By: ‘Atef al-Joulani.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Although the two competing camps in Israel’s Knesset elections share broadly similar strategic orientations, they differ on several aspects of the Palestine issue, reflecting divergent policies and priorities for the next phase.
First: The Two Camps’ Positions on the Palestine Issue
1. Netanyahu’s Governing Coalition
Led by Likud, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition comprises far-right nationalist and religious parties and pursues a hard-line, aggressive approach to the Palestine issue. Its key features at this stage include:
a. Continuing genocidal operations and military attacks in Gaza Strip (GS) and the West Bank (WB), while intensifying strikes against resistance groups, expanding targeted assassinations, and destroying infrastructure.
b. Enshrining religious Zionism and far-right ideology in government policy, openly advocating “Greater Israel,” expanding efforts to annex the WB and fragment its territory, maintaining military control over large areas of the GS, and rejecting withdrawal to the Yellow Line.
c. Expanding settler access to weapons and allowing settlers to carry out attacks across the WB, while intensifying security and economic pressure on Palestinians in the WB and GS to force them from their homes and displace them beyond Palestinian territory.
d. Targeting political expressions of Palestinian national identity and seeking to dismantle the Palestinian Authority (PA) in favor of localized administrations in the WB linked to Israel, while relying on collaborating militias to end Hamas’s rule and seize control of the GS.
e. Intensifying Judaization and settlement expansion in occupied Jerusalem while facilitating incursions into Al-Aqsa Mosque and the performance of Talmudic religious rituals.
2. The Opposition
The opposition to Netanyahu comprises three main parties that broadly share similar positions on the Palestine issue. In recent weeks, Yashar! has led opinion polls, overtaking Likud, and has become Netanyahu’s leading electoral challenger. Led by Gadi Eisenkot, a former chief of staff of the Israeli military, the party is generally classified as part of the security-oriented center, a profile reinforced by the senior positions held within the party by other former security and military officials.
The second party, Together (Beyachad), led by Naftali Bennett, emerged from an alliance between Yesh Atid and Bennett 2026. Positioned on the secular center-right, it advocates a hard-line security approach and seeks to reduce rather than resolve the conflict by improving Palestinians’ economic and living conditions while maintaining the occupation and Israeli security control. The third party, Yisrael Beiteinu, led by Avigdor Lieberman, is aligned with the secular nationalist right. Its core electoral base consists primarily of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and it takes hard-line positions on political and security issues.
On the Palestine issue, the three parties share broadly similar positions. All firmly reject a two-state solution and an independent Palestinian state, instead advocating political and demographic separation from Palestinians to preserve a Jewish majority. They also support annexing Area C of the WB while retaining Israeli security control over Areas A and B. However, they oppose the full annexation advocated by Netanyahu’s coalition, arguing that incorporating more than two million Palestinians into Israel would be ill-advised and threaten Israel’s Jewish character.
Regarding settlements in the WB, all three support expanding the major settlement blocs, which they consider legal, while calling for the evacuation of unauthorized outposts that fuel tensions and security incidents. They also criticize the Netanyahu government’s tolerance of settler violence, describing violent settlers as extremists and troublemakers and calling for their attacks to be curbed. In their view, such violence undermines the settlement project and Israel’s international image.
Although the three parties agree on the need to prevent a governmental vacuum in the WB that could allow resistance movements to expand their influence, they differ over the PA’s future role. Yashar! favors retaining the PA as an administrative instrument with expanded autonomy to manage Palestinians’ civilian affairs in the WB, but without full sovereignty or an army. It also views security coordination with the PA as beneficial, as it reduces the burden on the Israeli military and helps prevent instability. Similarly, Together supports limited cooperation and security coordination with the PA to prevent its collapse, provided that it undertakes fundamental reforms. Yisrael Beiteinu, however, adopts a markedly different approach. In early October 2026, it proposed abrogating the Oslo Accords, dismantling the PA, and annexing Area C under Israeli sovereignty, while transferring responsibility for Palestinians’ day-to-day affairs in Areas A and B to Jordan under a framework of bilateral cooperation or an Israeli-Jordanian “confederation.”
