Political Analysis: Israel and the Hexagon of Alliances.. Objectives and Implications

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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s remarks regarding the establishment of an alliance or “a hexagon of alliances around or within the Middle East” were clearly not incidental. On the contrary, they were carefully crafted and delivered at the start of the weekly Government meeting, a deliberate choice intended to confer formal authority and strategic significance upon the statement. In doing so, he ensured that the message would receive extensive domestic and international media attention. Furthermore, Netanyahu articulated this vision as a forward-looking strategic framework immediately prior to announcing the anticipated visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Background: The Periphery Doctrine

Netanyahu’s proposed framework echoes an older Israeli security doctrine associated with David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, dating back to the 1950s: the Periphery Doctrine, also known as the strategy of “pulling the peripheries.” This approach aimed to bypass the core Arab states by cultivating alliances with non-Arab regional powers and minority groups across the Middle East, thereby encircling and weakening the surrounding Arab states. Historically, the doctrine emphasized building ties with Türkiye, Iran and Ethiopia, as well as engaging minority communities in the Bilad al-Sham (Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon), Iraq, South Sudan and North Africa. The strategic rationale was that regional actors would become preoccupied with internal sectarian and ethnic conflicts and with managing tense relations with counterbalancing states, thereby depleting the Arab strategic environment and diverting attention from confronting Israeli occupation.

This strategy largely faltered, particularly following the fall of the Shah and the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, alongside the rise of conservative Islamic movements within Türkiye’s political landscape. Nevertheless, Israel offset these setbacks through normalization agreements with Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian leadership, and later with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. As a result, there was no longer a need to “pull the peripheries,” since the core had effectively been “tamed” and no longer represented a threat.

This, in turn, raises questions about Netanyahu’s motives in publicly advancing this idea? as well as the seriousness and practical feasibility of such a project?!

Is There a Sunni Radical Axis?!

Any objective study, or even a meticulous examination… finds no evidence of an emerging “Sunni radical axis.” What has appeared is merely a form of coordination between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye. States that are generally:

• Aligned with a “moderate” current and not adherents of political Islam.

• Strategically close to the US.

• Strong supporters of the peace process and the two-state solution, with Saudi and Pakistani openness to normalizing relations with Israel should it commit to that framework.

• Key backers of Trump’s plan for Gaza Strip (GS).

• Supportive of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah, insisting on Hamas’s compliance with the Oslo Accords and the peace process, thereby enabling its participation in Palestinian elections and integration into the PLO, and backing Hamas’s disarmament under PA oversight (as reflected in the vote at the International Conference on the Two-State Solution, 28–30/7/2025, and the New York Declaration, 12/9/2025).

• Pose no threat to Israel and have no intention of engaging in conflict with it. In practical terms, this means there is no axis, no political alliance, and no “radical” formation in any meaningful sense. Netanyahu’s claims, therefore, are a contrived and trivialized fabrication.

Rising Regional Anxiety:

The Israeli brutality and the ongoing genocide in GS have significantly heightened anxiety and raised serious questions among regional states, including those inclined toward normalization, about the possibility or viability of pursuing “normalization” or a “peaceful settlement” with such a political system. This anxiety has been further amplified by recent shifts in Israeli security doctrine, which now operates openly and coercively, enforcing its dominance across the region and attempting to usher all actors into an “Israeli era.” The desired peace process is no longer based on partnership or equality, but rather on the dynamic of an Israeli “master” and an Arab “follower.” Moreover, US behavior under Trump has further exacerbated this uncertainty, given his pragmatic approach that prioritizes “power and interest,” alongside a Zionist Evangelical worldview that disregards international norms, laws and shared agreements. Additional apprehension stems from the post-“striking Iran” phase, raising fears of comprehensive subordination of the region.

This anxiety has manifested in Saudi Arabia’s suspension or slowdown of normalization, as well as in coordinated efforts by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye to fill strategic gaps and protect shared interests. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other states have also moved to diversify their sources of armaments…

As a result, even modest coordination among these countries may have been sufficient to trigger Israel’s “red light,” particularly in a context where it seeks complete regional domination.

