By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
Will Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP) succeed in achieving its objectives of rebuilding Gaza Strip (GS), disarming the resistance, and ensuring Israel’s withdrawal from the remainder of the territory, as outlined in Trump’s plan, within its two-year mandate? Or will it lose momentum and weaken in substance? Will it focus on managing the conflict rather than resolving it, providing justifications for Israel’s continued presence instead of arranging an effective withdrawal? Could it ultimately become a “lame duck,” stripped of purpose… and waiting for unrest to flare again?!!
Political Momentum and the Logic of Power:
The BoP announced by Trump gained political and practical momentum not because it offered a just solution or charted a path accepted by Palestinians, Israel, Arabs and the international community. Rather, many saw it as a minimum step to halt Israel’s genocidal war, stop systematic destruction, prevent attempts to displace the people of GS, and open a channel for aid delivery and reconstruction. It was not a comprehensive political project nor a roadmap for the peace process. However, it drew momentum from US backing, as well as from Trump’s personal nature and his ability to pressure Israel, the Arab and Muslim parties, and the international community.
No one wanted to confront Trump, his anger, or his desire for revenge. Arab and international powers bet on benefiting from his impulsiveness and then gradually absorbing its momentum. They sought to redirect certain tracks over time and through detailed engagement, seeing a possible opportunity for a more pragmatic approach from Trump, who by nature favors rapid achievement. This included issues such as the disarmament of resistance groups, relief and reconstruction, the opening of crossings, the role of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and arrangements for Israel’s withdrawal.
The main criterion was to limit Israeli harm and avoid provoking US anger, in order to advance the plan and obtain international endorsement through UN Security Council Resolution 2803 on 17/10/2025. Yet, any plan with medium- or long-term objectives has little chance of success if support for it rests on addressing immediate field concerns rather than providing sustainable solutions.!!
Structural Gaps and Inherent Fragility:
The BoP lacks a solid foundation. Over time, and in the course of implementation on the ground, it remains vulnerable to fragility and possible collapse. The principal gaps can be outlined as follows:
1. The problem of definition, identity, and role: The BoP was initially presented as an international transitional administrative body and as part of the US plan to end the war on GS. Its mandate focused on setting the general framework for GS reconstruction, coordinating international funding, and supervising the technocrats committee (National Committee for the Administration of Gaza—NCAG) and the executive board (Gaza Executive Board). However, when Trump signed the BoP charter in Davos, he redefined and expanded its scope. He recast it as an international conflict-resolution organization and did not refer to Gaza explicitly even once. Its provisions reinforced the perception among many that Trump sought to position the BoP as an alternative to the UN and its institutions.
This shift generated widespread concern and unease. It also weakened the prospects of incorporating influential international partners, such as Russia and China, as well as major European powers. While globally influential states may not seek direct confrontation… they are likely to attempt to hollow out the BoP from within and to open channels that gradually push toward its failure.
2. The BoP does not merely assign exclusive leadership to the US. It also vests extraordinary authority in Trump personally and links decision-making to his personal disposition. Consequently, it resembles a form of “quasi-dictatorial management” rather than a credible international institution. Trump alone extends invitations to membership, withdraws them, and annuls participation. In this sense, he functions as a “ruler accountable only to himself.”
3. The BoP lacks international legitimacy. It is neither authorized by the UN or any international institution, nor grounded in a binding international resolution.
4. The BoP lacks a legal and constitutional foundation. It is not anchored in international resolutions or international law, nor is it guided by the norms and standards of the international community. Consequently, it is prone to arbitrariness and dominated by the logic of power. It undermines humanitarian, ethical and legal principles, shifting its approach from conflict resolution to conflict management.
5. It lacks Palestinian legitimacy, operating as a colonial oversight council imposed on the Palestinian people. It does not represent them nor reflect their will, and its decisions carry no binding authority. It disregards hundreds of international resolutions affirming the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and overlooks Palestinian representative institutions such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The technocrats’ committee functions merely as a group of administrative staff within a service-oriented colonial structure.
It also isolates GS from the West Bank (WB), from the wider Palestinian political and popular system, and from unified Palestinian representation. It asserts control over the Strip and its future arrangements, disregarding both the will of the Palestinian people and supportive international resolutions.
6. The Palestinian side is excluded from BoP membership, leaving the main stakeholder in the Palestine issue without representation or a meaningful role in decision-making, despite being central to managing GS and its reconstruction. Within the framework of Trump’s plan, the BoP reframes the Palestine issue from a matter of rights, justice and freedom into an economic and security problem, while leaving all potential sources of future conflict intact.
