By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Introduction
A trade war[2] can be defined as a conflict that typically arises when one or more countries adopt protectionist policies targeting certain sectors of their economy and trade. The primary tools of such conflict between two or more states often center on reciprocal tariffs imposed by the parties involved. These confrontations are sometimes referred to as tariff wars, customs wars, or duties wars. In response, the targeted country may retaliate by raising tariffs on its imports, heightening tensions between the parties. Such friction often results from one country imposing additional duties on goods imported from another country or group of countries.
| Click here to download: >> Academic Paper: The Future of Trade Wars in Trump’s Foreign Policy… Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay  (25 pages, 1.6 MB) |
A trade war—characterized specifically by the use of tariffs—differs from other measures aimed at controlling imports and exports, such as trade sanctions. Unlike trade wars, which focus primarily on commercial objectives, sanctions often pursue broader humanitarian, environmental or political goals. Non-tariff protectionist policies can also be employed, such as imposing import quotas (limiting the share of a particular product imported from a specific country), setting stringent product standards and specifications, or providing government subsidies to domestic industries to reduce dependence on foreign sources, etc.[3]
First: The Legitimacy of Tariffs under International Law
Although tariffs are a trade instrument recognized under international law, the World Trade Organization (WTO) sets upper bound rates that member states are permitted to impose, with allowances for variation from one country to another. However, exceeding these bound rates constitutes a violation of the commitments established by the organization.[4]
The Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle, as it relates to tariffs, places a constraint on states by prohibiting them from discriminating among their trading partners. Violations of this principle can trigger trade disputes brought before the WTO’s Appellate Body, which is established by and operates under the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). However, the Appellate Body has been effectively paralyzed since 2019,[5] when the US, beginning in President Trump’s first term, refused to appoint or replace its judges. This paralysis has significantly hindered the resolution of potential trade disputes. In contrast, countries joining free trade agreements also seek to further reduce, or even eliminate, the tariffs they have already committed to in the WTO. The lower tariffs then apply to the other parties to the free trade agreement. The goal is to promote better trade terms and improve trade flows between strategic trade partners.[6]
Second: The Modern and Contemporary US Experience with Trade Wars
The US has long led the world in engaging in trade wars driven by protectionist policies. Since the beginning of this century, it has been involved in 15 out of 23 global trade wars, some of which originated in the late 20th century, while others are more recent.[7] In other words, the US has been a party to approximately 65.2% of all trade wars, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. This record suggests that the trade policies pursued during the Trump administration were not a break from historical US strategy. Rather, under Trump, trade wars became broader in geographic scope, targeting a larger number of countries, and expanded across more economic sectors, as will be discussed later.
Historical US experience[8] indicates that trade disputes can escalate into direct military conflict. For instance, in 1921, the U S imposed trade restrictions whose ripple effects ultimately contributed to the outbreak of World War II. Similarly, the US oil embargo on Japan in 1941 paved the way for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent US entry into the war. Nonetheless, several significant developments caution against assuming that tariff wars will necessarily lead to armed conflict. The first is the deep interdependence of global economic and trade systems brought about by globalization, which makes it extremely difficult to isolate or control the effects of such disputes. The second development is the accelerating pace of technological change and the limited capacity for “internal” adaptation, particularly among economic, political and social institutions. One academic study, for example, estimated that Trump’s tariff policies would impose financial burdens across all income groups, though to varying degrees. In the early months of Trump’s second term, these burdens were projected at 5.8% for the poorest 20% of Americans, 2.9% for the middle class (roughly 60% of the population), and just 0.7% for the wealthiest 20%. These disparities highlight the importance of approaching the consequences of tariffs with great caution.[9]
Most historians who study trade wars tend to compare the protectionist policies adopted by major economies during the 1930s, following the Great Depression, with the current situation since Donald Trump’s rise in US politics in 2016. The comparison focuses particularly on the Tariffs Act passed by the US Congress and signed by President Herbert Hoover in 1930, which imposed steep and widespread tariffs on nearly 20 thousand imported goods, increasing tariffs by around 50%. At the time, these were the highest tariffs in US history. The objective was to shield American industries from foreign competition. However, this sparked nationalist reactions among affected countries, accompanied by retaliatory trade measures from Europe, especially France, Italy and Switzerland, as well as Canada. These actions ultimately deepened the Great Depression in the US and crippled global trade for the following five years. From this experience, economic and political elites concluded that winning trade wars is far from “easy,” and that remedying their damaging effects takes a very long time. Notably, US exports plunged by 66% shortly after the tariffs were imposed, prompting President Franklin Roosevelt to reduce tariff levels four years later.[10]
Historical experience in US trade relations reveals a deeper dimension of the link between geoeconomics and geopolitics. In a later period, Japan adopted a protectionist policy and benefited from a favorable exchange rate for the US dollar. This enabled Japan to become a leading exporter of manufactured goods, particularly cars and electronics. By the mid-1980s, the US trade deficit with Japan had surpassed $43 billion[11]—nearly one-third of the total US trade deficit—fueling concerns over potential Japanese economic dominance. At this juncture, the political and economic dimensions converged: Japan’s dependence on the US for its defense compelled it to accept a “voluntary quota” on its car and steel exports to the US market, and to acquiesce to the imposition of US tariffs on Japanese semiconductors.
