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By:  Dr. Said al-Haj.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Abstract

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime provided Türkiye with a significant opportunity to advance its political, economic, military and security relations with the new regime, as well as facilitate the return of Syrian refugees from Türkiye. This shift also allowed Türkiye to strategically reposition itself in the region. Meanwhile, Israel gained tactical advantages, exploiting the transitional period to target Syrian military structures and partially extend its influence across the border. This came at a time when tensions between Türkiye and Israel escalated due to the bloody Israeli war on the Gaza Strip (GS). Their fundamental interests also clash over the Syrian issue and Türkiye’s national security. While Türkiye supports Syria’s new regime, unity and revival, Israel backs sectarian and ethnic divisions, seeking to keep the Syrian regime weak and stagnant. For this reason, the Turkish Foreign Minister warned Israel against further provocation.

However, the escalating tensions between the two sides, both politically and in the media, do not necessarily indicate imminent friction or security risks on the ground, unless Israel crosses red lines concerning Turkish national security.

Introduction

Since Türkiye’s recognition of Israel in 1949, relations between the two countries have fluctuated. After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, years of openness, communication and reciprocal visits followed. However, tensions began to rise with Israel’s war on GS in late 2008. The situation worsened after the attack on the Mavi Marmara in May 2010, leading to a severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

In 2016, bilateral relations were restored after Benjamin Netanyahu apologized for the Marmara incident, but tensions resurfaced with the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem and the severe security response to the Marches of Return in May 2018.

In 2022, the two sides restored diplomatic relations, emphasizing a desire to separate bilateral ties from Israel’s policies against the Palestinians and to cooperate, particularly in the energy sector. However, Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the ensuing genocidal war on GS reignited tensions, leaving relations strained and resembling estrangement.

Operation al-Aqsa Flood

The October 2023 Operation al-Aqsa Flood occurred in the context of evolving relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv, just weeks after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the sidelines of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly,[1] which influenced Türkiye’s initial stance on the operation.

The Turkish position shifted rapidly and evolved through several stages. Initially, Türkiye adopted the Palestinian narrative, condemning the occupation and labeling the events as “genocide.”[2] This was followed by a political break with Netanyahu and a pledge to prosecute him,[3] along with broader condemnation of Israel as a “terrorist state.”[4] Türkiye then imposed sanctions, including economic and trade measures,[5] barring Israel from participating in NATO meetings and maneuvers,[6] and joining the genocide case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[7] Additionally, Ankara presented evidence against the Israeli forces to the International Criminal Court (ICC).[8] Furthermore, feeling self-threatened by both direct and indirect Israeli actions,[9] Türkiye has expressed concerns through President Erdoğan’s statement about the proximity of Israeli forces to its borders.[10] This tension escalated with a secret session of the Turkish parliament to address the issue,[11] Erdoğan’s threat to use force against Israel,[12] and Israel’s counter-response, warning him of a fate similar to that of the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.[13]

New Syria

Since the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and the subsequent developments, particularly those involving foreign intervention, Türkiye and Israel found some common interests in the Syrian conflict, primarily in countering Iranian and Russian influence. As for Türkiye and Iran, they were on opposing sides, with Türkiye supporting the opposition while Iran backed the regime, its ally. This dynamic led to media and political confrontations between the two countries, as well as clashes between Turkish forces and Iran-affiliated parties on Syrian territory. However, launched in January 2017, the Astana trilateral process involving Türkiye, Iran and Russia helped prevent direct clashes among the three parties, establishing a framework for resolving differences, dialogue and coordination.

The fall of the Assad regime marked a significant loss for Iran, which lost its most important ally and Hizbullah’s primary supply route in Lebanon. Iran has largely withdrawn from the Syrian file, facing strained relations with the new administration in Damascus. In contrast, Ankara has secured several notable gains: the removal of a regime resistant to normalizing ties with it, the establishment of a government eager to cooperate, promising prospects for trade and economic relations, and the revival of Syria as a gateway for Turkish land trade with the Arab world. Many Syrian residents in Türkiye may return to their homeland, and Türkiye is poised to play a key role in Syria’s reconstruction, enhancing its geopolitical influence over Iran and Russia. Additionally, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are under mounting pressure to disband or face a Turkish military operation, with Ankara now having a greater likelihood of launching and succeeding in such efforts.

