By: Dr. Tarek Ahmad Hamoud.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Summary
The fall of the Assad regime on 8/12/2024, marks a pivotal moment in modern Syrian history, ushering in a new political era under the leadership of revolutionary forces, amid a backdrop of security instability and institutional collapse. In this context, Palestinian refugees in Syria face significant challenges, including reconstruction, the issue of detainees, the return of the displaced, and their legal and political status in the new state. Although they once enjoyed full civil rights, excluding citizenship and political rights, under Decree 260 of 1956, the years of war have eroded their position.
Rebuilding the refugee camps (RCs), especially Yarmouk, remains one of the most pressing challenges, alongside the unresolved issue of the forcibly disappeared, which still lacks effective institutional coordination. The future of Palestinians is also shaped by shifts in Syria’s regional policy, particularly under US pressure to dismantle Palestinian factions. The new state faces three options: full compliance with external demands, restricting only armed activity, or maintaining the previous status quo, each carrying distinct domestic and international political consequences.
Introduction
On 8/12/2024, a long chapter in the history of the Syrian Arab Republic came to a close with the fall of the regime that had ruled since 1970 under the leadership of the al-Assad family. A new political phase began under the control of revolutionary military forces who assumed responsibility for governing the country.[1] This transition ushered in a period of security fragility that affected all segments of Syrian society and introduced new challenges for various population groups, including Palestinian refugees.[2]
Once again, Palestinians found themselves grappling with the consequences of sweeping political changes in host countries, a recurring pattern across the stages of their diaspora. What distinguishes the Syrian case, however, is that from the 1948 Nakbah until the outbreak of conflict in 2011, Palestinians in Syria had experienced a relatively stable existence compared to those in other host states. Nevertheless, they faced legal marginalization and administrative restrictions, which deepened during the war years, particularly with regard to their civil and legal rights.
First: Background
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has raised critical questions about the future of the Syrian state and its political and social identity, while also bringing the role of Palestinians in this evolving landscape into sharp focus. Since the 1948 Nakbah, Palestinian refugees in Syria have formed an active demographic and social group, making significant contributions across various sectors of public life. Their presence is closely tied to the first waves of displacement from Safed, Tiberias and Haifa, with around 80 thousand refugees arriving in Syria.[3]
The refugees are distributed across several RCs established between 1948 and 1967, with the current total of 12 official camps spread across seven Syrian governorates—nine of which are official, and three unofficial.[4] In addition, there are other Palestinian communities within villages and cities. Notably, more than half of the Palestinians in Syria reside outside the RCs, a result of natural population growth versus the limited geographical expansion of the RCs.
According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for 2025, approximately 587 thousand Palestinians are registered in Syria.[5] However, this figure likely does not account for a significant number of those born in the diaspora during the years of the revolution. Estimates from the Action Group for Palestinians of Syria (AGPS) place the number of Palestinian refugees displaced from Syria at around 250 thousand.[6]
The legal status of Palestinians in Syria was established under Law No. 260 of 1956, which grants them the same rights and duties as Syrian citizens, with the exception of the right to run for office and vote.[7] This legal framework has played a pivotal role in facilitating the integration of Palestinians into Syrian society, especially when compared to the restrictive laws imposed on Palestinian refugees in neighboring countries like Lebanon.
Second: Opportunities or Challenges?
The uncertainty surrounding the evolving Syrian landscape continues to raise fundamental questions for Palestinian refugees in the country. These questions revolve around whether the political shift will create new opportunities to improve their legal and social conditions, or whether it will bring additional challenges, particularly given the ongoing collapse of state institutions and governance.
Regardless of the policies the new authorities adopt in their dealings with Palestinians, numerous challenges linked to the broader situation in Syria are likely to affect Palestinian refugees in both the short and medium term. These challenges can be summarized in the following three key points:
1. Reconstruction of Palestinian RCs
Palestinian RCs in Syria experienced widespread destruction due to the military operations that marked the years of conflict since 2011. The al-Raml RC in Latakia was the first area in the country to be targeted by heavy artillery when Syrian warships shelled the RC in July 2011.[8] Other RCs also sustained significant damage throughout the conflict, with the most severe destruction affecting three major RCs:
• Yarmouk RC: Once home to between 120 and 170 thousand people before the war, is the largest Palestinian RC in Syria.[9] It is also the only RC situated within the administrative boundaries of Damascus Governorate. Between 2014 and 2018, the RC experienced extensive destruction, with the General Authority for Palestinian Arab Refugees (GAPAR)[10] estimating that over 80% of it was destroyed.[11] Today, only around 7 thousand people remain, while the majority of its former residents remain displaced in neighboring areas.[12]
• Dera‘a RC: Home to approximately 18 thousand Palestinian refugees,[13] it was heavily damaged by artillery and airstrikes. However, the displacement was not as prolonged as that of Yarmouk RC.
