Summary:
The predicament of the Palestinian elections is that these elections are legally established on the basis of Oslo and the following agreements; for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah, the elections is an opportunity to furnish for their legitimacy and continue with the peaceful settlement to achieve the National Palestinian Project, while for Hamas and resistance factions, it is an opportunity to reinforce the legitimacy of the resistance path and its political stance that rejects Oslo; and additionally a tool of action against the current corruption inside the PA, and the deteriorating settlement process.
It is little expected that the elections will take place on their set date of 24/1/2010, and the chances of postponement scenarios remain high, either to take place few months after without achieving a national consensus, or postponing it till the achievement of a reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas, or going without elections at all: extending the term of President Abbas and transferring the authorities of the Legislative Council to the PA Presidency and PLO institutions.
But whether it was held or not, the elections should remain a part of the Palestinian reform process, a constructive tool in arranging the internal Palestinian Scene, and not an additional ground of division and schism.
Introduction
The Legitimacy of the Elections
Elections as a Mechanism
The Legitimacy of the Illegitimate
Legitimizing the “de-facto”
The Choice of Elections, Now
The Hastiness of Mahmoud Abbas?
Options Available to the PA in Ramallah
1. Holding the elections in its set date on 24/1/2010
2. Postponing the elections for few months then holding it, without achieving any national reconciliation
3. Extending Abbas’ term and transferring more internal Palestinian authority to the PLO institutions
4. Holding the election after achieving reconciliation
Recommendations
Introduction
Concern with the Palestinian elections could be described as varying between welcoming, disregard, and postponement. Disregard has often been justified by the fact that the elections are the product of Oslo; which was the stance of the opposition in the 1996 elections. On the other hand, those who were enthusiastic for the elections in 1996 argued that running elections in 1999 is unnecessary and does not serve the Palestinian issue. Many calls were later issued for running elections in the early 21st century, but Arafat has consistently refused that although he had always “praised” the Palestinian democracy. The Palestinian legislative council that was elected in 1996 remained in term for 10 years, although its mandate is 4 years. Today, Fatah calls for elections as a decisive encounter between it and its rivals, while Hamas considers that elections should only take place after reaching national reconciliation.
Noteworthy is that all Palestinian factions have praised the impartiality of the 2006 Legislative Council elections, but many had later revolted against the results, and adopted a policy of disabling the council’s activity. Insurgence movements were supported by Israel as it detained a large number of the Council members, and by the United States and Donor European Countries that refused to give its financial aid to the government formed by Hamas.
The Legitimacy of the Elections
In this context, the very basic question is raised about the usefulness and validity of running elections under the Occupation; as this would indicate a recognition of the occupation’s legitimacy, because the elections is held under its direct supervision and command, and further, it gives the Occupation a “bright face”, portraying it as a “civilized Occupation that believes in democracy”.
Is it that we have been totally immersed in the elections for one reason or another, to the extent that we have adopted it as a measure of our own legitimacy in facing the Occupation?. And why it is that before we as Palestinians have achieved any victory or liberation or any of our national rights, we seek our legitimacy in elections that were requested by our enemy, and on which we have signed with him decrees and agreements!. This is further confirmed by the fact that elections do not take place unless Israel gives its approval, and suspends military action in the electoral area for few days.
Elections as a Mechanism
The essence of Palestinian elections in light of the current PA was not different than elections under direct occupation, where elections is adopted as a mechanism to give legitimacy to the occupation, regardless of it being direct or indirect occupation. It is stated in Taba Agreement, which details Oslo Accords, that a Palestinian Council of 25 members -including the President- is elected for executing the agreements, and that this Council will have legislative authorities. Thus put, the Palestinian Council that is currently known as the Palestinian Legislative Council is originally an executive and not a legislative council. The number of its members was increased on the request of the former president Arafat who considered that 25 is not enough for fulfilling the aspirations of those looking for leading positions in the PA, and Israel approved Arafat’s request; the number first increased to 88 and then to 132.
