By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
The escalating situation in the West Bank (WB), marked by increasing settler attacks on Palestinian civilians, the confiscation of their land, the destruction of homes, and the burning of crops…, as well as destructive military operations and the repression of Palestinian residents, is not simply a series of individual actions. Rather, it reflects a systematic form of “functional complementarity” between the Israeli government and the settlers. Although this coordination does not take an openly formal or declared form, allowing the government to evade legal responsibility, it nevertheless serves as an effective mechanism for “empowering” the broader Zionist project. Accordingly, these are not merely isolated settlement initiatives undertaken by zealous or extremist settlers, nor military orders improvised by field commanders. Rather, they constitute a “state system” in which formal and informal actions operate through functional complementarity to achieve the de facto annexation of Palestinian land, pending the appropriate moment for its formal annexation.
The Government of “Decisiveness”:
From the outset of its formation by the end of 2022, the current Israeli government has turned the West Bank (WB) into a “workshop” in which all available Israeli resources are being mobilized to determine its future, impose an extremist religious-nationalist Zionist vision, and put an end to any Palestinian, Arab or international “dream” of a two-state solution.
Smotrich, who published his vision for resolving the conflict with the Palestinians in 2017 under the title “The Decisive Plan,” found a historic opportunity to put that vision into practice following the 2022 Knesset elections, when the Religious Zionism Party, which he leads, adopted the plan. His alliance with Netanyahu’s Likud further facilitated its implementation. Upon assuming the Finance Ministry, Smotrich also became a minister in the Defense Ministry, thereby acquiring direct authority over the administration of the West Bank (WB) and settlement affairs, which fall primarily under the military establishment. Meanwhile, his Religious Zionism partner, Ben-Gvir, assumed the National Security Ministry, which oversees the Israeli police, Border Police, and prison system, including in WB and East Jerusalem. The two were thus positioned to complement each other in accelerating the Judaization of the land and holy sites and advancing the Decisive Plan. Netanyahu and Likud, for their part, had no objection to giving Smotrich and Ben-Gvir free rein while providing political cover and legitimacy for their actions. After all, they share the same overarching objectives, albeit through different methods.
The Decisive Plan is built around several core principles: the notion of “the complete Land of Israel”; the achievement of a settlement-based “decisive” outcome that establishes a dominant Jewish reality between the river and the sea and puts an end to the “illusion of a Palestinian state”; the use of violence and excessive force as the primary means of dealing with Palestinians; the denial of the existence of the Palestinian people; and the rejection of any form of Palestinian political entity.
Israel’s Strategy in WB:
The Israeli government’s strategy for “resolving the conflict” in WB can be summarized in seven key components:
First: Active Settlement Expansion and Reshaping the WB’s Demographic Geography:
The dramatic acceleration of settlement expansion becomes clear when the figures are compared. Between the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the end of 2022, successive Israeli governments approved only 6 new settlements in the WB over three decades, while largely pursuing policies aimed at “thickening” and expanding existing settlements. By contrast, during its first three and a half years in office, from early 2023 through July 2026, the current government approved a total of 104 new settlements: 51 entirely new settlements, 35 previously unauthorized settlement outposts upgraded to independent settlements, and 17 neighborhoods of existing settlements upgraded to independent settlements. In addition, another new settlement was approved in July 2026. The expansion of settlement outposts has likewise accelerated sharply.
From the beginning of the current government through the end of April 2026, 212 new outposts were established, in addition to the 151 that already existed, bringing the total to 363. This amounts to an annual average of approximately 64 new outposts, compared with fewer than 7 per year during 1996–2022.
The most alarming dimension of settlement expansion, however, has been the proliferation of agricultural and pastoral outposts, which have served as a particularly coercive mechanism for taking control of vast areas of land with relatively small numbers of settlers under army protection. These outposts and pastoral settlements now control approximately 1.1 million dunams (1,100 km²), or about 18% of the WB, of which 750 thousand dunams have been brought under their control since the current government took office.
Moreover, Israel controls 85% of the WB’s water resources, while hundreds of Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks fragment the territory and impede movement between its various parts. The Separation Wall has likewise isolated about 12% of the WB and completely encircled East Jerusalem, making its connection with the rest of the WB increasingly resemble an international border.
A detailed examination of these developments is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these dramatic increases have been accompanied by similarly extensive expansion in the construction of tens of thousands of housing units and the development of infrastructure, including roads, electricity, water, public services and security systems, as well as incentives to attract new residents. Meanwhile, the settler population has surpassed 900 thousand.
