Strategic Assessment (144): Implications of the Israeli–US War on Iran for the Palestinian Resistance

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By: ‘Atef al-Joulani.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Abstract:

Despite the severe damage inflicted by the Israeli–US campaign on Iran and its infrastructure, the operation failed to achieve its declared objectives, including regime change, the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, the neutralization of its missile capabilities, and the severing of its regional alliances. Instead, the Iranian state demonstrated resilience, preserved internal cohesion, and recalibrated its strategic posture, thereby restoring a substantial degree of operational effectiveness. Moreover, Iran consolidated its regional leverage, particularly through its positioning in the Strait of Hormuz, while US deterrence has weakened and allied confidence in US commitments has further eroded.

At the same time, regional and international attention shifted toward the war on Iran and its repercussions in the Arabian Gulf, while focus on GS, Jerusalem and the Palestine issue temporarily receded. Concurrently, Iran’s insistence on retaining its nuclear and missile capabilities, together with Hizbullah’s refusal to disarm, strengthened the position of the Palestinian resistance and its ability to resist external pressure for disarmament. Moreover, the Iranian leadership’s perception of an existential confrontation is likely to incentivize deeper support for Palestinian resistance forces, which it views as a forward line of defense. By contrast, substantial Iranian losses could also embolden domestic currents advocating strategic retrenchment and a more inward-looking orientation.

Introduction

The US administration and the Israeli government set out a series of objectives for their war on Iran, which began on 28/2/2026. Chief among these were regime change, the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program, the elimination of its missile capabilities, and the forced abandonment of its regional allies. However, despite significant human losses and extensive destruction of both civilian and military infrastructure in Iran and Lebanon, none of these core objectives had been achieved weeks into the military confrontation. Consequently, the US administration was compelled to accept a temporary ceasefire and return to the negotiating table in an effort to reach a new agreement on Iran’s nuclear file, as well as to secure the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic.

First: Regional Implications

1. Although the Israeli–US campaign inflicted severe damage on Iran’s political, military and security leadership and destroyed a substantial portion of its missile systems and military equipment, in addition to striking civilian and infrastructural targets, it nevertheless failed to achieve its declared objectives. By contrast, the Iranian state absorbed the impact, maintained internal cohesion, and recalibrated its strategic posture, thereby regaining a significant degree of operational effectiveness.

2. Despite these losses, Iran nonetheless consolidated its regional leverage, particularly through its influence over maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as its capacity to threaten US interests and target its regional bases.

3. Meanwhile, US deterrence has visibly weakened, along with the image it sought to project as a reliable security guarantor. This erosion is reflected in its limited effectiveness in defending regional partners, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure in several Gulf states, and the temporary disruption of oil export flows in parts of the region.

4. Israel succeeded in establishing control over a Lebanese border strip approximately 5–10 km deep and carried out extensive killing and destruction. However, it was subsequently confronted with a marked improvement in Hizbullah’s qualitative performance and its ability to close several previously exposed operational gaps. Moreover, Hizbullah rejected any ceasefire arrangement that would have allowed Israel to continue unilateral violations of Lebanese territory and sustained escalation. Iran, in turn, insisted that any cessation of hostilities must include Lebanon as well.

5. Concurrently, concerns across the region have intensified regarding Israel’s expanding assertiveness and its ambition to reshape the “new Middle East” according to its own strategic vision. This perception has been further reinforced by the growing view that the US does not accord decisive strategic weight to its Arab partners when this conflicts with its strategic alignment with Israel.

Second: Implications of the War for the Palestinian Resistance

1. At both the regional and international levels, attention has increasingly shifted toward the war against Iran and its repercussions in the Arab Gulf, thereby reducing focus on GS, Jerusalem and the Palestine issue more broadly. This shift has occurred notwithstanding the continuation of Israeli aggression, ongoing violations, intensified Judaization and annexation policies, and the sustained blockade.

