By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Introduction
The Iranian Revolution marked a turning point in the history of international conflict over the Strait of Hormuz. About five years later, reports emerged of what became known as the “Tanker War,” which lasted from 1984 to 1988. During the Iran-Iraq War, both Iran and Iraq attacked commercial vessels, while naval mines were laid to target ships belonging to regional states. This prompted US intervention to protect oil tankers, particularly Kuwaiti vessels, and led to direct confrontations with the Iranian navy, most notably Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. These developments were followed by a series of ship seizures in 2015, 2019, and 2021, among other incidents. Thus, these events were linked, on the one hand, to the Iran-Iraq War and, on the other, to escalating tensions between Iran and the US. Accordingly, the confrontations in the strait in 2026 represent the culmination of a conflict that has persisted for nearly half a century.[2]
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Given the strait’s economic importance for energy exports (oil and gas)—second only to the Strait of Malacca in terms of the volume of traffic passing through it—as well as its political significance as a gateway to US-allied states at odds with Iran and its military importance due to its proximity to US military bases, particularly in the eastern Arab region, confrontations have recurred, peaking in 2026. Consequently, commercial traffic through the strait declined to levels approaching a complete shutdown.[3]
First: The Future of the Legal Classification of the Strait of Hormuz: Transit Passage versus Innocent Passage
It is natural for states engaged in international conflicts to invoke legal qualification to justify their actions and, in purely normative terms, to lend legal support to the political, economic and military considerations underlying their policies. Accordingly, any future decision to close, open or establish new arrangements governing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz will depend, on the one hand, on the balance of power among the parties and, on the other, on their ability to provide legal justification for their political, economic and military interests, particularly their respective rights to use the strait. This, in turn, requires determining whether the strait constitutes an international strait or an internal sea and whether navigation through it is governed by transit passage or innocent passage. It also requires reconciling the relevant rules of the law of the sea with the rules of international law governing armed conflicts.
In its mainstream interpretation, international law defines an international strait as “a maritime passage connecting international waters.” Accordingly, this view considers the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean with the Gulf, an “international strait.” Its passage is therefore governed by the right of “transit passage,” meaning that it is open to vessels of all states without restrictions imposed by any party.
However, certain geographical features of the strait complicate this interpretation and raise questions about the validity of this legal classification. This is evident in the following:[4]
1. Territorial waters extended three nautical miles from the eighteenth century and remained at that limit under the 1958 Geneva UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By 1982, however, international law had established a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea for each state bordering a strait.[5] Since the Strait of Hormuz is only 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point and is bordered by Iran and Oman, each with a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, the strait is effectively divided into three sections:
• A northern Iranian passage extending 12 nautical miles.
• A southern Omani passage extending 12 nautical miles.
• A passage of about 3 nautical miles where Iranian and Omani territorial waters overlap, since the strait’s total width of 21 nautical miles is less than the two states’ combined 24 nautical miles of territorial waters.
2. Given the heavy traffic through the strait, which averages 138 crossings per day,[6] the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a “Traffic Separation Scheme” in 1968. The scheme designates three lanes, one for inbound traffic and another for outbound traffic, separated by a buffer zone, to reduce the risk of collisions and congestion. Both Iran and Oman have agreed to this arrangement.
3. Water depth varies across the strait, rendering some areas unsuitable for very large tankers because of shallow waters. Iran is aware of these navigational constraints and seeks to leverage them in support of its demands. Moreover, not all sections of the Omani coast can accommodate tankers of different sizes, limiting the feasibility of rerouting very large vessels through the Omani passage. Tankers with drafts of 15–22 meters, for example, require deep-water channels, while several areas along the Omani passage contain rocks that further increase navigational risks.
4. Given the concentration of Iranian islands at and around the mouth of the strait, Iran has considerable control over the waterway. Eleven Iranian islands are located in and around the strait and its approaches: Larak, Hormuz, Hengam, Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb, Abu Musa, Qeshm, Kish, Lavan, Farur, and Kharg, the latter located at the far end of the Gulf opposite the Kuwaiti coast. Since each island has a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, these islands further extend Iran’s maritime reach and reinforce its legal position regarding the extent of its territorial waters.
