Academic Paper: A Proposed Model for Measuring the “Strategic Sovereignty and Independence Index” in International Relations

Reading Time: 20 minutes

By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Introduction

Political decision-making is shaped by a complex set of internal and external variables that determine the “core substance” of state decisions. Although these variables influence all states regardless of their position in the international system, their relative weight differs across countries and changes over time.

Click here to download:
>> Academic Paper: A Proposed Model for Measuring the “Strategic Sovereignty and Independence Index” in International Relations … Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay (18 pages, 1.8 MB)

In particular, globalization has fostered increasing interconnectedness among states and societies across environmental, political, social, economic, technological and scientific domains. Consequently, external variables have gained growing influence over decision-making processes, often at the expense of domestic factors. This shift has made decision-making increasingly complex, as states must consider not only the expanding number of actors in the international system but also the interconnected consequences of international actions on other states. Moreover, the continuous evolution of international law and the successive adjustments to its rules governing interactions among international actors have further complicated this process.

Given that the active actors within the international system include approximately 206 states, 330 governmental international and regional organizations, nearly 7 thousand international non-governmental organizations, 90 thousand multinational corporations, 85 armed political organizations, and around 400 criminal organizations, the difficulty of insulating decision-making from external influences becomes clear. Consequently, states face growing challenges both in developing alternative policy options and in selecting the most appropriate choice among them.[2]

The other dimension of international relations concerns the concept of “decision-making autonomy,” particularly in foreign policy.[3] It refers to a state’s ability to make sovereign decisions and pursue its national interests, values, and objectives without coercion or external control. Thus, it represents a fundamental pillar of political independence and sovereignty.

The international relations literature identifies the following principal dimensions of the Strategic Sovereignty Index:[4]

1. Internal Sovereignty: Its core components include:

a. Domestic authority: The state’s ability to exercise effective control over internal affairs within its territorial boundaries.

b. Sovereignty under interdependence: The state’s capacity to regulate the cross-border movement of people, goods, information and capital.

c. International legal sovereignty: Reflected in the extent of diplomatic recognition the state receives from other states

d. Westphalian sovereignty: The state’s ability to prevent external interference in its domestic affairs..

2. External Sovereignty: This dimension is reflected in several key aspects:[5]

a. Sovereignty and self-determination: The state’s fundamental right to govern its internal affairs and conduct its external relations on an equal footing with other states.

b. Freedom of alignment: The ability to choose allies and strategic partners or, alternatively, to remain neutral and independent of major power blocs.

c. Economic and resource autonomy: Control over domestic resources and economic policymaking, enabling the state to pursue trade and economic policies on its own terms.

d. Independent diplomacy: The ability to negotiate and adopt positions on international issues based primarily on national interests and domestic strategic priorities, rather than merely following the agendas of foreign powers.

e. Although independence is a defining attribute of statehood under international law, it rarely implies absolute freedom in an increasingly interconnected world. States remain bound by international law and embedded within global power structures. Consequently, the degree of strategic autonomy they enjoy largely depends on their military, economic and institutional capabilities, which shape the independence of their decision-making. Moreover, growing interdependence among international actors has given rise to the concept of post-Westphalian sovereignty,[6] whereby sovereignty is regarded as conditional rather than absolute. Under this framework, states are increasingly subject to international accountability, particularly in areas such as human rights. Likewise, the expanding role of non-state actors, together with participation in alliances, regional blocs and technological networks, effectively entails the delegation of certain sovereign prerogatives to supranational or transnational institutions.[7]

First: Measurement of Decision-Making Autonomy and Sovereignty

The political adaptation literature provides a useful analytical framework for examining decision-making autonomy, particularly in foreign policy. Political adaptation refers to the ways in which states respond to changes in the structure of the international system, including shifts in its actors, the distribution of power, and the legal norms governing international interactions. Among the leading contributors to this field, the work of US scholar James Rosenau is particularly influential. Rosenau classifies patterns of political adaptation according to the interaction between pressures originating in the domestic environment (society or the state) and those arising from the international environment. Specifically, he identifies four patterns of adaptation based on the intensity and persistence of internal and external forces of change, as illustrated in Table 1.[8]