• Ein el Tal RC (Handarat): Between 2016 and 2018, the RC was the site of fierce military clashes between armed opposition groups and regime forces,[14] leading to near-total destruction and the displacement of most of its residents.
Reconstructing these RCs presents a highly complex challenge, as they fall within the broader effort to rebuild Syria; an undertaking that requires regional and international consensus, substantial funding and years to implement. Yet the RCs’ distinct status as UN-administered areas under UNRWA’s mandate could open the door to separate reconstruction tracks. This, however, depends on the availability of funding, which remains uncertain amid UNRWA’s deepening financial crisis; one that is likely to worsen under continued US opposition to the agency, particularly during Donald Trump’s presidency.
2. The Case of Detainees and the Forcibly Disappeared:
AGPS has documented the detention of 3,085 Palestinians[15] by the Syrian regime during the war, along with 333 reported missing.[16] When Syrian prisons were opened on 8/12/2024, only 42 detainees were released,[17] highlighting the magnitude and complexity of this ongoing crisis. It remains one of the most urgent human rights issues, with deep psychological and social repercussions for the Palestinian refugee community in Syria. Families continue to face significant obstacles in uncovering the fate of their loved ones. Despite occasional leaks from the crumbling security apparatus, the fate of the vast majority remains unknown.
This issue closely intersects with the case of Syrian detainees, whose number is estimated at around 112 thousand, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights.[18] However, the case of Palestinian detainees faces an added challenge: the extent to which Syrian human rights institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, are willing to address it as part of the broader Syrian context or as a distinct Palestinian file.
This challenge is compounded by the limited awareness within Syrian institutions of the abuses suffered by Palestinians, the lack of official Palestinian engagement with the issue, and the absence of effective coordination between Syrian and Palestinian institutions, all of which further complicate efforts to achieve justice or uncover the truth in the near future.
• The Issue of Return for the Displaced
Realistic estimates suggest that the number of Palestinians still residing in Syria does not exceed 350 thousand,[19] although official records put the figure at 430 thousand. The total number of Palestinians from Syria—both within the country and abroad—is estimated at around 650 thousand, based on population growth trends since 2011, when their number stood at approximately 600 thousand.[20]
The issue of return can be divided into two main aspects:
• Return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): This group represents the majority of Palestinian refugees in Syria, particularly those from the Yarmouk RC in Damascus and the Handarat RC in Aleppo. Widespread destruction of infrastructure and housing continues to be a significant barrier to comprehensive return. Although partial returns to Yarmouk have begun through individual initiatives, the RC’s capacity remains limited under current conditions due to the lack of full restoration of housing and essential services. In contrast, RCs in northern Syria, particularly in the Idlib governorate, previously under opposition control, have seen higher rates of return among Palestinian IDPs. This is primarily due to the removal of security obstacles tied to the Syrian regime’s previous control, creating more favorable conditions for return, despite the fragile service infrastructure in these areas.
• Return of Refugees Abroad: The issue of Palestinian refugees displaced outside Syria, particularly to neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, is likely to see significant developments in the near future. The fragility of their legal status, coupled with limited integration into the labor market, may lead many to consider voluntary return to Syria if favorable conditions arise. In contrast, returns from European countries are expected to remain low, due to the legal and economic stability these countries provide, including opportunities for permanent residence, employment and social protection.
The return of refugees, both internally and externally, is contingent upon the implementation of serious initiatives to reconstruct the RCs, rehabilitate infrastructure and create a legal and administrative environment that ensures dignity and security. This includes UN guarantees for safe and voluntary return, as well as economic and social support programs tailored to the unique needs of the Palestinian community in Syria.
Moreover, the return of refugees is closely linked to ongoing reconstruction efforts, which are progressing slowly through individual initiatives or limited restoration programs managed by UNRWA and various humanitarian organizations. While these efforts are important, they lack sufficient infrastructure and essential services. It is expected that these projects will accelerate following the regime’s collapse, as the stringent restrictions previously imposed on restoration and reconstruction activities are lifted.