Over the 20th century, the global banana market became dominated by U.S.-linked companies in Central and South America. However, the European Union (EU) had carved out favorable quotas for bananas imported from former colonies in the Caribbean. This prompted five Latin American countries, along with the US, to file a complaint with the WTO, which ruled in their favor in 1997. In retaliation, the US imposed trade sanctions on European products totaling nearly $200 million, intensifying the conflict. The dispute was ultimately resolved in 2009, when the EU agreed to lower tariffs on Latin American banana imports, while Caribbean countries continued to receive tariff-free access to the EU market.[12]
Another example that illustrates US expertise in trade wars is the case of American steel. Until the 1980s, the US controlled over 50% of the global steel market. However, this dominance steadily declined, falling to less than 10% by the early 2000s. In response to industry lobbying, the George W. Bush administration in 2002 imposed “safeguard” tariffs on imported steel of up to 30%. The move drew outcry from US trading partners such as South Korea, Russia and the EU, which immediately drew up proposals for retaliatory tariffs on American chicken, textiles and airlines. These actions, combined with the rising cost of steel for US manufacturers, led to significant economic repercussions, including the loss of nearly 200 thousand jobs in steel-consuming industries. In 2003, the WTO ruled against the tariffs, and they were repealed shortly after.[13]
There are many examples of US trade wars with countries around the world, particularly with its allies. One notable case occurred in the 1960s, when France and Germany imposed tariffs on American poultry. In retaliation, the US imposed 25% tariffs on light trucks and various agricultural products, a move that also impacted Japan. In response, European companies began establishing assembly plants in the US to bypass the new tariffs.[14]
In 1987, Japan faced a trade dispute with the US over the production and import of cars, electronics and motorcycles. In retaliation for Japan’s failure to implement a bilateral agreement to increase imports from the US, Washington imposed higher tariffs on these goods.[15]
In 1982, the US engaged in the Softwood Lumber Dispute with Canada, which eventually caused Canadian lumber prices to increase by about 40% by 2018. Additionally, during George W. Bush’s presidency, the US and Europe faced disputes over tariffs on steel and oranges.[16]
Third: Evaluating Protectionist Policies in Trade Wars
It is challenging to categorically define the protectionist aspect of trade wars as either wholly beneficial or entirely harmful. The outcomes are inherently relative, with the balance of benefits and drawbacks depending on several variables that sway the outcome toward either advantage or disadvantage. Nevertheless, two main perspectives prevail on this issue:
First perspective: Supporters of protectionism
This view argues that protectionist policies result in:[17]
1. Well-crafted policies provide competitive advantages. By restricting or discouraging imports, protectionist measures enhance employment opportunities for domestic producers, ultimately contributing to job creation.
2. Such policies can help address trade deficits.
3. Proponents contend that painful tariffs and trade wars may be the only effective means to counter countries that persist in unfair or unethical trade practices.
Second perspective: Opponents of protectionist policies
They argue:[18]
According to general economic estimates, tariffs in many countries will remain around 10%, while tariffs on China are expected to stabilize at 60% (although Trump favors 80% as more appropriate). Considering the overall trend of US trade tariffs, the average rate will settle near 20%. Historically, US tariffs rose from 1800 to 1860, then steadily declined, reaching about 2.42% by 2020. However, tariffs surged back to 28% with the onset of Trump’s second term, revealing a clear uncertainty regarding the future direction of his trade policy. Key issues include:[19]
1. Protectionism often harms those it aims to protect by restricting markets and slowing economic growth and cultural exchange.
2. Consumer choices may shrink, and shortages can arise if no local alternatives exist for imported goods affected or eliminated by tariffs.
3. Higher costs for imported raw materials reduce profit margins for domestic manufacturers.
4. Trade wars can drive up prices, especially for manufactured goods, which in turn may generally lead to inflation in the domestic economy.
A study tracking the impact of Trump’s tariff policies up to April 2025 highlights the following cumulative buildup of tariffs:[20]
1. Computing the average effective tariff rate (AETR) shows that, in 2024, importers paid an estimated 2.2 cents in duties for every dollar of imported goods.
2. Adding 20% tariffs on all Chinese imports and 25% tariffs on aluminum and steel — measures already in effect as of March 2025 — increases the AETR to 7.1%. Assuming full pass-through, the cost of imports from China rises by approximately 22 cents for every dollar of imported goods.
3. Adding 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico that fall outside US-Mexico-Canada Agreement coverage raises the AETR to 10.4%. Mexico’s and Canada’s effective rates rise sharply, to 15.5% and 11.9%, respectively.
4. Applying the 25% auto tariffs lifts the AETR to 12.4%. Tariff burdens deepen in sectors like transportation equipment, and country-level AETRs reach 30% for Mexico and 20% for Canada. We also find that a 25% tariff on all imports from the EU is added to the previous experiments, the AETR rises to 17.0%, the highest in the analysis.
Fourth: China’s Central Role in Trump’s Trade War Strategy
China’s Four Modernizations program, launched after the post-Mao Zedong economic reforms, marked a significant turning point in its global economic position. After joining the WTO in 2001, the US–China trade balance steadily shifted in China’s favor from around 1985, peaking at over $400 billion during Trump’s first term in 2018. This substantial trade deficit prompted Trump to accuse China of exploiting the US open trade policy, stealing intellectual property, and causing job losses in American manufacturing, etc. In response, in 2017, the Trump administration imposed broad tariffs on Chinese goods, including consumer electronics, medical devices and machinery. China retaliated by imposing tariffs targeting key US industries such as automobiles and agriculture, notably impacting the American soybean sector. Under President Biden’s administration (2020–2024), tensions in the trade war somewhat eased. China agreed to relax ownership restrictions for firms receiving foreign investment. Nevertheless, Biden’s administration maintained the initial tariffs and introduced additional trade measures, including export controls and restrictions on investments in China.[21]
Five international entities dominate US trade: two blocs, the EU (27 countries) and ASEAN (10 countries), and three individual countries: Canada, Mexico and China. In 2024, the US goods trade deficit totaled approximately $1.2 trillion, with these five parties accounting for 82.75% of that figure. This concentration helps explain why they were the primary targets of the new tariffs imposed by Trump. Among them, China accounted for the largest share of the deficit.
When Donald Trump assumed the presidency for his first term (2016–2020), the US trade deficit with China decreased from $346.825 billion to $307.966 billion; a reduction of 11.2%, or an average annual decline of 2.8%, as shown in Table 1. It is well known that Trump launched his trade war with China in 2018.
