regional countries and Israel. Following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Ansar Allah escalated attacks on merchant ships heading to Israel, raising concerns in India about its trade routes to Europe via the Suez Canal. In response, India deployed warships to the Middle East.[36]

b. The regionalization of the war, potentially leading to broader international confrontations, could disrupt the Indian economy by impacting trade flows and driving up energy prices, particularly given India’s heavy reliance on oil imports.[37]

c. India, as a rising power, is striving for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and aims to garner support from both Arab and Israeli sides to bolster its position. However, recent challenges have complicated this endeavor.[38]

d. Indian public opinion is deeply divided on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the broader Palestine issue. Right-wing forces, led by the ruling BJP, tend to align with the Israeli position, as we noted earlier, while the opposition, particularly the INC and the Indian Muslim community, show greater support for the Palestinian stance. This division pressures the state to maintain a delicate balance in its positions, further exacerbating societal tensions.[39]

Indian public opinion polls reveal a clear societal divide, with support for Israel remaining moderate despite the ruling party’s endorsement of this stance. This divergence highlights a disconnect between the ruling party’s position and the views of the other half of society, as illustrated in the following table:[40]

Subject	Percentage (%)
India should support Israel in the Israel-Palestine conflict	42
India should support Palestine	17
Attack on Israel harmed Palestine’s cause	52
Image of Islamic countries has been harmed	47
Israel’s retaliatory strikes	51
Supporting India’s help to Israel in GS war	54

e. Available data suggests that the Indian government is actively blocking efforts by Muslims in India to organize events supporting Palestinians, a stance that has drawn clear criticism from Indian Muslim intellectuals.[41]

f. India is increasingly concerned about the growing complexity of balancing its position between the international bloc supporting Palestine (including China, Russia and Iran) and the pro-Israeli forces led by the US and much of the EU.[42]

g. India has expressed reluctance to support the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) decision to arrest Netanyahu and his defense minister, citing that “India was not a signatory to the ICC and had not taken a formal position on the matter,” according to the Indian External Affairs Minister.[43]

h. Iraq and Turkey are collaborating to develop plans for new land routes connecting the Gulf to Europe via the Anatolian region,[44] a move that could impact the Suez Canal as well as Chinese and Indian projects, with potential implications for the projects’ mutual influence.

Third: Tools of Arab Influence on Indian Politics

The discussed above suggests that India’s de-hyphenation diplomacy conflicts with the strategic interests of the Palestinian side, as unlinking Arab interests from Indian political behavior allows Indian diplomacy to avoid adapting its policies to align with these interests and to forgo the benefits of such a linkage. Arab diplomacy has proven capable of influencing Indian policy on the conflict with Israel, as evidenced by several indicators that highlight some of the aforementioned aspects:[45]

1. The Arab side’s ability to employ Indian labor in the Gulf, which includes between 9-10 million workers, is significant, as these workers contribute approximately 29% of the total remittances sent by Indians worldwide. Notably, India’s total remittances are the highest globally, exceeding $120 billion.[46]

2. The GCC is India’s largest regional-bloc trading partner. Trade with the GCC comprised 15.8% of India’s total trade in FY2022/23, compared to 11.6% of total trade with the European Union. The Gulf region fulfilled 55.3% of India’s total crude oil demand in 2022–2023, a figure that could increase following the Ukraine crisis.

3. India’s success in the IMEEC project, particularly in ensuring maritime trade, depends significantly on cooperation with the Arab region, which could leverage this dependency as a bargaining tool in its dealings with India.

4. India harbors military aspirations in the Gulf region, driven by competition with China’s BRI and Pakistan, particularly after the latter’s hesitation to support the Gulf during the Yemen war. Reflecting its strategic interests, India has conducted military exercises with several Gulf countries: the UAE in 2018, Qatar in 2019, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 2021, and both the UAE and Saudi Arabia again in 2024.

