By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
Between 2007 and September 2026, President Mahmud ‘Abbas issued about 500 laws by decree, about 280 presidential decrees, and a huge number of presidential decisions.
The figures point to a veritable “factory” or “torrent” of decisions governing Palestinian political life (since the onset of the Palestinian schism), most of them tied to a single “leader” who simultaneously serves as President of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), President of the State of Palestine, and leader of the Fatah Movement. During this period, moreover, ‘Abbas has consolidated extensive control over the Palestinian executive, legislative and judicial branches. He has effectively paralyzed and sidelined the elected Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), while bringing the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinian Central Council (PCC), and the Executive Committee of the PLO, as well as the PA government, under his control.
The result is a form of leadership monopoly that has increasingly “personalized” the Palestinian political system. In turn, this concentration of power has deepened the crisis of the Palestinian national project, adding to its existing challenges, vulnerabilities and risks. Since the Oslo Accords of 1993, and particularly over the past two decades, the following interrelated crises have become increasingly acute:
• A crisis of popular legitimacy.
• A crisis of Palestinian representation within the institutions governing the Palestinian people.
• A crisis of the separation of powers.
• A crisis in the institutional foundations of the PLO and the PA.
• A crisis of internal democracy and political pluralism.
This concentration of power has produced a series of striking paradoxes and contradictions that warrant closer examination:
The first paradox is that, while the leader (President ‘Abbas) monopolizes power and engages in unilateral, authoritarian conduct, the Palestinian people are among the world’s most educated, open and freedom-loving populations. They possess hundreds of thousands of skilled professionals, experts and other talents, yet much of this human capital has little opportunity to contribute within the leader’s narrow political system.
The second paradox is that, while the leader has concentrated power, monopolized authority, and imposed authoritarian rule on his people, he and his leadership circle, including those holding VIP permits, remain, in his own words, “under Israeli boots.” Indeed, he cannot reach his workplace, enter or leave PA-controlled areas, or move between them without the approval of the Israeli soldier stationed at the checkpoint.
The third paradox is that Mahmud ‘Abbas continues to exercise these powers despite having “long exceeded his electoral mandate.” He was elected president of the PA more than 22 years ago, yet has never undergone a genuine, transparent renewal of his mandate, either within the PA or the PLO. Within the latter, moreover, outcomes have been effectively predetermined, with potential challengers excluded.
The fourth paradox is that ‘Abbas continues to exercise these powers despite Palestinian public opinion polls repeatedly calling for his resignation, with 80% to 89% supporting his departure for nearly three years. The same polls show that he would lose by a wide margin in any free election to either a Hamas candidate or Marwan Barghouti.
The fifth paradox is that more than 80% of Palestinians accuse the PA under ‘Abbas of corruption, while a majority of Palestinians in the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS) regard the PA as having become a burden on the Palestinian people.
The sixth paradox is that, despite the sweeping authoritarian powers exercised by ‘Abbas, he lacks the vision, strategic direction and coherent program needed to confront the existential threats facing the Palestine issue and navigate the Palestinian national crisis. At the same time, he has failed to establish an inclusive institutional environment capable of engaging Palestinian political forces, expertise and national capacities in a constructive effort to overcome the crisis.
The seventh paradox is that Israel has moved decisively beyond the Oslo framework, while its current leaders pursue a “decisive” strategy aimed at dismantling the PA into municipalities or cantons, effectively annexing the WB, and bringing the Palestine issue to a close. Against this backdrop, ‘Abbas and his leadership team are more than ever in need of effective Palestinian unity. Yet, rather than pursuing such unity, he continues to present himself as a credible partner in suppressing the Palestinian resistance, replacing it in the GS, and disarming it, while excluding it from the Palestinian political system and refusing to integrate it into the PLO and its institutions.
The eighth paradox is that, while many Palestinians have set aside their reservations about ‘Abbas and his political system and sought to participate in the PNC elections scheduled for next November, accepting a minimum common ground in confronting the Zionist project, they have instead found themselves ignored and excluded. They have witnessed firsthand how the representation of Palestinians abroad is being “engineered,” as evidenced by the selectively constituted electoral blocs in the Gulf states and Europe… This has fueled widespread resentment and a growing sense that the leadership is disregarding the public’s will, undermining their right to genuine and fair representation.
The ninth paradox is that the PLO’s legitimacy as the institutional representative of the Palestinian people does not automatically extend to the leadership that controls it. A fundamental distinction must be made between the PLO as the national political home of the Palestinian people and an entrenched, authoritarian leadership that has assumed control over its institutions. Conflating the legitimacy of the organization with that of its leadership is therefore constitutionally, legally, politically and morally untenable. ‘Abbas and his leadership team should consequently refrain from wielding “legitimacy” as a political shield to justify their hold on power.
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President ‘Abbas unfortunately continues to rely on his ability to monopolize decision-making through his control of the Fatah Movement, available resources and key appointments, as well as through Arab and international political and financial support and his control over the mechanisms governing the electoral process. He also relies on regional and international fears of Islamists and the resistance camp, as well as the fear among many that his removal or the collapse of his political system could produce a political vacuum.
Recognizing the gravity of the current moment requires President ‘Abbas and his team (particularly the Fatah Movement, which constitutes the effective organizational backbone of his political machinery) to assume their historic responsibilities and move, at a minimum, toward a common understanding with other Palestinian forces. Frankly, the author of these lines finds the record of the past deeply unsettling and sees little basis for building on it, although he hopes to be proven wrong. Palestinian forces, political actors and national figures committed to the national cause must likewise assume their responsibilities and work to help the Palestinian people overcome their current predicament.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 12/9/2026
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