It is important to note that the US and China signed a trade agreement in January 2020, the final year of Trump’s first term. The agreement focused on key sectors, including the regulation of trade relations between the two parties in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and the expansion of trade. The agreement also covered intellectual property in detail, addressing all matters related to trade secrets, patents, pharmaceutical-related intellectual property, geographical indications (GI[22]), trademarks, and enforcement against pirated and counterfeit goods.[23]
Table (1): The U.S. Trade Deficit with China [24]
| Year | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | Jan+Feb 2025 |
| Deficit ($Billion) | 342.629 | 307.966 | 352.806 | 382.133 | 279.107 | 295.401 | 52.911 |
Trump has advocated for tariffs since the 1980s (when the “Japan threat” included Japanese purchases of symbolic New York real estate). During his first term, he raised tariffs on a large share of imports from China and on aluminum and steel globally. During his 2024 campaign, Trump promised (at least) 60% tariffs on all imports from China and 10% or 20% global tariffs (all imports from all countries). He also threatened tariffs against specific companies, such as John Deere, that are considering shifting manufacturing abroad. Afterwards, reactions to Trump’s policies escalated from China and other countries, reaching record levels. He later reversed some measures and then permitted a 90-day freeze on the implementation of certain tariffs.[25]
Trump’s use of tariffs on China, and other countries, aims to achieve several key objectives:
1. Establish a trade balance between exports and imports and eliminate the trade deficit.
2. Encourage American factories to increase production by curbing foreign imports.
3. Halt illegal immigration and the smuggling of certain substances, notably fentanyl, a drug used for medical purposes.
4. Aim to balance state revenues with expenditures.
5. Curb certain foreign policies, especially those related to US national security. For example, in February and March 2025, Trump signed executive orders directing the US Department of Commerce to consider the necessity of imposing tariffs on copper and lumber imports to protect national security—copper being vital to US defense, infrastructure and emerging technologies, and wood products being essential to the construction sector and the military.
6. Some observers believe that Trump’s “friendly” relations with Russia are aimed at neutralizing it and discouraging its support for China in the trade standoff. An assumption we examined in a previous study, especially in light of the murky nature of Trump’s connections to Russian security circles.[26]
Data on the trade growth of both China and the US clearly highlight the significant failure of Trump’s tariff policies. This is evident in the comparison of the international trade relations of the two countries, as illustrated in the following table:[27]
Table (2): Comparing the International Trade Expansion of China and US
| Year | 2001 | 2018 | 2023 |
| Countries trading more with China than with the US | 30 | 139 | 145 |
| Countries with China as their largest bilateral trading partner | N/A | N/A | 60 |
| Countries with the US as their largest bilateral trading partner | N/A | N/A | 33 |
| Countries whose trade volume with China exceeds twice that with the US | N/A | 92 | 112 |
| Economies that trade more with China than with the US | 15% | N/A | 70% |
Table (2) highlights the rapid expansion of China’s trade dominance. Trump’s latest agreement with the Chinese, reached in the second week of May 2025, saw a sharp reduction in US tariffs on Chinese goods from 145% to 30% for a three-month trial period, matched by a Chinese cut from 125% to 10%.[28] This suggests that Trump’s trade initiatives were largely tactical bargaining positions, open to negotiation.
Fifth: Challenges in Trump’s International Trade War Measures
It is worth noting first that the statements issued by the Trump administration and its advisors reflect a degree of “uncertainty” in assessing the potential consequences of their trade war. Furthermore, the overlapping objectives often result in contradictions, with some goals appearing to undermine others. The most prominent challenges associated with the US objectives can be summarized as follows:[29]
1. Encourage onshoring: Trump seeks to eliminate the benefits for companies to build abroad in order to sell into the United States. This responds to a belief—sometimes correct—that U.S. companies “move” factories overseas when they can make products more cheaply there to sell into the U.S. market. This is considered a rationale for higher across-the-board tariffs, as well as tariffs threatened against specific companies or sectors.
2. Protect US producers: The Trump administration seeks also to support domestic manufacturing even when uncompetitive against foreign competition. This apparently was, for example, the main goal of the steel tariffs in 2017. The tariffs allow US producers to raise their prices and thus stay in business without significant restructuring. Note that this also raises costs for US producers downstream and thus makes US exports less competitive (and US consumers unhappy). Thus, revealing the contradictions inherent in some of these measures.
3. Reduce the trade deficit both bilaterally and globally: In Trump’s view, bilateral deficits denote “losing,” and global deficits reflect unfair foreign practices, such as artificially lower exchange rates. Tariffs can, in some cases, alter bilateral trade balances, but when applied to only one or a few countries, they simply shift the deficit geographically. Global tariffs could affect the overall trade deficit in some circumstances—but that is not assured as the dollar exchange rate and macroeconomic conditions play major roles in the trade deficit.
4. Reciprocity: WTO applies the principle of reciprocity based on parity in tariff rates and other trade conditions, such as product specifications, standards and expiration dates… For example, US auto tariffs are 2.5% while EU auto tariffs are 10%. This imbalance suggests that either Europe should lower its tariffs to match the US rate, or the US should raise its tariffs to align with Europe’s. Herein lies a core challenge: tariff policies on most goods vary widely across countries. This inconsistency creates complications for international trade, particularly in the context of intricate international supply chains.[30] When a product is manufactured across four countries, for example—as is often the case with multinational corporations—it becomes difficult to determine how tariffs should be calculated when each country involved applies a different rate.
5. Relying on higher tariff revenues must take into account the possibility that raising tariffs could drive the exporting country to seek alternative markets with lower tariffs and greater competitiveness, bypassing the US altogether. Such a shift would deprive the US Treasury of any tariff income—high or low. In this scenario, Trump’s claim that tariffs will “pay for” his tax cuts may prove to be an unreliable wager, particularly over the medium term.
6. Tariffs as leverage for political deals:Trump has at times used tariffs—or the threat of them—as leverage to advance demands unrelated to trade. For instance, he threatened to raise tariffs on Mexico, Canada and China unless they address drug trafficking and migrant flows. He also targeted the BRICS countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, for considering an alternative currency. Some of these threats, however, might blow up the US-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), which Trump negotiated during his first administration to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This prompts a crucial question: what limits govern the use of tariff threats as leverage whenever the US disagrees with another country on political, economic, social or even environmental matters?
7. The Dollar Exchange Rate Dilemma: There is a significant relationship between the effectiveness of tariffs and the US dollar exchange rate. The dollar may appreciate as other countries’ currencies weaken—often a consequence of declining exports due to higher US tariffs on their goods. Moreover, global investors may flock to the US for higher interest rates or as a refuge against global turmoil. Some countries might adopt policies designed intentionally to depreciate their currencies to stimulate exports, which would further strengthen the dollar in relative terms. A strong US dollar could shield US consumers from some of the price increases caused by the tariffs. It would also make US exports less competitive. So, while the revenue objective might be facilitated, the trade deficit would grow.
