Academic Paper: International Relations in 2035 from the Perspective of Future Studies Experts

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By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Introduction

Futures studies have served as a guiding reference for many countries in anticipating potential developments in international relations. Beyond establishing official units that produce forward-looking reports, some countries have established dedicated futures research centers to advise both society and government. For example, in the US, the National Intelligence Council publishes a report every four years to guide the incoming President on future trends. In Finland, a parliamentary Committee for the Future submits reports directly to Parliament, while in Singapore, leaders rely on the Centre for Strategic Futures. International organizations also maintain foresight units; for instance, the Strategic Foresight Unit of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in collaboration with the European Commission, issues an annual report on future developments across key international domains, among many other initiatives.[2]

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The accelerating pace of technological change, the resulting broad systemic transformations, the extreme complexity and interconnections across different sectors of states and societies, and the overarching dynamics of globalization are the primary drivers that make scientific understanding and systematic foresight indispensable for grasping international realities. No country can effectively adapt to maximize benefits or minimize losses without integrating futures studies into its strategic planning.[3]

This study examines the key forecasts in international relations for the coming decade (2035), underscoring the need to understand these developments and to craft strategies that effectively respond to them. This is especially urgent given that the Arab and Muslim worlds largely rely on intuitive approaches, which often constrain the impact of their analyses.

We focus on identifying the dominant trends in foresight research across critical areas of international relations, aiming to inform Arab policymakers in their strategic planning:[4]

First: The Nature of Future Interactions in International Relations

Futures studies for the coming decade (approximately 2025–2035) project a world characterized by volatility, fragmentation and multipolarity, with the traditional Western-led multilateral order giving way to emerging non-Western centers of power. They anticipate heightened competition over resources, the rapid integration of artificial intelligence into economies and warfare, the possibility of a “democratic recession,” and the consolidation of rival geopolitical blocs, factors that collectively elevate the risk of intense conflicts. These dimensions can be outlined as follows:[5]

1. The Emergence of a Fragmented Multipolar Global Order[6]

Foresight studies suggest that the international system over the coming decade will approximate what Morton Kaplan conceptualized as a “loose bipolar system.”[7] Its principal features may be summarized as follows:

a. The decline of US hegemony: The US-led order is expected to decline steadily, accompanied by a shift toward a more diffused distribution of power. Consequently, middle powers and regional alliances are likely to gain greater influence. As a result, the international system will gradually move from a tight bipolar system to a looser form of bipolarity, thereby enhancing the role of regional powers in shaping its structure and interactions.

b. The international system is expected to coalesce around two principal blocs: one aligned with China and the other with the US. The China-aligned bloc, often termed the “Global East,” includes China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, and is likely to pose a direct challenge to the Western-led order. Concurrently, a third grouping, the “Global South,” is emerging. Rather than being regionally defined, it is characterized by a non-aligned orientation and includes states such as India (Asia), Brazil (Latin America), and Saudi Arabia (Middle East), etc.

c. Futures studies point to a relative decline in the role of intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which are expected to become less effective in resolving international conflicts.

These shifts are expected to produce an international system with the following likely configurations:

Table 1: Projected Structure of the International System in 2035.[8]

System Structure	Probability (%)	Notes
Loose bipolarity	64%	Two central poles coexist with influential regional groupings less aligned with either.
Multipolarity	19%	Several poles of relatively comparable strength.
Classical bipolarity	9%	Strategic rivalry between two major poles.
Unipolarity	8%	A single dominant pole replaces the US.
Unipolarity – US Remaining the Sole Power	0%	Resembling the decade after the Soviet Union’s collapse.