5. It is important to distinguish between the strait’s natural width and the width of its navigable channels, particularly those suitable for very large tankers. For example, the Bosphorus, whose navigable channel for commercial vessels is less than 1 km wide, and the Dardanelles, at about 1–2 km, are among the narrowest waterways for large commercial vessels. By contrast, the Bab al-Mandab is about 16–20 km wide, while the navigable passage for very large vessels in the Strait of Hormuz narrows to 3.7 km, divided into two channels separated by a buffer zone.
Second: The Issue of Transit Passage and Innocent Passage
The 1982 UNCLOS, discussed above, provides the principal legal framework for defining and establishing the conditions governing both innocent passage and transit passage. Articles 17–32 address innocent passage, while Articles 37–44 govern transit passage; Articles 34–53 further elaborate on various aspects of the two regimes.[7] Based on UNCLOS and the views of international law scholars, the following points are particularly relevant when considering the Strait of Hormuz:
Definition of the Two Concepts: Innocent passage is the right of all vessels, whether civilian or military, to pass through the territorial sea of a coastal state, provided that the passage is continuous and expeditious and does not prejudice “the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State.” Under Article 19, it must not involve, among other activities, the use or threat of force, espionage, fishing, any act of willful and serious pollution, or military exercises.
By contrast, transit passage is the right of ships and aircraft to navigate or fly continuously and expeditiously through an international strait connecting one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone to another, as provided in Articles 37–44.
These definitions lead to several key conclusions:
• A coastal state bordering an international strait may not suspend transit passage.
• Transit passage applies to both ships and aircraft.
• Both regimes require respect for the prohibition on the threat or use of force and applicable maritime safety rules.
• Transit passage applies to international straits, whereas innocent passage generally applies to the territorial sea.
This suggests that innocent passage is more closely tied to security considerations, thereby strengthening Iran’s position regarding the Strait of Hormuz. In the current context, the excessive use of force by the US and Israel; the deployment of US military assets in the region; discussions with European states to expand the military presence in the strait; and persistent US threats to use force, conduct espionage, undermine Iran’s political system, and arm the Iranian opposition could strengthen Iran’s claim to exercise control over the strait. This position is further supported by the fact that most of the strait falls within Iranian territorial waters, whether measured by the 12-nautical-mile limit or by including the territorial waters surrounding Iran’s islands, whose combined area exceeds 1,600 km².[8]
The grounds for Iran’s position in favor of applying the innocent passage regime can be summarized as follows:[9]
1. Since Iran, like the US, is not a party to UNCLOS, it considers the transit passage regime established by the Convention to be treaty-based and, therefore, not binding on non-parties. Accordingly, Iran maintains that innocent passage should apply because it affords the coastal state broader authority to regulate passage through the strait.
2. Iran has consistently rejected the position, advanced in much of Western international legal scholarship, that the right of transit passage constitutes a “rule of customary international law.” Accordingly, Iran maintains that it would not be bound by such a rule even if it were to acquire customary status, invoking the “persistent objector” doctrine. Under this doctrine, “a state that has persistently objected to a rule is not bound by it, so long as the objection was made manifest during the process of the rule’s emergence.” However, the doctrine does not apply to peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens).[10]
3. The Strait of Hormuz lies entirely within the territorial seas of Iran and Oman. Since it is approximately 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, the entire strait falls within the two states’ 12-nautical-mile territorial seas. Accordingly, Iran maintains that it exercises territorial sovereignty over the portion of the strait within its waters.
4. International law recognizes a coastal state’s right to take measures to protect its security. Thus, Iran argues that it may restrict vessel passage or require warships to provide prior notification or obtain authorization when it considers them a security threat.
5. It is essential to interpret the law of the sea in conjunction with the law of armed conflict; neither can be applied in isolation when the facts engage both bodies of law. Accordingly, the ongoing war between Iran and the US and Israel requires these laws to be considered together, thereby supporting Iran’s right to impose restrictions on certain vessels associated with states hostile to it.
