By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Introduction
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001, with its charter signed in 2002 and entering into force in 2003. Initially, the organization included six member states: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Membership later expanded to include India and Pakistan in 2017, followed by Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024, bringing the total number of member states to ten.
Furthermore, the SCO’s charter is marked by considerable flexibility in fostering cooperation with other states through three levels of engagement:
1. Membership (10 member states): Membership entails full participation in all organizational bodies, including voting rights on decisions adopted by consensus, thereby granting each member state equal standing within the organization. It also carries security-related obligations, particularly in combating “terrorism, separatism and extremism,” an increasingly central dimension of the organization’s strategic orientation.
2. Observer status (2 states): This status is currently held by Afghanistan and Mongolia. Observer states may regularly attend summits and high-level meetings but do not possess voting rights. Nevertheless, their participation provides opportunities for indirect influence and strategic engagement within the organization.
3. Dialogue Partner status: 15 states have obtained this status, including six Arab Middle Eastern countries: Egypt, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Bahrain and Kuwait. Other Dialogue Partners include Türkiye, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Laos. This status allows participation in selected meetings and dialogues with the SCO’s institutions without imposing security or political obligations, while also enabling states to gauge the positions of member and observer states.
Some Israeli academics and policymakers have floated the idea of seeking either “Dialogue Partner” or “Observer” status within the SCO, while maintaining broader engagement with its institutions. This perspective was also reflected in remarks by Irit Ben-Abba Vitali, Israeli ambassador to China, during her meeting with the SCO Secretary-General. Nonetheless, the prospect of Israeli membership remains highly improbable, as it would require exceptional regional and international conditions that are not currently present. In particular, Iran would be expected to strongly oppose such a move, while Pakistan and several Central Asian states would likely express reservations or outright opposition. More broadly, the organization’s security and political orientation diverges significantly from the Western-aligned framework that shapes Israel’s strategic posture. Even so, limited or informal engagement, potentially in the form of an unofficial Dialogue Partner arrangement, cannot be entirely excluded, especially given Israel’s expanding economic and strategic ties with Central Asian states, as well as with China and India. This reflects a broader, albeit limited, tendency within the SCO to separate economic cooperation from political alignment. Still, such scenarios remain unlikely in the short to medium term.
First: The Gradual Shift in SCO Strategy
The early foundations of the SCO date back to 1997, when China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a treaty aimed at strengthening military confidence along their shared borders. This was followed by an agreement on the reduction of military forces in border areas, concluded in Moscow by the same states. These steps indicate that security and defense concerns, while present, were initially not the dominant driver of strategic cooperation among the founding members.
At the same time, although the SCO charter formally emphasizes good-neighborly relations and cooperation across political, economic, commercial, scientific, technological, cultural, transport, educational, energy, tourism and environmental fields, the 1997–2001 period still reflected a strong undercurrent of security-oriented engagement. This is further evident in the SCO’s official discourse, which prioritizes “strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region,” and “combating terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations, fighting against illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of transnational criminal activity.” Collectively, these priorities underscore an early recognition among policymakers of the close interconnection between security and broader forms of regional cooperation.
In parallel with institutions dedicated to development and peaceful cooperation, the SCO has also developed bodies with a clear security and defense orientation. Since 2004, its structure has included the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which comprises a council, an executive committee, and a permanent representative within SCO meetings. RATS focuses on three core areas: counterterrorism, combating separatism, and preventing the spread of extremist ideologies, whether religious, ethnic or otherwise.
RATS’s role was further reinforced following the 2007 agreement between the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which comprises several post-Soviet states. The agreement is significant in that it established a framework for security coordination between the two organizations, centered on addressing shared threats and promoting stability in Central Asia. It also introduced mechanisms to align elements of their respective security architectures. In effect, this arrangement reflects a functional division of labor between a Russia-led military alliance, the CSTO, and the SCO, in which China plays a leading role. The SCO thus operates primarily as a multilateral political-security platform, while the CSTO functions as the principal military arm within the Eurasian space.
Although the SCO is not a military bloc in the conventional sense and lacks core features of a defense alliance, such as supranational command structures or integrated forces, the 2007 agreement nonetheless laid the groundwork for a stronger security dimension. In particular, it introduced provisions for consultations among member states in the event of developments that could threaten the security of any party to the arrangement.
