By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Introduction
The concept of the “intellectual elite” remains one of the most debated in terms of definition. Broadly speaking, definitions of elites tend to link their identity with their capacity to influence society. Financial elites, for instance, wield considerable societal influence through their economic power; political elites, particularly leaders of parties and political organizations, play a decisive role in shaping policy and decision-making; while social elites occupy prominent positions within the social hierarchy, including religious authorities and tribal leaders, etc. Intellectual elites, by contrast, exert the most influence on the “culture and cognitive frameworks of society.” They are typically concentrated in universities, research centers, widely circulated media outlets, and at the helm of select civil society and charitable institutions. Their primary role lies in generating knowledge, shaping thought, and influencing the strategic decision-making of the state.[2] A US study indicated that 54.2% of the US intellectual elite graduated from just 34 of the nation’s most prestigious academic institutions, despite the fact that the total number of universities in the US approaches 4 thousand.[3] This demonstrates the existence of an “institutional elite” within US academia: representing only 0.85% of all academic institutions, yet producing over half of the nation’s intellectual elite.
| Click here to download: >> Academic Paper: Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Its Impact on the Orientations of US Political Intellectuals … Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay |
A review of the composition of the US intellectual elite over roughly the past half-century shows a clear consensus in the literature: the proportion of Jews within this elite significantly exceeds their demographic share in the general population, which is approximately 2.4%. Historically, Jews have occupied a highly visible position in the most prestigious academic environments. For instance, a study covering the period between 1965 and 1982 found that Jews accounted for 40% of American Nobel Prize winners in science and economics, as well as 20% of professors at the leading universities. In recent years, however, this pattern has begun to shift. A more recent study reports that only 4% of elite American academics under 30 are Jewish, compared to 21% among the baby boomers. Although the available research indicates a gradual decline in Jewish representation within the intellectual elite, it nevertheless remains markedly higher than their share of the population.[4]
A report by the Council on Foreign Relations highlights a noticeable shift in the orientations of the US elite toward Israel. The report observes that “most of America’s elite campuses… after the October 7…. Most of the reigning institutions of American culture, not just the elite universities but most of the media, the museums, much of Hollywood, the majority of famous actors and painters and writers, are bitterly anti-Israel now.”[5]
This discussion is particularly relevant to the present study, as it highlights an issue whose implications, both in the medium and long term, affect American public opinion toward the Arab region, and more specifically, the Palestine issue. Notably, the most influential segment of the US intellectual elite comprises approximately 40% university professors, particularly specialists in the social sciences and humanities; 40% editors or staff members of leading journals or newspapers; and 15% are “freelancers, including several poets and some novelists and short story writers as well as journalists and essayists.”[6]
First: Assessing the Impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on Elite Orientations
Operation al-Aqsa Flood constituted a watershed event that triggered profound shifts in the international community’s engagement with the political landscape of the Middle East. Given the depth of US involvement in regional affairs, this section seeks to trace the impact of this event on US “political thought,” as reflected in the leading figures who represent its diverse intellectual schools.
The channels through which this event influenced intellectuals may be categorized along several dimensions, which will be elaborated upon in the following sections:[7]
1. The widening divide within US society (including public opinion, party leaderships, independent actors, and intellectual elites) regarding US policy toward the war in Gaza Strip (GS).
2. The impact on the US political value system, particularly with respect to intellectual and academic freedom.
3. The degree of change in partisan alignments in the US concerning the two sides of the Israel–Palestine conflict.
4. The influence of intellectuals on shifts in US public opinion regarding the conflict.
We will therefore select a sample, one we consider reasonably representative, from among the most prominent figures of the contemporary US intellectual elite. Our objective is to map their orientations in order to determine the overarching direction of the transformations discussed above. Accordingly, we surveyed as many relevant sources on elite studies as possible and identified those individuals whose names recur most frequently across these platforms. This process yielded a sample of 24 individuals, listed in Table (1).[8]
An analysis of Table (1) reveals the following:
1. Among the 24 members of the US political intellectuals, 16 are Jewish, 6 are of Christian background, and 2 are Muslim (or of Muslim origin). This indicates that the proportion of Jews within the elite continues to exceed their share of the population, despite some recent decline in this regard.
2. When categorizing the ideological orientations of the sample:
• Among the 16 Jewish members, 5 are secular or non-religious.
• Among the 6 Christians, 3 are secular or non-religious.
• Among the Muslims, 1 is of Muslim origin but not religiously observant.