At the same time, a systematic effort has been undertaken to constrain Palestinians by confiscating their land or denying them access to it, demolishing their homes, burning their crops and mosques, and restricting their movement. These measures have also involved establishing increasingly unlivable conditions designed to drive Palestinians from their homes and pave the way for their displacement.
Second: Advancing De Facto and Institutional Annexation:
Since entering the government, Smotrich has sought to transfer responsibility for settlement affairs in the WB from the military establishment, which has traditionally overseen them, to a civilian political structure under his authority. In June 2024, he announced steps to transfer administration of settlement affairs to civilian officials under his control. Meanwhile, the Israeli police have gradually assumed a greater role in addressing security matters in the WB, replacing the military in some areas. Ben-Gvir has likewise expanded the so-called rapid-response teams (armed settler groups) whose membership has reached 13,400. At the same time, increasingly large parts of the WB have been incorporated into Israel’s political, administrative and economic systems. Moreover, in February 2026, acting on Smotrich’s initiative, the Israeli government decided to facilitate the purchase of land in the WB by Israelis by opening land registries and activating mechanisms for the organized acquisition of land for the benefit of settlements.
On 23/7/2025, the Knesset passed a nonbinding resolution calling for the annexation of the WB by a vote of 71 to 13. Subsequently, on 22/10/2025, it approved on first reading a bill calling for the annexation of the WB and the extension of Israeli sovereignty over it. Netanyahu, however, did not appear eager to proceed with formal annexation, given its potentially far-reaching repercussions for the peace process, which he sought to keep at least partially open, as well as for normalization efforts and international opinion. Nevertheless, he apparently did not oppose advancing the issue, both to accommodate supporters of Religious Zionism and the far right and to prepare the political and practical conditions for its implementation, thereby establishing annexation as a viable policy option.
Third: Settler Violence:
Under the current Israeli government, settler violence against Palestinian civilians has escalated to an unprecedented level. It has included killings, stabbings, beatings, assaults on children, and the burning of property, vehicles, agricultural land, mosques and other structures, as well as the destruction of wells, uprooting of trees and seizure of grazing land. Moreover, Ben-Gvir has issued tens of thousands of firearms permits to settlers, many of whom are also reservists. At the same time, Israeli forces are typically present but intervene only to maintain what is deemed an acceptable level of violence or, when Palestinians attempt to defend themselves, to protect the settlers carrying out the attacks. They also impose punitive and retaliatory measures on Palestinians, as occurred in Huwara, Tel, Qasra and elsewhere. Consequently, this climate of violence has facilitated the establishment of large numbers of settlement outposts and the dramatic expansion of pastoral settlements.
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), settlers carried out 1,828 attacks in 2025 against 280 Palestinian communities, compared with 1,420 attacks in 2024 and 1,189 in 2023. Moreover, in May 2026, OCHA reported that the rate had risen to 6 attacks per day. Between January 2023 and July 2026, 121 Palestinian communities in the WB experienced total or partial displacement as a result of such attacks.
Once settlers seize Palestinian land, the Israeli authorities then step in to protect the settlement outposts, construct roads and other infrastructure, and prevent Palestinians from accessing their land. At the same time, they subject Palestinians to security, economic and livelihood pressures intended to induce displacement and forced transfer. Finally, the authorities proceed to “legalize” the outposts and grant them official status.
Fourth: Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem:
East Jerusalem, which forms part of the WB, has become a central focus of Israel’s efforts to consolidate control. Accordingly, efforts to assert control over al-Aqsa Mosque and East Jerusalem have intensified significantly. Israel has imposed a de facto temporal and spatial division of al-Aqsa, while severely restricting access for Muslim worshippers. These restrictions have, at times, culminated in the closure of al-Aqsa Mosque and the barring of Muslim prayer there for dozens of days. Meanwhile, settler incursions into al-Aqsa have increased significantly, exceeding 73 thousand in 2025. In addition, settlers have been permitted to conduct Talmudic rituals and collective prayers, extend the hours of their incursions, and bring prayer books onto the compound. Settlement expansion has likewise intensified within Palestinian neighborhoods, particularly Silwan, Sheikh Jarrah, the Old City and Ras al-‘Amud. Israeli authorities have also intensified home demolitions and advanced “touristic and archaeological” Judaization projects in the Old City, Silwan and elsewhere. Moreover, settlement expansion has accelerated, with plans approved for 33,519 housing units in East Jerusalem between 2023 and 2025. At the same time, restrictions on the lives of more than 400 thousand Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem have continued.
Finally, in August 2025, plans were approved for the construction of 3,401 housing units in the E1 area. This particularly consequential project is intended to isolate Jerusalem and sever the northern and southern parts of the WB from one another.