2. The Rising Geopolitical Importance of Scarcity and Technology

This is reflected in the following dimensions:

a. Intensifying Competition over Scarce Resources: Competition for physical resources, such as critical minerals, metals, and water, and for non-physical assets, such as satellite positions, data and artificial intelligence capabilities, is likely to heighten international tensions in resource-rich regions. Furthermore, control over these resources will strengthen the strategic leverage of states, with China clearly emerging as a leading actor in this field.[9]

b. In the technological domain, artificial intelligence (AI) is set to fundamentally transform future military capabilities, elevating them from supportive tools to central pillars of defense. This evolution will accelerate decision-making, enable autonomous weapons, and enhance intelligence-gathering. Notable developments include AI-powered drones, predictive logistics, cyber operations, and automated targeting, all of which will increase operational speed and efficiency. Yet, these advances also pose significant ethical and strategic challenges regarding human oversight.[10]

c. The militarization of space is expected to intensify, gradually turning it into a contested domain. Earth’s orbit may increasingly become a disputed zone for military satellites, with the risk that debris from accidents could damage critical infrastructure. Future space warfare is likely to treat space as a strategic battleground, featuring anti-satellite weapons, lasers, and jamming technologies targeting GPS as well as communications and reconnaissance satellites. Conflicts will increasingly involve AI-enabled platforms, drone swarms, orbital weapon systems, and both terrestrial and satellite-based space assets.[11]

3. Rising Risk of a Major Conflict Escalating to Global War

Many experts foresee a potential conflict between major powers by 2035, possibly involving nuclear weapons and space-based combat. Taiwan and Ukraine are seen as the primary flashpoints: China may attempt a forcible takeover of Taiwan, while Russia could continue or pause its conflict with Ukraine in ways that serve its interests. Such developments may provoke a Western—particularly European—response. Studies estimate the likelihood of escalation from a limited conflict to a global or major inter-polar war at 27–40%.[12]

4. Nuclear Proliferation

The prevailing trend in nuclear affairs points to a steady increase in proliferation. Between 1945 and 2025, the number of confirmed nuclear states grew from one to nine, averaging nearly one new member per decade, underscoring the expansion of the nuclear club. Among the potential candidates for membership are Iran, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.[13]

5. Shifts in Economic and Environmental Power

These shifts can be summarized as follows:

a. Contemporary international relations are increasingly pragmatic, shifting away from shared democratic values toward cooperation that is either non-liberal or driven by national interests, reflecting the broader erosion of democratic norms in political systems.[14]

b. Climate change is emerging as the greatest threat to global prosperity, driving mass displacement and exacerbating conflicts. Although it may temporarily encourage transnational cooperation, such collaboration is typically limited to addressing immediate impacts, after which the international order readjusts under the pressures of these environmental challenges.[15]

6. Economic Fragmentation

A substantial body of futures studies projects a trajectory at odds with the aspirations of globalization over the coming decade. Specifically, global growth is expected to slow in the early 2026–2027 period, largely due to the expansion of protectionist trade measures and the increased use of politically driven sanctions. In turn, these dynamics are likely to accelerate the regionalization of supply chains, thereby strengthening regional blocs while constraining the development of critical industries. More broadly, “moves toward regionalization, reshoring, or other forms of deglobalization threaten the intertwined facets of the modern economy.”[16]

7. The Shift Toward Hybrid Warfare

Futures studies indicate that armed conflict is likely to evolve increasingly toward hybrid forms. In the coming decade, threats will more systematically integrate cyber operations, information warfare, economic coercion and conventional military force.[17]

8. Rising Defense Expenditure

Global military spending has reached its highest level since the Cold War, a trend that is expected to persist as states increasingly prioritize automated, unmanned, and AI-enabled combat systems. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military spending which hit $2.7 trillion in 2024 and “is projected to reach to $6.6 trillion by 2035 if current trends persist.” This “massive diversion of resources poses a serious threat to humanity’s future by undermining sustainable peace and development” by 2030. The annual financing gap for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) “is already $4 trillion and could widen to $6.4 trillion in the coming years.” Global military spending is not only increasing in absolute terms, but its share of the global economy is rising as well. Since 2022, it has climbed from 2.2% to 2.5% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and from 6.6% to 7.1% of government budgets. The shift is widespread, with more than 100 countries boosting their military spending in 2024 alone, intensifying existing global challenges such as declining development assistance, rising debt burdens, and deteriorating healthcare systems, especially amid the growing likelihood of environmental disasters.[18]