2. The resistance has faced a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, it has condemned the Israeli–US aggression against Iran and affirmed Iran’s right to respond; on the other hand, it has been confronted with pressure to denounce Iranian strikes on Gulf states. This has necessitated a clear distinction between attacks on US bases in these countries, used in operations against Iran, and strikes targeting civilian infrastructure within the states themselves. At the same time, Hamas has maintained generally constructive relations with states such as Qatar and Kuwait, while continuing efforts to improve its regional ties. Accordingly, it has upheld Iran’s right to respond to aggression, while simultaneously calling for restraint with regard to civilian infrastructure and non-military targets in Gulf countries.

3. Several media outlets have instrumentalized the relationship between the Palestinian resistance, Iran and the broader Axis of Resistance in campaigns of delegitimization, seeking to exploit the war’s negative security and economic spillovers to weaken the resistance politically.

4. Given the significant strain on the Iranian economy, two opposing trajectories emerge. On the one hand, Iran’s capacity to sustain support for the Palestinian resistance may diminish; on the other, the existential nature of the confrontation facing the Iranian regime may prompt an expansion of that support, viewing the resistance as a first line of defense against a Zionist project whose strategic reach increasingly extends toward Iran itself.

5. The recent war has also contributed to the strain on Israeli forces, which became engaged simultaneously on the Iranian and Lebanese fronts. This multi-front pressure has led to a relative reduction in Israeli military activity in GS and WB. As a result, this temporary easing likely afforded the resistance a limited opportunity to regroup and partially rebuild capabilities following two years of sustained and attritional confrontation.

6. The Trump administration’s focus on the war with Iran and its aftermath, including efforts to secure the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic, temporarily diverted attention from its intensified efforts to advance the “Board of Peace” in GS and to sustain pressure aimed at disarming the Palestinian resistance.

7. In parallel, Iran’s ability to frustrate US and Israeli war objectives, alongside Hizbullah’s resilience and effective performance in its confrontation with Israel, reinforced the broader resistance paradigm. It further highlighted the capacity of these actors to disrupt Israeli strategic planning, despite significant asymmetries in military power.

8. Iran’s continued commitment to its nuclear and missile capabilities, alongside Hizbullah’s rejection of disarmament and its insistence on preserving its defensive capacity against Israeli attacks, has reinforced the Palestinian resistance’s own refusal to submit to external pressure to relinquish its weapons or dismantle its deterrent capabilities. In this regard, it has also contributed to a broader regional legitimization of armed retention as a core element of resistance.

9. The Palestinian resistance did not participate militarily in the recent war against Iran, largely due to the sustained pressures of Operation al-Aqsa Flood over two consecutive years. However, the renewed emphasis on the “unity of arenas” framework, along with the demonstrated cohesion and resilience of the Axis of Resistance, carries potentially positive implications for the Palestinian arena. In particular, it underscores the importance of functional complementarity among regional actors opposing Israeli occupation and, in turn, their collective capacity to sustain confrontation despite cumulative losses.

Third: Possible Scenarios for the Impact of the War on Palestinian Resistance Options

The following scenarios outline the potential implications of the Israeli–US war against Iran for the future trajectory of the Palestinian resistance, particularly in light of intensified Israeli, US and regional efforts to contain it and limit its military capabilities:

First Scenario: The war’s repercussions would strengthen the resilience of the Palestinian resistance, enhancing its ability to withstand pressures for disarmament and demilitarization, while also facilitating its recovery from the prolonged confrontation with Israel during Operation al-Aqsa Flood.

Second Scenario: Israeli and US pressure on the Palestinian resistance would intensify, aiming to weaken it and strip it of its military capacity, partly as a compensatory response to the failure to achieve the objectives of the war against Iran, with the resistance potentially showing some degree of accommodation to such pressure.

Third Scenario: The US and Israel would seek to decouple the Palestinian file from broader regional confrontations involving Iran and Lebanon, thereby isolating it from wider spillover dynamics.

Fourth: Factors Shaping the Scenarios

1. The trajectory of the Iran–US–Israeli confrontation, including the war’s eventual outcome.

2. The developments on the Lebanese front, along with the potential outcomes of Israeli–Lebanese negotiations.

3. The Palestinian resistance’s capacity to withstand sustained Israeli, US and regional pressure aimed at disarming and constraining it, as well as the level of support it retains within its popular base.