3. When examining the orientations of the political intellectuals before and after Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the following results emerged, based on samples drawn from their published articles:
• The orientations of 9 of the 24 US political intellectuals shifted, albeit to varying degrees, toward a position more sympathetic to Palestine compared to their stance prior to Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This is reflected both in their explicit expressions of support for Palestinian demands and in increased criticism of certain or all Israeli policies following the operation, whether military or humanitarian. Notably, none of these individuals had expressed significant criticism of Israeli policies prior to the operation. This indicates that the operation prompted a shift affecting approximately 37.5% of the US political intellectuals, a change closely linked to the broader context of pro-Palestinian demonstrations, which took place across roughly 525 American “colleges, universities, K-12 schools, and school district offices,”[9] with 94% of these events explicitly supporting Palestinians.[10] These indicators help explain, at least in part, the broader shifts in US public opinion toward Israel, particularly the decline in popular support among Democrats and younger Americans.[11]
• Eight members of the sample maintained their pro-Israel position or became even more supportive, representing 33.3%.
• Seven members of the political intellectuals remained sympathetic to Palestine both before and after the operation, accounting for 29.2% of the sample.
Table (1): A Selected Sample of Leading US Political Intellectuals
| Name | Brief Description | Religion[12] | Initial Note on Position | |
| 1 | Peter Beinart[13] | American political science professor and columnist. | Jewish | Shifted from clear support for Israeli policies before the war to explicit criticism of those policies after the operation. |
| 2 | Noam Chomsky[14] | Well-known leftist thinker focusing on foreign policy and human rights. | Secular Jew (self-identified atheist) |
Consistently supported Palestinian rights and criticized Israeli policies before and after the operation. |
| 3 | Judith Butler[15] | Philosopher whose work centers on gender and political justice. | Jewish (self-identified atheist) |
Maintained her pro-Palestinian rights position before the war and after the operation. |
| 4 | Cornel West[16] | Classical leftist thinker. | Protestant Christian | Focused on criticizing the US stance, particularly its obstruction of a ceasefire. |
| 5 | John Mearsheimer[17] | Prominent international relations scholar, considered the leading contemporary theorist of political realism | Non-religious | Strong critic of the influence of the Israel lobby on US policymaking, and generally closer to the Palestinian position. |
| 6 | Stephen Walt[18] | A prominent professor of political science and one of the leading proponents of the realist school in international relations. | Non-religious | He is the most vocal advocate of the argument that Israel has become a strategic liability for the US, and Operation al-Aqsa Flood further reinforced this position. |
| 7 | Jeffrey Goldberg[19] | A well-known American journalist at The Atlantic, with a focus on Middle East analysis. | Jewish | Generally supportive of Israel’s security posture, though he criticizes some aspects of its foreign policy. |
| 8 | Thomas Friedman[20] | An American opinion columnist at The New York Times, specializing in international affairs. | Jewish | Continues to defend Israel, especially on security grounds, but has begun criticizing some of its humanitarian policies after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. |
| 9 | Fareed Zakaria[21] | A political analyst of Indian origin concerned with global affairs. | Muslim background | Inclined toward diplomatic solutions, including in Middle East issues, both before and after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. |
| 10 | Ben Shapiro[22] | American media figure and conservative commentator. | Orthodox Jew | Strong support for Israel from a security/conservative perspective before and after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. |
| 11 | Robert Kagan[23] | A conservative American thinker on foreign policy. | Jewish | Maintains a pro-Israel stance before and after Operation al-Aqsa Flood from the perspective of US strategic interests. |
| 12 | Phyllis Bennis[24] | Specialist in Middle East policy | Jewish | A prominent supporter of the Palestinian cause; aligned with the Palestinian position before and after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. |
| 13 | Alison Weir[25] | American activist on Palestinian rights; critic of US support for Israel. | Non-religious | Maintained a pro-Palestinian stance before and after the operation. |
| 14 | Josh Ruebner[26] | American political analyst and activist in Palestinian rights campaigns. | Jewish | Strongly pro-Palestinian from a US policy perspective before and after the operation. |
| 15 | Daniel Pipes[27] | Conservative American analyst of Middle Eastern affairs. | Jewish | Critical of Israel’s strategic direction but from an Israeli/security-centered lens; leans toward the Israeli position. |
| 16 | Barry Shaw[28] | American opinion writer for a conservative outlet. | Jewish | Fully adopts the Israeli perspective with no noticeable change after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. |
| 17 | Seth Grossman[29] | American analyst writing for the American Thinker website. | Jewish | Firmly aligned with the Israeli position without reservations. |
| 18 | Dahlia Scheindlin[30] | American-Israeli analyst; columnist for Haaretz and The New York Times. | Secular Jewish | Offers critical analyses of Israel; moved closer to the Palestinian position especially after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. |