The SCO’s discourse has gradually evolved through recurring emphasis on “security” cooperation among member states as a mechanism for advancing both the organization’s charter and the broader principles of the UN Charter. In particular, the SCO has stressed “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas;” “SCO being not directed against other States and international organizations; and the “peaceful settlement of disputes between the member States.” These principles largely fall within the domain of security and defense strategy. This orientation was especially evident in the statement issued at the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in Tianjin on 1/9/2025, commemorating the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the founding of the UN.
Second: Western Political Literature on the SCO
A substantial body of Western political literature, particularly since 2008, has increasingly portrayed the SCO as a security counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), aimed at securing the geopolitical sphere of both China and Russia. This perception became especially evident in the SCO’s rejection of a 2005 request by the United States to obtain “observer” status, as both Russia and China viewed the US request through the lens of their broader strategic rivalry with Washington.
Following the US war in Afghanistan in 2001, the US established military bases in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, in 2005, SCO called for the closure of all “foreign” military bases and facilities in its two member states. This position appears closely linked to broader strategic concerns, particularly statements made by Nicholas Burns, the US ambassador to NATO, at the NATO summit in Prague in 2003, only two years after the SCO’s establishment. Burns stated, “NATO’s mandate is still to defend Europe and North America. But we don’t believe we can do that by sitting in Western Europe, or Central Europe, or North America. We have to deploy our conceptual attention and our military forces east and south. NATO’s future, we believe, is east, and is south. It’s in the Greater Middle East.”
It is important to note the geopolitical and geostrategic overlap between the Greater Middle East, as conceived in the US strategic framework, and Eurasia, as defined by SCO. Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Caucasus states constitute major zones of geographic intersection between the two regions. This overlap is further reinforced by the interdependence of energy transportation routes across both spaces. As a result, the region increasingly reflects the interaction of two competing strategic spheres: one centered on Russia, China and Central Asia, and the other shaped by an Atlantic-oriented vision that both overlaps with and contests the former’s influence.
Third: Indicators of the SCO’s Shift Toward the Middle East
The SCO’s engagement with the Middle East can be characterized as a “secondary yet growing priority.” Although Central Asia remains the SCO’s core strategic focus, the Middle East has gained increasing prominence in the organization’s evolving orientation. Indeed, the region is gradually shifting from a “peripheral strategic concern” to a broader “strategic extension” of the SCO. This trend is reflected in the following indicators:
1. Iran’s full membership in the SCO, together with the designation of Egypt, Qatar, KSA, UAE, and Kuwait as Dialogue Partners, has strengthened the SCO’s footprint in the Middle East. The SCO has clearly weighed the implications of Iran’s accession, given its regional influence and strategic posture. Iran’s participation, particularly in light of its political and military confrontations with the US and Israel, highlights an expanding convergence of security perceptions and interests between the SCO and parts of the Middle East. It also reflects the deepening strategic ties between Iran, Russia and China. In this context, it is notable that the SCO has consistently excluded Israel from all levels of participation.
2. The Middle East’s strategic importance in energy terms is difficult to overlook. The region is of critical relevance for China, India and other major economies, making it difficult to disentangle “energy security” from the broader strategic considerations of SCO states. This linkage has become more pronounced in 2025–2026, following US–Israeli confrontations with Tehran and the escalation of crises in GS, as well as in Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Although Central Asian oil and gas transit routes pass through the Middle East only marginally, instability in the region still has a direct impact on global energy prices and on supply and demand dynamics. In addition, Central Asian states are advancing long-term plans to channel energy exports toward South Asia via Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of which share borders with Iran.
3. Leading SCO powers, particularly China and Russia, have consistently called for deeper cooperation in defense and security, alongside what they frame as a firm defense of the international order, as reflected in remarks by China’s defense minister at the SCO conference in 2025. With Iran now a full member, this agenda highlights the growing alignment between China’s efforts to reshape elements of the international system and the strategic significance of Iran in advancing that broader vision.