9. Temporal Projection of Environmental Disasters

Following the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement in January 2026, addressing climate change and its cascading effects is expected to become increasingly challenging, both in the short term (1–3 years) and over the next decade. Table 2 presents estimated likelihoods of such disasters globally, illustrating both short- and long-term risks.[19]

Table 2: Projected Probabilities of Global Environmental Catastrophes

Climate Probability	Short term (1–3 years)	Long term (4–10 years)	Notes
Stormy	5%	17%	Global catastrophic risks looming
Turbulent	31%	45%	Upheavals and elevated risk of global catastrophes
Unsettled	52%	30%	Some instability, moderate risk of global catastrophes
Stable	11%	8%	Isolated disruptions, low risk of global catastrophes
Calm	1%	0%	Negligible risk of global catastrophes

10. Regional Risks

The world’s eight major regions exhibit differentiated security concerns, which can be outlined as follows:[20]

a. Seven regions are expected to prioritize environment- and climate-related concerns, namely Eastern Asia, Europe, Latin America, Northern America, South-Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

b. The Middle East and Northern Africa stand out for their distinct security profile, where priorities are more closely associated with cyber espionage and warfare, and the need to mitigate the adverse outcomes of AI technologies.

c. Available indicators of the balance between militaristic and peaceful tendencies point to an increasing predominance of non-peaceful orientations in the coming period. This trajectory is reflected in the following trends within the international system:[21]

· The average level of country peacefulness deteriorated by 0.36% in 2025, continuing a downward trajectory that has persisted since 2019.

· In 2024, 74 countries recorded an improvement in peacefulness, whereas 87 recorded deterioration. Over the period 2008–2024, peace levels declined in 97 countries, thereby pointing to an expanding landscape of international instability, an outcome of particular relevance to futures studies.

· Of the 23 Global Peace Index (GPI) indicators used to assess global progress, eight improved, 13 deteriorated, and two remained unchanged. Notably, the largest deterioration was on external conflicts fought, alongside worsening trends in deaths from internal conflict, military expenditure, and weapons imports.

· Between 2019 and 2024, a total of 98 countries were involved, to varying degrees, in external conflicts, an increase of 29 compared to 2008.

· Military expenditure (% of GDP) increased in 84 countries in 2024, compared to 50 in 2008.

· Europe is experiencing increasing social tensions and declining public trust in its institutions. The reallocation of public funds from employment, healthcare and education towards defense heightens the risk of further exacerbating these tensions.

· Europe’s real defense challenge lies in the absence of military integration. Despite it collectively outmatches Russia, with military expenditure almost four times that of Russia, European forces remain hindered by fragmentation, which may exacerbate existing security vulnerabilities across Europe.

Second: The Mega Trend in International Relations

Across 23 GPI indicators from 2008 to 2025, several patterns emerge:[22]

1. Global stability has deteriorated over the past 17 years, marked by substantial increases in political instability, the number and intensity of conflicts, deaths from conflict, and increasing geopolitical fragmentation.

2. The gap between the most and least peaceful countries continues to grow, with “peace inequality” widening by 11.7% in the past two decades. The 25 most peaceful countries deteriorated by 0.5%, while the least peaceful deteriorated by 12.2%. Two of the three GPI domains have deteriorated since 2008, with Ongoing Conflict and Safety and Security deteriorating by 17.5% and 2.5%, respectively. Only the Militarisation domain improved, with peacefulness increasing on that domain by 2.7%, but that trend has begun to reverse over 2020–2025 as many countries respond to an increasing number of threats and rising geopolitical uncertainty, driven in part by increasing involvement of external actors in civil conflicts. Furthermore, deaths from internal conflict increased by over 438% in 2008–2025.

3. The competition over arms sales and the global arms race have intensified international tensions, effectively extending the “Thucydides Trap”[23] within and across geopolitical regions. In 2024, global military spending hit a record $2.7 trillion, a 9% increase from the previous year, driven largely by multiple conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere.