Fifth: Weakening and Dismantling the Palestinian Authority:
Despite the functional role the Palestinian Authority (PA) has played for more than three decades, particularly in tasks that Israel does not wish to undertake itself, such as administering Palestinians’ daily affairs, coordinating security, pursuing resistance, and managing the Palestinian environment, Religious Zionism and the nationalist right increasingly view the Oslo framework as having run its course. Accordingly, Smotrich outlined a proposal in September 2025 to dismantle the PA by annexing 82% of the WB and leaving six major Palestinian population centers, or cantons, in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho and Jenin under local administrations. Moreover, the Israeli government rejects any direct role for the PA in the Gaza Strip (GS). At the same time, Israeli authorities have imposed severe economic pressure on the PA. By the end of August 2026, they were withholding about $6 billion in PA revenues from clearance funds. Reports also indicate that another $5 billion in Palestinian funds and bank balances remain frozen or inaccessible because of Israeli measures, bringing the PA increasingly close to bankruptcy.
In March 2026, Smotrich stated that the government was working to bring about the PA’s collapse. In his view, the very existence of the PA signifies the existence of a Palestinian people and therefore constitutes an obstacle to the annexation of the WB.
Sixth: Seeking to Crush the Resistance and Dismantle Its Organizational Structures:
This has been a sustained strategic objective, rather than one associated with any particular Israeli government. Nevertheless, under the current government, it has assumed a more violent, destructive and punitive character, targeting not only the resistance itself but also its families and broader popular support base. In particular, since January 2025, Israel’s campaign against the northern WB refugee camps (RCs) has involved the systematic destruction of about half of the buildings in Jenin and Nur Shams RCs and about 36% of those in Tulkarm RC, in addition to the destruction of roads and water and electricity networks. Moreover, these military operations have displaced about 40 thousand Palestinians. At the same time, Israel has continued its policy of extrajudicial killings while significantly expanding arrest campaigns, the torture of detainees, and their detention under extremely harsh conditions.
Although security coordination with the PA has reduced the pace of resistance activity, it has not brought it to an end.
Seventh: Displacement:
Displacement is an integral component of the broader Zionist project. Nevertheless, the current Israeli government has become more explicit and direct in pursuing this objective. From its perspective, Palestinians constitute a “demographic time bomb,” particularly as their population in historic Palestine surpassed that of Jews this year. At the same time, Palestinian steadfastness, categorical Arab rejection of displacement, and the absence of a favorable international environment led the Israeli government to advance this objective through settler violence, building demolitions, land confiscation, economic and livelihood pressures, and restrictions on movement… among other measures. Collectively, these policies are intended to impose increasingly unlivable conditions that drive Palestinians from their homes and result in a steady and cumulative outflow of the population.
Nevertheless, the prospect of mass displacement remains, particularly if circumstances arise that Israel considers conducive to its implementation.
Playing with Fire:
Israeli policies, particularly settler terrorism, alongside frenzied settlement expansion, destruction, arson, killings and land confiscation, have generated growing Arab, international and even Israeli concerns about a potential collapse of the situation in the WB, the possible disintegration of the PA, and the emergence of conditions that could trigger a broad-based uprising and bring the peace process to an end. These concerns have been reflected in a steady stream of condemnations from European governments and international institutions. Moreover, on 26/7/2026, about 600 former senior Israeli officials, most of them military and security officers, sent a letter to US President Trump ahead of his meeting with Netanyahu, urging him to intervene to halt what they described as settler terrorism in the WB. They warned that the escalation of settler violence threatened Israel’s security and US interests in the region and could ultimately lead to catastrophe.
Conclusion:
The Israeli offensive against the WB is unprecedented in its intensity and severity, placing the territory in the eye of the storm. Its objective is to bring about fundamental changes on the ground that would ultimately eliminate the Palestinian presence. Moreover, it is increasingly indifferent to the peace process, the Oslo Accords and international law and resolutions. At the same time, the offensive reflects a convergence and functional complementarity between settler violence and the official political, military and security apparatus, while paving the way for the collapse and dismantling of the PA and the emergence of conditions conducive to the large-scale displacement of Palestinians. On the other hand, however, these policies could pave the way for a broad-based uprising and a broader popular shift toward resistance. They could also reduce the prospects for normalization in the Arab and Muslim world and further deepen Israel’s international isolation.
In any event, the existential threat facing the WB remains, underscoring the need to mobilize all Palestinian, Arab, Islamic and international efforts to confront the Israeli aggression, support the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the WB, and thwart the Zionist project.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/9/2026
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