Political Analysis: Israel and the Equation of War and Truce with Lebanon

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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

The ceasefire, announced by Pakistan in its capacity as mediator, aimed to halt the US–Israeli war on Iran for a period of two weeks across “all fronts.” However, almost immediately after it came into effect, Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the agreement did not extend to Lebanon, in clear contravention of the Pakistani announcement. Shortly thereafter, the Israeli army launched one of its most intense assaults on Lebanon in nearly 44 years (since the 1982 war), striking approximately 100 targets simultaneously. These attacks resulted in extensive casualties, with over 300 Lebanese killed and 1,150 others injured, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health.

Attempting to Appropriate the Lebanese File:

Israel appears to have had little interest in ending the war, instead pursuing maximal escalation, either to collapse the agreement altogether or, at the very least, to impose a de facto separation of the Lebanese file from the temporary ceasefire with Iran. This escalation generated widespread international shock; notably, Pakistan’s typically measured defense minister described Israel, in an unprecedented statement, as “evil” and a “curse for humanity,” observing that “while peace talks are underway in Islamabad, genocide is being committed in Lebanon.”

As for US President Donald Trump, widely noted for falsehoods and inconsistencies, he initially asserted that Lebanon was not included in the ceasefire arrangements. Subsequently, however, in the wake of Iranian threats to resume hostilities and amid mounting international pressure, he asked Netanyahu “to scale back the attacks on Lebanon.” Netanyahu later indicated a willingness to lower the intensity of operations, although without committing to a comprehensive ceasefire over the following two weeks.

The Israeli strategic-security conception of Lebanon, particularly its south, is premised on its treatment as a “vital space” or “rear garden,” intended to guarantee the security of its northern settlements. Accordingly, this perception has historically driven Israel to launch multiple military campaigns against Lebanon, including the establishment of the border strip in 1978, from which it was ultimately forced to withdraw under resistance pressure in 2000. However, Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Hizbullah’s participation in the confrontation, and subsequent shifts in Israeli security doctrine have collectively contributed to a transition under Netanyahu’s government from deterrence by threat to deterrence by destruction.

This approach increasingly relies on pre-emptive targeting and efforts to neutralize perceived threats at their origin before they may develop into a sustained danger. Furthermore, this doctrinal shift has been reinforced by the character of the current Israeli government, widely regarded as the most extreme since the establishment of Israel. It brings together Likud’s hardline nationalist orientation and religious Zionist currents in a manner that reflects an exclusionary and supremacist worldview, one that attributes limited value to the lives of others and shows little regard for international legal and normative frameworks. In addition, the “temptation of power,” derived from overwhelming military superiority, extensive destructive capacity, and unconditional US backing, has further encouraged efforts to impose regional dominance and reshape the surrounding strategic environment in line with Israeli preferences.

In practical terms, Israel is not in a position to unilaterally disarm Hizbullah itself, while the Lebanese state is not in the process of considering such an undertaking, given that it is neither feasible without a broad national consensus nor sustainable in light of its profound implications for civil peace and for the cohesion of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Consequently, Israel is likely to frame the continued inability to disarm Hizbullah as a justification for expanding its control over parts of Lebanon and for rendering the country an “open arena” for Israeli military operations and sustained coercive influence. In doing so, it would seek to entrench Israeli security parameters and operational constraints, while also enabling deeper involvement in Lebanon’s internal affairs and governance structures.

Possible Trajectories:

Regardless of the trajectory of the ongoing negotiations in Pakistan, Netanyahu and his government are likely to seek to secure tangible gains from the current war on Lebanon. Moreover, even at its most minimal level, Israeli strategic thinking in this context has direct implications for Lebanese sovereignty. Against this backdrop, four potential levels of intervention can be identified:

1. A limited approach confined to repeated violations of Lebanese airspace and the targeting of what Israel defines as potential threats, as has characterized the period between the two rounds of confrontation (late November 2024 to the end of February 2026).

2. The establishment of control over elevated terrain and strategically significant positions extending 1–2 km beyond the armistice lines (the border).

3. The establishment of a 3–5 km security buffer zone designed to preclude any armed presence of Hizbullah or other resistance forces.

4. The expansion of operational control south of the Litani River to a depth of 20–30 km, with the objective of maximizing security guarantees.

The first level appears to be the least costly; however, it would also serve as a sustained catalyst for continued resistance. This is primarily because resistance actors are unlikely to accept a ceasefire that is effectively one-sided, particularly in a context in which their fighters are being killed and their social base is targeted without any corresponding response or credible deterrent. The second level, by contrast, would not effectively prevent Hizbullah from striking settlements or launching rockets with relative ease.

Similarly, while the third level would provide better strategic depth for Israel, it would remain susceptible to prolonged military and economic attrition. As for the fourth level, although it may theoretically provide a higher degree of security, it would require a large-scale ground war and the control of a substantial and predominantly hostile population. It would also likely strengthen the legitimacy of armed resistance, while intensifying military and economic attrition. In addition, it would face broad international opposition, alongside a high probability of failure, particularly given that a comparable approach was previously attempted and ultimately collapsed, resulting in withdrawal from Lebanon.

On the other hand, a substantial Israeli majority supports military action against Hizbullah and its removal from the border area. At the same time, however, a significant segment of Israeli society is increasingly concerned about the risks of prolonged war, declining security, economic deterioration, the potential transformation of Israel into a less viable environment, and the prospect of escalation into a regional conflict. In this sense, prevailing public sentiment seeks to achieve maximal outcomes at minimal cost, a combination that is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to attain in the Lebanese context.

Conclusion:

Accordingly, it is likely that Netanyahu and his government will seek to avoid any settlement leading to a permanent ceasefire, irrespective of the outcome of US–Iran negotiations, so long as their objectives regarding the disarmament of Hizbullah and the securing of settlement safety remain unfulfilled. In this context, Israel is expected to retain several instruments of pressure over Lebanon, including continued control over strategic points and a limited border strip, persistent violations of Lebanese airspace, and sustained cycles of pressure and escalation through targeted assassinations and acts of destruction. This, in turn, underscores the need for sustained Lebanese, Arab, Islamic and international pressure to ensure that Lebanon is fully incorporated into any comprehensive settlement aimed at ending the current war. It likewise calls for a comprehensive national Lebanese approach that safeguards its sovereignty, security and stability, while preventing Israeli ambitions for dominance, control and the imposition of its strategic preferences on Lebanon’s domestic agenda.