Unlike other countries, where elections are viewed as a representation mechanism that legitimizes legislation, elections in the PA were set up for an executive/implementation goal. Thus, it was not possible by any means for the PA that was established as result of Oslo to accept the results of the legislative elections of 2006; nor it was possible for Israel, or other Arab and foreign countries that were part of the peace process to accept these results. Things would have been even worse had any presidential elections took place and brought to the PA presidency a president who does not recognize Oslo. Scenarios of refusing to accept the results of elections should be expected in the future, in case it was won by a party that rejects Oslo; and the political and financial besieging of Hamas government was not surprising.
The Legitimacy of the Illegitimate
The Palestinian elections are considered by many critiques as searching for legitimacy in the context of illegitimacy, that is the illegitimacy of the Occupation. For those, the Palestinian agreements with the Occupation is illegitimate as the Occupation itself is illegitimate, and because these agreements disregard all the national Palestinian fundamental, the basic of which are those stated in the National Palestinian Charter that was in act when the Oslo Agreements were signed. The Palestinians are competing for a “legitimate” representation of a nation under Occupation, whereas the elections are devoid of any national context as long as the Palestinians had not achieved liberation or their right to self-determination.
For those who support the settlement track and Oslo agreements, victory in the elections is sought as a means to prove the public support in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the opposite hand, those who oppose Oslo sought electoral achievement to prove the opposite, i.e. that the public opposes Oslo and its consequences. Hence, even though the elections are illegitimate, each party wants to prove a stance through it, given that legitimate elections do not seem achievable in the foreseeable future. Add to this that the oppositions considered the elections an opportunity to bring the corruption within the PA to an end, to stop the coordination with the Israelis in the security field, and to support the armed resistance.
Legitimizing the “De-facto”
Even though the elections were devised as an executive rather than a representative legislative mechanism, many Palestinian factions considered it from their own perspective. As we have mentioned earlier, elections are not ran in a standardized professional legal manner, but according to various internal and external predicaments. If Arafat didn’t pass away, we could have not witnessed Presidential elections; yet, if Hamas had then decided to support a specific candidate, the scenario might have been totally different. Similarly, the legislative council that was elected in 1996 could have “endured” additional years regardless of the immense legal critique it was subject to, was it not that the US and Western powers insisted on holding new elections, as stated in the Roadmap. In both cases, what is inferred is that the Palestinian elections are not based on the Political and Legal Statements of the constitution or law, but rather dependent on the factional interest, and the expected results based on the public orientations in the WB and GS, added to the foreign interests especially the Israeli and American ones.
In the Palestinian arena now, complete legitimacy is not enjoyed by any side or party. Taking the 2006 elections as a reference, Hamas’s government is probably the nearest side to claim that they enjoy such legitimacy since the Legislative Council that was elected in 2006 is still in term while Abbas’ term has ended and the legitimacy of Fayyad’s government is essentially in question since the latter’s establishment; not to mention the weaker case of the PLO institutions and committees, the term of which has ended decades ago, and that defy the PLO’s internal rules. Regardless of the above, every Palestinian side claims it enjoys legitimacy and maintains a list of justifications and reasons. The truth is that legitimacy in the Palestinian arena is actually associated with imposing a de-facto on the ground, so the side that can impose its rule and drive for that a regional support –and international if possible, is the side that becomes “legitimate”!.
The Choice of Elections, Now
The PA authority in Ramallah is proposing elections as the only possible choice to end the current Palestinian crisis. Reconsidering the past records of this Authority regarding the choice of elections, we can’t but suspect the reasons behind proposing elections now with this enthusiasm. This Authority has kept the WB and GS without elections until the death of Arafat, maintained an outdated Legislative Council for ten years until 2006, and did not accept the results of the elections when it came out different than what it was expected or predicted. What could be the reasons behind this call for elections?