4. Forced displacement indicator: Available data indicate that there are over 122 million people that have been forcibly displaced, with significant implications for the demographic structures of several countries. There are 17 countries where more than 5% of the population are either refugees or have been internally displaced. Moreover, forced displacement has followed a linear upward trajectory since 2008, increasing by over 185%. Consequently, this trend is likely to intensify the economic burden on host countries, while simultaneously heightening the risk of social tensions that may escalate into violence.

5. Technology has played a pivotal role in amplifying social violence globally. Advances in media and social networking platforms have expanded the reach of protests and mass mobilization; accordingly, within the measurement period, more countries deteriorated on violent demonstrations than any other indicator, with 109 deteriorating and only 23 improving.

6. Global economic stagnation, increasing debt, and the weaponization of economic interdependence via trade wars, are key factors shaping the economic landscape of geopolitics in the 21st century. In this regard, global trade has plateaued at around 60% of global GDP over the past decade, following rapid growth during the 1990–2000 period.

Third: Implications of the Current International Landscape

The indicators outlined above do not suggest a more secure trajectory for international relations. On the contrary, with 59 active state-based conflicts already underway, futures studies anticipate two additional conflict patterns alongside those currently in play:[24]

1. Latent Conflicts with a High Probability of Escalation, such as:

a. Kashmir remains the foremost flashpoint among these tension zones, as India–Pakistan relations continue to be highly volatile. The April 2025 attack markedly escalated hostilities, bringing the two nuclear-armed states closer to open war. In turn, the situation underscores the fragility of ceasefire arrangements in fluid geopolitical contexts, while highlighting the capacity of non-state actors to trigger wider international crises.

b. South Sudan constitutes another highly escalation-prone context, as it continues to face ethnic violence, fragmented militias, and unresolved political grievances. Despite the 2018 peace agreement, the absence of effective governance and the failure to integrate rival factions have sustained recurrent cycles of violence. Furthermore, the GPI consistently ranks South Sudan among the world’s most fragile states, with persistently low scores across all pillars of positive peace.

c. Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain high, exacerbated by the aftermath of the Tigray conflict and ongoing disputes over border regions and political control, particularly as landlocked Ethiopia seeks access to the Red Sea. While large-scale hostilities have eased, the situation remains volatile and unpredictable. According to GPI, both states face a persistent risk of renewed large-scale violence due to unresolved historical grievances, ethnic divisions and economic instability.

d. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), conflict is driven by the proliferation of armed groups and weak central governance. According to GPI, over 8,400 conflict deaths occurred in 2023, primarily in the eastern provinces. Despite its rich natural resources, DRC’s institutional fragility and the prolonged absence of state authority have exacerbated insecurity and humanitarian crises. Although a peace agreement with Rwanda appears imminent, the risk of the eastern conflict spreading to other regions remains pronounced.

e. Syria remains a critical flashpoint despite the fall of the Assad regime. The transitional period has created new political and military fault lines, while conflicting interests among local factions, regional powers and global actors have further complicated the peace process. The country continues to rank low on GPI, reflecting persistent violence and deteriorating security.

f. The African Sahel, stretching south of the Maghreb states (Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso), remains highly susceptible to widespread instability, with risks of spillover extending both northward and southward. Moreover, beyond intensifying international competition, rising instability indicators, driven by armed groups, arms flows, environmental pressures, and other factors, suggest that the domino effect is likely. Conflict in one state can easily spill into neighbors due to interwoven tribal and religious networks, weak economic structures, authoritarian governance, militarization, and external interventions, thereby triggering broader regional crises.

g. Taiwan: Most specialized studies suggest that China is unlikely to delay resolving the Taiwan issue, seeking to reclaim and integrate the island regardless of the constitutional form such integration may assume.[25] Such a move would, in turn, have significant implications for the strategic landscape in East Asia. Key determinants of Chinese behavior include Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, China’s internal pressure to act, the US commitment to protect Taiwan, China’s military capability to conduct an invasion, and the Taiwanese political willingness towards independence.

