By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Introduction
F. L. Klingberg’s Method of Triads is among the earliest quantitative models developed to measure levels of cooperation and conflict among states. The model converts interstate relations into measurable indicators by coding international behavior along two dimensions, cooperation and conflict between the parties involved, while also accounting for the role of third parties, such as major powers, in shaping these relationships. It then traces changes in interaction patterns over time to provide a basis for forecasting future relations among the states under study. The model relies on the quantitative analysis of two dimensions: the geopolitical and the psychometric.[2]
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First: The Structure of Pakistan-Iran-Israel Relations
Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, its diplomacy has been shaped by comparisons drawn in United Nations (UN) debates and among experts and political circles regarding the emergence of Pakistan and Israel as “states.” These comparisons were often seen as relevant to Pakistan’s position on the Palestine issue, particularly because the partition of Palestine took place about two months after Pakistan’s admission to the UN, while Israel was admitted approximately two years later. The comparison was based on the “partition of the Indian subcontinent between Muslims and Hindus and the partition of Palestine between Muslims and Jews.”[3] However, it overlooked the substantial differences in [historical] circumstances, demographic realities, and legal foundations, most notably India’s acceptance of partition, in contrast to the Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic rejection of the partition of Palestine. Accordingly, Pakistan’s representative to the UN rejected these superficial parallels between Pakistan and Israel. This position was, in turn, reflected in Pakistan’s decision, alongside 12 other states, to vote against Israel’s admission to the UN.[4]
Arab–Pakistani relations experienced some strain, particularly between 1955 and 1970, due to Pakistan’s membership in Western-oriented alliances, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), established in 1954, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), established in 1955 as a development of the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan’s participation in both alliances was viewed with deep suspicion by the Arab nationalist movement, which affected Arab–Pakistani relations. At the same time, the policies of Indian leaders, particularly following the 1955 Non-Aligned Conference, contributed to the strengthening of Arab–Indian relations.
For more than half a century, Pakistan has consistently supported a two-state solution, advocating the establishment of a Palestinian state on all territories occupied in 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This position has remained a cornerstone of Pakistani diplomacy to the present day.[5]
Second: Determinants of Pakistan-Israel Relations
Pakistan–Israel relations have been characterized by fluctuations; however, their overall trajectory has remained closer to Palestinian and Arab positions. The main determinants of Pakistan’s policy toward Israel are as follows:
1. The Influence of Islamic Forces in Pakistan’s Political Landscape:[6] Pakistan emerged as an independent state in 1947 on the basis of an Islamic identity distinct from India’s Hindu identity. However, the analytical model of pyramidal segmentarism was reflected[7] in tensions between Bengali and Punjabi nationalism, culminating in the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. Located about 1,600 kilometers from Pakistan, Bangladesh subsequently emerged as another Muslim-majority state, with India having supported Bengali separatism. Historically and today, Islamic forces in Pakistan have been among the strongest opponents of any form of relations with Israel. These include Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), founded in 1941, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), and Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). The position of these and other Islamic movements was reflected in the statement issued by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) rejecting the “Deal of the Century” announced by US President Donald Trump during his first term in January 2020.
However, some reports indicate the existence of limited, covert, and temporary Pakistani–Israeli cooperation during the period of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. This cooperation included the establishment of liaison channels among US, Israeli and Pakistani intelligence agencies, as well as Israeli assistance in supplying weapons to Afghan fighters. According to these reports, the cooperation took place under the direct guidance of Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who approved contacts among Pakistani intelligence, Mossad and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), while also welcoming financial support from certain Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. This effort became known as Operation Cyclone.[8] Nevertheless, the cooperation remained limited and discreet because of concerns over strong opposition from Islamic movements that rejected any relationship with Israel.[9]
2. The Influence of the Pakistani Military Establishment in Decision-Making: From independence in 1947 to the present, roughly 80 years, the military has ruled directly for about 42% of the period. Even under civilian governments, its influence has remained deeply embedded across state institutions.[10] This is reflected in Pakistan’s ranking of 139th on the Democracy Index in 2025, with a score of 2.44. Moreover, the overall trend over the past two decades indicates a steady decline in democratic performance.[11]
3. The Impact of India–Pakistan Relations on Pakistan–Israel Relations: As noted in the introduction and other studies,[12] India–Israel relations remained largely “unfriendly,” particularly during periods of Indian National Congress (INC) rule, despite limited Israeli arms sales to India during its wars with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.[13]
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel in 1992 and their subsequent gradual development, particularly with the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the late twentieth century and its continued hold on power since 2014,[14] alongside the expansion of Arab normalization with Israel, both Pakistani Islamic movements and the Pakistani government found themselves in an increasingly difficult position. This was especially the case after the PLO signed the Oslo Accords and Arab recognition of Israel continued to expand, particularly following the Abraham Accords.