Table 1: Patterns of Adaptation in Response to Demands From Domestic and External Environments

Patterns of Adaptation	Nature of the Adaptation Outcome	Demands and changes emanating from a society’s external environment	Demands and changes emanating from the essential structures of a society
Acquiescent	Zero-sum/ Loss	+	–
Intransigent	Zero-sum / Gain	–	+
Promotive	Non-zero-sum / Gain	–	–
Preservative	Non-zero-sum / Loss	+	+

(+) : Officials responsive to demands because they are intense or their intensity is perceived to be increasing.
(–) : Officials unresponsive to demands because they are not sufficiently intense or their intensity is perceived to be decreasing.

This framework suggests that decision-making ultimately reflects the balance between forces of change and the state’s capacity to respond to them. Thus, when negative pressures prevail and the state accommodates them, as in the acquiescent adaptation pattern, it indicates the greatest loss of sovereignty and autonomy. Conversely, the intransigent pattern represents the highest degree of resistance and independence. The promotive and preservative patterns fall between these two extremes, depending on the extent to which the state responds to both external and domestic demands.

The claim of “independent decision-making” is among the most frequently asserted by states worldwide, particularly in the developing world, including Arab states. To evaluate the validity of such claims, scholars have developed various models to measure foreign policy autonomy and patterns of response to international pressures. These models rely on diverse, and sometimes overlapping, indicators, allowing researchers to compare findings and identify the measures that most accurately reflect the degree of decision-making autonomy.

This study will first examine the leading measurement models and then develop a composite framework informed by the existing literature.

Accordingly, numerous efforts have sought to operationalize sovereignty by transforming its qualitative dimensions into quantitative indicators that allow for a systematic assessment of the level of state autonomy and sovereignty reflected in decision-making. The most prominent models in this field include the following:[9]

1. The Burke Sovereignty Index, which seeks to measure both theoretical sovereignty (international recognition of a state’s sovereignty) and effective sovereignty (the degree of autonomy available to decision-makers when choosing among policy alternatives). The model combines official data from relevant international and domestic institutions with expert assessments across specific indicators. It consists of 7 main dimensions, which are further divided into 18 sub-indicators, as follows:

a. Political Sovereignty. This dimension includes three sub-indicators assessing the extent to which political forces within society are fairly represented:
• Degree of political polarization.
• Institutional stability.
• Integrity of the electoral process.

b. Economic Sovereignty. This dimension is measured through three sub-indicators:
• Independence of monetary policy.
• Diversity of the national economic structure.
• Capacity to impose tariffs.

c. Military Sovereignty. This dimension includes three indicators:
• Level of self-sufficiency in defense industries.
• Defense budget capacity.
• Ability to project influence or exercise control beyond the state’s territorial boundaries.

d. Information Sovereignty. This dimension is assessed through two sub-indicators:
• The state’s capacity to govern and regulate the digital domain.
• The degree of information freedom and public access to information.

e. Technological Sovereignty. This dimension comprises three sub-indicators:
• Scientific research capacity.
• Technological development capability.
• Degree of dependence on external supply chains.

f. Cultural Sovereignty. This dimension is evaluated through two sub-indicators:
• The international influence and reach of the state’s cultural heritage.
• The state’s commitment to preserving its cultural heritage and archaeological assets.

g. Knowledge Sovereignty. This dimension is measured through two sub-indicators:
• Students’ academic performance, as assessed by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
• Innovation performance, reflected in indicators such as patent registrations.

2. The Prosperity Index. It evaluates national performance across 12 principal indicators, comprising 66 sub-indicators. These include security, personal freedom, governance, social capital, the investment environment, the economic environment, infrastructure, economic diversification, living standards, health, education and the natural environment, among others.