Netanyahu’s Objectives:

The axis Netanyahu referenced, which he suggested forms a strategic cord around the Middle East, includes India, Greece, Cyprus, and certain unnamed African and Asian countries. Ethiopia is a plausible candidate for the African state, while the identities of the others remain speculative. Some observers have suggested that the Arab country in question is a Gulf state known for its strong ties to Israel and close alignment with its regional agenda.

Netanyahu’s announcement of the “hexagonal axis” can be interpreted in light of:

1. His effort to portray himself to the Israeli public as a leader with strategic foresight, bolstering his image as a “hero and savior” of Israel, especially in light of his role in Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Israel’s wars on Lebanon (Hizbullah), Yemen (Ansar Allah) and Iran…

2. Israel’s international isolation and its standing as a globally “pariah” state. Netanyahu seeks to present himself to the Israeli public as a leader capable of breaking this isolation and forging regional alliances that would neutralize or contain potential external threats.

3. Even without a real adversary or imminent threat, Netanyahu has an incentive to “manufacture” an enemy to maintain internal cohesion, justify his continued leadership, legitimize Israel’s aggression and regional ambitions, and sustain tensions that hinder progress in the peace process, including the potential implementation of a two-state solution.

4. The declaration itself reveals the existential anxiety underscored by Operation al-Aqsa Flood, concerns over stability in a volatile environment, and the depth of the “security complex” within the Zionist mindset. It reflects the evolution of Israeli security doctrine after Operation al-Aqsa Flood, particularly its emphasis on precautionary security, the shift from deterrence through threats to deterrence through destruction, the preemptive neutralization of potential risks, and the reshaping of the “Middle East” according to Israeli imperatives rather than adapting Israel to the region’s realities.

This anxiety is exemplified by Netanyahu’s claim that Israel is fighting on seven fronts, while US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, clarified during an interview with Tucker Carlson that Egypt and Jordan constitute two of these fronts, solely because of the presence of the Muslim Brothers (MB) Movement there. This characterization ignores the crushing suppression of the MB in Egypt, their marginalization and delegitimization in Jordan, and the fact that both countries are normalized and firmly committed to the peace process.

5. The evident confusion and lack of balance within Netanyahu and the Israeli leadership. His approach is inherently self-contradictory, as it risks alienating friendly, normalization-oriented states by portraying them in ways that misrepresent their nature and political structures. Netanyahu may have intended to exert additional political pressure, even on potential regional partners, to deter them from pursuing policies more independent of US–Israeli dominance. In practice, however, this strategy intensifies their apprehensions and exposes Israel as an unreliable actor and a potential adversary (as it indeed is!!). It also sends an implicit warning to regional states that they are under close scrutiny, and that even the limited autonomy they hoped to exercise is not tolerated.

Conclusion:

Netanyahu may be aiming, at least in part, to establish a state of “strategic balancing,” with India countering Pakistan, Greece and Cyprus countering Türkiye, and Ethiopia countering Egypt… Yet it is unlikely that these countries would pursue entirely new initiatives, as many already follow similar policies to those predating the formation of this purported axis. What may be novel is the establishment of coordination mechanisms among them, while Israel would seek to exacerbate regional rivalries and preempt any potential agreements.

Nonetheless, these countries lack the capacity to form a genuine encirclement. They retain numerous overlapping interests with the Arab and Muslim world, and are unlikely to engage in conflicts against it. Furthermore, it is improbable that they would enter into overt alliances that subordinate their agendas to Israeli directives. Accordingly, much of Netanyahu’s rhetoric appears exaggerated and speculative, though prudence, careful engagement, and precautionary measures remain essential.

Overall, Netanyahu’s actions are likely to heighten apprehensions among potential partners and allies, while broadening the circle of opposition to the Zionist project in the region, even affecting the most “moderate” states with the closest ties to the US. This necessitates a comprehensive reassessment by all Arab states of the feasibility of the peace process and normalization with Israel, alongside a reevaluation of Arab and Islamic national security priorities. It also underscores the importance of viewing Palestinian resistance and the steadfastness of the Palestinian people as a central and strategic line of defense for the Ummah (Muslim nation).