Political Analysis: The Crisis of the Palestinian Political System and Elections as “Panadol”

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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

For any political system to achieve a reasonable degree of stability and credibility, it must meet a number of essential conditions and criteria, the most important of which are:

First: Popular Legitimacy: The leadership of a political system should derive its mandate from the will of the majority and command public trust through a free, fair and credible electoral process. Unfortunately, this is not the case with the current Palestinian leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whose mandate expired many years ago. Poll after poll has shown that it lacks popular legitimacy and public trust, with more than 80% of Palestinians calling for the resignation of Mahmud ‘Abbas, the president of the political system.

Second: Inclusiveness (Accommodating All): A political system should represent all segments of society, without excluding political forces with significant social and popular support. Its leadership should also be capable of managing differences and diversity while drawing on the talents and expertise of people regardless of their backgrounds. In the Palestinian case, however, Fatah has dominated the political system and monopolized power for nearly 58 years, since February 1969, while broadly supported and influential forces, including Hamas, the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine (PIJ) and the resistance forces more broadly, have been excluded through deliberate and artificial barriers. Moreover, Palestinians abroad have been almost entirely excluded from decision-making and the management of national institutions.

Third: Constitutional and Legal Framework: A political system requires a clear constitutional and legal framework defining the powers and limits of the executive, legislative and judicial branches. In the Palestinian case, however, power has effectively been concentrated in the hands of President ‘Abbas, who simultaneously serves as President of the PLO, President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), leader of Fatah and President of the State of Palestine. Over nearly two decades, he has issued hundreds of laws and decrees by presidential order, effectively sidelining the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), dominating the executive branch, and asserting control over the judiciary.

One of the most serious abuses has been the use of these self-assumed powers to exclude and marginalize competing Palestinian forces, particularly Hamas, while imposing an ostensibly legal condition for participation in the PLO that has no constitutional or legal basis: acceptance of the Oslo Accords and the obligations they imposed on the PLO. In fact, PLO membership is constitutionally open to all Palestinians, and its governing framework is the Palestinian National Charter, not the Oslo Accords, which should themselves be governed by the Charter’s principles and constraints. A legitimately elected leadership has the right to revise or amend such agreements in accordance with the higher interests of the Palestinian people, particularly given that the Oslo framework has been overtaken by events and its value effectively nullified by Israel’s subsequent actions.

Fourth: An Agreed Social Contract, or at Minimum, Agreed-Upon Higher National Interests (National Security)

The Oslo Accords produced a deep rift over even the most fundamental questions, most notably:

– The marginalization of the Palestinian National Charter itself and disagreement over the very definition and geographic map of Palestine (historical Palestine or the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS)?!);

– The emergence of a Palestinian political environment marked by a fundamental conflict and confrontation between the peace process and resistance approaches;

– Disagreement over national priorities and the courses of action required to advance the Palestine issue;

– The absence of an agreed-upon national political program; and

– Disputes over Palestinian “fundamentals” and what should constitute red lines?! Indeed, positions once regarded as “treason” in the 1960s and 1970s came to be viewed merely as “points of view,” as some veteran activists had anticipated.

Consequently, the common ground and areas of convergence that should unite members of the same people have been significantly eroded.

Fifth: An Effective Institutional Structure: A political system requires effective legislative, executive and judicial institutions, while its ministries, departments and agencies must have the capacity to implement policies, plans and programs with a high degree of efficiency. In the case of the PLO, however, the situation is dire. The current leadership bears responsibility for paralyzing most of the organization’s departments and stripping them of their functions, leaving its institutions in a state of “clinical death.” At the same time, it has placed the PLO itself in the “intensive care unit,” using it as a “rubber stamp” to legitimize its decisions and actions, effectively reducing the organization to another department of the PA in Ramallah.

Sixth: Independence: National decision-making should be independent and free from external pressures and considerations.

In the Palestinian case, however, this deficiency is particularly evident. Hamas and resistance forces are excluded in accordance with Israeli, US and “Quartet” criteria. Moreover, Palestinian decision-making in Ramallah takes place under the “boots of the occupation,” while concerns about resistance and “political Islam” are treated as obstacles to political partnership in line with Arab normalization frameworks and Western perspectives. This dependence reached the point of incorporating Oslo-related conditions and the disarmament of resistance forces into the September 2025 New York Declaration on the two-state solution. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to speak of independent national decision-making that reflects the free will of the Palestinian people; rather, it reflects the constraints and standards imposed by Israel and external powers.

Seventh: Accountability and Transparency: Political leadership should be subject to meaningful oversight and accountability, with access to relevant information and sound decision-making mechanisms.

Yet these principles are largely absent in the Palestinian case, particularly at the level of the PA and PLO leadership. The PLC in WB and GS has been effectively sidelined, while the Palestine National Council (PNC) and the Palestinian Central Council (PCC) have been “engineered” to align with the preferences of the dominant leadership. Moreover, their infrequent meetings and ineffective procedures have largely prevented meaningful oversight.

What Kind of Elections Are We Talking About?
Elections can provide a genuine entry point for meaningful reform and the serious reconstruction of the Palestinian political system, provided they are free, transparent and fair; equitably inclusive of all Palestinian constituencies; and held across all places where the Palestinian people reside.

However, the elections currently being presented to the Palestinian people are nothing more than a superficial remedy for a deep-rooted crisis. They appear designed in advance to reproduce the existing leadership and confer “false legitimacy” upon it, thereby perpetuating the crisis, deepening the Palestinian schism and accommodating the conditions imposed by adversaries and enemies.

We can only wonder how the current leadership feels as it sits atop the “ruins” of the PLO, having stripped it of its strength, effectiveness and broad representative character. How can it indulge in the “luxury of time” when every second is needed for a serious and genuine effort to put the Palestinian political house in order and mobilize the immense sources of strength within the Palestinian people, the broader Arab and Muslim nation (Ummah), and Palestine’s supporters around the world?

How, then, can we take meaningful steps forward under an authoritarian leadership facing crises of legitimacy and competence, one that sees only itself, lacks vision and an effective representative institutional structure, lacks independence, and is unable to accommodate others or manage diversity and disagreement?!

Finally, elections, as currently being engineered by the PLO leadership, are nothing more than a “Panadol” painkiller for a Palestinian political system beset by fundamental structural crises and a Palestinian situation confronting existential battles and challenges aimed at erasing the Palestine issue altogether.