| 19 | Robert Malley[31] | American diplomat and analyst; involved in Middle East negotiations. | Jewish | Critical of US–Israeli diplomacy; moved closer to the Palestinian position after the operation. |
| 20 | Marjorie Taylor Greene[32] | US politician (Republican); an example of shifts on Gaza. | Evangelical Christian | Has traditionally belonged to the right, but has increasingly criticized the humanitarian dimension of Israeli policies. |
| 21 | Bernie Sanders[33] | US senator known for his left-leaning positions. | Secular Jew | Represents a tendency within the traditional US political camp that has moved closer to the Palestinian position. |
| 22 | Tim Scott[34] | US Republican senator | Christian | Maintained a strong emphasis on Israel’s security posture, and this stance even hardened after the operation. |
| 23 | Max Blumenthal[35] | US journalist strongly critical of Israel and its policies. | Secular Jew | Supports the Palestinian position both before and after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. |
| 24 | Ghaith al‑Omari[36] | Writer of Arab origin, affiliated with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. | Muslim | Generally close to a neutral stance between both sides, with a slight post-operation shift toward the Palestinian position. |
Second: The Elite’s Position on Rebuilding Gaza
The question of Gaza’s reconstruction, both in terms of the extent of US financial contribution and the broader US role in the reconstruction effort, has become a matter of considerable importance. US public opinion survey indicates marked variation in the willingness to engage in Gaza’s reconstruction. A survey, conducted on 7/8–3/10/2024, reported the following results:[37]
Table (2): Support for US Participation in Gaza’s Reconstruction by Leader Category
| Category | Support for Participation in Reconstruction (%) |
| Republican leaders | 24 |
| Democrat leaders | 70 |
| Independent leaders | 56 |
As for the orientations of political science and international relations (IR) scholars at US universities regarding US policy and support for Israel, a survey, conducted on 25/6–14/7/2024, indicated the following:[38]
1. Approximately 92% oppose US President Donald Trump’s policies on the Arab–Israeli conflict, compared to 7.3% who support them.
2. Regarding his handling of relations with Israel, 90.48% expressed opposition, while 8.55% voiced support.
3. 77% of IR scholars said they disapproved of Israel’s military action in Gaza, compared to 17% who said they approved.
Public opinion surveys indicate that the shift observed among the US political intellectuals is not detached from broader changes in American public opinion. These surveys (September 2025) suggest “some alignment” between the transformations within the elite and shifts in society at large:[39]
Table (3): Shifts in US Public Opinion toward Israeli Policies after Operation al-Aqsa Flood (%)
| Topic | 2025 | 2024 | 2023 | |
| Israeli conduct in Gaza went too far | 39 | 31 | 27 | |
| Negative opinion of the Israeli government | 59 | 51 | – | |
| Approval of Trump’s policies in Gaza | 42 disapprove; 30 approve | – | – | |
| Favorable view of Palestinians | Democrats | 70 | – | – |
| Republicans | 37 | |||
| Favorable view of the Israeli government | Democrats | 18 | – | – |
| Republicans | 55 | |||
Third: Manifestations of the Shift in the Positions of US Political Intellectuals
The direct effects of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on US intellectuals can be identified in the following areas:[40]
1. Intensified intellectual polarization: The operation deepened existing divisions among American political intellectuals. While support for Israel had long constituted a dominant and stable trend, criticism and skepticism toward Israeli policies toward the Palestinians have expanded, particularly among academics, youth, progressives and a substantial segment of immigrants, especially Black Americans. This criticism has focused on two main dimensions: Israel’s military operations, especially the targeting of civilians, and US support for the war, which transferred the burdens of Israel’s deteriorating global image onto the US itself. These dynamics have contributed to widening divisions within the Democratic Party specifically, and within academic circles more broadly.
2. Operation al-Aqsa Flood raised questions about the seriousness of academic freedom within the American cultural and university spheres. The American campus landscape witnessed a significant expansion in the number and scale of pro-Palestinian protests and encampments, which in turn triggered a wave of mass arrests and disciplinary actions. Issues related to the war in GS began to be framed in connection with broader values such as freedom of expression, antisemitism and Islamophobia. At the same time, criticism mounted among segments of the cultural elite who argue that academic freedom is under increasing pressure from donors, legislators and pro-Israel advocacy groups.
3. The impact of critical thought and intellectual elite’s discourse on US public opinion: As noted earlier, US attitudes toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have undergone marked changes. The war produced a major shift in public opinion, which in turn influenced intellectual discourse as the elite became increasingly sensitive to this transformation. This indicates a reciprocal relationship between the intellectual elite and US public opinion. The notion, promoted by Benjamin Netanyahu, that “in defending ourselves against this barbarism, Israel is defending civilization” suffered a significant setback, particularly as graphic media coverage documenting signs of genocide was widely circulated on social media and viewed extensively by younger Americans. This made it increasingly difficult for traditional media outlets and political commentators to control the narrative.