It is also possible that the dollar weakens, probably driven by fear of turmoil and uncertainty in the US business environment, driven by the tariffs, expulsion of immigrants, and burgeoning US debt, along with Trump’s proclaimed intention to pressure the US Federal Reserve into keeping interest rates lower than otherwise indicated. A weaker dollar would contribute to the objective of reducing the trade deficit—although not the revenue-raising goal.[31]
8. It is important to recognize that raising tariffs results in higher consumer prices through two main channels:[32]
a. Importers are likely to raise the prices of imported goods to offset the additional costs imposed by tariffs.
b. Domestic producers may also increase prices, as their production, processing and storage often depend on imported raw materials—particularly from China—such as pharmaceuticals, apparel and foodstuffs.
Sixth: The Future of Trump’s Trade Policies
Mercantilist theory offers the most fitting framework for understanding Trump’s trade policies, particularly in their international economic aspect. This theory emphasizes self-sufficiency through a favorable balance of trade. Mercantilist policies focus on the accumulation of wealth and resources while maintaining a positive trade balance with other countries. By maximizing exports and minimizing imports, mercantilism is also viewed as a form of economic protectionism. Modern mercantilist policies restrict imports by increasing tariffs, thereby reducing the competitiveness of foreign products in the domestic market while also maximizing government revenue from these tariffs.[33]
Trump’s tariff-focused economic plan clearly reflected his policy stance, but it carries several implications:
1. Political Implications
The interconnection between economics and politics is a well-established principle in political science. The mutual influence between the two is self-evident, as geoeconomic planning often serves geopolitical objectives and vice versa.[34] Tariffs and other trade measures may be employed for geopolitical reasons, such as protecting national security or addressing environmental concerns. In these cases, the goal is not merely economic profit or welfare, but to influence the global balance of power. Geopolitical dynamics thus help explain state behavior in terms of power distribution and the competition for global leadership. States may seek to enhance their geopolitical standing by securing access to critical resources, such as essential raw materials, semiconductors and digital technologies, or by building and integrating into resilient supply chains. For example, China, the EU and the US have adopted various measures to restrict the entry of certain foreign electric vehicles into their domestic markets and to secure a dominant position in the global electric vehicle supply chain.[35]
Countries may use commercial tariffs as a geopolitical tool to achieve domestic objectives and to maintain or claim global leadership. These emerging policies risk undermining international cooperation and economic interdependence, at a time when many argue that international rules and institutions are under growing pressure. One of the earliest consequences of Trump’s tariff policies has been the disruption of much globalization literature, especially that which viewed globalization and Americanization as two sides of the same coin. While Trump’s tariff measures have dealt a blow to free trade and its flows—undermining one of the key mechanisms of globalization—it is the (socialist) Chinese president who now, in both rhetoric and practice, appears to be steering the ship of globalization and showing the greatest commitment to it. This scenario is ideologically disorienting for classical frameworks, which have failed to distinguish between globalization as a process and globalization as a destination. This confusion reflects one of the intellectual and political implications of Trump’s measures. As the US withdraws from numerous international organizations and multilateral international agreements—such as the UN Human Rights Council, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Global Compact on Migration, the Paris Agreement, and even through Trump’s threats to withdraw from the WTO—China is increasing its integration into international organizations. This is evident both through its self-initiated projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and newer efforts like the Global Development Initiative (GDI) launched in 2021, which has garnered the support of over 100 countries, etc.[36]
On the political front, the trade war reflects a US reversion to a realist, Westphalian perspective—disregarding the transitional phase the international system is currently undergoing, marked by a shift from zero-sum to non-zero-sum dynamics. Given that this reversion originates from one of the most influential powers in the global order, it represents an attempt by a sub-trend to counter a prevailing mega-trend. However, this suggests that its impact will be limited and short-lived, and that the mega-trend will soon reassert itself, drawing this major power back into alignment—sooner than many anticipate.[37]
The third political consequence of Trump’s tariff policies is heightened trade tension, increasing the risk of unrest within states and conflict between them. This strain may extend to alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), raising questions about their role, relevance and burden-sharing. Affected states may be driven to adopt counterstrategies, especially if the tariffs—and related economic measures—inflict enough harm to realign alliances, turning former adversaries into partners, and vice versa. Europe’s response is a clear example. This trend is further compounded by the weakening of international institutions such as the WTO, as well as organizations concerned with the environment, human rights, migration and global peace. As their capacity to function effectively diminishes, the broader situation is likely to deteriorate. This undermines Trump’s stated aim of pursuing “fewer wars,” which appears to be faltering.[38] Notably, his tariffs are expected to affect €549 billion in EU exports—97% of the bloc’s total exports to the United States.[39]
China is expected to be the hardest hit—particularly in light of the successive and somewhat erratic tariff hikes, which rose from 20% to 50%, then 104%, and finally 145%. In contrast, Russia is likely to be far less affected by this US policy, as it is no longer a significant trading partner for the US. Following the war in Ukraine and four years of Democratic-led policies, trade between Russia and Washington declined sharply—from $36 billion in 2021 (at the start of the Biden administration) to just $3.5 billion in 2024. Of that total, $1.3 billion consists of fertilizers and plutonium—both of which are difficult for the U.S. to substitute in its agricultural and industrial sectors—rendering Trump’s measures largely inconsequential for the Russian economy.[40] While the ruble has remained relatively stable, any impact on Russia would likely stem from declining oil prices, given that oil is one of its major exports. This, however, would be an indirect effect, resulting from broader economic repercussions. In fact, the scale of damage to the Russian economy mirrors that experienced by Iran, and may even be less severe, despite Russia’s already limited economic exposure.
In economic history, trade relations between states have typically been governed by negotiation between the parties involved. However, President Trump adopted a policy of unilateralism, imposing decisions without prior consultation. This approach was perceived by the EU, Japan, India and others as reckless and a breach of international trade norms, casting a negative light on US diplomacy.
