Political Analysis: The Israeli Society: From Right to Further Right!!

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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

Whatever the outcome of the Israeli elections expected in October 2026, they are likely to reinforce the dominance of the Zionist “right.” Whether the opposition led by Naftali Bennett or the current ruling coalition headed by Benjamin Netanyahu prevails, both camps are led by hardline right-wing figures whose ideological differences are minimal.

Over the past two decades, Israeli society has witnessed the steady consolidation of a broad right-wing majority. Some estimates suggested that, by 2017, about 70% of Israeli society either identified with or leaned toward the right. By contrast, the leftist current that established Israel and dominated its governments until 1977 has undergone a marked decline. Although the period between 1977 and 2001 was characterized by alternating competition between the Israeli Labor Party and Likud, the right subsequently entrenched its electoral dominance, accompanied by the rise of “Religious Zionism” in its increasingly extremist activist-religious form. This article does not seek to examine in detail the differences between the Zionist left and right, as both ultimately remain committed to the same Zionist objectives. The distinction lies primarily in method and pace: the left has generally favored gradualism and greater sensitivity to international legitimacy and external appearances, whereas the right has adopted more explicit and coercive policies aimed at accelerating annexation, Judaization and the decisive settlement of the conflict.

The Return of Bennett:

Most Israeli opinion polls since 7/10/2023 have shown the opposition consistently outperforming the ruling coalition, typically securing about 58–61 seats compared to 49–53 seats for the coalition. During the first year following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, polls generally favored Benny Gantz of the center-right over Benjamin Netanyahu. However, over the past year, Naftali Bennett has experienced a rapid political resurgence, emerging as the opposition’s leading contender against Netanyahu.

There is little need to elaborate on the extremism and right-wing orientation of Benjamin Netanyahu, who served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2009 to the present, except for a one-year interruption. Naftali Bennett, however, embodies a fusion of religious extremism and ultranationalist Zionism. A former member of Likud, he served as Netanyahu’s chief of staff between 2006 and 2008 and led Netanyahu’s internal campaign for the Likud leadership in August 2007. Bennett later emerged as a leading figure within the Religious Zionist camp, heading The Jewish Home in 2012 and subsequently the Yamina alliance. After several years of relative political decline, he returned to prominence last year by establishing his own party, “Bennett 2026,” and assuming leadership of the opposition. His electoral prospects further improved following the merger of his party with Yesh Atid, led by Yair Lapid, into the new “Together” party under Bennett’s leadership. Supporters present him as a “clean Netanyahu,” or a non-corrupt alternative!! meaning he shares Netanyahu’s ideological orientation and hardline stance, but without the associated corruption allegations.

According to a poll published by Maariv on 1/5/2026, Bennett’s party was projected to secure 28 Knesset seats, compared to 26 for Likud. The same poll showed 46% support for Bennett as prime minister, versus 41% for Netanyahu.

Rightward Societal Shift:

The strength of right-wing tendencies within Israeli society is particularly pronounced among youth and Generation Z. According to a poll published by Maariv on 2/4/2026, 56% of respondents aged 18–22, who will be voting for the first time in the upcoming elections, identify as right-wing. In addition, 22% identify with the center-right, 14% with the political center, and only 8% with the left. The same survey suggests that the events of 7/10/2023 and their aftermath have significantly reinforced young Jewish Israelis’ attachment to religion and tradition. Notably, 57% reported that their “faith” has strengthened since 7/10/2023.

This broad right-wing popular base provides a significant societal buffer and a form of political insulation for the governing system’s accelerating policies of Judaization, the marginalization of the Palestine issue, the use of force, regional assertiveness, and declining regard for the peace process. According to a poll conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and published on 4/3/2026, 81% of Israelis supported the Israeli–US attack on Iran, while 63% believed the campaign should continue until the fall of the Iranian regime. At the same time, willingness to absorb the costs of sustained warfare appeared limited, with 62% indicating they would tolerate living in a state of war for up to one month at most. This points to a public with pronounced support for escalatory policies, yet limited readiness to endure their medium- and long-term consequences.

Following the announcement of a ceasefire with Iran after 40 days of war, which also extended to Lebanon, Maariv reported on 10/4/2026 that 63% of Israelis were dissatisfied with the outcome of the war with Iran, while 77% opposed ending the military campaign in Lebanon.

A further indication of the hardening of Israeli public attitudes is reflected in polling data showing that 88% supported a return of Israeli forces to deep operations in Lebanon, according to a survey published by Channel 14 on 30/4/2026. In the same poll, 77% supported halting the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza Strip (GS) until Hamas is disarmed. Taken together, these findings point to broad public endorsement of expanding military escalation beyond the occupied Palestine, alongside majority support for the use of the deliberate engineering of famine in GS, home to more than two million civilians, with the aim of securing a “military victory” and Palestinian capitulation. These patterns reflect a deeply entrenched form of radicalization within Israeli society that cannot be reduced solely to Netanyahu and his governing coalition.

The increasingly hardline public mood is further reflected in a survey conducted by INSS, on 17–22/2/2026, shortly before the most recent Israeli–US war against Iran. The findings indicate that more than half of Israelis supported an independent Israeli strike on Iran even in the event of a US–Iran agreement. In addition, 51.5% believed that the transition to Phase B in GS does not align with Israeli interests, and 28% endorsed a “peace agreement” with Saudi Arabia that involves the establishment of a Palestinian state.

From Right to Further Right:

Accordingly, it is clear that expectations that an opposition victory and a change of government in Israel would lead to genuine settlement agreements, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank (WB) and GS, a shift in the aggressive character of the Zionist project, or a halt to annexation and Judaization policies are largely misplaced. At most, what Naftali Bennett may pursue is a moderation in the pace of this accelerated drive toward Judaization, aggressive consolidation, and the rush to settle final-status questions, a trajectory more forcefully advanced by figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, though not absent from Benjamin Netanyahu’s broader approach. In parallel, Bennett and his allies in the “center” and “center-right” would likely seek to recalibrate the pace of annexation and Judaization policies and the closing of the Palestine file, while also easing the burden on Israel’s military, human and economic resources. They would also aim to reduce regional strategic friction, mitigate international isolation, and improve Israel’s external image, without departing from the overarching framework of the Israeli right.

In any case, if the Israeli left has historically lacked genuine commitment to a settlement leading to a viable Palestinian state in the WB and GS, and has in recent years absorbed several right-wing positions after nearing political eclipse, then it is all the more unrealistic to expect such outcomes from the center-right, the right or the far right.