3. Other Specialized Models. One prominent example is the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) framework, which relies on statistical analysis, such as the correlation between democracy and economic growth (and their impact on decision-making sovereignty), as well as indicators of political system resilience and judicial independence, and the implications of each for sovereignty and decision-making autonomy, etc.

Second: Proposed Model[10]

Drawing on the quantitative methodologies used to measure social and political phenomena, researchers in international relations have increasingly applied these approaches to the field by quantifying international phenomena and assigning relative weights to variables according to their impact on the phenomenon under study.[11]

Accordingly, this study adopts a quantitative approach to develop a model for measuring strategic “sovereignty and independence.” It draws on indicators employed in several existing models[12] and then applies the Delphi technique to assess these indicators through expert judgment.[13] The resulting model is presented below.

1. Objective of the Model: To measure the state’s capacity to make strategic decisions without altering its fundamental choices in response to external pressures.

2. Core Indicators of the Model: The model comprises five core indicators and 25 sub-indicators, along with their respective weights, as presented in Table (2).

Table 2: Core and Sub-Indicators of Sovereignty and Independence and Their Relative Weights

Core indicators of sovereignty and independence	Relative weight of core indicator (%)	Sub-indicators	Average weight of sub-indicator (% of core indicator)	Relative weight of sub-indicator in the state under study (Determined through the case study)	Sovereignty and independence score of the core indicator (According to the formula)
Economic [14]	30	Share of trade with the largest trading partner	4
		External debt-to-GDP ratio	5
		Dependence on foreign aid	5
		Share of strategic imports (food, energy, and medicine)	3
		Diversity of trading partners	3
		Capacity to withstand sanctions	3
		Availability of domestic supply chains	3
		Foreign currency reserves sufficient to cover imports	4
Military and Security [15]	30	Self-sufficiency in military production	6
		Presence of foreign military bases	6
		Ability to conduct military operations independently without external support	6
		Areas of the state outside the control of the central government	6
		Military expenditure as a share of GDP	6
Societal independence and domestic legitimacy [16]	15	Political stability rate	5
		Diversity of subcultures	3
		Expansion of national identity within the geopolitical neighborhood	4
		Peaceful transfer of power	3
Political and diplomatic behavior [17]	10	Voting alignment with a major power in key international organizations	2
		International sanctions imposed on the state	3
		Level of globalization	3
		Independence of political elites from external forces	2
Technological [18]	15	Share of expenditure on scientific research	5
		Patents	3
		Dependence on imported technology	4
		Availability of domestic cybersecurity capabilities	3
Total	100		25

The results are classified into three levels based on the negative impact of each sub-indicator on sovereignty and independence, as follows:

1. Limited sovereignty: 70–100

2. Moderate sovereignty: 40–69

3. High sovereignty: below 40

The results are determined through the following steps:

1. Calculating the average score of the sub-indicators for each core indicator.

2. Calculating the share of this average relative to the total weight of the core indicator.

3. Calculating the overall sovereignty score according to the following formula: (Core Indicator 1 score × its relative weight) + (Core Indicator 2 score × its relative weight) + … (Core Indicators 3, 4, and 5), followed by calculating the resulting percentage. In addition, the future trajectory of sovereignty in the state’s behavior is assessed using time-series analysis.[19]

Third: Measurement of the Sub-Indicators

The sub-indicators are intended to divide each core indicator into its constituent components, which collectively determine its overall weight. Accordingly, the economic and military/security indicators were each assigned a weight of 30%, societal independence and technological advancement 15% each, while the political/diplomatic indicator was assigned 10%.