From a political standpoint, Trump’s tariffs disrupted traditional alliances but stopped short of dismantling them. While they may have laid the groundwork for certain strategic shifts, a four-year term—even with active implementation—is insufficient to transform a secondary trend into a dominant one.[41]
2. Impact on International Relations
Economists widely agree that free trade enhances economic output and income, whereas trade barriers tend to suppress both. Historical examples of tariff hikes reveal that such policies typically raise prices and limit the supply of goods and services available to businesses and consumers. The result is often a decline in income, job opportunities, and overall economic performance. Notably, the level of US tariff imposition on a given country tends to correlate with that country’s degree of political dependence on the US, what is sometimes referred to as the “political distance” between the two parties. Countries that are politically and strategically aligned with the US, such as Israel, Taiwan, and some Arab and Asian states, tend to have more leeway in negotiations and face less rigid tariff enforcement. In contrast, countries less dependent on Washington often face harsher measures. In essence, tariff levels are influenced not only by trade balances but also by the degree of alignment with US foreign policy, regardless of any moral or ethical justifications that may be presented to frame these decisions.[42]
On another front, the impact of Trump’s tariff policies is closely linked to the US share of global trade. The US accounts for 13% of total global imports, and 30 countries alone represent 89.6% of its total imports. This indicates that the number of countries directly affected by Trump’s policies is relatively limited, despite their substantial role in US trade relations. As a result, the direct geoeconomic impact of these tariffs is expected to remain narrow, though indirect effects, transmitted through those 30 countries, should not be overlooked. In the Middle East, Israel ranks 21st among the top exporters to the US. Among Arab countries, only Saudi Arabia (ranked 33rd) and Iraq (45th) fall within the top 50, while most others rank below 60th, such as Jordan (63rd). Given that approximately 163 countries collectively account for just 10.4% of US imports, their direct exposure to Trump’s tariff policies is minimal. Nonetheless, indirect repercussions remain plausible, as suggested by the “Futures Wheel” model.[43] As outlined earlier, the data points to a rapidly accelerating Chinese trade expansion, largely unimpeded by trade restrictions, that has clearly outpaced US trade growth, both before and after Trump’s first term.
As for the domestic impact on the US economy, most studies paint a far less optimistic picture than the one Trump promotes. China appears to be a particular fixation for him—especially given that, by 2024, its exports exceed those of the US by approximately $1.361 trillion. Trump’s track record in this area offers little reason for confidence. For example, his “similar 2018 tariffs created just 1,000 steel jobs while costing 75,000 jobs in steel-using industries,” according to official U.S. government records. Based on similar estimates, his “new, more comprehensive tariffs may boost US steel producers, supporting 80,000 jobs. But they threaten a portion of 12 million jobs in industries that use steel and aluminium,” just to name a few.[44]
On the other hand, the shift in trade away from the US toward alternative markets could undermine the rent (economic gain) Trump hopes to extract through higher tariffs and reduce the dollar’s dominance in global trade. The EU, a key trading partner of the US, has begun seeking agreements with the Southern Common Market “Mercosur,” and has launched negotiations with Mexico, India and Malaysia. The UK is doing the same, particularly with India and other partners. Furthermore, containing a global power like China requires the cooperation of other major economies. But how can such cooperation be expected when Trump is shaking the foundations of their economies? Some countries, like Canada, Portugal and other NATO members, have already begun exploring alternatives to purchasing the US-made F-35 fighter jets, in response to Trump’s confrontational trade and defense policies.[45] These concerns are reflected in data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which confirms that an escalation in the trade war would lead to higher inflation, thereby prolonging the period of elevated interest rates. The OECD stated that “Significant risks remain. Further fragmentation of the global economy is a key concern. Higher and broader increases in trade barriers would hit growth around the world and add to inflation.” To illustrate these concerns, the OECD stated in a series of reports that “Global GDP growth is projected to moderate from 3.2% in 2024, to 3.1% in 2025,” mainly due to rising trade tensions. It also revised its inflation forecast for the G20 economies upward to 3.8% for this year, compared to a previous estimate of 3.5%—a change attributed to the measures announced by former President Trump. Consequently, the organization downgraded its growth projections for key economies, including the UK (the US’ closest ally) where growth is now expected to fall to 1.4% in 2025 (down from 1.7%) and to 1.2% in 2026 (down from 1.3%). If other countries respond with countermeasures—whether economic or security-related—further tariff increases may follow, deepening the complexity of the situation. For instance, “U.S. companies, according to internal estimates, pay over $200 billion per year in value-added taxes (VAT) to foreign governments—a “double-whammy” on U.S. companies who pay the tax at the European border, while European companies don’t pay tax to the United States on the income from their exports to the U.S.” Such imbalances are likely to prompt a shift toward more confrontational, rather than cooperative, policies—even among allies.[46]
It is crucial to recognize that the US economy is facing deeper structural challenges than what Trump assumes his policies, such as imposing tariffs, can address. For example, in 2001, US Manufacturing Output accounted for 28.4% of Global Manufacturing Output; by 2023, this share had declined to just 17.4%, a drop of 11% over two decades. This sharp decline partly explains why, between 1997 and 2024, the US “lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs and experienced one of the largest drops in manufacturing employment in history.”[47] Moreover, only about 8% of the American workforce is currently employed in the manufacturing sector. Even under the most optimistic projections, Trump’s policies are unlikely to increase this figure by more than 2%.[48]
Another major challenge is “the annual cost to the U.S. economy of counterfeit goods, pirated software, and theft of trade secrets is between $225 billion and $600 billion.” These infringements pose a serious threat to the United States’ competitiveness in the affected sectors.[49]
However, supporters of Trump’s tariff policies argue that such measures could reduce U.S. imports by 25%, amounting to approximately $800 billion.[50] A 2024 economic analysis reinforces this optimistic outlook, suggesting that “a global tariff of 10% would grow the economy by $728 billion, create 2.8 million jobs, and increase real household incomes by 5.7%.”[51] It is also important to highlight the substantial gap between US tariff rates and those of other countries: while the average US tariff stands at around 3.5%, rates elsewhere can reach 10% or higher. In certain agricultural and industrial sectors, the disparity is even more pronounced—for example, US tariffs may be as low as 2.5%, compared to up to 40% in other countries. This is particularly evident in sectors such as automobiles, some electronics, rice, and specific fruits like apples, etc.[52]
An important dimension in evaluating Trump’s policies, one that should not be overlooked, is public opinion toward his plans. Globally, and even within the US, most public opinion does not support them. Domestic opposition has pushed Trump’s economic approval rating down to 37% as of April 2025, with nearly a quarter of Republicans expressing disapproval. During Trump’s first term, opposition to his tariff measures—then less aggressive than those currently in place—reached 68% in a survey conducted across 33 countries. In Germany, opposition reached 85%, while in South Korea and Japan it stood at 82%.[53]
It is important to note that Trump has shown a willingness to reverse or modify his positions. In his first term, he initially adopted a hardline stance on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but ultimately eased off on implementing his threats. This time, around fifty countries have entered into negotiations with Trump or members of his administration on the issue, suggesting that the political distance between the US and each of these countries must be taken into account when determining the tariffs to be imposed on their imports.