2. Quasi-Permanent Wars: GPI 2025 shows that only 9% of current conflicts result in decisive victories, and just 4% are resolved through peace agreements. This leaves 87% of conflicts prone to renewed escalation, particularly with shifts in the balance of power, signaling a broader trend toward “quasi-permanent or recurrent wars,” or alternatively, low-intensity but protracted conflicts that defy conventional resolution strategies.

3. Shifts in Mediating Actors in International Conflict Resolution: Europe is likely to play an increasingly prominent role in mediating Middle Eastern conflicts, given that the adverse spillover effects of regional instability impact the European Union (EU) more significantly than other actors.[26]

4. Nuclear Proliferation:[27] In addition to the nine recognized nuclear-armed states (US, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) six countries host nuclear weapons on their territories: Italy, Türkiye, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Belarus. Furthermore, approximately eight states possess the essential infrastructure and technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons, i.e., the Nuclear Threshold States, including Iran, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Germany, Taiwan, South Africa and Brazil.[28]

Iran’s nuclear program remains one of the most contentious strategic issues today. Futures studies suggest a nuanced outlook regarding Tehran’s potential pursuit of nuclear weapons:[29]

a. Probability that Iran’s program remains peaceful: Key indicators include:

· Religious edict (Fatwa).

· Lack of support from China and Russia for an Iranian nuclear arsenal.

· The prospect of Türkiye acquiring nuclear weapons remains limited, owing to its NATO membership, its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the presence of NATO nuclear weapons on its territory.

b. Likelihood of escalation toward nuclear armament: This trajectory is shaped by multiple factors:

· Heightened external threats, particularly from Israel and the US.

· Political regime changes do not necessarily reduce nuclear ambitions.

· Major-power competition, including promotion of civilian nuclear technology.

· Potential escalation of the Ukraine conflict into a nuclear dimension.

· Rising ambitions of North Korea.

· The expanding reliance on civilian nuclear energy is likely, albeit indirectly, to facilitate the further development of nuclear weapons capabilities.

· Risk of armed groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Fourth: Conflict Management Mechanisms

The increasing reliance on regional bodies as an adaptive response to the “cobweb” model of globalization reflects declining confidence in the capacity of a global government, or even the UN and other intergovernmental organizations, to resolve disputes effectively. This shift elevates the strategic importance of regional groupings, with profound geostrategic implications, and signals a revival of the realist perspective in international relations, now emphasizing regional bodies over traditional nation-state boundaries.[30]

Communal difference will remain a key feature of political life. Power sharing continues to offer a means of building peace within divided societies, yet its success is contingent upon the participation of external brokers who have the ability to act as spoilers and/or brokers. Moreover, the development and implementation of institutions does not suffice to establish a lasting peace; rather, more attention must be paid to inequalities and local developments. Furthermore, several factors shape the role of external actors in conflict management:[31]

1. State fragmentation arising from power struggles or the mobilization of subnational identities, etc.

2. The proliferation of non-state actors (local, national and trans-national).\

3. Greater regional penetration from international actors either directly or indirectly

The failure of leaders to provide for the basic needs of their citizens hallows out the state from the inside and pushes it to the brink of collapse. Also, the outflux of refugees and asylum seekers from the region is sufficient to draw pressure from foreign countries that receive the fleeing multitudes. Liberal democracies will find it in their interest to prevent the disintegration of fragmented states as a mean of preempting a crisis at their doorstep.

Fifth: The Future of Energy Sources[32]

The availability of oil from the Gulf region is crucial for maintaining a strong global economy and promoting its expansion. The uninterrupted and unrestricted availability of this oil, ensuring its smooth distribution to global markets, is a crucial concern for maintaining stability. Comprising the countries in the Gulf region as well as nations that import oil globally. A narrative centered around markets and Institutions is better appropriate for ensuring a reliable oil supply. The existence of Empire order and TransAtlantic fracture will inevitably result in a fragmented gap in the oil supply value chain in Gulf region. To bridge the disconnected divide, a strong link with a functional nucleus is essential. Employing a proactive approach, as opposed to a preemptive attack, is more suitable for assuring energy supply security. Ensuring the security of the oil supply is crucial and it is imperative to combat “radicalism and terrorism” to achieve this goal. Exclusively relying on United Nations agencies and methods is insufficient to effectively tackle all the issues in the Gulf region concerning the security of the oil supply.