4. US policy direction in the post-war period will be decisive, particularly whether Washington maintains deep regional engagement or moves toward partial retrenchment. This trajectory is also likely to be shaped by the outcomes of the congressional midterm elections in November 2026.

5. Israeli policy in GS in the coming period, shaped by the repercussions of the confrontation with Iran and Hizbullah, as well as the outcomes of the anticipated Israeli elections in October 2026.

6. The Arab and Islamic response to Israeli expansionist and aggressive policies, particularly amid a growing perception among various actors that such policies now pose a direct threat to their interests and regional stability.

7. The level of coordination among the components of the Axis of Resistance going forward, in light of the war’s outcomes and implications, and the extent of consensus around further developing the concept of “unity of arenas.”

Fifth: Weighing the Scenarios

The first scenario, an enhanced resilience of the Palestinian resistance and the continued retention of its military capabilities, appears the most likely under current conditions, particularly in light of the expected repercussions of the Israeli–US war on Iran. This assessment is reinforced, on the one hand, by the failure of both Israel and the US to achieve their strategic objectives in Iran, and on the other, by Hizbullah’s demonstrated resilience in its ongoing confrontation with Israel. Concurrently, polling trends in both the US and Israel point to potential political setbacks for the Republican Party in Congress and for Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition in the Knesset. In parallel, the broader Arab and Islamic political environment is gradually shifting toward greater recognition of the risks posed by Israel’s increasingly radical security doctrine and its expanding regional assertiveness. Moreover, the relative gains associated with the “unity of arenas” framework during the war on Iran are likely to sustain momentum for continued coordination going forward.

By contrast, the second scenario, the heightened Israeli and US pressure to weaken the Palestinian resistance and strip it of its weapons, remains the preferred option for both actors, as well as for certain regional stakeholders. However, it faces substantial structural constraints, most notably the resilience of the Palestinian resistance and its sustained commitment to preserving its defensive capabilities despite ongoing Israeli attacks, as well as the durability of its popular support base. In addition, the inability of Israel and the US to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, along with their failure to disarm Hizbullah, further limits the feasibility of achieving similar outcomes against the Palestinian resistance.

Sixth: Recommendations

In light of the above analysis, and given the anticipated US and Israeli efforts to decouple the Palestinian resistance track from the broader regional confrontations involving Iran and Lebanon, the following recommendations are proposed:

1. Arab states and Iran should pursue the resolution of their disputes through peaceful means, while respecting sovereignty and non-interference. This is essential to prevent Israel and the US from exploiting intra-regional divisions to further consolidate regional dominance.

2. The protection of the economic resources, energy assets, and critical infrastructure of Arab and Muslim countries should be prioritized, avoiding their erosion or destruction in ongoing conflicts, from which Israel and Western powers are the primary beneficiaries.

3. The Palestinian resistance should maintain its steadfastness against sustained pressure aimed at disarmament and the dismantling of its defensive capabilities, as the risks of compliance outweigh those associated with continued endurance and resistance.

4. The significant participation of several resistance factions in the Israeli–US war against Iran highlights the need to further assess the potential of the “unity of arenas” framework and to deepen operational coordination among resistance actors. Such integration could enhance defensive capacity and improve deterrence against Israel’s continued aggressive policies, while accounting for the distinct conditions and constraints of each party.

5. Engagement with Arab and Islamic actors that are increasingly cognizant of the risks posed by Israel’s expansionist trajectory has become more consequential. This engagement should underscore the role of the Palestinian resistance in confronting such dynamics and frame it as a stabilizing force that merits preservation and strategic investment, both to constrain Israeli escalation, safeguard regional stability, and advance the interests of Arab and Muslim countries.

6. While the Palestinian resistance is expected to withstand sustained regional and international pressure, political and popular actors across Palestine and the Arab world bear a growing responsibility to defend the legitimacy of its armed capability and its right to self-defense. This is particularly salient given continued Israeli actions that pose risks to the stability and territorial integrity of Arab states.