Conclusion
The US trade deficit with most countries, particularly China, has emerged as a troubling indicator of the future US role in international affairs. This deficit is rooted in three key structural imbalances:
1. A mismatch between savings[54] and investment levels.
2. A widening gap between government spending and tax revenues.
3. An ongoing imbalance between exports and imports.
An examination of the cumulative deficit stemming from these dimensions reveals that in 2024 the US has reached a federal budget deficit of $1.8 trillion, equal to 6.4% of its GDP; an increase of around 0.1% from 2023.[55] This substantial figure could provide grounds for pessimistic projections unless preventive measures are taken to contain its impact. The concern is heightened by the fact that the United States’ key economic competitors do not face such a structural imbalance at a comparable scale.
This means that the most direct approach to achieving fiscal balance is by first controlling government spending domestically. However, such measures are likely to provoke popular resistance and opposition from various economic sectors. Would the average American welcome cuts to healthcare, education, or other essential services? Furthermore, Trump’s promises of tax cuts—as he claimed—would exacerbate the fiscal deficit, since tax revenues would decline while government spending levels remain unchanged.
Regarding tariffs, particularly in confronting major powers like China, their success hinges on several key factors, including:
1. The response of other countries by imposing tariffs on US goods makes these products less attractive, as the resulting price increases from retaliatory tariffs diminish their competitiveness. Each tariff hike directly leads to higher prices, weakening their market appeal.
2. Ability to offset in markets: Imposing tariffs on US goods across most global markets will raise their prices everywhere, while Chinese products will retain, and potentially strengthen, their competitiveness in countries where Chinese goods face similar tariff levels. Goods previously sold in the US market will simply shift to other markets. Notably, China’s total trade surplus in 2024 with its top twenty trading partners was about $992.2 billion, including $361 billion with the US. This means that, theoretically, even if China’s trade with the US were completely halted, its trade surplus would still amount to roughly $631 billion.[56] Moreover, China would likely redirect some exports blocked from the US to other regions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with trade valued at approximately $982 billion, or the EU ($786 billion), increasing trade volumes enough to absorb the impact of US tariffs.[57]
3. China is pursuing a deliberate strategy by relocating industries targeted by US tariffs to other countries, then exporting the goods to the US under the name of the host country, especially those facing relatively low US tariffs. This approach allows the host country to benefit economically from the influx of Chinese manufacturing, while China gains indirect access to the US market, disguised as exports from these partner countries. Although some countries, such as Vietnam, have expressed reluctance toward this arrangement due to historical political reasons, others may view it as an opportunity. Given that US tariffs affect around $300 billion worth of Chinese exports, if China succeeds in finding alternative markets for even half of these exports, “the direct impact on China will be less than 1% of GDP.”[58]
4. One of China’s responses was to devalue its currency, making Chinese goods more affordable. While this reduces their nominal value (price in foreign currencies), it enhances their appeal to price-sensitive consumers. If China succeeds in managing the depreciation, it can compensate for the lower value by boosting demand for its goods through more competitive pricing.
5. China’s increase in tariffs on US goods will make American products significantly more expensive, especially since they are already costly due to high wage levels in the US. This will further drive up their prices in global markets, considering that the “manufacturing wages in China are now 20% of manufacturing wages in the US.”[59]
6. It is worth noting that in 2024, US military spending exceeded China’s by approximately $566 billion ($939 billion vs. $373 billion),[60] recalling Paul Kennedy’s warning about imperial overstretch and its economic burdens—an issue that further complicates Trump’s ambitions.
7. Since the mid-1990s, a significant shift has taken place in industrial production, marked by the rise of what economists call “global value chains (GVCs).” This refers to the fragmentation of production processes—ranging from design to delivery—across multiple countries. Many of these chains operate outside the US, functioning as extensions of a globalized production center. The challenge is that the manufacturing model underpinning Trump’s economic vision has not existed over the past four decades. This raises a key question: how can his tariff policy reconcile the deeply interconnected nature of GVCs with a nationalist approach that focuses exclusively on production stages within the US? Any serious attempt to repatriate entire supply chains would likely drive-up consumer prices and undermine the global competitiveness of American goods.[61]
It is clear that Trump prioritizes narrowly economic policies over international political, social and legal considerations. While such an approach may appear feasible in the short term, the deep economic, political, security and social interdependence forged by globalization (regardless of how one evaluates it normatively) will inevitably compel Trump, or any successor, to align with its direction. His pathological narcissism may lead him to believe he is reshaping the world and restoring America’s greatness, as his platform and organization’s slogan (Make America Great Again, MAGA) proclaims, but reality will prove otherwise. This is to say nothing of the unsettling political consequences that have shaken the traditional bonds within the capitalist bloc.
However, we do not rule out the possibility that Trump will attempt to compensate for the shortcomings of his global trade project by leaning on certain regions, particularly Southeast Asia and the Middle East. This may involve a US response to the internal or regional stability concerns of some Arab regimes in exchange for substantial economic and trade benefits to the US. These could include pressuring Arab countries to impose trade restrictions, including tariffs, on certain states, especially China.
[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] Trade war, site of Business Dictionary, https://web.archive.org/web/20180621043058/http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/trade-war.html
[3] Protectionism: Examples and Types of Trade Protections, site of Investopedia, 31/5/2024, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/protectionism.asp
[4] Definitions of World Trade Organization (WTO) members’ tariffs are of two types:
– Bound rates (the ceiling rates as listed in members’ “schedules” or lists of commitments)
– Applied rates (the rates members currently charge, whih can be lower than the bound rates).