However, all of the above hinges on the extent of independence in Arab political decision-making, particularly in navigating the US network of interdependence with the region, as well as the ability to recognize global geostrategic shifts and leverage them to advance Arab strategic interests, especially regarding the Palestine issue. The future outlook indicates that local, regional and international complexities are likely to obstruct this Arab transformation in the near term.

[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.

[2] Democracy Index 2023, Age of Conflict, site of Economist Intelligence, The Economist Group, https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf

[3] Real GDP growth, 2024, site of International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD

[4] Preyash Shah, Charted: A Breakdown of India’s Overseas Trade in 2023, site of Visual Capitalist, 5/6/2024, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/charted-a-breakdown-of-indias-overseas-trade-in-2023; and India’s Trade Performance in FY 2023-24 and Strategy to Explore New Export Markets, site of India Briefing, 14/5/2024, https://www.india-briefing.com/news/indias-trade-performance-fy-2023-24-exploring-new-export-markets-32612.html

[5] Dlip Ratha, Sonia Plaza and Eung Ju Kim, In 2024, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries are expected to reach $685 billion, larger than FDI and ODA combined, site of Worl Bank Blogs, 18/12/2024, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/peoplemove/in-2024–remittance-flows-to-low–and-middle-income-countries-ar; and Population of Overseas Indians, site of Ministry of External Affairs, https://www.mea.gov.in/population-of-overseas-indians.htm (accessed on 25/12/2024)

[6] GDP, current prices, 2024, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPGDP@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD

[7] Soumitra Dutta, Bruno Lanvin, Lorena Rivera León and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (eds.), Global Innovation Index 2024: Unlocking the Promise of Social Entrepreneurship (World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2024), 17th Edition, https://www.wipo.int/web-publications/global-innovation-index-2024/assets/67729/2000%20Global%20Innovation%20Index%202024_WEB3lite.pdf

[8] 2024 Military Strength Ranking, site of Global Firepower, https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php

[9] Role of nuclear weapons grows as geopolitical relations deteriorate—new SIPRI Yearbook out now, site of The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 17/6/2024, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/role-nuclear-weapons-grows-geopolitical-relations-deteriorate-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now

[10] India: Political stability, site of TheGlobalEconomy.com, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/India/wb_political_stability

[11] Countries in the world by population (2024), site of Worldometer, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country

[12] Renewable Energy, site of Invest India, https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/renewable-energy#:~:text=India’s%20installed%20renewable%20energy%20capacity,additions%20of%209.83%25%20in%202022

[13] For details on these aspects, see Bhaskar Chakravorti and Gaurav Dalmia, Is India the World’s Next Great Economic Power?, site of Harvard Business Publishing (HBP), 6/9/2023, https://hbr.org/2023/09/is-india-the-worlds-next-great-economic-power

[14] Question No-1994 India’s Position in the Ongoing Palestine-Israel War, Rajya Sabha, UNSTARRED Question No-1994, Answered On- 08/08/2024, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/38117/QUESTION_NO1994_INDIAS_POSITION_IN_THE_ONGOING_PALESTINEISRAEL_WAR; Liyaqat Nazir, 1 Year in, India’s Approach to the Gaza War Reflects a Wider Foreign Policy Change, site of The Diplomat, 7/10/2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/1-year-in-indias-approach-to-the-gaza-war-reflects-a-wider-foreign-policy-change; Jean-Loup Samaan, India, a New Key Player in the Middle East, site of Institut Montaigne, 14/10/2024, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/india-new-key-player-middle-east; Narendra Modi (@narendramodi), site of X (Twitter), 10/10/2023, 12:08 PM, https://x.com/narendramodi/status/1711669988116050142; Supreme Court dismisses plea to halt Indian firms’ supply of arms to Israel during Gaza conflict, site of The Hindu, 9/9/2024, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-dismisses-plea-to-halt-indian-firms-supply-of-arms-to-israel-during-gaza-conflict/article68623257.ece; India “Very Much” Concerned About Middle East Tensions: S Jaishankar, site of NDTV, 2/10/2024, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/s-jaishankar-says-india-very-much-concerned-about-middle-east-tensions-6695358; and 1 year of Gaza genocide: Israeli war tests India’s Palestine policy, site of Anadolu Agency, 4/10/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/1-year-of-gaza-genocide/1-year-of-gaza-genocide-israeli-war-tests-india-s-palestine-policy/3351781