4. Israeli Concerns Regarding the Khan Nuclear Network:[15] Both before and after Pakistan’s nuclear test in 1998, Israeli diplomacy and intelligence agencies closely monitored Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. Particular attention was initially directed toward the activities of the Pakistani nuclear scientist ‘Abdul Qadeer Khan, who played a central role in making Pakistan the first Muslim-majority state to acquire nuclear weapons. This development became a major source of Israeli concern. Israeli apprehensions subsequently intensified amid reports of links between the Khan network and several Arab states, including Libya, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, as well as other Muslim countries, particularly Iran.
Numerous reports also referred to an Israeli plan proposed in the 1980s to strike Pakistani nuclear facilities in order to prevent Pakistan from developing a nuclear bomb. The plan reportedly envisioned Israeli aircraft operating from bases in India; however, India’s lack of enthusiasm for the proposal ultimately led to its abandonment.[16]
5. Public Opinion in Pakistan: Pakistan’s population is estimated at 259 million, of whom more than 96% are Muslims, including 10–15% Shi‘ah. Following the outbreak of Operation al-Aqsa Flood in 2023, opinion polls were conducted to assess Pakistani public attitudes toward the conflict. The results showed that:[17]
a. 91% of Pakistanis, drawn from all provinces of the country, align their sympathies with the Palestinians of Gaza, while only 2% report sympathizing with Israel.
b. 66% remain hopeful that Palestinians have a greater chance of success in this war between Israel and Palestine.
c. 67% expressed dissatisfaction with the US role, viewing it as negative.
d. 31% of Pakistanis do not look favorably upon the policy of their own country regarding the ongoing Israel-Palestine war, while 29% viewed it as good. Another 23% regarded it as neither good nor bad, and 18% were unsure.
e. 55% of Pakistanis “strongly” supported the deployment of Pakistani military units to Gaza as part of peacekeeping forces, while 18% expressed “slight” support. By contrast, 6% opposed the idea, and 16% were undecided.[18]
However, reports on public mobilization in Pakistan indicate that popular activism has remained limited, whether among citizens or political groups. Between October 2023 and May 2026, only 18 demonstrations were held in support of Palestine, averaging about 0.6 demonstrations per month. Moreover, participation levels did not match the degree of public sympathy reflected in opinion polls.[19]
Third: Pakistan’s Position on the Iranian–US–Israeli War
Why has mediation between the US and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, shifted from Omani diplomacy to Pakistani diplomacy?
The evidence and developments discussed above suggest that political pragmatism has been a consistent feature of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Broadly speaking, this policy seeks to reconcile “an internal Islamic orientation” with “an international environment” characterized by the “direct and indirect” interdependence of interests. Consequently, a non-zero-sum perspective has increasingly taken precedence over a zero-sum approach. As a result, external variables in the political decision-making environment have gained greater weight relative to domestic considerations. This pattern is evident in Pakistan’s positions toward Israel at different stages. It is also reflected in the absence of a broad popular Pakistani movement supporting the government’s official position on the Palestine issue, as noted in the preceding sections.