The 25 sub-indicators were assessed based on a central question: Does the sub-indicator enhance sovereignty and independence, and what is its relative weight within the overall weight of the core indicator to which it belongs? For example, what is the impact of dependence on foreign aid on economic independence? The proposed model assigns this factor a value of 3 out of 30. The actual assessment may assign it a value of 3, 2, or another value determined by the study, the evaluating expert, or the average of expert assessments for this sub-indicator, particularly since the Delphi technique was applied through its five stages.

Fourth: Benefits of the Measurement

Assessing the overall conditions of a state before entering either cooperative or adversarial relations with another state requires an evaluation of its bargaining capacity. Sovereignty constitutes one of the principal variables in assessing that capacity. At the same time, however, all states operate under general constraints in managing their external relations. The most important of these are:[20]

1. Interdependence, which requires states to adapt their economic and trade structures to changing global conditions. However, such adaptation does not necessarily imply a reduction in sovereignty or strategic independence.

2. Membership in international organizations, which requires states to comply with the decisions of organizations of which they are members. A state may therefore be required to implement decisions that it does not support. Nevertheless, this should not be regarded as a diminution of its sovereignty, particularly when it concludes that the benefits of membership outweigh the associated costs.

3. Accession to international or regional agreements imposes obligations on states. However, these obligations stem from the state’s own sovereign decision to enter into such agreements and accept the commitments arising from them.

This suggests that assessing a state’s bargaining capacity is essential for managing negotiations with that state. In this context, the Sovereignty and Independence Index serves as an important indicator of bargaining capacity, as sovereignty and independence constitute key variables in determining the following:

1. The state’s ability to implement the terms of an agreement regardless of the positions of other states.

2. The state’s ability to sustain implementation of the agreement in line with the strength of its sovereignty and independence indicators, regardless of the positions of other external actors.

3. The state’s ability to further develop the agreement regardless of opposition from other international actors.

4. The state’s ability to withdraw from an agreement that subsequently proves detrimental or when the other party fails to fulfill its obligations under the agreement.

Fifth: Connecting Sovereignty and Independence to the Concept of Security: The Middle East as an Illustrative Case

Security is a central concept in the policies of every state. It comprises three dimensions that, taken together, constitute a measure of sovereignty and independence:[21]

1. Human or Societal Security: This concept places the individual at the center, prioritizing the safety, dignity and well-being of citizens. It focuses on everyday threats, including poverty, disease, illiteracy, underdevelopment, environmental degradation and human rights violations. At times, human security is directly threatened by external forces, such as economic blockades, or by internal forces, such as civil wars. Accordingly, any factor that undermines the survival, normal life or development of individuals and society constitutes a threat to human security.

2. Political Regime Security: This concept refers to the survival of the incumbent ruling elites, political parties or the system of government. It prioritizes preserving political authority and preventing political opposition or subversion. Consequently, governments may at times restrict public freedoms, thereby sacrificing human security, to protect the regime from being overthrown.

3. State Security: This concept refers to protecting the state’s territory, resources, borders and other essential components of the state.

The difference among states lies in how they prioritize the three dimensions of security. When examining states’ approaches to the Middle East conflict and linking them to sovereignty and independence, the following can be observed:

1. The Israeli Side: The primary priority of the Israeli side is state security (i.e., geopolitical and geostrategic existence), followed by societal security. Accordingly, when presented with any proposal, its central concern is the proposal’s potential positive or negative impact on state security, the framework that encompasses both society and political authority. This does not imply a lack of attention to other considerations; rather, it means that the Israeli side may compromise on certain aspects of sovereignty, provided that such compromises do not undermine its highest security priorities, even to a minimal degree. Moreover, this security priority extends beyond current circumstances, as anticipating future implications for Israeli security remains central to Israeli negotiations. The main components of Israeli security consist of three dimensions:

a. State Security: This refers to ensuring that the state’s territory is not compromised and establishing a security perimeter around it through buffer zones, pushing hostile forces as far away as possible or eliminating them, and mobilizing international support to safeguard its territorial space, etc. It also requires maintaining comprehensive military capabilities to deter any actor that may threaten state security.