[15] India’s de-hyphenation policy reflects a dynamic response to the complexities of the evolving multipolar global order, see Sujith R., “India’s Policy of De-hyphenation in an Emerging Multipolar World Order,” Journal of Contemporary Politics, vol. 2, no. 4, October-December 2023, pp. 123–124; and India Israel Relations, site of Vajiram & Ravi, Institute for IAS Examination, 11/12/2024, https://vajiramandravi.com/quest-upsc-notes/india-israel-relations

[16] Rezul Laskar, India backs Israel to keep Palestinian group out of UN bodies, site of Hindustan Times, 11/6/2019, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-backs-israeli-resolution-at-un-body-to-deny-observer-status-to-palestinian-group/story-Sush1pLviAg2N59tf3K9hK.html; and Israel, India ink agreement to allow 42,000 Indian workers to work in Jewish state, site of Times of India, 9/5/2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/israel-india-ink-agreement-to-allow-42000-indian-workers-to-work-in-jewish-state/articleshow/100106225.cms

[17] Transcript of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, in conversation with Mariano-Florentino (Tino) Cuéllar of Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC (October 2, 2024), Ministry of External Affairs, 2/10/2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/interviews.htm?dtl/38364/Transcript_of_External_Affairs_Minister_Dr_S_Jaishankar_in_conversation_with_MarianoFlorentino_Tino_Cu233llar_of__Carnegie_Endowment_Washington_DC_Oct; and “Because We’re…”: S Jaishankar On India’s Strong Position Over Terrorism, NDTV, 30/10/2023, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/s-jaishankar-on-why-india-takes-a-strong-position-on-terrorism-because-we-are-victims-of-it-4526176

[18] Why the India-Israel Relationship Is Facing Trouble, site of India Today, 1/10/2024, https://www.indiatoday.in/global/story/why-the-india-israel-relationship-is-facing-trouble-2609516-2024-10-01

[19] 1 year of Gaza genocide: Israeli war tests India’s Palestine policy, Anadolu Agency, 4/10/2024.

[20] Timeline Of Middle East And West Asia Conflicts And Impact On India’s Trade, site of NDTV Profit, 2/10/2024, https://www.ndtvprofit.com/business/timeline-of-middle-east-and-west-asia-conflicts-and-impact-on-indias-trade

[21] PM launches “Look West” Policy to boost cooperation with Gulf, site of Former Prime Minister of India, 27/7/2005, https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/press-details.php?nodeid=271

[22] India-Arab trade crosses $240bn, site of GDN Online, 20/7/2023, https://www.gdnonline.com/Details/1286905/India-Arab-trade-crosses-$240bn

[23] GCC-Stat, Economic Relations, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and India, https://gccstat.org/images/gccstat/docman/publications/India_2.pdf; and India-Gulf trade goes beyond oil to broader horizons, site of Independent Arabia, 11/9/2023, https://www.independentarabia.com/node/494206

[24] Arab trade in 2023: trends and highlights, E/ESCWA/CL4.SIT/2024/Policy brief.1, site of United Nations Economic and Social Council (ESCWA), https://www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pdf/arab-trade-2023-trends-highlights-english.pdf; and Preyash Shah, Charted: A Breakdown of India’s Overseas Trade in 2023, Visual Capitalist, 5/6/2024.