Regarding the future of the GS, the three parties share a broadly similar security and political outlook. They favor maintaining a military presence and ensuring the Israeli military’s freedom of military operation, while opposing a rapid withdrawal. At the same time, they reject the far right’s calls to reestablish settlements or impose Israeli civilian rule in the GS, citing the associated security and demographic burdens. They also oppose the PA’s return to GS, instead advocating a transitional Palestinian technocratic administration, unaffiliated with Hamas, to manage civilian and economic affairs under international and regional supervision and coordination.
All three parties also call for eliminating Palestinian resistance, dismantling its military capabilities, and destroying its infrastructure. Together, in particular, advocates a hard-line approach based on deterrence and targeted killings. It also supports retaining full Israeli control over the borders and crossings to prevent resistance groups from rearming and prevent the GS from posing a future security threat.
Second: Potential Implications of the Election Results for the Palestine Issue
Recent Israeli election polls give the opposition bloc an average of 54 seats, compared with about 50 for Netanyahu’s camp. Neither bloc would therefore secure the 61 seats required to form a government independently. Although the opposition could potentially form a minority government with the support of a blocking bloc of Arab lawmakers (about 13 seats), this scenario appears unlikely. Alternatively, Netanyahu could continue governing without a parliamentary majority while awaiting new elections or seek to expand his coalition by bringing additional parties on board.
A third possibility is a “national unity” government under which the two sides would alternate as prime minister, each serving a two-year term. Although neither side favors this arrangement, political necessity could compel them to accept it. It would, however, be a bitter compromise for both, leaving this “unity” fragile and vulnerable to collapse at any time, potentially paving the way for new elections.
If Netanyahu’s coalition wins the election, or if he remains in power because competing political blocs fail to secure the majority needed to form a government, potentially leading to new elections, he is likely to maintain his current policies toward the Palestine issue.
By contrast, a broad-based national unity government, though unlikely, could provide international cover for many of Israel’s hard-line policies. Nevertheless, its policies and actions may be less aggressive, reflecting the opposing camp’s priorities of restoring Israel’s international standing, ending its diplomatic isolation, improving its image, and reviving efforts to normalize relations with Arab countries.
If Netanyahu’s rivals succeed in forming the next government, they are likely to reconcile their stated priorities with their support for annexing Area C, extending Israeli security control over the entire WB and GS, and dismantling the resistance and its capabilities. Their policies would also likely align closely with US President Donald Trump’s vision for the GS, including the role of the Board of Peace (BoP) and its affiliated National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) in administering the Strip.
Under this scenario, annexation and settlement expansion in Area C would likely continue, albeit at a slower pace and on a more limited scale. Settler violence in the WB and incursions into Al-Aqsa Mosque might decline, while some of the harshest measures against Palestinian prisoners could be eased. Military operations targeting the resistance and targeted killings of activists in the WB and GS would probably continue, but with less intensity. Meanwhile, Israel would likely continue to condition its withdrawal from the GS on the disarmament of the resistance. The BoP would likely play an expanded role in overseeing the administration of the GS, alongside some improvement in humanitarian aid, shelter and reconstruction. Despite Avigdor Lieberman’s reservations and preference for a “confederation” with Jordan, the government would be unlikely to adopt this proposal. Instead, it would probably maintain political relations and security coordination with the PA in the WB while preventing it from resuming control of the GS.
Conclusion
Although the two competing camps in Israel’s elections differ in their priorities and approaches to the next phase, they share many strategic objectives for managing the conflict in the Palestinian and broader Arab arenas. Accordingly, while their policy differences may offer opportunities to advance the Palestine issue, the election results should not be a source of undue optimism. Ultimately, a unified and strong Palestinian position, backed by broader support from Arab and Muslim countries, as well as humanitarian solidarity, remains essential to safeguarding the Palestinian people’s interests and confronting the existential threats facing their cause.
| Political Insights: A periodic series that provides brief and condensed political analyses and position assessments, issued by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Al-Zaytouna Centre. |
Click here to download: >>Political Insights (22): The Positions of Competing Israeli Political Parties on the Palestine Issue and Their Potential Implications  (4 pages, 634 KB) |
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