By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
The armed gangs and groups that Israel formed or enabled have remained limited to temporary tactical tools, tied to a narrowly defined functional role: pressuring the resistance and its social base, and attempting to impose an environment amenable to Israel’s conditions. However, these groups are ultimately expendable; they can be abandoned at any moment when their harm outweighs their utility or when they lose their value. Thus far, the experiences of the Yasir Abu Shabab⁎ gangs in Rafah, Husam al-Astal in Khan Yunis, and Rami Hillis and Yasir Khunaidiq in the northern Gaza Strip (GS)… have failed to produce a viable model upon which Israelis can build, nor even for the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah, despite indications that its Security Forces have maintained links with these groups.
Modern Palestine history has witnessed several instances in which groups or locally formed militias were mobilized to undermine the national movement or to serve as instruments of occupation. The most prominent example was the “Peace Bands,” which operated between 1938 and 1939 in coordination with the British occupation to suppress the Palestinian Revolt. These bands generated deep anxiety and contributed to distorting the revolt’s image. Among their leading figures were Fakhri al-Nashashibi and Fakhri ‘Abdul Hadi, both of whom were later assassinated. Another such experience emerged with the “Village Leagues” in the early 1980s. These bodies sought to present themselves as an alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and to the established Palestinian factions and forces in the West Bank (WB). However, they ultimately failed due to a broad popular and factional boycott, coupled with the systematic targeting of their leading members by the resistance.
Israeli Sponsorship:
The group led by Yasir Abu Shabab represents the most prominent of these factions. Evidence from Abu Shabab’s own statements, corroborated by multiple Israeli sources, suggests that the group operates under the direct supervision of the Israeli military, deriving both protection and support, including armament, from it.
The relationship between Israel and these armed groups can be summarized as follows:
• Israel supplies them with weapons and combat resources, enabling them to carry out their operations and to protect themselves.
• It provides Israeli-controlled security zones and protected areas that shield these groups.
• While Israel targets government personnel who protect and accompany aid convoys entering GS, claiming they are affiliated with Hamas, it simultaneously fosters an environment in which these groups can seize aid convoys, resell the goods at inflated prices, extort money from the population, or distribute portions selectively to secure loyalties.
Notably, The Washington Post reported that an internal UN memorandum identified Abu Shabab’s group as “the main and most influential stakeholder behind systematic and massive looting” of aid convoys.
• Collaborating and exchanging intelligence with Israel, including providing information on the resistance and its cadres, as well as participating in field operations that facilitate the tasks of the Israeli military. This includes attacking resistance members and targeting civilian and governmental facilities.
• Generating a security vacuum by preventing the Palestinian police and civilian forces from carrying out their duties; through shelling, killing personnel and destroying their logistical capacities, under the pretext that these bodies are aligned with the resistance. Consequently, this environment of disorder, looting and road closures enables these operative groups to consolidate their control.
• Attempting to build on the Abu Shabab model and replicate it with the aim of dismantling Hamas’s dominance and positioning themselves as an alternative authority capable of controlling GS.
The PA’s Role:
Furthermore, there are indications that the group incorporates former officers from the Palestinian Security Forces affiliated with Ramallah, most notably Ghassan al-Dahini. Hence, the Jerusalem Post has reported that Abu Shabab collaborates with influential figures within Palestinian intelligence in Ramallah, a claim he himself confirmed in a written interview with the Israeli Army Radio, asserting ongoing coordination with officials from the PA. In addition, a report by i24NEWS identified Mahmud al-Habbash, an aide to President ‘Abbas, as one of the channels facilitating communication with Abu Shabab. The report further highlights that the principal orchestrator of militia formation on the PA’s side is Bahaa’ Balousha, a senior officer within the PA’s Intelligence Service, who delegated responsibility for recruiting the militia in the southern region (GS) to Fayez Abu Hannoud, the intelligence officer overseeing that area. Moreover, according to a senior security official cited by the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, Abu Shabab’s “militia is reportedly supported simultaneously by Israel, the PA and exiled Fatah figure Mohammed Dahlan.” The militia reportedly receives its salaries from the PA and operates under its direct sponsorship.
These leaks further suggest that the PA in Ramallah has acted as a conduit for the Israeli military to communicate with the leaders of these gangs, reflecting the effective security coordination between the PA and Israel. It is conceivable that the PA viewed this arrangement as a means of presenting itself as an alternative to the resistance leadership in GS, effectively offering Israel a “certificate of good conduct” by demonstrating its capacity to cooperate with it and disarm the resistance, as it does in the WB. Although the PA officially denies any connection to these groups, other leaks indicate that the PA leadership seeks to manage this “dirty” file without becoming directly implicated; consequently, it has maintained the secrecy of its involvement.