There is some belief in the PA that if the elections took place now, Hamas will lose as its popularity has declined after its control over Gaza and as the powers of money and siege are exerted against it by major powers. But this perspective overlooks the fact that the popularity of the PA itself is in decline in the WB. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the Americans and the Israelis will commit the same mistake again, and allow for elections with non-guaranteed results to take place, i.e. if Israel and the US agreed on elections then they have in mindset the needed measurements to be taken to ensure the victory of the PA in Ramallah; on the other hand, the electoral campaign would focus on connecting Hamas’ victory with increased poverty and suffering among the Palestinians because the Western countries will cut financial aid if the PA in Ramallah does not win; and this needs no prove, as it was lively experienced!.
The Hastiness of Mahmoud Abbas?
According to many observers, the head of the PA, Mahomud Abbas, has been “hasty” in his decision to announce a date for the coming elections. Some of the statements by Abbas and some of his assistants implied that the coming elections will be devoid of any essence from the perspective of many parties, for the following reasons:
First: It seems that Abbas’ announcement of a specific date was but a form of a political tactic; it was correctly justified by a due constitutional date with respect to the Legislative Council, but not so for the presidency because the term of Abbas already ended in early 2009. The whole issue is most probably a form of counter-attack by Abbas and the PA in Ramallah against Hamas, after the latter has cornered them in the media in an embarrassing situation in the issue of Goldstone’s report (following Ramallah’s PA decision to postpone the voting on the report).
Second: The elections that Abbas called for will not essentially contribute to solving any of the problems encountered currently on the Palestinian level. The major of these problems being the Palestinian division, the American and Western powers interference, the Israeli Occupation and the Security coordination in the West Bank, the Siege on Gaza, and the harsh living conditions in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the elections will not change any given in these vital issues to the Palestinian people.
Third: If elections were hold only in the West Bank, then it would be like an internal Fatah elections more than a national Palestinian event. It will not be real elections, although some of the PLO factions might participate, but these factions are of minimal -if any- weight, and essentially their participation will not affect the major competing camps within Fatah. In addition, the majority of independent candidates is expected not to participate because the elections are not taking place under a united national Palestinian cover (i.e. before reconciliation).
Fourth: holding the elections will essentially imply an increased tension on the internal Palestinian level, especially between the two authorities of Ramallah and in Gaza.
Fifth: Abbas himself devalued the elections when he decided not to nominate himself because of “America and Israel’s unwillingness to give the Palestinians any of their national rights”; Ureiqat announced the failure of the negotiations that have been extended endlessly; all this intimidated the question of “then why we are holding elections? Wouldn’t it be wiser to look for other options to take the Palestinian people out of their current suffering, and not worry about a failing peace process?”. This question was asked by those criticizing the PA in Ramallah and those supporting it alike.
Options Available to the PA in Ramallah
1. Holding the elections in its set date on 24/1/2010:
This is the scenario used by the PA in Ramallah to threaten Hamas in case the latter didn’t agree to sign the reconciliation document, thus pushing it to agree to its (i.e. PA) terms. However the possibility of this scenario taking place has diminished because the Central Elections Committee announced its incapability of holding the elections in this divided situation, especially in Gaza Strip where it will need the coordination and agreement of Ismail Haniyyah’s government.
2. Postponing the elections for few months then holding it, without achieving any national reconciliation
This scenario is dependent on the PA in Ramallah reaching a state of hopelessness regarding its ability to impose its own will on Hamas and the government in Gaza Strip, on issues of reconciliation terms and the elections; and on the idea that some of the PA figures in Ramallah are calling for the sufficiency of getting the needed legitimate “cover” (i.e. electoral legitimacy) in the West Bank, and postponing the issue of Gaza till a later stage.
Although this scenario would lead to additional rupture between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will only give partial credit -that will remain questionable- to the elections result, it is favored by some for the sake of distancing Hamas from the Palestinian political scene and moving forward with political and economic relations with Israel and the US; considering that any reconciliation with Hamas will obstruct the settlement track and will tighten the siege and increase the suffering, and that some figures in Fatah might lose their “share in the power-cake” in the National Authority and in the PLO, had any national reconciliation took place.
