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Abstract:

Hamas faces today numerous challenges on all levels, local, regional, and international. Despite this, it was able to hold internal elections, overcoming several geographical and security obstacles. Hamas also published a new political charter, which sums up its general political vision including that of the conflict with Israel and other major issues concerning the Palestinian cause.

In the coming phase, Hamas will need to realign itself, and in doing so, it faces several possible paths. These include: putting forward a national initiative, whether to complete the reconciliation by offering certain concessions to get through the phase; through building a coalition of resistance forces to close ranks against attempts to liquidate the Palestinian issue; through forging a creative vision based on the new charter to break through the narrowing regional space; or through steadfastness and preservation of the key gains such as the resistance infrastructure in Gaza Strip (GS), while pursuing a double track of solidifying the national front and attempt a breakthrough in the region to frustrate the campaign targeting Hamas.

The latter path is what is currently available, through a strategy of steadfastness and self-defense in the face of current threats, in parallel with efforts to shore up the Palestinian national ranks and breach the regional space.

First: Regional and International Shifts and Their Impact on the Palestinian Issue and Hamas
Second: Hamas in the Regional and International Spheres
Third: Hamas’ Local, Regional, and International Policies
Fourth: Hamas’s Current Alignment in Light of Local, Regional, and International Equations
Fifth: Internal Changes in Hamas and the Challenges of the Next Stage
Sixth: The New Political Charter and Hamas’s Ability to Invest it
Seventh: Hamas’s Priorities in the Context of Realignment
Eighth: Factors That Hinder or Help Hamas’s Realignment in Palestine, the Region, and Internationally
Ninth: Possible Scenarios for Hamas’s Realignment
Tenth: Recommendations

First: Regional and International Shifts and Their Impact on the Palestinian Issue and Hamas

– The contradictions in the world order suggest the inability of the international powers to settle regional conflicts, which will prolong regional chaos and adversely affect the Palestinian issue by marginalizing it or using it as capital in other regional deals.

– The Israeli role in shaping US policy in the region is increasingly apparent, as is the convergence between countries of the region and Israel, and the lowered Arab ceiling vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, as evident from the outcomes of Donald Trump’s visit to the region.

– China and Russia are drawing increasingly close to Israel, amid growing coordination and economic and security cooperation between them.

– The region continues to reel from overwhelming chaos and unrest, despite attempts to form regional blocs in the midst of the current conflict. The new Middle East Strategic Alliance embodies the latest iteration of such blocs. It may be followed by the intensification of proxy wars or perhaps it may help reverse the course of conflicts through regional settlements attempting to maintain the balance with this alliance.

– The region is currently devoid of regional—individual or collective—leadership. International efforts have made sure to make it so, in order for the region to remain under Western dominance under the pretext of protecting Israel. However, the region is in the process of reconfiguration within a Middle Eastern geostrategic framework, devoid of Arab and Islamic identities.

– Political Islam, the ideological flavor of Hamas’s thought, is coming under fierce attack by regional and international powers, which places further pressure on Hamas’s regional horizon.

At the Palestinian level, this is all accompanied by a sharp division in the national movement, while at the Israeli level, the peace process is at an impasse amid pressures on the resistance path. Meanwhile, the Israeli extreme right is on the rise, pushing settlement and Judaization programs to new extents, to alter the facts on the ground in the Palestinian territories in the West Bank (WB).

Second: Hamas in the Regional and International Spheres

– Hamas has forged some informal international relations. Various Western leaders and elites have communicated with the group’s politburo on several occasions. However, Hamas has yet to gain international legitimacy because of its rejection of any commitments demanded in return, especially when they touch on Palestinian national fundamentals.

– Hamas has maintained its cohesion and survived, and was able to hold internal elections and publish a comprehensive political charter detailing its vision. However, it has not been able to preserve all its gains, and has been unable to translate its military victories into a political harvest, because of the regional and international obstacles.

– Hamas has preserved the resistance infrastructure in GS, and is attempting to revive it in WB. It enjoys considerable popularity among Palestinians, and continues to command popular support in the Arab and Muslim spheres.

– All attempts to blockade and weaken Hamas have failed. Hamas remains a major component of the Palestinian equation, and as a main leader of the Palestinian resistance. However, Hamas so far has been unable to rally the majority of the people around its choices, because of the division of the Palestinian national movement and its weak regional position.

Third: Hamas’ Local, Regional, and International Policies

A number of determinants shape Hamas’s political conduct at the local, regional, and international levels including:

– The political positions in its international discourse are based on UN resolutions upholding Palestinian rights, while eschewing those resolutions that undermine the national rights of the Palestinian people.

– Seeking balance in relations with the countries of the region. Hamas has been met with extreme censure often because of the intense polarization in the region, but it has relatively succeeded in maintaining this balance.

– Proposing the Palestinian issue as a leverage and universal banner for all communities in the region, and accepting the support of any party to the Palestinian issue, which does not demand commitments that contradict with the interests of the Palestinian issue.

– Promoting an inclusive patriotic, national, and Islamic discourse, and shunning sectarian mobilization that divides the nation and reassures the occupation, and obscures the real enemy and struggle.