Given the close connection between the US–Israeli war against Iran and the Palestine issue, it is necessary to understand the determinants of Pakistan–Iran relations, as follows:
Geopolitical and Geostrategic Variables: The Pakistan–Iran border extends for 959 kilometers. Geographic factors intersect with demographic realities: although both countries have Muslim-majority populations, Iran is predominantly Shi‘i, whereas Pakistan is predominantly Sunni. Moreover, separatist tendencies among the Baloch minority concentrated along the shared border have served as a factor encouraging coordination between the two states. The issue of Balochistan, which straddles the Pakistan–Iran border, remains a politically sensitive aspect of bilateral relations. The Baloch population is distributed across Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Balochistan was incorporated into Pakistan following its separation from India in 1947, a development that some Baloch continue to reject. At the same time, certain Baloch groups in Iran have expressed dissatisfaction with what they perceive as policies of “Persianization” and demographic change in favor of Persians. Furthermore, the predominantly Sunni Baloch population, in contrast to Iran’s Shi‘ah majority, receives support from certain actors, including India and Israel.[20]
The significance of Balochistan lies in its role as a strategic corridor linking the Middle East with South and Central Asia. Pakistan and Iran share the region’s coastline, with about 1,100 kilometers belonging to Pakistan and approximately 400 kilometers to Iran. This coastline overlooks the maritime route to the Strait of Hormuz through Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and Iran’s Chabahar Port, further enhancing its geostrategic importance in regional and international competition. This was evident in Pakistan’s decision to contract a Chinese company to operate Gwadar Port.[21]
As a result of this complex regional structure, Israel has been reported to have supported forces opposing both states (Pakistan and Iran), with particular emphasis on destabilizing Iran through backing Baloch armed groups on the Pakistani side, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA), and on the Iranian side through organizations such as Jaish al-Adl (formerly Jundallah). This situation has generated mutual suspicions and accusations between Pakistan and Iran regarding each side’s support for Baloch opposition groups operating in the other country, at times leading to limited and brief cross-border clashes.[22] Against this backdrop, Israel’s role in this context warrants examination, as allegations regarding its involvement have frequently been raised as follows:[23]
1. Promoting digital wallets affiliated with Jaish al-Adl and soliciting financial support for the group in exchange for activities directed against the Iranian regime. In addition, the Mossad was accused of supporting attacks carried out by the group in 2024.
2. Pakistan has accused Israel of supporting BLA by providing funding, training and arms. There have also been reports of the establishment of a Baloch government-in-exile, temporarily based in Jerusalem since 2006.
3. The intelligence-linked Israeli think tank, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), has adopted an initiative that aligns with promoting Baloch separatist aspirations in both Pakistan and Iran. In June 2025, MEMRI launched a new project dedicated to the study of Balochistan, allocating resources to the systematic research and documentation of the Baloch issue. Given the institute’s close ties to Israeli intelligence circles, its increasing focus on translating and analyzing Urdu, Balochi, Persian and Pashto sources suggests that some Israeli policymakers now view Balochistan not merely as a peripheral and unstable region, but as an area of growing strategic and geopolitical significance. This perception has become more pronounced amid escalating tensions with Iran and Pakistan’s expanding regional role. The strategic logic underlying this approach was further reflected in Netanyahu’s February 2026 speech, in which he characterized the Baloch as an “oppressed nation,” a position subsequently echoed by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. Israeli–Indian coordination against Pakistan: On 31/3/2011, in an interview with Israeli journalist Dana Weiss, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, referring to Iran and Pakistan, stated that “preventing a militant Islamic government from acquiring nuclear weapons—or nuclear weapons joining such a government—was the greatest mission, referring to Iran and Pakistan.” A key indicator of this alignment is Israel’s provision to India of advanced military technologies during the Indo-Pakistani wars, particularly the 1999 Kargil War, including airborne early-warning systems, air-defense systems, and other advanced combat capabilities targeting sensitive installations in Pakistan. At the same time, cooperation between India’s intelligence agency (RAW) and Mossad continues, aimed at containing Pakistan’s regional role.
Fourth: Implications of These Indicators
Pakistan’s defiance of US pressure to block its entry into the nuclear club offers a potentially replicable model for other Islamic states, including Iran. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ‘Abdul Qadeer Khan network covertly transferred sensitive centrifuge technology, designs and components to Iran, significantly contributing to its uranium enrichment capabilities. The centrifuge designs used at Iran’s Natanz facility closely resembled those developed at Pakistan’s Kahuta facility, which in turn were based on earlier European designs. However, this cooperation remained limited due to a range of constraints, including:[24]
1. US political and economic pressure, alongside pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Pakistan.
2. Pakistani concerns that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities could further destabilize their shared regional environment.
3. The “relative” influence of sectarian differences between Sunni-majority Pakistan and Shi‘ah-majority Iran.
4. Given Iran’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), any assistance from Pakistan (a non-signatory), particularly in the aftermath of controversies surrounding the ‘Abdul Qadeer Khan network, would place Pakistan in a diplomatically sensitive position.