4. Questioning US Foreign Policy and Global Standing: The US’s continued military and diplomatic support for Israel, despite the deep humanitarian crisis in GS, has intensified debate over the US role in contributing to crimes against humanity. This perception is reinforced by two particularly significant factors:
a. The repeated use of the US veto in the United Nations Security Council. In most votes aimed at halting hostilities, the US has acted as an obstacle to the collective international will. This pattern has prompted some segments of the US political intellectual elite to question US’s commitment to global liberal values and human rights.
b. “Double standards” have been widely acknowledged by many members of the intellectual elite, undermining the credibility of US political discourse and, consequently, diminishing the US’s influence and global standing. These concerns have been further amplified by rulings from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognizing the issue of genocide, followed by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) decision to issue arrest warrants for the Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister. These developments have forced the US legal and political elite to confront implications that cannot be ignored.
5. Impact on US Domestic Politics: Operation al-Aqsa Flood reinforced two central themes within the US intellectual discourse. The first concerns the perceived negative influence of the pro-Israel lobby, which has drawn the US into policies that impose significant burdens on its foreign policy. This dynamic was markedly accentuated in the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, thereby enhancing the credibility of Mearsheimer and Walt’s analysis on the subject. It also intersected with debates regarding the rationale behind the US complicity in potential war crimes, particularly through the ongoing provision of arms to Israel. Consequently, these developments exerted considerable pressure on policymakers and intensified calls for greater accountability. The second theme relates to the electoral success of several immigrant figures, particularly Muslims, in strategically significant US states and cities. Their victories, closely linked to pro-Palestinian positions during the war, signal emerging fissures in Israel’s expectation of unwavering popular support from the US.
Fourth: Implications of the Shift in the US Political Intellectuals’ Thinking
According to several US articles monitoring shifts in the orientations of the US political intellectuals following the war in GS, the transformations have been as follows:[41]
1. Growing skepticism among key segments of the political intellectuals regarding the Israeli military operation: An increasing segment of political intellectuals has expressed the view that Israel’s military operation in GS has “crossed the line.” This sentiment has intensified since the initial months of the war.
2. Rising calls among certain elite circles to condition US aid to Israel: There is a growing inclination, particularly within the Democratic Party, to impose substantial conditions on the use of US weapons and aid to Israel. This represents a notable departure from the historically unconditional US support for Israel.
3. Declining positive perceptions of the Israeli government among some elites: Positive opinions of the Israeli government have declined among both the general public and the political intellectuals. This trend is also evident among elites and opinion leaders in the political sphere, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing particularly severe criticism regarding his stance on the war in GS.
4. Increasing division among US partisan elites: While the majority of Republican opinion leaders continue to oppose a US-led role in the reconstruction of GS, most Democratic opinion leaders support such involvement and are increasingly inclined to favor neutrality or even lean toward the Palestinian side.
5. Impact of elite orientations on US public opinion: Elite dissatisfaction often follows rising popular discontent, particularly among younger and progressive Americans, creating pressure to reconsider US policy. Perceptions of human rights violations by the Israeli military in GS have been a primary driver of this shift.
6. Emphasis on the leverage of US influence: Given Israel’s heavy reliance on US political, military and economic support, the US administration possesses the capacity to shape and restrain Israel’s inhumane actions. This potential for influence is an increasingly emphasized demand among segments of the political intellectuals.
Fifth: Israel’s Response to US Political Intellectuals after Operation al-Aqsa Flood
Israel’s response to recent shifts in US society and its political intellectuals is reflected in the following positions:[42]
1. Condemnation of US Campus Protests: The Israeli Research Committee for University Presidents issued a strongly worded statement condemning pro-Palestinian protests on US campuses, describing them as “violent and anti-Semitic demonstrations.” The committee expressed deep concern that these protests, often incorporating intellectual arguments critical of Israeli policy, create a hostile environment for Jewish and Israeli students as well as faculty members, according to the committee’s assessment.
2. Dismissing Criticism from US Intellectuals as a “Public Relations Issue”: There is a growing tendency within Israel to perceive international and intellectual criticism, including that originating from US sources, as primarily a “public relations” problem or a failure of the Israeli Hasbara strategy (i.e., Israeli public diplomacy/ propaganda), rather than a substantive matter concerning their military actions or policies in GS. In responding to critiques from certain US political intellectuals regarding alleged genocidal practices, some Israeli actors attempt to portray the suffering in GS as “exaggerated or even partially fabricated by Hamas.”