4. Certain religious movements in the Middle East have contributed to the emergence of forms of religious extremism, some of which have extended into Central Asia, a core region within the SCO’s strategic space. Addressing this phenomenon, therefore, is difficult without some level of cooperation between the SCO and Middle Eastern states, which are often viewed as “key origin points” for these movements. At the same time, SCO discourse tends to differentiate between non-state actors that are regarded as part of its security concerns and those that are viewed as aligned with resistance to Israel and the US presence in the region, including Hamas and Hizbullah…, which in several cases are treated more as political actors rather than security threats. In some instances, SCO member states have hosted or engaged in dialogue with actors associated with these resistance movements. More broadly, major SCO members, particularly China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran, maintain varying degrees of engagement with Palestinian resistance groups, whereas others, most notably India, do not pursue comparable forms of interaction.
5. The SCO’s 2025 summit resolutions underscored two key issues related to the Middle East:
a. “The only way to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East is through a comprehensive and just resolution of the Palestinian issue.” This position contrasts sharply with US and Israeli policies. SCO statements consistently link regional instability—including extremism, terrorism, separatist tendencies, energy market volatility, and rising military expenditures—to the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Accordingly, the issue has become part of the SCO’s broader strategic outlook and, in this regard, converges with the general position of the EU in support of a two-state solution.
b. The SCO also rejected external military intervention in the region. Both the o SCO’s discourse and the positions of several member states associate the continued foreign military presence in the Middle East with the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, viewing it as a source of instability with direct implications for the SCO’s security environment.
6. The SCO’s growing Middle Eastern orientation is increasingly evident in the security and defense dimensions of its policies and activities, as reflected in the following developments:
a. China’s defense minister called for “greater defense cooperation to address instability in the Middle East,” a position largely supported by SCO member states despite some Indian reservations. These reservations are partly tied to the deepening India–Israel relationship since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) assumed power in 2014, following earlier brief terms in office in 1996 and 1998.
b. Ongoing trilateral coordination among Iran, Russia and China on nuclear issues, joint military exercises, particularly naval drills, and Russian arms transfers to Iran, especially air defense systems and helicopter platforms. These exchanges have coincided with Tehran’s support for Moscow in the Ukraine war.
c. An accelerating pace of joint military exercises, including the “Interaction-2024” maneuvers and the “Sahand-2025” drills hosted by Iran, which involved Indian, Chinese and Russian forces alongside participants from six additional states, with observers from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Significantly, these were the first SCO military exercises held on Iranian territory.
d. Iran’s accession to BRICS has further strengthened its position within the SCO, particularly given the growing strategic complementarity between the two organizations, both of which include Iran, Russia and China.
e. SCO statements on the Iranian-US-Israeli confrontations of 2025 and 2026 condemned the US and Israeli positions, describing them as violations of “the norms of international law” that “undermine regional and international security, and have serious consequences for global peace and stability,” despite India’s refusal to endorse this stance. The SCO also denounced the Israeli attacks on Qatar in September 2025, considering them “a gross violation of the UN Charter, as well as universally recognized norms and principles of international law.”
Fourth: Implications for the Palestine Issue
The SCO’s drive to broaden its membership base is reflected in its growing engagement with Türkiye, currently a Dialogue Partner. This trend is further reinforced by initiatives to establish specialized centers addressing emerging security challenges, particularly information security and cybersecurity. It also underscores a continued emphasis on countering extremism, terrorism and separatism, which have been integral to the organization’s mandate since its inception.
However, the expansion of the SCO’s security and defense role is likely to produce several concrete implications for the Palestine issue:
1. It could enhance international support for the Palestinian side and its allies, whether by constraining Western dominance, reinforcing calls for a more equitable settlement, or modestly limiting Israel’s strategic maneuverability. This is particularly significant given the SCO’s endorsement of a two-state solution, which stands in tension with the positions of Israel’s right-wing government.
2. In the longer term, SCO may function as a form of strategic protection for Iran, a key energy supplier to China. This could, in turn, reduce incentives for Iranian de-escalation in its confrontation with Israel.
3. These dynamics, however, should be assessed in light of China’s continued economic and technological partnerships with Israel, a consideration that also extends, to varying degrees, to Russia.
Fifth: Indicators of Future Expansion
1. SCO is likely to continue expanding its membership, thereby further strengthening its international profile and geopolitical weight.