Fifth: Application of the Klingberg Model to the Iran–Pakistan–Israel Triangular Relationship
Based on the background outlined above on Iran–Pakistan–Israel relations, seven indicators were selected to assess the relationship among the three parties (Iran, Pakistan and Israel), drawing on the data presented in the preceding pages as well as international models for measuring similar indicators. A 3-point Likert scale was used to evaluate the relationship in both positive and negative terms, as shown in the following table:[25]
Table 1: A Modified Application of Klingberg’s Triad Method for Measuring Interstate Relations
| No. | Indicator | Iran/ Pakistan | Pakistan/ Israel | Israel/ Iran |
| 1 | Similarity in the level of political stability among the three states | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 2 | Similarity in the level of democracy | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | Magnitude of economic relations | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | Similarity in socio-cultural relations | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 5 | Convergence in relations with major powers | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| 6 | Frequency of conflict/ cooperation | 1 | 1 | -3 |
| 7 | Voting alignment in international organizations | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | Total | 13 | 4 | -1 |
The table above indicates the following:
1. Iran, Pakistan and Israel rank relatively close in terms of political stability, placing 175th, 187th, and 168th, respectively.
2. Iran and Pakistan also exhibit comparable levels of democracy, ranking 152nd and 139th, respectively, whereas Israel ranks significantly higher at 30th.
3. Economic ties among the three countries remain limited or nonexistent. Bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan is modest, at about $3.129 billion, while Iran has no trade relations with Israel, and Pakistan’s trade with Israel is unofficial and estimated at only about $4.3 million.
4. Pakistan and Iran share a common Islamic identity but differ sectarianly, with a Sunni majority in Pakistan and a Shi‘ah majority in Iran. Both countries, however, differ fundamentally from Israel in both national and religious terms.
5. In their relations with major powers, Pakistan and Iran show a degree of convergence in their ties with China and Russia. However, Pakistan’s relationship with the US is less adversarial than Iran’s. Israel maintains the strongest relationship with the US, while its ties with Russia and China are more variable. Meanwhile, India’s relationship with Israel is stronger than its relations with either Iran or Pakistan.
6. Recurring tensions are most pronounced between Iran and Israel, followed by Pakistan and Israel, while Iran–Pakistan tensions remain comparatively limited.
7. Voting patterns in international organizations reveal a much higher degree of alignment between Iran and Pakistan than between either country and Israel.
The findings indicate that:
1. Iran–Pakistan relations are positive, with a convergence rate of 61.9%.
2. Pakistan–Israel relations are negative, with a divergence rate of 80.96%.
3. Iran–Israel relations are even more negative, with a divergence rate of 90.48%.
4. Comparative analysis shows that Israel’s relations with the other two states are the most adversarial (90.48% with Iran and 80.96% with Pakistan) whereas Iran–Pakistan relations appear conducive to greater convergence in opposition to Israeli policies. The combined level of opposition to Israel across the two countries stands at 85.72%.
Sixth: Implications of the Triangular Relationship with Major Powers
The US, China and India are the major powers that most significantly shape the dynamics of the regional triangle comprising Iran, Pakistan and Israel. This warrants examining the future pattern of interactions between these powers and the three states through the political distance index, which encompasses indicators such as security alliances, economic and trade relations, voting patterns in international organizations on initiatives sponsored by major powers, military cooperation, and long-term strategic orientations.[26]
An assessment of Iran’s and Pakistan’s relations with these major powers reveals the following:[27]
1. China: Pakistan’s relationship with China is characterized by extensive military and nuclear cooperation, in addition to the strategic China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which links western China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port through a network of roads, railways, ports, energy facilities, industrial zones and communication networks. The project enhances China’s maritime access and influence in the Indian Ocean while providing significant economic benefits to western China. The partnership is further strengthened by Pakistan’s growing reliance on Chinese military technology to modernize its armed forces. Most estimates indicate that about 81% of Pakistan’s arms imports originate from China, compared to only a marginal share from the US. As a result, political distance between Pakistan and the US has widened, while Pakistan’s alignment with China has deepened, a development that offers reassurance to Iran.
This trend is also reflected in growing bilateral trade, which has been estimated at $20–23 billion annually since 2020 until 2026, compared to about $6–8 billion in Pakistan–US trade.