Israel swiftly took advantage of the turmoil following the regime’s fall by establishing a fait accompli. It announced the termination of the Disengagement Agreement, deepened its occupation in southern Syria, and conducted incursions into Quneitra and Daraa,[14] edging closer to Damascus. Israel bombed and destroyed many of Syria’s strategic assets, including weapons, headquarters, factories and research centers.[15] Additionally, there were troubling signals about the new administration’s ideological stance,[16] along with reports suggesting proposals to divide Syria[17] and plans to cooperate with minorities[18] and promote settlement building.[19]

In the current landscape, common interests between Türkiye and Israel have become nearly nonexistent, as Iran has largely withdrawn from the Syrian issue and Russia has confined its involvement to providing interim guarantees concerning the Hmeimim and Tartus bases. Meanwhile, the conflicting interests between Türkiye and Israel have escalated significantly, with the most notable issues being:

1. Türkiye has almost fully supported the new Syrian administration, providing political cover, making official visits, and expressing its readiness to offer all forms of support to various ministries and agencies while urging regional and international parties to do the same. In contrast, Israel remains skeptical of the new leadership, citing potential future dangers it may pose to Israel.

2.Türkiye has a strong interest in stabilizing the situation in Syria due to its positive impact on national security, the economy, trade and the return of refugees, in contrast to Israeli actions that, as previously outlined, threaten this stability.

3. Ankara prioritizes Syria’s territorial integrity within its national security strategy, focusing on this issue both under the previous regime and currently, while Israel advocates for scenarios of federalization and partition.

4. Ankara views the SDF and its ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê—PKK) as the primary threat and its top priority in the Syrian context. Meanwhile, Israel regards Syrian minorities, including the Druze in the south and Kurds in the north, as natural allies. Some reports suggest that Israel has been engaging with the SDF to offer support.[20]

5. The area of Turkish influence in Syria is expected to expand in the coming phase, potentially involving the training and arming of the Syrian army and security forces,[21] the establishment of Turkish military bases on Syrian territory and the signing of a military and security cooperation agreement with the Syrian government. This dynamic positions Israel’s actions targeting Syria as a direct threat to Türkiye, potentially incentivizing Ankara to defend Syria more assertively.

Potential Scope of Confrontation

Despite Israel’s temporary advantage following the fall of the Assad regime, which enabled it to take aggressive actions against Syria to weaken its capabilities and impose a challenging fait accompli on any current or future Syrian leadership, as well as its strategic moves that have left Syria facing a choice between normalization, negotiation, acceptance of its weakened state, or a confrontation it cannot afford, Israel remains apprehensive about the new Syrian administration. On one hand, the potential orientations and policies of the new leadership remain uncertain. On the other, its Islamist-jihadist ideology is a source of significant concern. Adding to this is Türkiye’s growing role in the Syrian crisis, positioning itself as the dominant regional power filling the vacuum left by Russia and Iran.

Recent developments in Syria have placed Türkiye and Israel on opposite sides of the spectrum, with Türkiye seemingly benefiting from the fall of the regime, while Israel faces the primary threats posed by the new regime. In contrast to the few and quiet statements from the new Syrian leadership regarding Israel’s repeated violations, the strongest criticism and direct warning came from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan[22] and the Defense Ministry spokesperson,[23] both stressing the urgency for Israel to cease its provocations and violations.

The position on the SDF will be the key point of escalation between the two sides at this stage, particularly as it is a priority for Ankara in the Syrian context and aligns with a potential path to an internal political solution to the Kurdish issue.

A direct military-security confrontation between the two sides is unlikely in the foreseeable future due to several obstacles. Primarily, both sides are preoccupied with other priorities, and any direct confrontation would have potentially dangerous repercussions. Additionally, there is initial reluctance from the United States to allow such a confrontation between its two allies.