6. Historical Precedents: A review of the evolution of international law indicates that the right of innocent passage, which Iran seeks to invoke in the Strait of Hormuz, has long been recognized and applied. For example, in 1967, Arab states supported Egypt when it invoked the right of innocent passage in the Straits of Tiran. Similarly, in 1949, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed the right of innocent passage through the Corfu Channel, a strait between Albania and Greece connecting Greek territorial waters with the high seas.[11]
The Corfu Channel shares several important characteristics with the Strait of Hormuz: both are international straits used for international navigation, and both lie within the territorial waters of adjacent coastal states. Accordingly, the Strait of Hormuz would appear to fall under Article 37 of UNCLOS. Nevertheless, the strait has continued to operate under a regime of innocent passage. This has prompted doctrinal debate over Article 35, which excludes certain categories of straits from the transit-passage regime, and Article 45, which preserves innocent passage through certain types of straits, in some cases on the basis of customary international law. Some international law scholars therefore argue that the 1982 UNCLOS did not abolish innocent passage but preserved it for the categories of straits covered by Article 45. More broadly, the applicable legal regime depends on the nature and circumstances of each strait.[12]
This interpretation is further supported by the regime historically applicable to the Strait of Hormuz. Under customary international law and the 1958 Geneva Conventions, coastal states exercised sovereignty over their territorial seas, while foreign vessels retained a right of innocent passage, provided that such passage did not threaten the security of the coastal state. Comparable practice can be seen in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, where Indonesia and Malaysia asserted sovereignty over the straits while subjecting navigation to rules resembling those governing innocent passage.
Other historical precedents reinforce this position. Spain, for instance, adopted positions concerning the Strait of Gibraltar that sought to expand its role in regulating navigation. Egypt likewise closed the Straits of Tiran in 1967 and restricted passage, particularly by Israeli vessels.[13] Similarly, Türkiye and the Soviet Union applied the 1936 Montreux Convention to the passage of Soviet vessels, especially warships. The Soviet Union notified Türkiye in advance and accepted restrictions concerning the type of cargo carried by such vessels. Significantly, however, the Soviet Union failed at the 1945 Potsdam Conference to persuade Türkiye to establish a joint administration of the straits. Western states supported Türkiye’s position that it should retain exclusive sovereignty over them. This stance contributed to Türkiye’s accession to The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. By contrast, Western states today reject Iran’s position that administration of the Strait of Hormuz should be limited to Iran and Oman, following the model previously proposed for Türkiye.[14]
As noted earlier, international maritime law cannot be considered separately from the law of armed conflict. In this context, two points warrant emphasis:
1. The US and Iran are engaged in an armed conflict. Accordingly, the legal treatment of the Strait of Hormuz in peacetime differs from that applicable during wartime. Iran has been subjected to direct US military attacks and a US naval blockade, both of which place the relationship within the framework of armed conflict and belligerent action under international law.
2. Neither the US military action nor its naval blockade of Iran has been authorized by the UN, particularly by the UN Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, the US conduct falls within the framework of acts of aggression.
Based on the foregoing, US conduct lacking UNSC authorization, particularly its military attacks against Iran, raises serious legal questions regarding the legitimacy of any US naval blockade. Likewise, the right of US vessels to transit the Strait of Hormuz during an armed conflict with a coastal state is not settled by any single provision; rather, it depends on the interaction between the law of the sea and the law of armed conflict, making it a highly contested issue in international maritime law.
Accordingly, the Strait’s future will depend in part on the legal regime ultimately applicable to it.[15] If Iran succeeds in restoring the customary regime that prevailed before 1982, its legal position would be strengthened. Conversely, if transit passage is applied to the Strait and accepted by Iran, this could have implications contrary to Iran’s longer-term strategic objectives.