The Chinese perspective toward Iran, Pakistan and Israel can be outlined as follows:[28]
a. Israel: It is a significant center of technology, innovation and infrastructure for China, which remains its second-largest trading partner. Although China has supported the establishment of a Palestinian state at the UN and expressed concern over Israeli military operations, economic cooperation continues to be driven by shared pragmatic interests. Beijing manages this tension by separating its political positions from its trade, technological and investment ties with Israel.
b. Iran: China serves as Iran’s primary economic lifeline, purchasing an estimated 80–90% of its oil exports despite Western sanctions. The two countries maintain a comprehensive strategic partnership and long-term diplomatic coordination spanning more than 25 years in opposition to US influence, with Beijing supporting Iran’s accession to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China remains cautious during regional crises to avoid direct entanglement in Iran’s conflicts, while benefiting from discounted energy and investment opportunities. Since 2023, and as a result of Western sanctions, particularly those imposed by the US, Iran has reportedly sold oil to China at preferential prices, ranging from $5 to $13 below global market rates. This differential reflects prevailing international conditions at each stage.
c. Pakistan: China and Pakistan describe their relationship as a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership,” reflecting Pakistan’s central role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through the CPEC. Beijing views Pakistan as a key regional pillar and its gateway to the Indian Ocean. Given overlapping security interests that directly conflict with those of India and a shared preference for regional stability, China prioritizes Pakistan and provides it with extensive military support, while preserving its broader relations in the Middle East.
2. India: It expresses strong concern over the CPEC, as it passes through disputed Kashmir on the one hand and strengthens China’s strategic footprint near India on the other. Combined with competition between the India–Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and China’s BRI, the region’s geostrategic complexity and potential for rivalry become evident. This is further underscored by tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, whose maritime routes are closely linked to the coasts of Pakistan
3. United States: Despite a historically deep US–Pakistan relationship dating back to the 1950s, including Cold War cooperation, the training of Pakistani officers in the US, and extensive collaboration during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, ties have periodically deteriorated, particularly over Afghanistan and US accusations of Pakistani support for Afghan armed groups. At the same time, the growing US–Israel–India alignment has heightened Pakistani concerns, especially as US military assistance to Pakistan has significantly declined.
Overall, these dynamics indicate that China–Pakistan relations have taken on a strategic character, while US–Pakistan relations remain largely “functional.” This shift is viewed by Israel as weakening the strategic conditions underpinning efforts to contain Iran.
Conclusion
Prospects for future Pakistan–Iran cooperation are likely to expand over time. This trajectory may be reinforced by China’s role in linking both countries through their importance to its strategic BRI. At the same time, the deepening India–Israel partnership, particularly through IMEC, may further incentivize Pakistan–Iran convergence, especially with Chinese backing. Given that Iran and Pakistan are both members of SCO, and in light of India’s opposition to Pakistan’s BRICS membership, conditions for closer Iran–Pakistan alignment are likely to strengthen.
As for the implications of future relations among the three actors for the Palestine issue, they can be summarized as follows:
1. Greater coordination between Iran and Pakistan in mobilizing international support for the Palestine issue.
2. A potential escalation of tensions between Pakistan and Israel over maritime navigation in the Gulf region and along Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast, particularly if Iranian influence over the Strait of Hormuz increases.
3. Iran–Pakistan rapprochement may help mitigate sectarian divisions in the Muslim world, thereby strengthening Palestinian resistance.
4. Israel may express concern over potential future nuclear cooperation between Iran and Pakistan, or between Pakistan and Arab states.