One study proposes the development of an internal power equilibrium as a precautionary step among Iranians, Arabs and Israelis, with the support of EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), US and Asia-Pacific-based organizations, both pre-existing and newly incorporated. However, this scenario appears impractical; it is also important to note that the share of oil in the global energy mix is gradually declining. Meanwhile, the Middle East remains the most unstable region, increasing the likelihood of continued disruptions and thereby compounding the challenges surrounding Arab oil. The March 2026 Iran–Israel–US War clearly illustrates these dynamics. Furthermore, mounting pressure from environmental groups advocating for cleaner energy alternatives is accelerating the shift away from oil.

Sixth: The Palestine Issue

Since the study of international relations has evolved from the Billiard Ball Model, which assumes limited and contained interactions among states, to the Cobweb Model, where globalization fosters rapid and reciprocal interdependence, the nature of state interaction has fundamentally changed. Accordingly, the transformations outlined above (political, military, social, economic and environmental) across local, regional and international levels will inevitably generate both positive and negative repercussions for the Palestine issue. Nevertheless, most futures studies indicate that the key features shaping the Middle East through 2035 are likely to be as follows:[33]

1. Regional Level:

a. Expansion of cyber espionage and cyber warfare across the Middle East.

b. Increasing risks associated with artificial intelligence, affecting individuals as well as political, economic, social and military institutions.

c. Persistence of political instability, as reflected in both interstate and civil conflicts.

d. Gradual depletion of natural resources.

e. Intensification of environmental risks and their wide-ranging repercussions.

2. Palestinian Level:

a. Persistence of Israeli occupation in the 1967 occupied territories (62.5%).

b. Prospective normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel (56%).

c. Likelihood of engagement in another war with Iran following the 2026 war (36.4%).

d. Establishment of a Palestinian state (17.1%).

e. Establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and Israel (9.4%).

Seventh: Methodology for Examining the Future of the Palestine Issue in Light of the Findings

To move beyond intuitive and wishful thinking, it is necessary to adopt systematic futures studies approaches. This entails, first, applying the Delphi method, in its five stages, to assess the future of the Palestine issue; second, employing a cross-impact matrix to identify the key drivers shaping the trajectory of the landscape; and, third, mapping these drivers using the Futures wheel to trace their potential implications and cascading effects. This framework is presented in the following table:

Table (3): Cross-Impact Matrix of Drivers Shaping the Future of the Palestine Issue[34]

	Polar system	Scarcity of Rare Materials	Technological Development	Global War	Nuclear Proliferation	Overall & Sectoral Economic Shifts	Environmental Changes	Regionalism	Defense Spending	Political Instability
Polar system	*
Scarcity of Rare Materials		*
Technological Development			*
Global War				*
Nuclear Proliferation					*
Overall & Sectoral Economic Shifts						*
Environmental Changes							*
Regionalism								*
Defense Spending									*
Political Instability										*

Therefore, it is crucial to form an integrated research team to examine the future of the Palestine issue using the proposed matrix methodology, while carefully considering the broader international context and its implications for the Palestinian project.

[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.

[2] Anne Pordes Bowers and Peter Glenday, Effective foresight by governments: an international view, site of Medium, 14/7/2021, https://medium.com/soifutures/effective-foresight-by-governments-an-international-view-8bb496d0c62c

[3] Ibid.

[4] The discussion is confined to the findings, without addressing the methodological techniques employed in these foresight studies.