Third: Prospects for a Geostrategic Shift in Energy Transportation Routes Amid the Current Crisis
The disruption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, its impact on global oil and gas markets, and the resulting effects on the broader global economy have renewed interest in alternative energy transportation routes. The main alternatives include:[16]
1. The pipeline that transports oil from Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea. It is widely regarded as the most viable alternative.
2. A pipeline linking Abu Dhabi to Fujairah, allowing Emirati oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reach the Gulf of Oman directly.
3. Expanding the use of Red Sea ports, particularly Yanbu, to facilitate alternative export routes.
4. Offsetting potential shortfalls in Gulf oil supplies through two measures:
a. Encouraging non-Gulf producers, including the US, Norway, Brazil, Canada and Guyana, to increase production to compensate for any shortfall in the flow of Gulf oil and gas to international markets, alongside non-Gulf members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), such as Algeria, Libya and Nigeria.
b. Drawing on strategic energy reserves held by the US, Japan and other countries to offset potential shortfalls in Gulf energy supplies.
However, these proposals face several significant challenges:
1. The proposed Saudi pipeline lacks sufficient capacity to handle Saudi Arabia’s substantial oil output. Moreover, it does not serve the other Gulf states, leaving the core problem largely unresolved.
2. The Abu Dhabi pipeline primarily benefits the UAE, while its capacity is limited relative to the combined oil output of the GCC states and Iraq.
3. Security conditions in the Red Sea make greater reliance on Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port more hazardous, particularly given Yemeni attacks on Saudi vessels bound for the port and elsewhere along the Red Sea.
4. Asking non-Gulf states to offset the shortfall would require considerable time to expand production, develop the necessary infrastructure, and transport supplies to consumers. Moreover, such requests may conflict with the political priorities of some states; for example, increased Russian production could undermine European policies toward Russia.
5. Reliance on strategic reserves could ultimately worsen the situation if the closure of the Strait of Hormuz persists and reserves near depletion, particularly if this coincides with additional economic or environmental crises.
6. Qatar’s gas export problem is clearly the more complex challenge, since most of its gas production is exported through the Strait of Hormuz and no alternative pipeline offers comparable capacity. Moreover, some studies[17] indicate that reopening the Strait would not immediately restore pre-war export levels. Although the removal of military risks would be essential, technical, commercial, insurance, and political constraints would likely delay a return to previous levels. In particular, maritime insurance premiums would likely remain elevated amid persistent security concerns. In addition, some gas fields, pipelines, and export terminals would require repairs and technical inspections, while restarting facilities and supply chains would take additional time. Overall, replacing oil supplies from outside the Strait of Hormuz would be considerably easier than compensating for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) shortfall, which is far more difficult to address through alternative sources.
7. Alternative routes remain vulnerable to the broader political instability of the region. To illustrate this point, it is useful to examine stability levels across the countries surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. Major peace and political stability indices indicate continued deterioration across much of the world, particularly in the Middle East and West Asia. Accordingly, the security of maritime, land and even air transport cannot be separated from the broader regional environment. Most potential land and maritime alternatives pass through areas of significant instability, making them less viable substitutes for the Strait of Hormuz. The Red Sea littoral states, as well as countries through which pipelines could potentially run, including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine (Israel) and Pakistan, have remained among the world’s most unstable areas over the past decade. The following table illustrates the regional environment surrounding potential alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz:[18]
Table 1: The 2025 Global Peace Index (GPI) by Region
| Rank | Geopolitical Region | GPI (1: highest level of stability; 5: lowest level of stability)) |
| 1 | Western and Central Europe | 1.588 |
| 2 | Asia-Pacific | 1.882 |
| 3 | Central and North America | 2.157 |
| 4 | South America | 2.180 |
| 5 | Eastern Europe and Central Asia | 2.213 |
| 6 | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2.299 |
| 7 | South Asia | 2.310 |
| 8 | Middle East and North Africa | 2.377 |
Table 1 shows that the proposed alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz pass through areas marked by high levels of instability. Consequently, the security of transit along these routes cannot be assured and remains exposed to substantial risks.