5. Although a direct Pakistan–Israel confrontation is unlikely in the short term due to the geographical distance of approximately 2,100 km, the possibility of indirect confrontation cannot be ruled out. Regional instability would likely affect key Pakistani interests, particularly if conflicts in the Middle East escalate—especially those involving Iran—or draw in other regional powers. This partly explains Pakistan’s active role in diplomatic mediation aimed at regional stabilization, reflecting its awareness of how Middle Eastern developments shape its own security environment, given its close defense and strategic ties with Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. Israeli strategists continue to express concern over the possibility, however limited, of a broader military alignment among Muslim-majority states. In this context, intelligence and cyber domains may emerge as key arenas of Pakistani involvement, particularly if tensions intensify. Pakistan is therefore more likely to exert indirect pressure on Israel through intelligence monitoring, cyber espionage, and diplomatic engagement rather than direct military confrontation, especially if Israel advances proposals associated with a “Greater Israel,” increasingly referenced in Israeli political discourse, alongside perceptions of its growing feasibility.[29]
What is notable in Pakistan–Israel relations is the escalation of hostile rhetoric between the two sides, particularly since 2023. This is reflected in the growing number of statements by Israeli officials, increased Israeli media coverage of Pakistan in relation to Israel, and expanding attention from Israeli research centers to Pakistan-related issues. It is also evident in Israel’s heightened focus on the implications of the Pakistan–Saudi partnership launched in September 2025.[30]
[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] Frank L. Klingberg, “Studies in measurement of the relations among sovereign states,” Psychometrika Journal, vol. 6, no. 6, December 1941, pp. 335–352.
Many contemporary scholars and research institutions have further developed this model, including the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) project led by Edward Azar and the World Event Interaction Survey conducted by Charles McClelland, among numerous other studies. Researchers in international relations who employ artificial intelligence have likewise begun applying this model, particularly in AI-assisted algorithmic analysis.
Psychometric analysis in international relations focuses on political leadership personalities, societal perceptions of one another, public attitudes toward specific issues, negotiating behavior, and the measurement of international polarization. These variables are quantified and then used to assess their impact on the nature of relations between actors, whether cooperative or conflictual. See Joshua D Kertzer and Dustin H.Tingley, “Political Psychology in International Relations; Beyond the Paradigms, Annual Review of Political Science Journal, vol. 21, May 2018, pp. 319–339; and Charles McClelland, “World Event/Interaction Survey, 1966–1978,” Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, site of Department of Computer Science (University of Rice), January 1999, https://www.cs.rice.edu/~devika/conflict/papers/05211-Codebook.pdf
[3] Ayesha Siddiqa, Is Pakistan like Israel or North Korea?, site of The Express Tribune, 5/6/2010, https://tribune.com.pk/story/19048/is-pakistan-like-israel-or-north-koreaSee also the important chapter on this comparison in the important book: zad Essa, Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between India and Israel (London: Pluto Press, 2023), pp. 14–27.For applications of the model, see Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Al-Dirasat al-Mustaqbaliyyah fi al-‘Alakat al-Duwaliyyah (Futuristic Studies in International Relations), 2nd edition (Morocco: ‘Uyun al-Maqalat, 1993), pp. 45-49.
[4] Ramzan Shahid, Iftikhar Ahmad and Shumaila Rafiq, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy towards the Arab–Israel Conflict: A Historical Overview (1947–Present),” Advance Social Science Archive Journal, vol. 5, no.1, January–March 2026, pp. 2067–2072.
[5] Pakistan’s concerns at the unfolding situation in the Middle East, site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Government of Pakistan, 7/10/2023, https://mofa.gov.pk/pakistans-concerns-at-the-unfolding-situation-in-the-middle-east
[6] For further details on these movements, their influence, and their orientations, see Al-Sayyid al-Tijani, The Most Important and Prominent Islamic Parties in Pakistan, 12/1/2026, site of Alomah News, https://alomah.net/أهم-وأبرز-الأحزاب-الإسلامية-في-باكستا; JI’s Hafiz Naeem warns govt against any move to recognise Israel, site of Dawn e-paper, 8/7/2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1922792; and Religious parties reject Israel recognition under Abraham Accords, site of Samaa TV, 23/7/2025, https://www.samaa.tv/2087336778-religious-parties-reject-israel-recognition-under-abraham-accords
[7] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World (London: Frances Pinter,1983), p. 74.
[8] George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times (New York: Grove Press, 2007), Chp.10; and Noor Dahri, Pakistan’s Military Cooperation with Israel, site of The Blogs (The Times of Israel), 1/2/2016, https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/pakistan-israel-ties-relations-and-recognition/
[9] Pakistan got Israeli weapons during Afghan war, site of Daily Times, 30/9/2003, https://web.archive.org/web/20030930073002/http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-7-2003_pg1_4; and Katz, Yaakov, WikiLeaks: Pakistan passed terror intel to Israel, The Jerusalem Post newspaper, 1/12/2010, https://www.jpost.com/defense/wikileaks-pakistan-passed-terror-intel-to-israel/article-197573
[10] Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 211–215.