For details, see Tariffs, site of World Trade Organization (WTO), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariffs_e.htm
[5] Philip Blenkinsop, At WTO, growing disregard for trade rules shows world is fragmenting, Reuters News Agency, 3/10/2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/wto-growing-disregard-trade-rules-shows-world-is-fragmenting-2023-10-02/
[6] Insight: The geopolitics of trade tariffs: The new Trump presidency, site of House of Commons Library, UK Parliament, 12/3/2025, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/the-geopolitics-of-trade-tariffs-the-new-trump-presidency/
[7] Robert Abad, “Trade Wars in the 21st Century: Perspectives From the Frontline,” site of Western Asset, August 2018, https://www.westernasset.com/sg/qe/pdfs/whitepapers/trade-wars-in-the-twenty-first-century-2018-08.pdf
[8] For historical details of the examples we list in this study, see Ibid; Alex Gendler, America’s trade wars: Past and present, site of VOA News, 5/3/2025, https://projects.voanews.com/trade-wars/; and Douglas A. Irwin, “Trade Policy in American Economic History,” Annual Review of Economics journal, Vol.12, 2020, https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-070119-024409
[9] Kimberly Clausing and Mary E. Lovely, PIIE Chart: Trump’s bigger tariff proposals would cost the typical American household over $2,600 a year, site of Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), 21/8/2024, https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2024/trumps-bigger-tariff-proposals-would-cost-typical-american-household-over
[10] Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Smoot-Hawley-Tariff-Act; and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech to Congress on Foreign Trade, 2/3/1934, site of Teaching American History, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/speech-to-congress-on-foreign-trade/
[11] “Macroeconomic Influences on the U.S.-Japan Trade Imbalance,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) Quarterly Review, Spring 1986, site of Federal Reserve Bank of New York, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/quarterly_review/1986v11/v11n1article2.pdf
[12] Alex Gendler, America’s trade wars: Past and present, VOA News, 5/3/2025.
[13] Ibid.
[14]See Sarah Shamim, Before Trump: The long US history of tariff wars with Canada and the world, site of Al Jazeera, 4/2/2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/4/before-trump-the-long-us-history-of-tariff-wars-with-canada-and-the-world
[15] See Ibid.
[16] See Ibid.
[17] Tejvan Pettinger, Benefits and costs of tariffs, site of economics, 21/11/2017, https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/218/trade/benefits-and-costs-of-tariffs/; and Marina Azzimonti et al., “Tariffs: Estimating the Economic Impact of the 2025 Measures and Proposals,” Economic Brief, April 2025, No. 25-12, site of Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2025/eb_25-12
[18] Countries & Regions, site of Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), https://ustr.gov/countries-regions; and U.S. Trade in Goods by Country, site of United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html
[19] Paritosh Bansal, Davide Barbuscia and Jeff Mason, In Trump’s circle, some expect high tariffs even after trade deals, Reuters, 9/5/2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/amid-trumps-muddled-trade-agenda-one-thing-is-clear-tariffs-will-be-higher-2025-05-09/
[20] Marina Azzimonti et al., “Tariffs: Estimating the Economic Impact of the 2025 Measures and Proposals”.
[21] Alex Kliment and Luisa Vieira Graphic Truth: The US trade deficit with China, from zero to now, site of GZERO Media, 17/4/2025, https://www.gzeromedia.com/gzero-north/graphic-truth-us-china-trade-howd-we-get-here-anyway
[22] This involves addressing the potential for inappropriately “overprotecting” Geographical Indications (GIs) related to the production, management, analysis and planning of data tied to computer-based mapping systems that identify optimal trade websites. The United States has accused China of using this approach to effectively exclude American agricultural and food producers.
[23] United States – China, Phase One Trade Agreement, USTR, https://ustr.gov/phase-one; Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China: Fact Sheet, USTR, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Phase_One_Agreement-IP_Fact_Sheet.pdf; Robert Abad, “Trade Wars in the 21st Century: Perspectives From the Frontline,” Western Asset, August 2018; and Jack Caporal, The U.S. Trade Balance With Every Country, site of The Motley Fool, 7/5/2025, https://www.fool.com/research/us-trade-balance/#toc_the-us-trade-balance-with-china
To understand the nature of the U.S.-China trade relationship see China, Mongolia & Taiwan, USTR, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan
[24] Trade in Goods with China, United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2016
[25] David Nelson, Trump Trade 2.0, site of Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 20/12/2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-trade-20
Also, see the details of the tariff rates imposed by Trump on various countries: Insight: The geopolitics of trade tariffs: The new Trump presidency, House of Commons Library, UK Parliament, 12/3/2025.
[26] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Trump and the Dilemma of Transforming US-Russian Relations, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 28/3/2025, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2025/03/28/academic-paper-trump-and-the-dilemma-of-transforming-us-russian-relations/
[27] Roland Rajah and Ahmed Albayrak, Data Snapshot: China versus America on global trade, site of Lowy Institute, January 2025, https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/china-versus-america-on-global-trade/; and John Edwards, What’s next in the US trade conflict?, site of The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 14/4/2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-s-next-us-trade-conflict
[28]Josh Boak and Didi Tang, What’s next with Trump’s trade war truce with China, The Associated Press (AP), 13/5/2025, https://apnews.com/article/trump-tariffs-whats-next-2d597284774fddd6ad9fa4f60e783d34
[29] David Nelson, Trump Trade 2.0, CSIS, 20/12/2024; and Michelle L. Price, How Trump justifies his tariffs — from budget balancing to protecting ‘the soul’ of America, AP, 26/3/2025, https://apnews.com/article/trump-tariff-justifications-50f0b4416234e63c7136eaa5c5f96759
[30]Trump’s Economic Disruption: The World Adapts, site of Council of Councils (CoC), Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 1/5/2025, https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/trumps-economic-disruption-world-adapts
[31] David Nelson, Trump Trade 2.0, CSIS, 20/12/2024.
[32] Dara-Abasi Ita, How Tariffs on Chinese Goods Could Affect Your Grocery Bill, Investopedia, 16/1/2025, https://www.investopedia.com/tariffs-on-chinese-goods-8773900
[33] Mercantilism, site of Corporate Finance Institute (CFI), https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/mercantilism /
[34] Insight: The geopolitics of trade tariffs: The new Trump presidency, House of Commons Library, UK Parliament, 12/3/2025.
[35] Risks in 2025: Geopolitical instability and trade wars, site of Everstream Analytics, https://www.everstream.ai/articles/2025-risks-geopolitical-tariff-wars/
[36] Xin Ping, Guest Opinion: China’s leading role in globalization, site of Xinhuanet, 26/11/2024, https://english.news.cn/20241126/4e07c7850bf844a3aee871a136190094/c.html
[37] Juan Carlos Palacios Cívico,Trump protectionism and tariffs: a threat to globalisation, or to democracy itself?, site of The Conversation, 13/3/2025, https://theconversation.com/trump-protectionism-and-tariffs-a-threat-to-globalisation-or-to-democracy-itself-252072
[38] Nancy Qian, Trump’s Trade War Is about More Than Trade, Kellogg Insight magazine, Kellogg School of Management, 17/2/2025, https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/trumps-trade-war-china
[39] Camille Gijs, Trump’s trade war threatens €549B of EU goods, Brussels warns, site of POLITICO, 6/5/2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/trumps-probes-and-tariffs-threaten-to-hit-e549b-of-eu-goods-eu-trade-chief-warns /
Other sources estimate that Trump’s measures affect 70% of European exports to the United States, which total $585 billion annually.