At the same time, some international relations scholars have examined the crisis in terms of Russia’s gains from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, many Western strategists have an interest in resolving the crisis quickly, which could, in turn, reduce incentives to develop alternative routes for Gulf oil outside the Strait. Russia’s main gains include:[19]
1. Rising oil and gas prices would increase Russia’s revenues as one of the world’s largest energy exporters, thereby helping it offset the effects of Western sanctions and finance its war in Ukraine.
2. The crisis could also divert international attention from the war in Ukraine, particularly in the media and political spheres.
3. An escalating confrontation with Iran would consume substantial quantities of munitions and military equipment that Ukraine and European states have been awaiting.
4. The Strait of Hormuz crisis strengthens Russia’s international bargaining position. Moreover, the proliferation of crises gives Moscow greater latitude to link international issues and leverage their interconnections.
5. The crisis has also disrupted commodity markets beyond oil and gas, including fertilizers and other raw materials. Consequently, Russia can benefit from increased demand for its products as alternatives to supplies that would otherwise transit the Strait of Hormuz.
6. Further weakening Iran would likely increase its dependence on Russia, thereby expanding Moscow’s strategic room for maneuver.
Fourth: The Future Role of Gulf Oil in Global Energy Markets
As is well known, the Gulf, through the Strait of Hormuz, supplies about one-fifth of global oil trade. However, this share may decline for additional reasons, including the following:
1. The growing role of alternatives to oil in meeting global energy demand: Available data indicate that oil accounted for as much as 46% of the global energy market in the early 1970s. Its share has since declined because of the wider use of natural gas, the growth of renewable energy, the gradual return of nuclear power and greater energy efficiency. It now stands at less than 30%, reflecting a broadly linear decline[20] of about 1% every three years. Given the accelerating pace of technological advances in oil alternatives, however, this rate could reach 1.5% every three years and accelerate further if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz recur. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that transportation accounts for more than half of global oil consumption. However, the shift toward electric cars and trucks is expected to reduce global oil demand by 9–10 million barrels per day by 2035. Moreover, the expanding use of solar and wind power, together with continued research into alternatives such as green hydrogen, biofuels, and nuclear fusion, could further reduce global reliance on oil.[21]
2. The declining share of the Strait of Hormuz countries (GCC states, Iran and Iraq) in the global oil market: Although these states remain among the world’s leading oil producers, their share has declined because of rising US shale production, growing Russian output, and expanding production in Brazil, Canada, Norway and elsewhere. Their share of global oil production fell, albeit unevenly, from 37.1% in 1973 to 32% in 2022. More significantly, their share of global seaborne oil trade declined from 60% in 1980 to about 20%.[22]
3. Potential future competition between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India’s India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) could affect the strategic position of the Strait of Hormuz. Some studies suggest[23] that IMEC seeks to diversify trade and energy routes and reduce reliance on maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal. Similarly, the BRI aims to diversify trade and transportation routes by expanding land-based corridors. However, these initiatives are likely to have only a limited impact on the Strait of Hormuz unless trade routes become increasingly militarized for security purposes, an assessment supported by various studies, including those pointing to China’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017. Accordingly, greater militarization could increase risks for regional states while further affecting the strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz.[24]
4. Pressure on Iran: Most estimates point to a sharp decline in Iran’s exports, particularly oil exports. Iran has shifted some exports through Jask Port on the Gulf of Oman; however, Jask is a complementary facility rather than a substitute for the main Kharg Port. Consequently, this pressure could encourage Iran to make limited, non-strategic concessions, thereby facilitating a gradual return to normal traffic through the Strait. Nevertheless, such a return is unlikely to be immediate.
Fifth: The Israeli Perspective on the Future of the Strait
Israeli political literature generally views the Strait of Hormuz as an “asset” for Iran within the broader strategic balance. Israeli studies have emphasized this assessment for roughly 15 years. Accordingly, Israel may have an interest in developments that reduce the Strait’s strategic importance, as this could:[25]
1. Deny Iran the leverage afforded by the threat of closing the Strait to influence other states in ways that serve its interests.