[11] The Economist Democracy Index, site of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Economist_Democracy_Index
[12] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Impacts of India’s “De-Hyphenation” Diplomacy on Operation al-Aqsa Flood: A Forward Look, site of Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2/1/2025, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2025/01/02/academic-paper-the-impacts-of-indias-de-hyphenation-diplomacy-on-operation-al-aqsa-flood-a-forward-look-prof-dr-walid-abd-al-hay/
[13] For a detailed examination of the background and complexities of India–Israel relations and their implications for Pakistan, see Azad Essa, Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between India and Israel, pp. 33–34.
[14] The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) first governed India during several relatively brief periods (1996; 1998–1999; and 1999–2004), before consolidating its hold on power from 2014 to the present. See List of prime ministers of India, site of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_prime_ministers_of_India
[15] For details on these relationships, see: Pallava Bagla, Pakistan Pardons Nuclear Scientist, site of Science, 5/2/2004, https://www.science.org/content/article/pakistan-pardons-nuclear-scientist; Michael Laufer, A. Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology, site of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7/9/2005, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2005/09/a-q-khan-nuclear-chronology; and Ayesha Tanzeem, Pakistan Has Complicated Nuclear Relationship With Saudi Arabia, Iran, site of Voice of America (VOA), 7/4/2015, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-has-complicated-nuclear-relationship-with-saudi-arabia-iran/2710343.html
[16] Imran Mulla, ‘Why not an Islamic bomb?’: How Israel planned and failed to stop Pakistan going nuclear, site of Middle East Eye, 25/6/2025, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/how-israel-planned-bomb-pakistan-stop-it-building-nuclear-weapons
[17] Survey on Israel Palestine Conflict, site of Gallup Pakistan, November 2023, https://gallup.com.pk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Gallup-Pakistan-Report-on-the-Israel-Palestine-Conflict-6.pdf
[18] Abid Hussain, Strong support in Pakistan for Gaza peacekeeping force but questions linger, site of Al Jazeera, 9/2/2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/9/survey-finds-strong-pakistani-support-for-gaza-force-but-questions-linger
[19] List of pro-Palestinian protests in Pakistan, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_pro-Palestinian_protests_in_Pakistan
[20] Mir Sherbaz Khetran, Indian Interference in Balochistan: Analysing the Evidence and Implications for Pakistan, Strategic Studies journal, vol. 37, no. 3, 16/10/2017, https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/7-SS_Mir_sherbaz_Khetran_No-3_2017.pdf; and F.M. Shakil, Israel’s covert war in Balochistan binds Iran and Pakistan in rare alliance, site of The Cradle, 16/8/2025, https://thecradle.co/articles/israels-covert-war-in-balochistan-binds-iran-and-pakistan-in-rare-alliance
[21] Dalshad Hussein, Baluchistan, A Corridor Under Fire, site of Alhurra, 31/3/2026, https://alhurra.com/en/17443; and Iranian Balochistan: Strategic Geography and Identity Struggle, site of Independent Arabia, 6/3/2026, https://www.independentarabia.com/node/643995
[22] Key Baloch groups opposing Pakistan in Iran, site of Aljazeera.net, 1/2/2024, https://aja.ws/pio0t2
[23] See details in Ahmar Mustikhan, Balochistan leaders seek Israel help amid Pakistan crackdown, The Jerusalem Post newspaper, 24/6/2015, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/balochistan-leaders-seek-israel-help-amid-pakistan-crackdown-407054; F.M. Shakil, Israel’s covert war in Balochistan binds Iran and Pakistan in rare alliance, The Cradle, 16/8/2025; M Abdullah Hamid Gul, Malicious game of India & Israel in Balochistan, site of Pakistan Observer, 9/8/2025, https://pakobserver.net/malicious-game-of-india-israel-in-balochistan/; Sergio Restelli, Balochistan enters Israeli strategic calculus, site of The Times of Israel, 27/7/2025, https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/balochistan-enters-israeli-strategic-calculus/; Irfan Raja, The greater Israel project: Is Pakistan next on the list?, site of Daily Sabah, 30/6/2025, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/the-greater-israel-project-is-pakistan-next-on-the-list; Rovshan Mammadli, War from within: Israel’s bid to exploit Iran’s ethnic divisions, site of The New Arab, 1/12/2025, https://www.newarab.com/analysis/war-within-israels-bid-exploit-irans-ethnic-divisions; and How Israel helped India during the Kargil war, site of India Today, 5/7/2017, https://www.indiatoday.in/fyi/story/israel-helped-india-during-kargil-war-modi-in-israel-diplomatic-ties-1022521-2017-07-05