[25] It is important to be aware of the discrepancy in some figures, due to variations in the calculation of currency rates when converting from one country to another, see Infographic: Figures about the Indian community in the Gulf, site of Gulf Online, 13/9/2023, https://khaleej.online/ApRRjw

[26] The GCC in India: Deeper Economic Cooperation, Deeper Political Ties?, site of Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 18/6/2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-gcc-in-india-deeper-economic-cooperation-deeper-political-ties-177961; and Alexandre Kateb, The GCC’s Multipolar Pivot: From Shifting Trade Patterns to New Financial and Diplomatic Alliances, site of Carnegie Middle East Center, 28/5/2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/05/the-gccs-multipolar-pivot-from-shifting-trade-patterns-to-new-financial-and-diplomatic-alliances?center=middle-east&lang=en

[27] India-Israel Bilateral Relations, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/EOI_TELAVIV_BILATERAL_BRIEF2.pdf

[28] Bhaskar Chakravorti and Gaurav Dalmia, Is India the World’s Next Great Economic Power?, Harvard Business Publishing (HBP), 6/9/2023.

[29] Steve L. Monroe, The India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor: an early assessment, site of Economic Research Forum (ERF), 31/10/2023, https://theforum.erf.org.eg/2023/10/30/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-an-early-assessment

[30] I2U2: India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, United States, site of U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/i2u2

I2 refers to the two countries, Israel and India, whose names begin with the letter “I,” while U2 represents the United States and the United Arab Emirates.

[31] Jean-Loup Samaan, India, a New Key Player in the Middle East, Institut Montaigne, 14/10/2024.

[32] Yoshiharu Kobayashi, “Economic Sanctions as Foreign Policy,” in Cameron Thies (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), passim.

[33] Jean-Loup Samaan, India, a New Key Player in the Middle East, Institut Montaigne, 14/10/2024; Antara Chakraborthy and Yasmine Wong, India’s Digital Footprint on the Israel-Gaza War, site of The Diplomat, 21/10/2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/indias-digital-footprint-on-the-israel-gaza-war/

[34]Antara Chakraborthy and Yasmine Wong, India’s Digital Footprint on the Israel-Gaza War, The Diplomat, 21/10/2023.

[35] Liyaqat Nazir, One year on, India’s approach to Gaza War reflects wider foreign policy change, site of The Jerusalem Post newspaper, 7/10/2024, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-823570

[36] Frederick Kempe, Tracking Global India’s growing influence, site of Atlantic Council, 2/5/2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/tracking-global-indias-growing-influence/

[37] At BRICS, India flags ‘widespread anxiety’ over spread of Gaza war, site of Anadolu Agency, 24/10/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/at-brics-india-flags-widespread-anxiety-over-spread-of-gaza-war/3373091

[38] Ranjith Rebello, India’s Response to the October 7 Gaza Conflict: A Geopolitical and Strategic Analysis, site of Diplomatic Nite, 21/10/2024, https://diplomatist.com/2024/10/21/indias-response-to-the-october-7-gaza-conflict-a-geopolitical-and-strategic-analysis/

[39] Opinion: India’s Israel tilt, polarised domestic politics after Hamas attacks, site of India today, 19/10/2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/opinion/story/opinion-cvoter-survey-reveals-israel-tilt-polarised-domestic-politics-after-hamas-attacks-2450955-2023-10-19

[40] Ibid.

[41] Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Ongoing Israel-Gaza war: Views from Indian Muslims, site of Daily Sabah, 22/11/2024, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/ongoing-israel-gaza-war-views-from-indian-muslims

[42] Suhail Anjum and Muhammad Atif, India faces tough balancing act amid escalating Middle East conflict, site of Voice of America, 4/10/2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/india-faces-tough-balancing-act-amid-escalating-middle-east-conflict/7811002.html

[43] Azad Essa, India doubles down on pro-Israel policy saying ‘national interest’ drives arms transfers, site of the Middle East Eye, 5/12/2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/india-doubles-down-pro-israel-policy-national-interest-drives-arms-sales

[44] The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. A year of achievements and obstacles, site of Hespress, 13/9/2024, https://www.hespress.com/1430027-1430027.html (in Arabic)

[45] Viraj Solanki, The Gulf region’s growing importance for India, site of International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 21/2/2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/02/the-gulf-regions-growing-importance-for-india

[46] India received $120 billion in remittances in 2023, maximum from US: World Bank, site of The Indian Express, 26/6/2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/business/india-120-billion-dollars-remittances-2023-world-bank-9416442/