2. Reduce Iran’s influence over global oil and other markets, thereby weakening other states’ incentives to accommodate Iran.
3. Increase the prospects of Israel being considered an alternative transit route, particularly for international projects connecting the Gulf to global markets, such as China’s BRI and the IMEC.
4. Mitigate the impact of oil shocks and, consequently, strengthen Israel’s prospects for economic growth.
By contrast, Israel views the growing strategic importance of the Strait and Iran’s expanding control over it as negative developments for several reasons:
1. They would strengthen Iran’s deterrence by enhancing its ability to threaten closure of the Strait.
2. The threat of closure could pressure states worldwide to urge Israel to avoid confrontation with Iran.
3. Iran could strengthen its negotiating position by leveraging its control over the Strait.
At the same time, greater Iranian control could encourage Arab states to pursue further normalization with Israel. It could also draw Iran into additional military confrontations with international actors affected by disruptions in the Strait, which Israel could regard as strategically advantageous.
Sixth: The Black Swan
As we have noted repeatedly, a “black swan” scenario refers to what some scholars describe as a low-probability, high-impact variable. In the case of the Strait of Hormuz, it may involve unlikely yet highly consequential developments, some of which could enhance the Strait’s strategic importance, while others could diminish it:[26]
1. Factors that could increase the Strait’s importance: These include attacks or environmental disasters that disrupt overland supply routes to Saudi or Emirati ports; the discovery of major oil reserves in Gulf waters that increase the volume of energy supplies passing through the Strait; setbacks in the development of energy alternatives; or declining production in competing oil-producing regions such as Russia, West Africa and Latin America. Conversely, a settlement of Gulf–Iranian tensions could further enhance the Strait’s strategic importance by turning it into a channel for regional cooperation.
2. Factors that could reduce the Strait’s importance: These include technological breakthroughs that make oil less viable, such as ultra-high-density batteries, commercially viable nuclear fusion, or low-cost synthetic fuels; the development of large-scale, rapid transportation routes that bypass the Strait; a global economic downturn that reduces oil demand; or the emergence of major oil-producing centers outside the Gulf. Moreover, a prolonged regional war, similar to the Iran–Iraq War, between Iran and Israel or a Gulf state could further reduce international reliance on the Strait.
Conclusion
The conflicting evidence suggests that the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to lose its strategic importance in the near term. Although the share of oil and gas transported through the Strait has declined relative to earlier periods, alternative trade routes, particularly overland routes, largely pass through unstable regional environments, as noted above. Moreover, intensifying international competition could further disrupt the Strait’s role as a maritime trade corridor.
The economic impact on Gulf states also varies considerably, resulting in different levels of pressure that could, in turn, shape their positions. Qatar, Kuwait and Oman appear to be the most affected, followed by Iraq, whereas the UAE and Saudi Arabia are comparatively less affected.[27]
On the other hand, resolving the political and legal disputes over the coastal states’ rights in the Strait would strengthen its role. However, this will depend on broader regional dynamics, including the Arab–Israeli conflict, international competition, and the unstable relations between the Gulf states and Iran.
From a geostrategic perspective, the outcome of the dispute over the applicability of the right of innocent passage to the Strait of Hormuz will shape a key dimension of Iran’s future regional strategic position.
The struggle over the Strait of Hormuz is no less consequential than the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. Accordingly, Iran is likely to leverage the outcome by reinforcing factors that preserve the Strait’s strategic importance while limiting those that could diminish it. Monitoring these efforts could therefore offer insight into Iran’s future policies in this area. Israel, by contrast, is likely to strengthen factors that constrain the Strait’s strategic importance, while Iran will pursue the opposite course. Thus, a new front between the two sides is likely to persist through different forms and strategies.
Clearly, Israel stands to gain more from a decline in the Strait’s importance than from an increase in its strategic value and will therefore support efforts to limit Iran’s ability to leverage the Strait.
Finally, the potential effects of a “black swan” event, should one occur, must not be overlooked, particularly given its possible impact on the Strait’s strategic importance and Iran’s ability to leverage it as part of its broader regional strategy.