[5] The Global Risks Report 2025: 20th Edition (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2025), https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2025.pdf; and Mary Kate Aylward et al., Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts, site of Atlantic Council, 12/2/2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/welcome-to-2035/

[6] Although projections in this domain exhibit some variation, the dominant trend points toward a form of fluid or “loose” multipolarity. For further discussion, see AA Dynkin and E A Telegina, “Globalization and the World Order in the New Realities of the Post-COVID World,” Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences journal, vol. 91, no. 4, 14/9/2021, pp. 414–418, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8438280/; Mathew Burrows, “Global Risks 2035 Update: Decline or New Renaissance?,” Atlantic Council, 30/10/2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/global-risks-2035-update/; Mathew Burrows, Global Risks 2035 Update: Decline or New Renaissance?, Atlantic Council, 30/10/2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Global-Risks-2035-Update.pdf; Angel Saz-Carranza et al., “The Future(s) of global governance: A scenarios exercise,” Global Policy journal, vol. 15, no. 1, 3/11/2023, pp. 149-165, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.13295; Richard Maher, “Bipolarity and the Future of US-China Relations: U.S.-China Bipolarity,” Political Science Quarterly journal, vol. 133, no. 3, 2018, pp. 497–525, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327757395_Bipolarity_and_the_Future_of_US-China_Relations_US-CHINA_BIPOLARITY; Mary Kate Aylward et al., Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts, Atlantic Council, 12/2/2025; Yan Xuetong, Emerging Bipolarity in the Current Global Order,” site of China-US Focus, 16/5/2023, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/emerging-bipolarity-in-the-current-global-order; and Mathew Burrows, Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2016), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/global-risks-2035

[7] For further details on the six models of international systems proposed by Morton Kaplan, see James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Al-Nathariyyat al-Mutadaribah fi al-Alaqat al-Duwaliyyah (Conflicting Theories of International Relations), translated by Walid ‘Abd al-Hay (Kuwait: Dar Kazma for Publishing, Translation and Distribution, 1985), pp. 128–131.

[8] Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 155.

[9] Rare Earths Reserves: Top 8 Countries, site of Vinachem, 13/8/2023, https://www.vinachem.com.vn/content/market-and-product-vnc/rare-earths-reserves-top-8-countries.html

[10] Sebastian Clapp, Defence and artificial intelligence, European Parliamentary Research Service, site of European Parliament, April 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769580/EPRS_BRI(2025)769580_EN.pdf

[11] Charles Beames, What the War in Ukraine Reveals About the Future of Space Warfare, site of Forbes magazine, 11/7/2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlesbeames/2025/07/11/what-the-war-in-ukraine-reveals-about-the-future-of-space-warfare/

[12] Mary Kate Aylward et al., Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts, Atlantic Council, 12/2/2025; and Greg Heilman, World War III? What global experts are starting to say out loud, site of AS USA, 1/3/2026, https://en.as.com/latest_news/world-war-iii-what-global-experts-are-starting-to-say-out-loud-f202603-n/

[13] Mary Kate Aylward et al., Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts, Atlantic Council, 12/2/2025.

[14] EIU’s 2024 Democracy Index: trend of global democratic decline and strengthening authoritarianism continues through 2024, site of The Economist Intelligence Unit, 27/2/2025, https://www.eiu.com/n/democracy-index-2024/

[15] Climate and Environmental Migration, site of Migration Data Portal, 2024, https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/environmental-migration

[16] Protectionism Is Failing to Achieve Its Goals and Threatens the Future of Critical Industries, site of World Bank, 29/8/2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/08/29/protectionism-is-failing-to-achieve-its-goals-and-threatens-the-future-of-critical-industries

[17] Frank Hoffman, Colonel Matt Neumeyer and Benjamin Jensen, Future of Hybrid Warfare, site of Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 8/7/2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-hybrid-warfare; and Raphael Cohen et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Overview and Conclusions (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2800/RR2849z1/RAND_RR2849z1.pdf

[18] Record military spending threatens global peace and development, new UN report warns, site of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 9/9/2025, https://www.undp.org/press-releases/record-military-spending-threatens-global-peace-and-development-new-un-report-warns

[19] The Global Risks Report 2025: 20th Edition.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Global Peace Index 2025: Identifying and Measuring the Factors that Drive Peace, site of Institute for Economics & Peace, June 2025, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GPI-2025-web.pdf

[22] Ibid.