3. Netanyahu’s Challenge to the Shifts in US Elite Perspectives: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly rejected US criticisms of his government’s policies during the GS war, particularly accusations from US elites that he prioritizes his nationalist base regardless of the impact on America’s global image. Some former Israeli officials note that “He’s looking on purpose for a conflict with the U.S. so that he can blame” the US administration, if his war objectives are not fully realized.
4. Concern over the Shift in US Public Opinion: There is an implicit awareness within both the Israeli government and public that American universities and intellectual circles play a central role in shaping political awareness and future decision-makers in the US. Any shift in opinion among this segment is perceived as a long-term threat to Israel’s position and narrative in the West.
5. Emphasis on Internal Unity/ Hostage Crisis: The Israeli public has been predominantly preoccupied with the hostage crisis and concerns over national security, leading, in general, to the disregard or outright rejection of international criticisms, including those raised by US intellectuals. Many Israelis support the continuation of military operations to secure the hostages’ release, often prioritizing this objective over concerns related to international law or humanitarian issues highlighted by US thinkers.
Conclusion
This study suggests that Operation al-Aqsa Flood has produced a rupture in US political intellectuals’ perception of Israel, a development that requires strategic engagement by Palestinian and Arab actors. It should be noted, however, that the strategic shift emerging from transformations within the elite will require sufficient time for the forces capable of exploiting and consolidating this shift to fully materialize.
This shift may indicate that the prevailing pragmatic perspective within the US political value system is amenable to strategic leverage. The greater the burdens imposed by Israeli policies on American society and institutions, the more inclined the US becomes to reassess its regional orientations. Washington has recognized that negative developments regarding Israel are increasingly evident across Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as within American society itself—particularly among the youth, Democrats and even segments of the Republican base. Moreover, voting patterns in the UN General Assembly and Security Council, as well as in most international organizations and judicial bodies, often diverging from Israel’s position, have placed US diplomacy in a precarious situation, raising global doubts about the credibility of its political values. This dynamic has not gone unnoticed by significant segments of the US political intellectual elite.
This indicates that Operation al-Aqsa Flood has influenced the political behavior of the US elite to a degree that cannot be ignored. What remains necessary is to capitalize on this shift and to assess the extent of changes in the US elite’s perception of the Palestine issue, without either exaggeration or underestimation.
[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] See the issue of definition and the limits of the intellectual elite in Charles Kadushin, “Who are the elite intellectuals?,” in John Sommer, The American Intellectual Elite (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 109–125, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/storage/app/uploads/public/58e/1a4/b64/58e1a4b64394f545878972.pdf
[3] Jonathan Wai et al., “The most successful and influential Americans come from a surprisingly narrow range of ‘elite’ educational backgrounds,” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications journal, vol. 11, no. 1129, 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-024-03547-8
[4] Steven Mintz, The End of an Era, site of Inside Higher Ed, 9/5/2023, https://www.insidehighered.com/opinion/columns/higher-ed-gamma/2023/05/09/end-era#:~:text=Just%20to%20look%20at%20one%20tally:%20between,percent%20in%20the%201990s%20and%20early%202000s; and Franklin Foer, The Golden Age of American Jews Is Ending, site of The Atlantic magazine, 4/3/2024, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/04/us-anti-semitism-jewish-american-safety/677469/
To examine the orientations of the US Jewish elite toward religion and political and social matters during the 1960s and to compare them with the current situation, see Seymour Lipset and Everett Ladd Jr., “Jewish Academics in the United States: Their Achievements, Culture and Politics,” American Jewish Year Book (New York: American Jewish Committee and Springer Nature, 1971), vol. 72, pp. 89–128, https://www.bjpa.org/content/upload/bjpa/72ac/72academics.pdf
And compare these orientations with their views on education, which enables their integration into the intellectual elite: Samuel J. Abrams, Jews: Still the Educational Exception, site of American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 20/3/2022, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/jews-still-the-educational-exception/
And compare the shift in their political orientations and affiliations, see Herbert F. Weisberg, The Politics of American Jews, site of University of Michigan Press Ebook Collection, 2019, https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/rn3012840
[5] For an examination of shifts in the positions of US universities toward the Gaza war, as well as indicators of changing attitudes among elite circles, see the study published by the Council on Foreign Relations: Elliott Abrams, Is the “Golden Age” of American Jewry Over?, site of Council on Foreign Relations, 27/10/2025, https://www.cfr.org/blog/golden-age-american-jewry-over
[6] Charles Kadushin, “Who are the elite intellectuals?,” p. 114; and see Josh Feigelson, American Jews & Our Universities: Back to Basics, site of Sources journal, 30/6/2024, https://www.sourcesjournal.org/articles/american-jews-our-universities-back-to-basics#:~:text=While%20my%20personal%20experience%20might,2%5D