2. Economic and strategic interdependence among member states is expected to deepen, particularly through large-scale connectivity frameworks such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the gradual expansion of local currency settlement mechanisms in place of the US dollar, and enhanced energy cooperation, especially between Central Asia and the Gulf.
3. With overlapping participation by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran, the organization could increasingly serve as an institutional platform for managing regional tensions. In this regard, China’s mediation in March 2023 between Saudi Arabia and Iran signals a broader shift in its role from a primarily economic actor to a more consequential geopolitical stakeholder in the Middle East, thereby reinforcing SCO’s strategic relevance beyond its traditional economic mandate.
Sixth: Obstacles on the Path
The functioning of the SCO is shaped by several structural constraints that may affect its decision-making processes to varying degrees:|
1. Sino–Russian competition: Despite sustained strategic alignment between China and Russia on major international issues, underlying tensions may still shape SCO dynamics. This is most evident in Central Asia, where Russia seeks to preserve its traditional sphere of influence, while China advances its economic footprint through BRI. In addition, Russia tends to prioritize the SCO’s security agenda, whereas China places greater emphasis on its economic and connectivity functions.
2. Gulf concerns over SCO security alliances: Several Gulf states remain cautious about the security dimensions associated with the SCO’s evolving framework, which may limit expectations regarding its potential benefits for them. These concerns are compounded by the growing Russian and Chinese engagement with Iran, particularly within broader efforts to counterbalance Western, especially US-led, initiatives in the region. Consequently, Gulf states find themselves navigating a delicate balance between their longstanding security partnership with the US and their expanding ties with Russia and China through the SCO. Notably, Iran is now a full SCO member, while Gulf states remain “Dialogue Partners.”
3. Continued US influence in the region: The US is expected to maintain a cautious stance toward the SCO. As the organization expands and gradually develops a stronger security profile, Washington is likely to seek to limit or contain aspects of its activities.
4. Regional and intra-member tensions: The SCO’s expanding role is also complicated by persistent regional and intra-member tensions that may constrain cohesion within the organization. These include India’s relations with Israel, which are a source of concern for Iran; longstanding India–Pakistan and China–India rivalries; the security alignment of Gulf states with the US; and the ties of some Central Asian states with Israel, etc.
Conclusion
The security and defense dimension has been a consistent and increasingly prominent feature of the SCO’s evolution over the past 25 years. Although its security footprint in the Middle East remains limited compared to other regions, its gradual expansion in this direction is likely to accelerate over the medium term (5–10 years). Should this trajectory coincide with a relative decline in US influence, the SCO’s strategic relevance for Arab states would increase accordingly.
At the same time, the SCO’s strategic orientation is not closely aligned with the depth of Western–Israeli ties, and its generally favorable posture toward Iran could, over time, evolve into more assertive positions regarding Israel, notwithstanding India’s differing stance. This emerging dynamic highlights the importance for Arab states of leveraging their relations with India to encourage a more balanced SCO approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict.
It is also noteworthy that Israel’s close alignment with the Western bloc, particularly the US, makes its admission at any of the SCO’s three levels of engagement highly unlikely. This constraint is further reinforced by the presence of Iran, along with several Arab states as members or dialogue partners, which adds additional political and diplomatic barriers to any potential inclusion of Israel. As a result, Israeli diplomacy is largely unable to benefit from the opportunities associated with the SCO framework.
In recent developments, China and Russia have adopted a broadly aligned position condemning Israel and issuing both direct and indirect criticism of the US in the context of the ongoing confrontation involving Iran. Both emphasize diplomatic solutions while framing the relevant military actions as violations of the UN Charter and infringements on Iranian sovereignty. This stance is reflected in SCO statements, signaling increasing convergence in strategic discourse. It also reflects an effort by both powers to project a normative position that contrasts with what they describe as Western double standards, where Russia is characterized as a destabilizing actor due to its war in Ukraine, while Israeli actions against Iran are either downplayed or, at times, tacitly supported.
China and Russia have promoted an anti-hegemonic narrative opposing US-led unipolarity, using it to justify their broader challenge to the Western-dominated international order. This discourse could have favorable implications for the Palestine issue, particularly if Arab diplomacy is able to more effectively leverage these shifts within the SCO framework and beyond in support of its strategic objectives.
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