b. Israeli Societal Security: This requires distinguishing between everyday security (including education, income, health and social security, etc) and political security, which is closely linked to state security. The latter is reflected primarily in demographic security. Demographically, Palestinians in historic Palestine slightly outnumber Jews, while the Palestinian population growth rate exceeds that of the Jewish population. This raises the prospect of a binational state, which is viewed as a strategic threat to the state and society. Accordingly, Israeli security links the physical geography of the state with its demographic geography. This is pursued through efforts to displace as many Palestinians as possible from the West Bank (WB), Gaza Strip (GS) and Galilee to nearby or distant areas. Although this idea may remain implicit in various Israeli plans, it continues to shape Israeli behavior. From the Israeli security perspective, demographic security can be pursued through the use of military power, even at the expense of others.

c. Regime Security: This refers to the ability of a political party or president to retain power for the longest possible period. However, this must be achieved through ensuring state security and societal security. Thus, the key criterion for the survival of a ruling party is its ability to safeguard state security first and societal security second. For example, the Labor Party (Mapai, Alignment (HaMa‘arakh), etc.) remained in power for decades because it was the central force shaping Israeli policies. However, the 1973 defeat removed it from power and gradually reduced it to a marginal party due to its perceived failure to ensure state and societal security (from the perspective of Israeli society and elites).

Accordingly, the Israeli side may show some flexibility regarding sovereignty and independence when negotiations concern regime security. However, it is unlikely to make similar concessions when negotiations involve state security, while it may show relative flexibility regarding societal security.

2. The Arab Side: The pattern described above is largely reversed in the Arab context, where regime security (i.e., maintaining political power) often takes precedence over state security and societal security. Arab regimes tend to build their domestic, regional and international relationships according to the extent to which these actors contribute to the regime’s ability to remain in power. Consequently, Arab rulers may sacrifice state and societal security in favor of regime security. Across various political transformations in Arab states, this has been reflected in territorial fragmentation (Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Libya, etc.) and societal deterioration, including rising political instability, declining levels of income, education, health and social security, as well as increasing poverty, divorce rates, and domestic and external debt. This occurs because regime security is prioritized above all other forms of security and is often concentrated in the “person” of the ruler. Accordingly, when confronting external actors, whether Israel or others, the regime’s central calculation becomes: my domestic, regional and international alliances should be determined by those who guarantee the survival of my political regime, even if this comes at the expense of state and societal security.

3. The US Side: In this case, societal and economic security interests (including gains from markets, investments, reserve holdings, trade balances, and related interests) constitutes the primary priority. The US has no direct connection to the Middle East’s physical geography; rather, its engagement is primarily driven by geostrategic considerations and the management of geopolitical realities to serve its objectives. Since this security can only be ensured through Middle Eastern regimes that provide the US with the necessary conditions to secure its interests and support its competition with other actors, the US leverages the priority given to regime security to advance its own interests. In turn, Arab regimes use the protection of US interests as a means of securing US support for maintaining their political power.

4. The European Side: Although societal security is the primary focus in the European perspective, state security remains a critical component of societal security. The Middle East is Europe’s immediate neighborhood and maritime vicinity; therefore, migration flows from the region, the impact of regional instability on the European economy, and disruptions to trade flows linking Asia and Africa with Europe are major concerns. Accordingly, Europe’s approach to the Middle East combines the priorities of societal and state security, while placing less emphasis on regime security, the preservation of political power, than Arab regimes do, although it does not disregard it entirely.