[7] How the Gaza War exposed America’s political fault lines, site of Geopolitical Desk, 6/11/2025, https://www.thegeopoliticaldesk.com/how-the-gaza-war-exposed-americas-political-fault-lines/; Frederic C. Hof, Gaza is a war without end. American interests must be reassessed., site of Atlantic Council, 29/10/2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/gaza-israel-american-interests/; Georgios Karagiorgos, Charikleia Christina Konstantinidou and Irene Peklari, Gaza Through Whose Lens?: Breaking Apart U.S. Coverage of the Israel-Hamas War, site of Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), December 2023, https://features.csis.org/gaza-through-whose-lens/index.html; and Lama El Baz et al., US Opinion Leaders Deeply Divided on Israel-Gaza War, site of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 25/11/2024, https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/us-opinion-leaders-deeply-divided-israel-gaza-war
[8] The sample’s names, views, and biographical details were drawn from the following sources:
Ben Sales, 11 thinkers from across the spectrum weigh in on what might end the Gaza war, site of The Times of Israel, 17/5/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/11-thinkers-from-across-the-spectrum-weigh-in-on-what-might-end-the-gaza-war/; Eliyahu Freedman, Q&A: Noam Chomsky on Palestine, Israel and the state of the world, site of Al Jazeera, 9/4/2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/4/9/qa-noam-chomsky-on-palestine-israel-and-the-state-of-the-world; Marc-Olivier Bherer, Judith Butler, by calling Hamas attacks an ‘act of armed resistance,’ rekindles controversy on the left, site of Le Monde newspaper, 15/3/2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2024/03/15/judith-butler-by-calling-hamas-attacks-an-act-of-armed-resistance-rekindles-controversy-on-the-left_6621775_23.html; Giulia Carbonaro, Cornel West’s Speech on ‘Genocidal Attack’ in Gaza Viewed 1 Million Times, site of Newsweek magazine, 13/11/2023, https://www.newsweek.com/cornel-west-speech-genocidal-attack-gaza-viewed-1-million-times-1843146; Peter Slezkine, John Mearsheimer: A World Tour, site of Stimson, 10/10/2025, https://www.stimson.org/2025/john-mearsheimer-a-world-tour/; Jeffrey Goldberg, Sinwar’s March of Folly, The Atlantic, 23/6/2025, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/06/sinwar-march-folly/683290/; Five realities about the new Middle East, site of Fareed Zakaria, 9/10/2025, https://fareedzakaria.com/columns/2025/10/9/five-realities-about-the-new-middle-east; Norman J.W. Goda and Jeffrey Herf, Why it’s wrong to call Israel’s war in Gaza a “genocide,” site of The Washington Post newspaper, 3/6/2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/06/03/israel-gaza-genocide-allegations/; Georgios Karagiorgos, Charikleia Christina Konstantinidou and Irene Peklari, Gaza Through Whose Lens?: Breaking Apart U.S. Coverage of the Israel-Hamas War, CSIS, December 2023; Trump ally Marjorie Taylor Greene decries ‘genocide’ in Gaza, Al Jazeera, 29/7/2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/29/trump-ally-marjorie-taylor-greene-decries-genocide-in-gaza; and Thomas Friedman on Trump, Foreign Policy, and America’s Global Role l Charlie Rose Rewind, Charlie Rose channel, site of YouTube, 21/7/2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7obcvbRmoCY
[9] Brandon Drenon and Grace Eliza Goodwin, US campus activists relieved – and anxious – after Gaza ceasefire deal, site of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 15/10/2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn40yzpjp5ko; and Jay Ulfelder, Crowd Counting Consortium: An Empirical Overview of Recent Pro-Palestine Protests at U.S. Schools, site of Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation-Harvard Kennedy School, 30/5/2024, https://ash.harvard.edu/articles/crowd-counting-blog-an-empirical-overview-of-recent-pro-palestine-protests-at-u-s-schools/
[10] Bianca Ho and Kieran Doyle, US Student Pro-Palestine Demonstrations Remain Overwhelmingly Peaceful | ACLED Insight, site of The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 10/5/2024, https://acleddata.com/brief/us-student-pro-palestine-demonstrations-remain-overwhelmingly-peaceful-acled-insight
[11] William Galston and Jordan Muchnick, Support for Israel continues to deteriorate, especially among Democrats and young people, site of Brookings, 6/8/2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/support-for-israel-continues-to-deteriorate-especially-among-democrats-and-young-people/
[12] It is notable that the proportion of Jews in the selected sample closely mirrors their overall share within the US intellectual elite: Josh Feigelson, American Jews & Our Universities: Back to Basics, Sources journal, 30/6/2024; Richard Lynn and Satoshi Kanazawa, “How to explain high Jewish achievement: The role of intelligence and values,” Personality and Individual Differences journal, vol. 44, no. 4, March 2008, pp. 801-808, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0191886907003674; and Gilbert Kahn, Jewish Activism in the United States: Is J Street a Passing Phenomenon?, Potomac Papers, site of French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), 27/2/2012, https://www.ifri.org/en/papers/jewish-activism-united-states-j-street-passing-phenomenon
[13] Ahmed Noor, ‘A moral wreckage that we need to face’: Peter Beinart on being Jewish after Gaza’s destruction, site of The Guardian newspaper, 27/1/2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2025/jan/27/israel-gaza-us-jews-peter-beinart
[14] Where to Start with Noam Chomsky: His Best Books, site of Noam Chomsky Reading List, https://www.chomskylist.com/where-start-chomsky-best-books.php
[15] Marc-Olivier Bherer, Judith Butler, by calling Hamas attacks an ‘act of armed resistance,’ rekindles controversy on the left, Le Monde, 15/3/2024.