7. While the victim is punished, the occupier is rewarded. Israel’s withdrawal from GS remains contingent on its own discretion, with nothing preventing it from continuing its aggression, assassinations, destruction and blockade. At the same time, Israel sits as a member of the BoP, making those responsible for war crimes partners in “peacebuilding” and in shaping the future of GS. The perpetrators of GS destruction and bloodshed become central actors in determining the Strip’s fate. In this structure, the accused assumes the role of judge, and the concept of justice is hollowed out. Meanwhile, Netanyahu is repackaged and his image rehabilitated, even as he faces prosecution as a war criminal before the International Criminal Court (ICC). This underscores the danger of “legitimizing” the occupation, which continues under so-called “agreed arrangements” without obligation to withdraw, enabling Israel to convert the “temporary” into the “permanent,” while the Palestinian people and their resistance are punished and disarmed.
8. Trump’s domestic challenges and external crises generate an environment unfavorable to the BoP’s success under his leadership. In The New York Times article dated 23/1/2026, David Brooks identified at least four major “unravelings” affecting Americans and the world, with Trump himself as the central factor:
• The unraveling of the postwar international order.
• The unraveling of domestic tranquility.
• The unraveling of the US democratic order.
• The unraveling of President Trump’s mind.
Since the beginning of his presidency, Trump has repeatedly destabilized the US domestic system and “ignited tensions” globally, pursuing his “populist nationalist” agenda. This undermines any prospect of stable and continuous functioning for the BoP, limiting its ability to achieve tangible results. Furthermore, in roughly nine months, Trump will face the midterm elections, with polls suggesting a strong chance that the Republican Party could lose control of the House of Representatives, further constraining his capacity to implement his plans.
Forward-Looking Assessment:
It seems unlikely that anyone will challenge Trump in forming the BoP. Many Arab, Muslim and international countries are expected to participate for various reasons, though fundamentally they do not endorse Trump’s authoritarianism or his claim to global leadership and the establishment of a new world order.
The BoP is nonetheless likely to function in the near term, as the interests of multiple parties converge. It offers Israel occupation without obligations, grants the US influence without costs, and allows many Arab and Muslim countries to sideline the resistance axis and weaken “political Islam,” while shielding numerous governments from domestic criticism. Some Arab and Muslim countries may choose to engage in order to exert influence, steer certain tracks from within the BoP, and leverage available space to benefit the Palestinian people.
On the other hand, a state of persistent “friction” is expected, with Israel determined to maintain its dominance and the Palestinians firm on their political rights while rejecting the disarmament of the resistance. As a result, the situation will likely oscillate between periods of tension and relative openings for the delivery of relief and reconstruction materials, accompanied by Israel’s tactical repositioning.
From the Palestinian perspective, there will be a deliberate avoidance of direct confrontation with the BoP and its instruments, pragmatic acceptance of services, and support for the NCAG to operate. Efforts will concentrate on activating popular initiatives and union structures, establishing a realistic local pace for operational frameworks, and attempting to move beyond factional disputes.
Future Scenarios for the BoP:
Scenario One: Limited Formal Success: This scenario depends on US momentum and the cooperation of Arab and Muslim countries to achieve progress in selected areas, particularly relief, reconstruction and the establishment of administrative and security institutions. Nevertheless, delays and setbacks are likely to continue in reconstruction, Israel’s withdrawal, and the disarmament of the resistance.
At the same time, global powers such as China, Russia and key European states are expected to seek to restrict the BoP’s activities to GS.
Scenario Two: Gradual Erosion: This scenario stems from the obstacles and structural gaps identified earlier, compounded by Trump’s growing domestic and international crises, which hinder his ability to advance his plans for GS and the wider region. It is further aggravated by efforts from major global powers to weaken the BoP and strip it of substance, alongside conflicting roles among key actors, escalating Israeli obstruction, and insufficient funding. These dynamics coincide with rising Palestinian anger and frustration, the failure to disarm the resistance, declining Arab enthusiasm, and waning media attention. Consequently, the BoP is likely to lose its influence and relevance gradually, increasing the probability of direct confrontation between Israel and the resistance.
Scenario Three: Partition of Spheres of Influence: In this scenario, the interests of China and Russia align with Trump’s in challenging the global order and the UN system, and in fostering an international environment governed by “power and interest.” This environment is exploited to secure strategic deals, for instance, China advancing its objectives in Taiwan, Russia achieving its aims in Ukraine, while Trump pursues his agendas in the Americas, Greenland and the Middle East. However, China and Russia may anticipate that Trump’s gains will largely be temporary, given his limited capacity for sustained action and the many destabilizing factors he faces, whereas their own gains are “solid” and more likely to endure. Under these conditions, pressure on GS and the broader region could intensify, pushing toward the peace process and the “Abraham Accords.” At the same time, these developments are likely to fuel public frustration and anger in the region over the medium to long term.
Although this scenario is improbable, it echoes the conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, prior to World War I, when the so-called “Colonial Balance of Power” partitioned weaker countries among the major colonial powers.
***
In any case, the BoP carries within it many seeds of failure and may open the door to a new struggle of wills, shifting the conflict to a new phase with different instruments. As such, it resembles more a “crisis management council” than a genuine peace body. Over the medium term, it is likely to collapse, not through a dramatic fall, but through gradual disintegration and erosion, losing both its role and its justification for existence.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 3/2/2026
Leave A Comment