The Trump administration’s stance on supporting SDF and maintaining US forces in Syria will shape the tension between Tel Aviv and Ankara. Türkiye is focused on persuading Trump to withdraw US forces from Syria, end support for the SDF, and press it to abandon its cross-border project while “changing its behavior” in Syria. In return, Türkiye proposes that the new Syrian government, in cooperation with Türkiye, take charge of confronting ISIS, which remains Washington’s primary priority in Syria.

Ankara’s growing influence in Syria, combined with Washington’s reliance on it across several fronts, has led Türkiye to feel optimistic about persuading the new US administration to adopt its proposals. Meanwhile, Israel is hopeful that it can convince Trump to counter this influence, particularly given the escalating tensions in the region.

The war on GS and its extension into southern Lebanon marked a shift in Türkiye’s stance, moving from solidarity with Palestine and Lebanon to perceiving Israel as a direct threat. While recent developments in Syria suggest the potential for direct confrontation, the current and near-future dynamics are expected to remain within the political and media realms, avoiding escalation into direct conflict. However, Türkiye’s expanding role in Syria, particularly in defense, security, arming and training, indicates that tensions could escalate into more serious friction in the medium to long term, especially if Israel persists in targeting Syrian territory.

Finally, while the escalating confrontation between Türkiye and Israel is expected to remain within a controlled framework, certain exceptional scenarios could shift the dynamics significantly. These include chaos in Syria, Israeli violations in Syria that exceed acceptable limits—especially given Türkiye’s sponsorship of the new Syrian situation—direct Israeli targeting of Turkish interests in Syria, or Israeli support for separatist militias in northern Syria against Ankara.

In conclusion, the escalation in the region following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood persists and continues to expand, despite moments of temporary de-escalation. Any potential developments, such as the war extending toward Lebanon, Yemen, or Iran, may reinforce Türkiye’s concerns about Israel’s ambitions and broader regional projects, including the notion that Türkiye itself could become a future target. This could significantly influence Ankara’s perception and stance on the situation.

Operation al-Aqsa Flood dramatically altered the region’s landscape, opening up the possibility for change previously deemed unlikely in Syria. It has shifted relations between Türkiye and Israel from a stage of normalization, development and energy cooperation (as of September 2024) to direct confrontation, driven by conflicting vital interests. This situation leaves the door open for future developments. Currently, there are points of direct friction or “symbolic common borders” between Türkiye and Israel.

Conclusion

Recent official rhetoric from Türkiye has emphasized that Israeli policies in Palestine and the broader region threaten regional stability and pose a direct threat to Ankara.

With the new situation in Syria, Türkiye and Israel stand at opposite ends of the spectrum. Türkiye supports the new administration, viewing Syria’s territorial integrity as a red line, while Israel perceives it as a threat, favoring partition scenarios and expanding its occupation. Additionally, Israel has made statements in support of SDF, which Türkiye classifies as a terrorist organization.

The escalating rhetoric between the two sides, including Türkiye’s warnings against “provocation” and Israeli threats to President Erdoğan regarding “the fate of Saddam Hussein,” signals growing tension in their relations. This could pave the way for further escalation, contingent on several factors, including the direction of the next US administration and the level of cooperation between Israel and SDF. Additionally, the extent to which Israeli violations in Syria continue to threaten stability or directly harm vital Turkish interests will play a crucial role.

Recommendations

1. Israel’s ambitions in Syria, part of what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to as “redrawing the maps of the Middle East,” have raised significant concerns. In response, it is crucial to take appropriate steps to confront these ambitions effectively.

2. Preparing for the possibility of Israel targeting Turkish interests, either directly or indirectly, particularly in light of Israel’s support for separatist organizations in northern Syria, against which Ankara has threatened a military operation unless they disband.

3. There is a pressing need to strengthen the Arab and Muslim internal fronts, as well as to enhance systems of cooperation and support among the region’s diverse components, to counter the escalating threats posed by Israeli projects that are advancing rapidly and targeting all parties.