5. The Russian Side: The Russian and Israeli perspectives share certain similarities. Russia recognizes that its national security is partly dependent on its strategic position within the Eurasian and Middle Eastern (or “West Asian,” as termed by Russians) spheres. Accordingly, Russia is willing to accommodate Israel or Arab regimes as long as this prevents the region from becoming a threat to its interests, particularly when considering the Middle East and Iran together. For example, Russia accepted the fall of the Syrian regime as long as its military bases remained intact. It also facilitated the migration of hundreds of thousands of Jews to Palestine, who later became the largest bloc within Israeli society, while ranking 36th in contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Moreover, Russia considers reliance on Iran more beneficial than reliance on Arab states. Thus, the Russian position is primarily shaped by a security-based assessment of developments in the Middle East, while also seeking additional gains whenever possible.

6. China: The Chinese perspective on the region reflects certain similarities with the US and some European approaches, as its policies and strategic projects are primarily based on societal security, albeit from a pragmatic perspective. As former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping stated, “It does not matter if a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.” China has recognized Israel for 34 years and views the region primarily through two lenses: energy resources and commercial markets. However, it sometimes supports actors such as Iran to secure its oil supplies, promotes Saudi-Iranian rapprochement to safeguard access to their resources, and seeks to balance Arab regional contradictions to ensure the continuity of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At the same time, China maintains technological cooperation with Israel and uses its relationship with Israel to engage Jewish lobbying networks in the US and leverage these ties in its relations with the US.

Sixth: Measurement Controls

To enhance the rigor of the measurement process, the following controls should be incorporated:

1. The core indicators should constitute the foundation of the measurement, as they determine the state’s fundamental capacity (Capability Score).

2. A weight multiplier should be applied to each sub-indicator across different periods. This study proposes the international context as the weighting factor, since the relative importance of certain sub-indicators varies with changes in the international system. At times, the international system is characterized by widespread wars and intense polarization; at others, by the predominance of cold wars or peace. In other periods, it may be shaped by global economic crises or natural and environmental disasters. Accordingly, such changes affect the weight assigned to each sub-indicator.

3. The state’s strategic position should also be taken into account. This may derive from its geostrategic location, membership in particular blocs, the emergence of newly valuable resources, or other factors whose relative importance changes over time. Accordingly, the geostrategic value of a state is itself influenced by developments in the international system.

There is also an important body of literature in international relations that helps guide the calibration of the weights assigned to both the core and sub-indicators. For example, the theory of Flexible Dependency emphasizes, on the one hand, the impossibility of disengaging from international linkages and, on the other, the difficulty of reconciling the requirements of sovereignty with those linkages.[22] Similarly, the Chinese Comprehensive National Power (CNP) model adjusts indicator weights over time in response to changing conditions.[23] Likewise, the Fragility Index contributes to this calibration by modifying the weights assigned to sub-indicators in accordance with changes in the international environment.[24]

Conclusion

Application-oriented futures studies consistently indicate that states that prioritize regime security ultimately fail. They are followed by states that prioritize state security, whereas those that place societal security first demonstrate the greatest capacity for adaptation and development. Accordingly, sovereignty and independence should be assessed by interpreting the measurement results in light of the following criteria:[25]

a. Identifying the highest priority within the three security dimensions: regime security, societal security and state security.

b. Clarifying the relationship between concessions in political decision-making and the attainment of the highest-priority security objective (regime, state or society).

c. Determining the statistical correlation between the highest levels of “dependency and lack of independence,” on the one hand, and prioritizing regime security over the other security dimensions, on the other.

Accordingly, sovereignty and independence, as well as their temporal trajectory, can be measured on the basis of the indicators proposed in this model while taking these three dimensions into account.

[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.