[23] The Thucydides Trap refers to the mutual fear among states regarding the rising power of one actor, a concept originating with Thucydides’ analysis of the relationship between Sparta and Athens in ancient Greece.

[24] Top 10 Crises the World Can’t Ignore in 2025, site of International Rescue Committee (IRC), 11/12/2024, https://www.rescue.org/article/top-10-crises-world-cant-ignore-2025; Top 10 Crises the World Can’t Ignore in 2026, IRC, 16/12/2025, https://www.rescue.org/article/top-10-crises-world-cant-ignore-2026; 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2025, site of International Crisis Group, 1/1/2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/global/10-conflicts-watch-2025; and Sarah Stimson Karis, Turning Point or Tipping Point? The Future of Global Stability, site of Global Governance Forum, 3/4/2025, https://globalgovernanceforum.org/turning-point-tipping-point-future-global-stability/

[25] See details in Tuomo Kuosa, Max Stucki and Henrik Södergrann, Three scenarios on the future of Taiwan-China relations, site of Futures Platform, 15/12/2023, https://www.futuresplatform.com/blog/scenarios-taiwan-china-relations-conflict; and Jean Hoffman, “Taiwan Trap: New Stories Needed Rethinking Taiwan and China Futures,” Journal of Futures Studies, vol. 21, no. 4, June 2017, pp.1–18, https://jfsdigital.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/J1.pdf

[26] Samuele Abrami and Francesc Fàbregues, The Future of the Middle East: Understanding Conflict, Building Peace, CIDOB Briefings 65, site of Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), 5/5/2025, https://www.cidob.org/sites/default/files/2025-05/65_CIDOB%20BRIEFINGS_ANG_0.pdf; and Tarek Megerisi, ““Our Sea”: Europe’s Role in Mediterranean Security,” in Galip Dalay and Yahya Zoubir, The Future of the Mediterranean (dis)Order, Dossier, February 2025, https://mecouncil.org/publication/the-future-of-the-middle-eastern-disorder/

[27] Which Countries have Nuclear Weapons, site of International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), https://www.icanw.org/nuclear_arsenals

[28]Micha Tomkiewic, Israel, North Korea, and “Threshold States,” 16/7/2025, https://climatechangefork.blog.brooklyn.edu/2025/07/16/israel-north-korea-and-threshold-states/

[29] Asmeret Asghedom (ed.), The Nuclear Future of the Middle East (Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security Research, 2025), https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2025-01/occasional-paper-nuclear-middle-east_0.pdf; and Gary Ackerman and Michelle Jacome, “WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat,” PRISM journal, vol. 7, no. 3, May 2018, pp. 22–36,https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1983566/wmd-terrorism-the-once-and-future-threat/

[30] Louise Fawcett, “The Changing Regional Faces of Peace: Toward a New Multilateralism?” Contemporary Security Policy journal, vol. 46, no. 2, 2025, pp. 372–401, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2025.2460130

[31] The Middle East in 2050, site of Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation (SEPAD), 1/6/2021, https://www.sepad.org.uk/files/documents/The%20Middle%20East%20in%202050%20-%20Formatted.pdf

[32] Huma Bilal and Ali Shan Shah, “Middle Eastern Energy Security: A Study of Threats and Countermeasures,” Journal of Development and Social Sciences, vol. 5, no. 3, Jul-Sep 2024, pp. 360–367, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/395853743_Middle_Eastern_Energy_Security_A_Study_of_Threats_and_Countermeasures

[33] Mary Kate Aylward et al., Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts, Atlantic Council, 12/2/2025.

[34] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Manahij al-Dirasat al-Mustaqbaliyyah wa Tatbiqatiha fi al-‘Alam al-‘Arabi (Methods of Futures Studies and their Applications in the Arab World) (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Studies and Research, 2007), pp. 44–116.