Background of the Formation of Armed Groups:
The emergence of these groups can be attributed to several underlying factors:
• They provide cover for the criminal and deviant behavior of gangs involved in theft, drug trafficking and thuggery.
• They fulfill the financial and economic needs of their members, particularly those of weak-willed individuals; this function is especially pronounced given the extreme deprivation, widespread hunger and severe hardship.
• They serve political purposes, particularly in favor of opponents of the resistance, where the interests of the PA in Ramallah or of those opposed to the resistance’s approach intersect with the formation of these groups, aiming to weaken the authority of the resistance and supplant it. These groups are often presented under a “national” guise, ostensibly to combat “terrorism” or to restore the formal “legitimacy” of the PA, etc.
• They reflect ambitions of leadership among reckless, opportunistic adventurers, guided by flawed political and social calculations.
• In some cases, their motivations stem from personal vengeance or family vendettas, particularly among individuals whose relatives have been sanctioned by the resistance for collaboration with Israel, participation in drug trafficking, acts of intimidation, or other illicit activities.
What are the Prospects?
Approximately a year and a half after Abu Shabab began his activities, and several months following the emergence of other groups, it has become evident that the foundations sustaining these factions are largely artificial constructs orchestrated by Israel, lacking both competence and sustainability.
First, their overt collaboration with Israel, alongside the latter’s sponsorship and protection, has provoked widespread popular indignation and contempt, thereby discrediting them in the eyes of the public, particularly in light of the brutal massacres and destructive operations carried out by Israel.
Second, a significant proportion of these groups’ members are criminals, individuals with prior convictions and drug traffickers, some of whom have been implicated in attacks on aid convoys, theft of food supplies, and extortion of the local population.
Third, numerous families and clans associated with these individuals have issued statements disavowing them and withdrawing any familial cover or protection, particularly given that these families otherwise comprise honorable and patriotic members.
Fourth, the resistance has successfully inflicted severe blows on these groups, including those led by Abu Shabab, al-Astal and Hillis. It has become evident that these factions cannot survive without Israeli backing and are effectively dependent on the occupation for their existence. This reality prompted many members to retreat and surrender their weapons to the resistance once the latter provided an opportunity for such action.
Fifth, there was significant Israeli concern regarding the potential success of these groups and their ability to carry out the tasks assigned to them by Israel. Although they played a role in “engineering chaos,” disrupting the internal Palestinian situation and undermining the resistance, their status as “criminal gangs” led the opposition leader Yair Lapid to describe the move as reckless, particularly since he views them as ideologically proximate to ISIS. Likewise, opposition figure Avigdor Lieberman warned against arming such gangs. Overall, these groups remain temporary instruments, lacking the competence, skill and credibility necessary to evolve into a permanent administrative or leadership structure. They cannot be relied upon concerning the future of GS. Moreover, a substantial quantity of their weaponry fell into the hands of the resistance during its operations to discipline and strike them, further heightening Israeli apprehension.
Sixth, these groups exist in a perpetual state of apprehension regarding their future. Their activities are inherently high-risk, marked by criminal conduct, the absence of popular and national legitimacy, and the severe setbacks they have endured at the hands of the resistance. Moreover, they remain vulnerable to sudden abandonment by Israel, which treats them as “disposable” instruments once their objectives have been fulfilled.
Consequently, the ultimate destiny of such groups is extinction. In the short term, however, they will continue to function as tactical instruments for Israel, while the PA may exploit them as temporary actors to undermine the resistance and prepare for a post-Hamas administration of GS. Israel may seek to activate their presence in resistance-controlled areas to foster collaboration, sow disorder, weaken the resistance and obstruct any effective arrangements for the population’s return to normal civilian life. Furthermore, both Israel and the PA may aim to integrate these groups into the Palestinian police forces, which are expected to enforce Israeli directives, pursue Hamas, and confiscate its weapons in accordance with the Trump plan and relevant UN Security Council resolution.
Nonetheless, these groups hold no legitimacy within Palestinian society or among its active forces. Their “lifespan” will inevitably expire, and the people and the resistance will persist, steadfast in their ongoing struggle for return and liberation.
⁎ This article was published before the killing of Yasir Abu Shabab on 4/12/2025.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 9/12/2025
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