[24] Israel-Iran Conflict: Why Pakistan never helped “bother” Iran develop nuclear weapons – Explained, site of Times of India, 19/6/2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/israel-iran-conflict-why-pakistan-never-helped-brother-iran-develop-nuclear-weapons-explained/articleshow/121942249.cms
[25] The Economist Democracy Index, Wikipedia; Political stability – Country rankings, site of TheGlobalEconomy.com, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability; How the US-Iran-Israel War Is Disrupting Global Trade, Oil Prices, and Shipping Costs, site of TradeImeX, 5/3/2026, https://www.tradeimex.in/blogs/us-iran-israel-war-impact-global-trade-oil-prices-shipping-costs; and Mandy Taheri, Full List of Countries Who Voted to Give Palestine New UN Power, site of Newsweek, 10/5/2024, https://www.newsweek.com/full-list-countries-voted-give-palestine-un-power-1899399
[26] Political distance refers to differences between states in the organization and management of the relationship between their domestic and external affairs. For further details and the measurement methodology, see Tatiana Lukoianova and James Agarwal, “Methodology for Measuring Political Distance Using Dynamic Factor Analysis and Cluster Analysis,” Academy of Management Proceeding journal, vol. 2024, No. 1. August 2024, https://journals.aom.org/doi/10.5465/AMPROC.2024.21207abstract
[27] For the details of these relations, see Ejaz Hussain, “An analysis of contemporary China–Pakistan relations,” The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies, vol. 115, no. 2, 2026, pp. 348–353, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2025.2606773; Zahid Hussain and Muhammad Fahim Khan, “PAK–US Relations and US–China Strategic Competition in South Asia: A Policy Analysis,” Journal of Media Horizons, vol.6, no.6, 2025, pp. 328–338, https://jmhorizons.com/index.php/journal/article/view/959; Atiqa Iqbal, Anum Saleem and Ammara Tariq Cheema, “Pakistan’s Balancing Strategy between the United States and China: An Analysis,” Journal of Political Stability Archive, vol. 4, no. 1, 2026, pp. 199–207, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/400056149_Pakistan’s_Balancing_Strategy_between_the_United_States_and_China_An_Analysis; China, Pakistan aim to revamp economic corridor, Gwadar port, site of The Straits Times, 26/5/2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-pakistan-aim-to-revamp-economic-corridor-gwadar-port; China’s Balancing Act in the Iran–Israel Conflict: Energy, Diplomacy, and Global South Alignments, site of Global South Forum, 27/6/2025, https://www.globalsouthforum.org/article/chinas-balancing-act-in-the-iran-israel-conflict-energy-diplomacy-and-global-south-alignments
[28] Shirzad Azad, “Bargain and Barter: China’s Oil Trade with Iran,” Middle East Policy journal, vol.30, no.1, Spring 2023, pp. 23–35, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14754967/2023/30/1; and Parsa Hajiannejad, Profit maximization for international firms under sanctions: A dynamic economic model of Iran’s sanctioned economy, site of ResearchGate, 21/8/2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/397859200_Profit_maximization_for_international_firms_under_sanctions_A_dynamic_economic_model_of_iran’s_sanctioned_economy
[29] For these scenarios, see Altaf Parvez, Is Pakistan Israel’s next target?, site of Prothomalo, 14/5/2026, https://en.prothomalo.com/opinion/ompjgcpv8m; and Irfan Raja, The greater Israel project: Is Pakistan next on the list?, Daily Sabah, 30/6/2025.
[30] Nuresh Yadav, The Distant Threat: Is Israel Constructing a Strategic Rival in Pakistan, site of Centre for Security and Strategy Studies (Cescube), 15/5/2026, https://www.cescube.com/vp-the-distant-threat-is-israel-constructing-a-strategic-rival-in-pakistan
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