– Rejecting normalization with Israel and warning against its dangers to the Palestinian issue and the interests of the entire nation.

– Strengthening the national discourse and tackling Palestinian division by promoting national reconciliation based on partnership with all Palestinian forces.

Fourth: Hamas’s Current Alignment in Light of Local, Regional, and International Equations

– Hamas has left a regional bloc that to a large extent had provided regional protection, towards a vacuum that may drag it into dangerous paths in light of the ongoing regional in-fighting.

– Hamas is currently sheltering with a regional ‘host’ that is not strategically aligned with it, represented by Qatar and Turkey. Strategic divergences between the two sides concern Hamas’s lines such as the full liberation of Palestine and the non-recognition of Israel. Qatar and Turkey currently provide an umbrella of strategic support for Hamas, but in the event pressures intensify further, the long-term prospects for this are not guaranteed.

– Although Hamas continued to influence the national equation, it has not been able to bring together the national forces to accept a shared agenda that furthers the resistance choice.

– Hamas has scored major military achievements. On the other hand, it has not been able to translate this into political gains that can propel forward the Palestinian issue and itself locally and regionally, as a result of the regional chaos.

– Hamas, in the context of the Oslo Accords that formed the Palestinian Authority (PA), tried to marry government with resistance, but it has not been able to succeed fully given the Oslo structure’s subservience to the regional and international balance of power.

– Through security coordination in WB and the imposition of rules of engagement in GS, Israel has limited Hamas’s resistance.

– Israel has been able to shift the strategic focus on a specific geographical area, in GS, limiting Hamas’s ability to distribute its efforts in the remainder of Palestine’s geography, especially in WB. As a result, Israel has relatively had a free hand in Jerusalem and WB.

– The international sphere remains hostile to Hamas. Israel has been able to successfully lobby countries to designate Hamas as a terror group. However, Hamas on the other hand has contributed to efforts to delegitimize Israel in the Western sphere.

– Regional in-fighting has preoccupied the region with its internal affairs, reducing the priority assigned to the Palestinian issue in the regional agenda, which has adversely affected Hamas’s position.

– Despite the difficulties described above, Hamas remains steadfast. Attempts to weaken it and remove it from the Palestinian equation have so far failed to achieve their full goals. However, even more intense attempts in this direction may continue in the coming period.

Fifth: Internal Changes in Hamas and the Challenges of the Next Stage

Hamas recently held its internal elections despite the extended and non-contiguous geography of its presence in the region, amid security threats surrounding the group. Hamas however succeeded in managing its internal balances, electing new leadership frameworks for the next term.

This success points to Hamas’s vitality and the flexibility of its internal system, which allows the rotation of posts and the renewal of leaders, and which combines technical specialization and geographical representation in pursuit of stability and internal balance, although the geographical distance of various leadership levels represents a challenge and a complication in decision-making.

Despite what has been said about the new leadership structure, with military leaders “overshadowing” political leaders in the wake of the elections in GS, the overall changes do not reflect a change in its political positions. However, they may open up a space for new political approaches. Furthermore, the structural composition of Hamas has comprised both military and political components since the inception of the group.

Indeed, what reinforces the constant direction in Hamas’s political discourse, is the fact that it has an institutional structure that is difficult to submit to the visions of specific leaders. In addition, it has a decentralized structure that spans a broad geography. Moreover, Hamas’s strong ideological-religious inhibitor prevents political misdirection.

The challenges that will face the new leadership can be summarized as follows:

– The challenge of leadership transition, from a historical leadership represented by Khalid Mish‘al, which has had a special mark on the performance of Hamas throughout the past two decades. In addition, the new leadership represented by Isma‘il Haniyyah is confined to a blockaded geography, which creates complex challenges.

– The challenge of internal balance among the components of the group, especially the organization of leaderships between the interior and the exterior of Palestine.

– The challenge of managing the political dossier in tense regional climates and a regional and international targeting of the group.

Sixth: The New Political Charter and Hamas’s Ability to Invest it

Hamas recently published a new political document that has since received broad interest in Palestine, the region, and the world. The charter, formulated in delicate political and legal language, contained a translation of Hamas’s political conduct and its results in the past three decades.

Interestingly, the document refrained from mentioning the Muslim Brothers (MB) movement as an organizational reference frame for the group, as the previous charter had stated. Instead, Hamas defined itself as a Palestinian Islamic national liberation movement, identifying the conflict as one with Zionism rather than Judaism. Hamas considered the lines of 1967 to be interim that can be accommodated by Palestinian national consensus, without ceding any inch of Palestine and while maintaining the fundamentals of the Palestinian people.

In the context of the opportunities for Hamas to invest the document:

– Despite rapid reactions from Fatah and some Palestinian factions, the document can theoretically produce a basis for partnership with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) factions especially Fatah.

– The document constitutes political support for Hamas’s regional hosts, Qatar and Turkey, and will create a margin for political maneuvering for them.

– The document could create opportunities to build a political vision through which Hamas can achieve a breach in the narrowing regional impasse, especially following the visit by Donald Trump to the region.