[16] Middle East Monitor (@middleeastmonitor), “Cornel West calls for Gaza ceasefire, criticises US stance,” site of Instagram, 12/11/2023, https://www.instagram.com/reel/Czj-rQZiVIz/
[17] Peter Slezkine, John Mearsheimer: A World Tour, Stimson, 10/10/2025.
[18] Stephen Walt, The Peace in Gaza Won’t Last, site of Harvard Kennedy School, 15/10/2025, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/peace-gaza-wont-last
[19] Jeffrey Goldberg: Recent and archived work by Jeffrey Goldberg for The New York Times newspaper, https://www.nytimes.com/by/jeffrey-goldberg
[20] Peter Wallison, Thomas Friedman Suggests That Israelis Surrender, AEI, 13/6/2025, https://www.aei.org/social-cultural-and-constitutional-studies/thomas-friedman-suggests-that-israelis-surrender /
[21] Fareed Zakaria, Five realities about the new Middle East, The Washington Post, 9/10/2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/10/09/trump-gaza-ceasefire-middle-east/
[22] Ariel Bulstein, Ben Shapiro: Defending Israel means telling the truth, site of Jewish News Syndicate (JNS), 29/4/2025, https://www.jns.org/ben-shapiro-defending-israel-means-telling-the-truth /
[23] Etan Nechin, Robert Kagan on How America’s Democratic Future Hangs in the Balance, and Why He Quit The Washington Post, site of Haaretz newspaper, https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-11-06/ty-article-magazine/.premium/robert-kagan-on-how-americas-future-hangs-in-the-balance-and-why-he-quit-the-post/000001
[24] Phyllis Bennis: Trump, Netanyahu, and the Real Estate Logic of Genocide, site of The Transnational Institute (TNI), 10/4/2025, https://www.tni.org/en/video/phyllis-bennis-trump-netanyahu-and-the-real-estate-logic-of-genocide
[25] Alison Weir, site of Anti-Defamation League (ADL), 8/1/2013, https://www.adl.org/resources/profile/alison-weir
[26] Josh Ruebner, Trump’s call to ‘clean out’ Gaza is a direct threat to Palestinians, site of The Hill, 5/2/2025, https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/5126430-trump-middle-east-policy/
[27] Gaza and the West Bank Differ: An Inspection of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, site of Daniel Pipes, Fall 2025, https://www.danielpipes.org/22685/gaza-and-the-west-bank-differ
[28] Barry Shaw, A New Gaza, site of Jewish Policy Center, 21/4/2025, https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2025/04/21/a-new-gaza/
[29] Seth Grossman, 13 Basic Facts to Defend Israel, site of American Thinker, 13/10/2023, https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2023/10/13_basic_facts_to_defend_israel.html
[30] Dahlia Scheindlin, Israel Is Turning Gaza Famine Into a Hasbara War. It Won’t Make It Less Real, Haaretz, 1/8/2025, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-08-01/ty-article/.premium/israel-is-turning-gaza-famine-into-a-hasbara-war-it-wont-make-it-less-real/00000198-60c7-de6e-a198-e8ef4ce50000
[31] Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, Life in Gaza may go from utter hell to mere nightmare. What happens now?, The Guardian, 14/10/2025, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/oct/14/gaza-palestinians-trump-peace-plan
[32] Ross Williams, Georgia’s Marjorie Taylor Greene labels Gaza crisis a ‘genocide’ in break from GOP colleagues, site of Georgia Recorder, 30/7/2025, https://georgiarecorder.com/2025/07/30/georgias-marjorie-taylor-greene-labels-gaza-crisis-a-genocide-in-break-from-gop-colleagues/
[33] Gregory Svirnovskiy, Sanders calls war in Gaza a ‘genocide’ for the first time, site of Politico, 17/9/2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/17/bernie-sanders-israel-gaza-genocide-00569586
[34] Senators Scott, Wicker, Cotton: President Biden has Authority to Use Military Force to Secure Release of American Hostages in Gaza, site of Tim Scott, 14/2/2024, https://www.scott.senate.gov/media-center/press-releases/senators-scott-wicker-cotton-president-biden-has-authority-to-use-military-force-to-secure-release-of-american-hostages-in-gaza/
[35] Muhammet Tarhan, American journalist decries Western media’s ignoring of Israel’s war crimes, site of Anadolu Agency,11/10/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/american-journalist-decries-western-media-s-ignoring-of-israels-war-crimes/3358475
[36] Neomi Neumann et al., The Ceasefire in Gaza: Views on Security, Palestinian Governance, and Regional Dynamics, site of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 14/10/2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ceasefire-gaza-views-security-palestinian-governance-and-regional-dynamics
[37] Lama El Baz et al., US Opinion Leaders Deeply Divided on Israel-Gaza War, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 25/11/2024.