[2] Estimates of the number of actors involved in international relations vary considerably due to differences in how these actors are classified. Therefore, we have referred to approximate averages derived from multiple sources. For further details, see John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning (eds.), 21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook (USA: Sage Publications INC., 2011), chap. 3; “Actors in International Relations,” Scribd platform, https://www.scribd.com/presentation/388573387/Actors-in-International-Relations; Peter Willetts, “Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics,” from: J. B. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), The Globalisation of World Politics, second edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 356-383, https://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/3651/TransnationalActors.pdf; and Inass Abdulsada Ali, “Reshaping the World, Rethinking Actors: The Role of Sub-State Actors in Foreign Relations,” Journal of International Studies (JIS), vol. 21, no. 1, April 2025, https://e-journal.uum.edu.my/index.php/jis/en/article/view/23115

[3] Chinese scholar Tian Ye analyzes autonomy and sovereignty through three dimensions that are closely linked to the nature of the international system at the time of assessment: the distribution of power within the international system, the obligations imposed on member states, and the state’s capacity to mobilize resources. For further details, see the theoretical chapters of the study: Tian YE, A Nation’s Choice: International Institutions, Domestic Politics and National Autonomy (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2014), chapters 1-4.

[4] For a more detailed discussion of these dimensions, see Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp.127-148.

[5] Said Ali et al., “The Concept of State Sovereignty in International Law,” Asian Social Studies and Applied Research (ASSAR), vol. 2, no. 4, November 2021, pp. 393-400. Also, see the discussion linking diplomatic activity to sovereignty.

[6] Leonid E. Grinin, State Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization: Will it Survive?, site of Social Studies, https://www.sociostudies.org/books/files/globalistics_and_globalization_studies/211-237.pdf

[7] Erman Akilli, Cognitive Diplomacy and digital Autonomy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2025), pp. 31-51.

[8] James N. Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation (London: Frances Pinter, 1981), pp. 58-79.

[9] For further discussion of these models, see Igal Avanim and Gabriel Mart, “The Sovereignty Gap: A Multidimensional Index of Effective State Autonomy,” site of American Political Science Association (APSA), 2026, https://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/api-gateway/apsa/assets/orp/resource/item/69fcb7c44770e67d92a8ada4/original/the-sovereignty-gap-a-multidimensional-index-of-effective-state-autonomy.pdf; Rachel Avraham, Measuring Sovereignty in an Age of Strategic Illusions, site of Foreign Policy Association (FPB), 21/3/2026, https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2026/03/21/measuring-sovereignty-in-an-age-of-strategic-illusions; The Legatum Prosperity Index™ 2023, site of Prosperity Institute, https://index.prosperity.com/rankings; and Staffan I. Lindberg (ed.), Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling The Democratic Era? (University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, 2026), https://www.v-dem.net/documents/75/V-Dem_Institute_Democracy_Report_2026_lowres.pdf

[10]Ashley J. Tellis (et al.), Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (USA: Rand Corporation, 2000), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1110/RAND_MR1110.pdf

[11] For a detailed discussion of the principles and criteria for developing quantitative models in international relations, see Kelly M. Kadera and Willow Kreutzer, “Quantitative Analyses and Formal Modeling in International Relations,” Cameron G. Thies (ed.), Handbook of International Relations (USA: Edward Elgar Publisher, 2025), chap. 8, pp. 107-126.

[12] See an applied model: European sovereignty Index, site of European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), https://ecfr.eu/special/sovereignty-index, It is also useful to review the following index: Igal Avanim and Gabriel Mart, “The Sovereignty Gap: A Multidimensional Index of Effective State Autonomy,” APSA, 2026.

[13] A questionnaire outlining the sovereignty indicators and the proposed weight assigned to each indicator was sent to 30 university professors and researchers affiliated with study centers that have contributed to aspects of this topic. The Delphi technique was then applied through successive rounds to determine the final weight of each indicator.

[14] Riadh Ben Jelili, Global Economic Sovereignty Composite Index (ECO-SOV) 2024 Edition Third Research Report -Final Version, 2025, https://hal.science/hal-04906682v1/document

[15] Regarding this aspect, see R Joseph Huddleston, “Continuous recognition: A Latent Variable approach to measuring International Sovereignty of Self-determination movements,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 57, no. 6, November 2020, pp. 789-800.