[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] For further details, see David Roos, The Strait of Hormuz: A Timeline of Tensions, site of History, 13/3/2026, https://www.history.com/articles/7-historical-fights-over-strait-of-hormuz
[3] Mariel Ferragamo, The Strait of Hormuz: A U.S.-Iran Maritime Flash Point, site of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 15/7/2026, https://www.cfr.org/articles/strait-hormuz-us-iran-maritime-flash-point
[4] For further details on these points, see Jean-Paul Rodrigue and Theo Notteboom, 5.4 – Maritime Transportation, site of The Geography of Transport Systems, https://transportgeography.org/contents/chapter5/maritime-transportation/; Ships’ routeing, site of International Maritime Organization (IMO), https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/safety/pages/shipsrouteing.aspx; and World Oil Transit Chokepoints, site of U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 3/3/2026, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints
[5] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, site of United Nations (UN), https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
[6] Thomas Copeland, Shruti Menon and Barbara Metzler, Dozens of ships head through Strait of Hormuz after US-Iran deal, site of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 23/6/2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx23rnzdgl8o
[7] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
[8] Iranian Islands Inside and Outside the Strait of Hormuz, site of Arabic Post, 18/3/2026, https://arabicpost.live/?p=1261992
[9] For details, see the legal analysis in Soheil Golchin, How Iran Legally Frames Control Over the Strait of Hormuz: Law of the Sea Considerations and Applicable Naval Warfare Rules, site of Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 14/4/2026, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6519418; and Abd Alkreem Ismail, Can Iran Restrict Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz? “Between Treaty Law and Customary Uncertainty,” SSRN, 25/4/2026, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6645778
For the views of Iranian international law scholars, see Asghar Jafari-Valdani, “The Geopolitics of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iran-Oman Relations,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, no. 4, Winter 2012, pp. 8–12; and Muhammad Asim Rafiq, Kanwal Riaz and M. Abu Bakar Chandia, The Strait of Hormuz and the Law of the Sea: The Strait of Hormuz Between Sovereignty, Diplomacy, and International Maritime Law, site of The International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), 12/8/2025, https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/the-strait-of-hormuz-and-the-law-of-the-sea-the-strait-of-hormuz-between-sovereignty-diplomacy-and-international-maritime-law/
[10] Moisés Montiel Mogollón, “The Consent-Based Problems Surrounding the Persistent Objector Doctrine,” Michigan Journal of International Law, vol.43, no.2, 2022, pp. 308–309.
[11] Judgment of 9 April 1949, 1 – Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), site of International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9/4/1949, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103099
[12] Among the important legal studies on this subject are the following: Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, 4th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. 111–134; and Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, 3rd edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2023), pp. 75, 272–276 and 297–302.
[13] Carl F. Salans, Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of Tiran, site of U.S. Naval Institute, December 1968, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1968/december/gulf-aqaba-and-strait-tiran
[14] Regarding this issue, see the details in a Turkish university thesis: Idlir Lika, “The Quest For Security: Soviet Union’s Demands From Turkey, 1945–1946” (Master’s thesis, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2015), pp. 34–44, https://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/server/api/core/bitstreams/c67a45a1-a67b-4b20-8dc6-cddc4ec731af/content
[15] Marc Weller, The Strait of Hormuz, shipping, and law, site of Chatham House, 13/4/2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/04/strait-hormuz-shipping-and-law; Muneeb Hussain, Navigating Conflict: Legal Dimensions of Iran’s Control over the Strait of Hormuz, site of Junge Wissenschaft im Öffentlichen Recht, 2/4/2026, https://www.juwiss.de/31-2026/; and Mark Chadwick, What legal right does Iran have to ‘close’ the Strait of Hormuz?, site of Nottingham Trent University, 19/3/2026, https://www.ntu.ac.uk/about-us/news/news-articles/2026/03/expert-blog-what-legal-right-does-iran-have-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz
[16] How long can Iran weaponise Hormuz?, site of The Economist, 3/8/2026, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/08/03/how-long-can-iran-weaponise-hormuz
[17] Clara Gillispie, Not So Strait-Forward: Hormuz, Iran, and the Future of Gulf Oil and Gas Flows, CFR, 9/7/2026, https://www.cfr.org/articles/not-so-strait-forward-hormuz-and-the-future-of-gulf-oil-and-gas-flows
[18] Global Peace Index 2025: Identifying and Measuring the Factors that Drive Peace, site of Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), June 2025, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GPI-2025-web.pdf
[19] For further details on these aspects, see Nikita Smagin, What Does War in the Middle East Mean for Russia–Iran Ties?, site of The Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, 6/3/2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/03/iran-russia-after-khamenei; Alexander Palmer and Sofiia Syzonenko, The Limits of Russia’s Friendship: How Moscow Sees the Iran Crisis, site of Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 8/6/2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/limits-russias-friendship-how-moscow-sees-iran-crisis; and Jana Kobzová, From good to not good: The impact of the war in Iran on Russia, site of European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 14/4/2026, https://ecfr.eu/article/from-good-to-not-good-the-impact-of-the-war-in-iran-on-russia
[20] Global Energy Review 2025: Oil, site of International Energy Agency (IEA), 24/3/2025, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2025/oil
[21] Energy Technology Perspectives 2026: Deployment of clean energy technologies, materials and fuels, IEA, 26/3/2026, https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2026/deployment-of-clean-energy-technologies-materials-and-fuels
[22] For an assessment of the Strait of Hormuz’s role in global trade generally, and in global oil trade in particular, see Linda Qaimmaqami (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974, site of Office of the Historian: U.S. Department of State, 2011, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36; Strait of Hormuz disruptions: Implications for global trade and development, site of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 10/3/2026, https://unctad.org/publication/strait-hormuz-disruptions-implications-global-trade-and-development; and World Oil Transit Chokepoints, EIA, 3/3/2026.
[23] Maha S.Kamel, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implication for the Middle East,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol.31, no. 1, June 2018, pp.76–95; and Lojain Suliman, Yujun XU and Zhàoyuánqí, “The geopolitics of the belt and road initiative and IMEC in the Middle East,” Discover Global Society, vol. 4, no. 1, 2026, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44282-026-00420-8
[24] For this subject, see Cristina L.Garafola Stephen Watts and Kristin J. Leuschner, China’s Global Basing Ambitions, site of Rand Corporation, 8/12/2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1496-1.html
[25] See details in Amos Yadlin and Yoel Guzansky, The Strait of Hormuz: Assessing and Neutralizing the Threat, site of Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), January 2012, https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/the-strait-of-hormuz-assessing-and-neutralizing-the-threat/; Tammy Caner and Pnina Sharvit Baruch, The Strait of Hormuz as a Key Theater of War—The Legal Dimension, INSS, 29/3/2026, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hormuz-legal/; and 103FM, Iran unlikely to ever willingly surrender control over Strait of Hormuz, INSS expert claims, site of The Jerusalem Post newspaper, 9/8/2026, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-904950
[26] For further details, see Mathieu Blondeel et al., “Global energy scenarios: A geopolitical reality check,” Global Environmental Change, vol. 84, no. 102781, January 2024, https://d2e1qxpsswcpgz.cloudfront.net/uploads/2023/12/Global-energy-scenarios-A-geopolitical-reality-check.pdf; and Joel Krupa and Cameron Jones, “Black Swan Theory: Applications to energy market histories and technologies,” Energy Strategy Reviews, vol. 1, no. (4), May 2013, pp. 286–290, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257742410_Black_Swan_Theory_Applications_to_energy_market_histories_and_technologies
[27] Hormuz closure divides the fortunes of Middle Eastern oil states, site of TimesLIVE (Sunday Times newspaper), 6/4/2026, https://www.sundaytimes.timeslive.co.za/news/2026-04-06-analysis-hormuz-closure-divides-the-fortunes-of-middle-eastern-oil-states/
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