Those who consider the resistance a useless act, and build their decisions solely on the regional and international powers interest thus ignoring their own national Palestinian interest, will not welcome with comfort any reconciliation that gives Hamas a just share in managing the Palestinian Authority or the Palestinian Security Bodies or the PLO institutions. For them, the slogans of “an authority committed to Oslo” and “a government that doesn’t cause siege” are of key priority in leading “their” “national Palestinian project”, even though this might eventually torn apart the national Palestinian project.
3. Extending Abbas’ term and transferring more internal Palestinian authority to the PLO institutions
This scenario is built on the proposition of not holding the elections, and instead, extending the term of Abbas through the PLO’s executive committee, while the latter will claim the authorities of the Palestinian Legislative Council on the pretext that the Council’s mandate has ended and that the PLO and its institutions are part of the Palestinian political system, in ruling and directing the Palestinian Authority.
In this scenario, Mahmoud Abbas will continue with issuing presidential decrees, that will then be approved by the PLO institutions (executive committee, central committee, and the national council if needed).
Although the legitimacy of these institutions themselves is controversial and outdated, with its mandates due many years ago, these institutions are still “used” to provide some cover for Fatah leadership and the PA in Ramallah to claim their representation of the Palestinian people, and take the decisions they want.
This scenario is viewed by some as fail-safe, since it doesn’t involve any unguaranteed risks, and it takes advantage of the regional and international support available for Abbas to stay in power and for the PLO to claim some role and legitimacy, while it also maintains the pressure and siege against Hamas with the goal of bringing it down.
This scenario doesn’t present any new serious change on the ground, as it preserves the status-quo, further establishing the division; gaining more time in hope of getting better conditions for negotiations. The Americans and the Israelis will surely take advantage of dealing with a weak and divided Palestinian Authority, to establish more facts on the ground and impose their will and terms in negotiations.
4. Holding the election after achieving reconciliation
This scenario requires that Hamas signs the Egyptian Reconciliation Document, most probably after Egypt modifies it slightly to relax some of Hamas’ reservations, but without removing or contradicting Fatah’s major requests and conditions. This scenario might be occur as a result of the feeling of the Palestinian sides that they are losing with time; and thus elections will be held as part of a compete reconciliation package, where all sides have some trust in the elections’ integrity and legitimacy. The chances of this scenario are also made higher, when many of the PA figures in Ramallah will start to lose hope in the possibility of bringing Hamas down in Gaza Strip by siege or force. It is also the favoured scenario on the public national level, because it gives opportunity for peaceful transform of power, heals the division, and gives priority to elections and the people’s say, on the use of force and bullets.
This scenario however is hugely dependent on the ability of the Palestinians to stand against the Israeli and American pressures, re-arrange the internal Palestinian house in accordance with the national Palesitnian interest, and proceed in a trust and confidence building projects that heal what was broken in the period of division, in order to have a real reconciliation on ground.
Recommendations
1. Holding elections as a part of a complete package of national reconciliation that includes other national priorities like reforming the PLO and the Security Bodies; because the elections by itself will not change anything on the ground unless other problems are tackled.
2. Working on reconstructing/reforming the PLO in a democratic way that gives chance to all Palestinian sides to participate in it; and according to a new national Palestinian accord. After that, the new PLO should deal with the various Palestinian issues of matter, outside and inside Palestine, including the political issues.
3. Giving priority to national Palestinian interests over the external pressures, and rejecting the continuous American and Israeli pressures to impose their wills and conditions on the Palestinian decision-making or on the Palestinian reconciliation terms.
4. Moving forward with designing and implementing a program of confidence and trust building between Fatah, Hamas, and other factions; that should take place before the elections and heals the negative results of the periods of division. Such a program will also establish for a new stage of national Palestinian work, that respects institutional and democratic values, and in which all sides are involved as responsible parties in building the national Palestinian project.
5. Postponing the elections date until reconciliation takes place, so that elections are held in an environment of unity and cooperation, and all the sides have trust in the results’ integrity and transparency.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations sincerely thanks Dr. Abdul-Sattar Qassem for writing the original text on which this strategic assessment was developed.
The Arabic version of this Assessment was published on December 2009
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