Third: The Palestinian Political File and Syria’s Regional Positioning Post-Regime Fall:
Amid the internal challenges facing the new Syrian administration, the Palestinian file received little attention in the initial months following the fall of the previous regime. However, clear indicators began to emerge later, particularly with the onset of discussions regarding US conditions for partially lifting sanctions on Syria as part of confidence-building measures between the two sides.
Media reports[21] indicate that one of the eight conditions raised in this context calls for the termination of the military and political presence of Palestinian factions on Syrian soil. While no official statement has been issued by Syrian authorities on this matter, a series of actions, such as the arrest of key figures, including two leaders from the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ) and Talal Naji, the Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)– General Command,[22] suggest some level of response, albeit unannounced.
In addressing this condition, Syrian authorities reiterated their commitment to preventing the presence of any weapons outside the state’s control and ensuring that no threats are launched from Syrian territory towards neighboring countries, including Israel.[23] However, this statement reflects a complex reality, given the ongoing Israeli attacks on Syria and repeated interventions in its internal affairs. This places Syria in a precarious position, entangled in both internal and regional challenges.
Fourth: Potential Scenarios
Based on the above, three potential scenarios for Syria’s approach to this file can be outlined:
1. Complete Fulfillment of the US Condition: Terminating the Military and Political Presence of Palestinian Factions:
This is the most extreme scenario, entailing full compliance with the US demand by prohibiting Palestinian factions from engaging in any military or political activities in Syria. While this may offer short-term diplomatic gains, its internal repercussions could be significant. The Palestinian community in Syria has long relied on political representation, even from traditional factions. Consequently, restricting this public space could push political activity into secrecy or disorganization. Furthermore, this scenario poses legal and civil risks by potentially shifting the relationship between the Syrian state and Palestinian refugees from one defined by civil-political terms under Law No. 260 of 1956 to one based solely on security. This could jeopardize the legal rights Palestinians have established in Syria over the past seven decades and heighten the precariousness of their legal and social status.
2. Banning Military Activity While Maintaining Controlled Political Work:
This scenario assumes that the Syrian government would prohibit the military activities of Palestinian factions, considering the complexities of the local and regional security situation, as well as the ongoing Israeli airstrikes, which would likely justify their actions by the presence of these factions. At the same time, this scenario allows for continued political activities within specific legal frameworks, managed in alignment with the new reality in Syria.
This option represents a middle ground between adhering to the US condition and avoiding internal conflict within the Palestinian community. It also provides the Syrian government with greater maneuvering space in regional affairs, while not abandoning the symbolic “political support” for the Palestine issue. This scenario aligns with the historical relationship between Palestine and Syria and is considered the most likely in terms of political realism and feasibility.
3. Disregarding the US condition while maintaining the political and military presence of Palestinian factions:
This scenario assumes that the new Syrian administration remains committed to supporting Palestinian factions, potentially ignoring the US condition due to the presence of numerous competing priorities. The regime might argue that this issue is sensitive, with broad popular support for resistance, and that it can take practical action against factions that supported the previous regime without making an official declaration. While this position reflects a commitment to “traditional resistance” options, it could have significant political and security costs. On one hand, it could provide Israel with further justification for continuing attacks on Syrian territory and possibly adopting a more aggressive stance in international forums. On the other hand, this approach could undermine Syri’s efforts to reposition itself regionally and weaken its chances of rebuilding balanced relations with key international and regional powers. However, Israe’s ongoing policies of dominance and provocation, which fuel domestic opposition, might lead the regime to view resistance as a potential leverage, regardless of its actual use, and delay its response to the US condition. Given the complex internal situation and the urgent need to lift sanctions, this scenario seems unlikely in the short term, though it cannot be entirely ruled out in the medium term if geopolitical circumstances shift.
Recommendations:
1. Reaffirming the Palestinian people’s right to their land and holy sites, as well as their unwavering national fundamentals—foremost among them the right of refugees to return to the homes from which they were displaced
2. Enhancing institutional Syrian-Palestinian coordination by establishing a joint mechanism to address the issues of detainees and civil rights, in collaboration with relevant international organizations, to ensure transparency and achieve transitional justice.
3. Developing a national plan for the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development of Palestinian RCs, particularly Yarmouk and Handarat, through joint funding from UNRWA and donor countries, with priority given to housing and infrastructure.
4. Establishing a transitional legal framework for Palestinians by amending Laws 260 and 450 to guarantee expanded rights for refugees under the new state, without infringing on any previously held rights.