[16] Among the references used to measure judicial independence and the impact of international relations on it, see Drew A. Linzer and Jeffrey K. Staton, “A Global Measure of Judicial Independence:1948-2012,” Journal of Law and Courts, vol. 3, no. 2, 2015, pp. 223-256.

[17] For mechanisms of linkage in this field, see further details in Giulia Prelz Oltramonti, Practicing and Performing Sovereignty Abroad: Alternative Diplomacy, European School of Political and Social Sciences (ESPOL), 2023, pp. 3-8.

[18]Martin Kaloudis, “From Quality to Quantity: How Can Digital Sovereignty be Parsed into Measurable Components?” European Journal of Business Science and Technology, vol. 8, issue. 2, December 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366731568_From_Quality_to_Quantity_How_Can_Digital_Sovereignty_be_Parsed_into_Measurable_Components

[19] Time-series analysis is applied by dividing the past measurement period into two phases, calculating the arithmetic mean for each phase, and then plotting these averages on a graph. The two points are connected to identify the trajectory of the next phase and determine its corresponding sovereignty level. For the use of time-series analysis in future studies, see Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Manahij al-Dirasat al-Mustaqbaliyyah wa Tatbiqatiha fi al-‘Alam al-‘Arabi (Methods of Futures Studies and their Applications in the Arab World) (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Studies and Research, 2007), pp. 70–74.

[20] Morris Altman et al., Waking the Asian Pacific Co-Operative Potential (Elsevier Inc, 2020), Chapter 3, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/economics-econometrics-and-finance/autonomy-and-independence; and Challenges of Diplomacy and Its Potential Solutions in 2023, Best Diplomats Insider, 26/10/2023, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/challenges-diplomacy-its-potential-solutions-2023-bestdiplomats-ik6df

[21] Traditional Security Vs Human Security: Contrasting Approaches to Global Safety, site of PolSci.Institute, 15/11/2025, https://polsci.institute/human-security/traditional-security-vs-human-security; The Concept of Sovereignty: Definition and Evolution, site of PolSci.Institute, 15/8/2025, https://polsci.institute/global-politics/concept-of-sovereignty-definition-evolution; State vs Nation vs Country, site of UOLLB, 14/7/2024, https://uollb.com/blogs/uol/state-vs-nation-vs-country; Dieter Grimm, Translated by Belinda Cooper, Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political Concept (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), https://dokumen.pub/sovereignty-the-origin-and-future-of-a-political-concept-0231164254-9780231164252.html; and Carl T. Dahlman, Sovereignty, site of Sage Reference and Academic Books, https://sk.sagepub.com/dict/mono/key-concepts-in-political-geography/chpt/sovereignty

[22] Balancing or Integrating? How Power–Dependence Relations Shape International Politics, site of Cambridge University Press, 19/1/2026, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/balancing-or-integrating-how-powerdependence-relations-shape-international-politics/7D11C579706ED318A8268B85ED27967C

[23]Joshua Eisenman and Sisi Meng, “Measuring the rise and fall of countries: the Comprehensive National Power Index,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 19, issue 3, Autumn 2026, pp. 237–258, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/19/3/237/8711324

[24] The Fund for Peace (FFP), Fragile States Index: Methodology and Cast frame Work, FFP, 2017, https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology

[25] For further theoretical analysis and practical applications of these issues, see Michael Andrew Barnett, “Quantifying Sovereignty: A New Way to Examine an Essential Concept” (Master’s thesis, Harvard Extension School, 2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/7312037e-6a96-6bd4-e053-0100007fdf3b/content; Houcem Smaoui et al., “The Politics of Sovereign Credit Spreads,” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade Journal, vol. 53, no. 8, August 2016, pp. 6-13; and Kenwilliams Nyakomittah and Leah Jelimo, “Assessing the Correlation Between Sovereign State and Global Governance,” International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), 20/6/2023, https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/assessing-the-correlation-between-sovereign-state-and-global-governance