– The document will allow Hamas’s supporters in the West to defend it in Western circles, and open channels of communication, which may help soften Hamas’s “demonized” image in the West. It may also open up a space for better relations with Russia, China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and other countries in the world willing to listen to Hamas and build relations on the basis of shared ideas.

However, it will be difficult for the charter to produce a major political shift for Hamas, given that the conditions of the International Quartet rejected by Hamas remain in place. A gap also still exists between Hamas’s vision of the conflict and that of most countries in the region.

Seventh: Hamas’s Priorities in the Context of Realignment

– Strengthening the internal front against potential campaigns against the movement.

– Preserving the resistance’s infrastructure in GS and reducing the blockade on the popular base in the Strip.
– Strengthening the cohesion of the Palestinian national front to counter the challenges of the coming phase, by concluding some form of Palestinian reconciliation. It may also by forming a bloc of national forces that support resistance based on a joint national agenda to end the monopoly of Palestinian decision making and counter efforts to liquidate the Palestinian issue.

– Making a breach in the regional horizon to thwart efforts for a full regional blockade on Hamas or at least offset some of their impact.

Eighth: Factors That Hinder or Help Hamas’s Realignment in Palestine, the Region, and Internationally

1. Factors that Help Hamas’s Realignment

– Hamas enjoys considerable popularity among the Palestinians and is part of the Palestinian people’s fabric, making it hard to sidestep it in the Palestinian equation.

– Hamas enjoys strong popular support in Arab and Muslim countries.

– Hamas is in a leading position in relation to resistance against the occupation.

– Israel is not serious about the peace process, weakening Palestinians supporting the Oslo program.

– Hamas’s political charter, which addressed in moderate terms key Palestinian issues without undermining the fundamentals, may help Hamas maneuver politically to confront attempts to isolate it in the region.

2. Factors That Hinder Hamas’s Realignment

– The PA and Fatah’s leadership continue to cling on to their vision regarding the peace process, and refuse partnership with Hamas and other Palestinian factions on the basis of shared features.

– The conditions of the Quartet remain in place. The Western sphere does not recognize Hamas’s political legitimacy. Perhaps the new US administration is more extreme in this regard; during his visit to the region, Donald Trump called for designating the movement as a terror group, and is attempting to force the countries of the region to follow suit.

– Hamas’s ideological flavor and reference frame remains Islamic, despite it being a national liberation movement, which increases its burdens and automatically includes it in the regional and international campaign targeting “Political Islam.” This is not to mention its armed resistance against Israel.

Ninth: Possible Scenarios for Hamas’s Realignment

No doubt, the coming phase will be one of the most difficult for Hamas. Its new leadership requires great shrewdness to overcome it, especially since the challenges surround Hamas from all directions, internally, regionally, and internationally.

Hamas has four possible options in light of the aforementioned realities:

Option 1: Escalating the situation in GS to reshuffle the deck and “escape forward.”

Option 2: Putting forward a national initiative, whether to complete the reconciliation by offering certain concessions to get through the phase; or by building a coalition of resistance forces to close ranks against attempts to liquidate the Palestinian issue.

Option 3: Forging a creative vision based on the new charter to break through the narrowing regional space.

Option 4: Steadfastness and preservation of the key gains such as the resistance infrastructure in GS, while pursuing a double track of solidifying the national front and attempt a breakthrough in the region to frustrate the campaign targeting Hamas.

It seems here that Option 1 may be too costly for GS while there is no regional space backing it at present.

Regarding Option 2, Palestinian and regional conditions may not be available for this as an independent path, but it can be pursued partially where possible.

Option 3 can also be pursued partially in an attempt to offset the targeting of Hamas, but is not viable as an independent path because there is a huge gap between Hamas’s political vision and that of the countries of the region.

Option 4 remains the most viable, namely, a strategy of steadfastness and self-defense against current threats, in parallel with efforts to strengthen the Palestinian national ranks and attempting to make a breach in the regional sphere.

Tenth: Recommendations

– Hamas must seek to strengthen its internal ranks, because the coming phase is extraordinary in terms of the attempts seeking to weaken and isolate it.

– Hamas needs to intensify its communication with elites and influential forces in the Arab and Islamic spheres, at official and popular levels.

– Given Israel and US lack of seriousness about the peace process, and the inability of any Palestinian side to marginalize the other, this requires Fatah’s leadership to accept partnership with all Palestinian factions to emerge from the Palestinian crisis and counter efforts to liquidate the cause.

– We must warn that the quest to weaken or remove Hamas from the Palestinian arena will lead to the emergence of extremist forces that have no political vision or practical project.

– All forces and states must realize that Hamas combines the functions of a national liberation movement and a political movement whose political ideology converges with the identity of the region, therefore representing aspirations held by the entire nation. For this reason, it is difficult to uproot or even weaken Hamas, and attempts to do so may only serve to motivate and strengthen the movement. Therefore, the best course is to engage with Hamas rather than targeting it.

* Al-Zaytouna Centre thanks Mr. Abdul-Rahman Farhana for authoring the original text upon which this strategic assessment was based.

The Arabic version of this Assessment was published on 29/5/2017