Philip Blenkinsop, EU seeks unity in first strike back at Trump tariffs, Reuters, 7/4/2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-seeks-unity-first-strike-back-trump-tariffs-2025-04-06/
[40]Russia not on Trump’s tariff list, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 3/4/2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdjl3k1we8vo
[41] To examine the political and economic ramifications of Trump’s measures and the potential turmoil that could lead to the outbreak of military wars as a result, see How Trump’s Trade Wars Could Ignite World War III, Site of LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-trumps-trade-wars-could-ignite-world-war-iii-shocking-harvey-mwlyc; and Susan A. Hughes, The Trump administration’s tariff threats are as much about politics as they are about economics, experts say, site of Harvard Kennedy School, 10/2/2025, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/democracy-governance/trump-administrations-tariff-threats-are-much
[42] Ana Swanson, ‘Totally Silly.’ Trump’s Focus on Trade Deficit Bewilders Economists, site of The New York Times, 9/4/2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/business/economy/trump-trade-deficit-tariffs-economist-doubts.html
[43] For more details on US global trade, see Global Trade Update (December 2024), site of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), https://unctad.org/publication/global-trade-update-december-2024; and United States trade statistics, site of World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/USA
Also, for an overview of each country’s position in global trade and a comparison with the United States, see Trade statistics by Country/ Region, WITS, https://wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?lang=en; U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December and Annual 2024, site of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (bea), https://www.bea.gov/news/2025/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-december-and-annual-2024; and Impact of the recent US Tariff Decisions on Middle East Businesses: What to do now?, site of PwC, April 2025, https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/services/tax/me-tax-legal-news/2025/impact-us-tariff-decisions-on-middle-east-businesses-what-to-do-now.html
[44]Max Yoeli, Trump’s tariff policy undermines his own agenda and the foundations of US economic power, site of Chatham House, 26/3/2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/trumps-tariff-policy-undermines-his-own-agenda-and-foundations-us-economic-power
[45] Esra Tekin, Canada looks for alternatives to US-made F-35 fighter jets: Defense minister, Anadolu Agency, 15/3/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/canada-looks-for-alternatives-to-us-made-f-35-fighter-jets-defense-minister/3510340
[46] Sophie Kiderlin, U.S. and global economic outlooks cut by OECD as Trump’s trade tariffs weigh on growth, site of CNBC, 17/3/2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/17/oecd-cuts-us-and-global-economic-growth-outlooks-as-trumps-trade-tariffs-weigh.html; OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2025: Steering through Uncertainty (Paris: OECD, 2025), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/03/oecd-economic-outlook-interim-report-march-2025_47a36021/89af4857-en.pdf; and Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Declares National Emergency to Increase our Competitive Edge, Protect our Sovereignty, and Strengthen our National and Economic Security, site of The White House, 2/4/2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-declares-national-emergency-to-increase-our-competitive-edge-protect-our-sovereignty-and-strengthen-our-national-and-economic-security
[47] Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Declares National Emergency to Increase our Competitive Edge, Protect our Sovereignty, and Strengthen our National and Economic Security, The White House, 2/4/2025.
[48] Explainer: How do tariffs work and how will they impact the American and global economy?, Harvard Kennedy School, 9/4/2025, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/public-finance/explainer-how-do-tariffs-work-and-how-will-they
In fact, there are those who believe that the percentage will be even lower: James Scott, Trump’s tariffs: what is behind them and will they work?, site of King’s College London, 2/4/2025, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/trumps-tariffs-what-is-behind-them-and-will-they-work
[49] Globalization and Digitization Usher In a New Era of Intellectual Property Theft, site of National Crime Prevention Council, https://www.ncpc.org/resources/ip-theft/trends; and Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Declares National Emergency to Increase our Competitive Edge, Protect our Sovereignty, and Strengthen our National and Economic Security, The White House, 2/4/2025.
[50] Imports in the U.S. – statistics & facts, site of Statista, https://www.statista.com/topics/3840/us-imports/#topicOverview
[51] Tariffs Work — and President Trump’s First Term Proves It, The White House, 2/4/2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/04/tariffs-work-and-president-trumps-first-term-proves-it
[52] See World Tariff Profiles, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/tariff_profiles_e.htm
[53] Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, Janell Fetterolf and Shannon Schumacher, “Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” site of Pew Research Center, 8/1/2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/01/08/little-support-for-trumps-international-policies; and Jason Lange, Americans sour on Trump’s handling of the economy, Reuters, 23/4/2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/americans-sour-trumps-handling-economy-reutersipsos-poll-finds-2025-04-23
[54] The US is among the industrialized nations with the lowest savings due to high consumerism, see Gross domestic savings (% of GDP), site of World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS
[55] The Federal Budget in Fiscal Year 2024: An Infographic, site of Congressional Budget Office, 20/3/2025, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61181
[56] Site of Time Magazine, https://time.com/7277506/us-china-trade-balance-surplus-exports-imports-tariffs-trump/
[57] Site of General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (GACC), 13/1/2025, http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/zfxxgk/2799825/302274/302275/6312783/index.html
[58] John Edwards, What’s next in the US trade conflict?, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 14/4/2025.
[59] Torsten Sløk, US Wages vs Wages in China and India, site of Apollo Academy, 16/9/2024, https://www.apolloacademy.com/us-wages-vs-wages-in-china-and-india/
[60] Military expenditure, defence sector PPP, site of Lowy Institute, Asia Power Index, 2024 Edition, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/military-capability/defence-spending/military-expenditure-defence-sector-ppp
[61] Linda Yueh, President Trump’s challenge to global value chains, site of London Business School, 26/2/2025, https://www.london.edu/think/president-trump-challenge-to-global-value-chains
| Click here to download: >> Academic Paper: The Future of Trade Wars in Trump’s Foreign Policy… Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay (25 pages, 1.6 MB) |
Leave A Comment