[*] A Palestinian physician based in Türkiye, he is a writer and political analyst specializing in Turkish affairs, as well as broader Arab and Islamic issues. He has published hundreds of articles and interviews in newspapers, websites, Arab study centers and on satellite channels, and has participated in numerous international forums and conferences.
[1] Erdoğan meets Netanyahu in New York, site of Aljazeera.net, 20/9/2023, https://aja.me/kdix09 (accessed 4/1/2025)
[2] Erdoğan calls Israel a “terrorist state” and accuses it of committing “genocide” in Gaza, site of France 24, 15/11/2023, https://www.france24.com/ar (accessed 4/1/2025)
[3] Erdoğan attacks Netanyahu over Gaza massacres: “We erased him and threw him aside,” site of Arabi21, 4/11/2023, https://arabi21.com (accessed 4/1/2025)
[4] Erdoğan calls Israel a “terrorist state” and accuses it of committing “genocide” in Gaza, site of France 24, 15/11/2023
[5] Türkiye halts all trade with Israel, Aljazeera.net, 2/5/2024, https://aja.ws/7nxz4o (accessed 4/1/2025)
[6] Reuters: Türkiye blocks NATO-Israel cooperation since October, Aljazeera.net, 1/8/2024, https://aja.ws/8p25em (accessed 4/1/2025)
[7] Türkiye officially joins South Africa’s case against Israel at the Court of Justice, Aljazeera.net, 7/8/2024, https://aja.ws/n599c8 (accessed 4/1/2025)
[8] New York… Erdoğan presents the ICC prosecutor with the books “Evidence” and “Witness,” Anadolu Agency, 23/9/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/ar (accessed 4/1/2025)
[9] Said Al-Haj, “Türkiye and the ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ … . From solidarity to feeling threatened,” Aljazeera Center for Studies, 9/10/2024, https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/6044 (accessed 4/1/2025)
[10] Erdoğan sounds the alarm: Only two and a half hours away, site of Russia Today (RT), 1/10/2024, https://arabic.rt.com (accessed 4/1/2025)
[11] Kurtulmuş: Türkiye sees Israel’s expansionist policies as a threat to its national security, Anadolu Agency, 8/10/2024. (accessed 4/1/2025)
[12] Erdoğan: As we did in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, we will enter Israel if necessary, RT, 28/7/2024. (accessed 4/1/2025)
[13] After threatening to intervene militarily… Israel reminds Erdoğan of Saddam’s fate and Ankara reminds it of Hitler’s end, Aljazeera.net, 29/7/2024, https://aja.ws/z80ogt (accessed 4/1/2025)
[14] Israel makes incursion in the vicinity of the Mantara Dam in Syria’s Quneitra countryside, Aljazeera.net, 3/1/2025, https://aja.ws/pbb275 (accessed 4/1/2025)
[15] More than 100 Israeli raids on military sites in Syria in 24 hours, site of al-Arabiya channel, 9/12/2024. (accessed 4/1/2025)
[16] Erdoğan was not spared.. A new Israeli attack on the new Syrian administration led by al-Sharaa, RT, 1/1/2025, (accessed 4/1/2025)
[17] Shocking details.. Israeli media reveals the plan to divide Syria into “five states,” site of Bawabat Akhbarelyom, 31/12/2024, https://akhbarelyom.com (accessed 4/1/2025)
[18] Israel looks to build alliances with Kurds and Druze, site of Independent Arabia, 12/11/2024, https://www.independentarabia.com (accessed 4/1/2025)
[19] Israeli magazine … Settlers looking to seize areas in Syria and Lebanon, Aljazeera.net, 14/12/2024, https://aja.ws/1v6w4u (accessed 4/1/2025)
[20] Why the Syrian Democratic Forces asked for support from Israel, RT, 12/12/2024. (accessed 4/1/2025)
[21] Türkiye is ready to support the new Syrian authority, Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, London, 15/12/2025, https://aawsat.com (accessed 4/1/2025)
[22] Türkiye warns Israel against provocation in Syria and reopens its embassy in Damascus, Aljazeera.net, 14/12/2024, https://aja.ws/buirxg (accessed 4/1/2025)
[23] Türkiye condemns Israel’s decision to expand settlements in the Golan, RT, 19/12/2024. (accessed 4/1/2025)

The Arabic version of this Assessment was published on 7/1/2025 

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