[38] Kelebogile Zvobgo, What do international relations scholars think about the war in Gaza?, site of Good Authority, 11/10/2024, https://goodauthority.org/news/international-relations-scholars-survey-israel-war-gaza/; and “TRIP Snap Poll 22 Report,” site of Teaching, Research & International Policy (TRIP), May 2025, https://trip.wm.edu/research/snap-polls/snap-poll-22/Snap-Poll-22-Report.pdf
[39] Ted Van Green et al., How Americans View the Israel-Hamas Conflict 2 Years Into the War, site of Pew Research Center, 3/10/2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/10/03/how-americans-view-the-israel-hamas-conflict-2-years-into-the-war/
[40] Christopher Shell, Most Black Americans Want a More Active U.S. Role in Ending the War in Gaza and Protecting Palestinian Lives, site of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 25/4/2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/04/most-black-americans-want-a-more-active-us-role-in-ending-the-war-in-gaza-and-protecting-palestinian-lives?lang=en; Seyla Benhabib, The Gaza War Reconsidered, site of Völkerrechtsblog, 16/9/2025, https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-gaza-war-reconsidered/; Zaid Mustafa Alvi and Sana Haider, Human Rights and Geopolitical Narratives: The U.S. Discourse on the Israel-Palestine Conflict, site of Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 21/4/2025, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5224586; Alberto Toscano, The War on Education—in Gaza and at Home, site of In These Times, 15/2/2024, https://inthesetimes.com/article/campus-wars-gaza-higher-ed-christopher-rufo; Abeer al-Najjar and Bouziane Zaid, Western media’s ethical collapse: silencing Gaza’s voice, Third World Quarterly journal, 2025, pp. 1–20, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2025.2552361#d1e383; Anemona Hartocollis, Professors in Trouble Over Protests Wonder if Academic Freedom Is Dying, The New York Times, 23/10/2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/us/faculty-protests-academic-freedom-tenure-discipline.html; Allison Hantschel, Why Are Americans’ Opinions Changing on the Gaza War?, site of Dame magazine, 12/8/2025, https://www.damemagazine.com/2025/08/12/why-are-americans-opinions-changing-on-the-gaza-war/; J Oliver Conroy, ‘The war needs to end’: is the US right turning on Israel?, The Guardian, 29/7/2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/29/israel-gaza-war-united-states-right; and Laurence H. Shoup, The Council on Foreign Relations, the Israel Lobby, and the War on Gaza, site of Monthly Review magazine, 1/5/2024, https://monthlyreview.org/articles/the-council-on-foreign-relations-the-israel-lobby-and-the-war-on-gaza/
[41] Daniel Drezner, Americans Are Changing Their Views of Israel. That’s a Problem., Politico, 16/8/2025, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/08/16/israel-criticism-americans-gaza-shift-00506649
[42] Netanyahu Rejects US Criticism of Gaza War Policies, site of Voice of America (VOA), 17/3/2024, https://www.voaafrica.com/a/netanyahu-rejects-us-criticism-of-gaza-war-policies/7531441.html; Mtanes Shihadeh, Seven Months of War on Gaza, Israel Is in International Distress, site of Arab Center Washington DC, 17/5/2024, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/seven-months-of-war-on-gaza-israel-is-in-international-distress/; and Andreas Kluth, The Gaza Ceasefire Won’t Win Back Young Americans for Israel, site of Bloomberg, 15/10/2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-10-15/after-gaza-the-us-and-israel-will-have-a-new-relationship
| Click here to download: >> Academic Paper: Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Its Impact on the Orientations of US Political Intellectuals … Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay |



Leave A Comment