5. Adopting a balanced policy toward Palestinian political work and institutions, including preserving the civilian political representation of factions in a manner that aligns with national sovereignty and the regional interests of both the new state and the Palestinian people.
Endnotes
[*] An assistant professor of political science at Lusail University in Qatar and a researcher at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha. He specializes in Palestinian affairs and international relations. Hamoud has published numerous newspaper articles and academic studies in both Arabic and English.
[1] Syrian opposition announces Assad’s escape as celebrations erupt in Damascus, site of Aljazeera.net, 8/12/2024, https://www.aljazeera.net (in Arabic)
[2] What does it look like for Palestinian refugees in Syria after the fall of Assad, Aljazeera.net, 17/12/2024 (in Arabic); and Muhammad Yasin, Challenges for Palestinian refugees after the fall of Assad, site of Al-Akhbar newspaper, Beirut, 23/12/2024, https://www.al-akhbar.com
[3] Wael al-Hersh, The Palestinians in Syria: Their Situation Under the New Political Regime, site of Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 2025, https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1657147
[4] Where We Work, site of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/syria
[5] Ibid.
[6] Infographic–Palestinians of Syria: Statistics, Figures and Facts,” site of Action Group for Palestinians of Syria (AGPS), 20/6/2024, https://actionpal.org.uk/ar/post/20413
[7] The Legal Status of Palestinian Refugees in Syria Before the Armed Conflict, site of Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), https://pahrw.org
[8] Gunboats and Tanks bombard neighborhoods in Latakia city, dozens killed, site of France 24, 14/8/2011, https://www.france24.com/ar/20110814-syria-army-tanks-in-damascus-suburbs-king-abdallah-obama-call-to-stop-violence (in Arabic)
[9] The Nakbah of Palestine: Yarmouk Camp as a case study, site of Alkhaleej newspaper, Abu Dhabi, 16/5/2014, https://www.alkhaleej.ae; and Ayham al-Sahly, Yarmouk Refugee Camp: Syria, site of Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question, https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/33649/yarmouk-refugee-camp
[10] General Authority for Palestinian Arab Refugees (GAPAR), established in 1949 under Law 450, is the governmental body responsible for following up on the civil and legal affairs of Palestinian refugees in Syria.
[11] Fatah’s initiative for the return of Syrian Palestinians from Lebanon is unresponsive, Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, London, 17/12/2018, https://tinyurl.com/58873ah7; and Beyond the destruction: Yarmouk camp has another face, AGPS, 26/2/2025, https://www.actionpal.org.uk/ar/post/21196
[12] The researcher conducted a field visit to Yarmouk RC and interviewed several humanitarian organizations providing assistance to families living there, based on their aid lists.
[13] Wael Alhersh, Dera‘a Refugee Camp: Syria, Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question, https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/38365/dera%E2%80%98-refugee-camp
[14] Assad’s forces control the Handarat camp, site of Al-Arabiya channel, 29/9/2016, https://www.alarabiya.net
[15] AGPS calls for revealing the fate of Palestinian detainees in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances, AGPS, 30/8/2024, https://www.actionpal.org.uk/ar/post/20612
[16] 333 Palestinian Refugees Missing During the War in Syria, AGPS, 25/2/2021, https://www.actionpal.org.uk/ar/post/14929
[17] Families demand to know the fate of Palestinian detainees in the prisons of the Assad regime, site of Quds Press Agency, 11/12/2024, https://qudspress.com/170526/
[18] Opening detention centers reveals the continuation of the humanitarian catastrophe: more than 112,414 people are still forcibly disappeared by the Assad regime, site of Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), 28/12/2024, https://snhr.org
[19] Fatah’s initiative for the return of Syrian Palestinians from Lebanon has not received a response, Asharq Al-Awsat, 17/12/2018.
[20] Daily report: The situation of Palestinian refugees in Syria, No. 3809, AGPS, 19/12/2022, https://actionpal.org.uk/en/reports/daily/03-1-2023.pdf
[21] Timour Azhari and Maya Gebeily, Exclusive: Syrian letter delivers response to US conditions for sanctions relief, Reuters News Agency, 26/4/2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-letter-delivers-response-us-conditions-sanctions-relief-2025-04-26/
[22] Arrest of the Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command in Damascus, Aljazeera.net, 3/5/2025. (in Arabic)
[23] Ibid.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 8/5/2025
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