By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
The “euphoria” experienced by Netanyahu and his government following Hizbullah’s harsh blows appears to have led the Cabinet to decide on a ground incursion into southern Lebanon, aiming to impose new dynamics in the conflict with Hizbullah and perhaps even in Lebanon’s political landscape. However, in their haste, the initial gains might overlook critical factors in managing the conflict, potentially forcing Netanyahu to pay a steep price and leading to another “failure.”
Objectives of Israeli Escalation:
In its escalation against Hizbullah and Lebanon, Israel seeks to:
1. Establish a “displacement-for-displacement” equation by displacing hundreds of thousands of Lebanese, particularly Hizbullah’s constituencies, in response to Hizbullah’s role in displacing over 100 thousand Israeli settlers in northern Israel due to its involvement in military actions supporting Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Gaza Strip (GS). Israel seeks to put pressure on both Hizbullah and the Lebanese state, with the goal of achieving a “return-for-return” equation—an outcome that can only be realized if Hizbullah halts its military involvement in the war, alongside agreements acceptable to the Israeli side.
2. Tighten control over GS, remove Hizbullah from Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and halt the Israeli military, security, economic and human losses in northern Israel.
3. Secure additional gains beyond those outlined in the 1701 Agreement, such as preventing Hizbullah’s military presence south of the Jordan River, disarming Hizbullah, and imposing stricter control over its activities, particularly its military operations, with international cover.
4. Weaken Hizbullah and inflict significant losses on its members and constituencies, thereby reducing its influence and political standing in Lebanon. This would enable other actors to gain traction and establish a new political equation that aligns more closely with Israeli and US demands and standards.
It appears that the Israeli government has entered a state of “seduction,” prompting it to pursue its “dreams” more aggressively, accompanied by numerous arrogant statements and threats from Israeli leaders and representatives. This comes at a time when Netanyahu has regained his prominence in Israeli society, with both him and his party gaining ground in opinion polls following what they view as “achievements” on the Lebanese front.
Possible Scenarios and Paths
There are four potential paths for an Israeli war on Lebanon:
First: Drowning in the Lebanese Quagmire: This scenario envisions a ground incursion that results in the destruction of much of Lebanon’s infrastructure, even at a significant cost. It is predicated on the notion that the prevailing Israeli mindset—bolstered by recent “achievements,” a sense of “euphoria,” religious nationalism, and arrogance—will strive for a decisive victory over Hizbullah and attempt to impose its conditions. Conversely, Hizbullah, with its ideological foundation, the combat readiness of tens of thousands of its cadres, relatively strong military capabilities, substantial popular support, and the potential for continuous logistical backing, is well-positioned to sustain effective operations alongside its allies, thus exhausting the Israeli forces and gradually wearing them down. This situation could result in a prolonged conflict, akin to the circumstances in GS, until Netanyahu is compelled to withdraw, burdened by disappointment, or until opposition forces force him to resign.
Second: Continuing the State of Calculated Engagement: This approach entails abandoning the idea of a ground invasion, while adjusting the pace of the war—either reducing or occasionally escalating it—based on field assessments. It involves leveraging Israel’s superiority in air power, drones and intelligence, while also preventing the return of displaced persons. Hizbullah will persist in striking Israeli targets in the north and even in central Israel. This situation results in a cycle of “mutual attrition” for both sides, contingent upon which side gains the upper hand and reliant on field developments in GS.
Third: A Strong Israeli Ground Invasion: This scenario envisions achieving “victories” through military and security strikes against Hizbullah and its leaders and cadres, aiming to impose new equations and fulfill the aforementioned objectives. This is the “desired” scenario for Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich… It assumes that Hizbullah has suffered severe blows, including losses to its weapons depots and infrastructure, rendering it unable to withstand prolonged ground engagement. However, this scenario is unlikely, as news indicates a strong performance by the resistance in thwarting all attempts by the Israeli forces to cross the border. Moreover, Hizbullah possesses significantly more weapons now than it did when it forced the Israeli forces to retreat from southern Lebanon (on 24/5/2000 and summer 2006). Furthermore, ground military engagement is the area where Hizbullah excels, utilizing its human and military capabilities, along with its extensive knowledge of the terrain, which it has meticulously prepared for such situations.
Fourth: A Regional War: This path is based on the Israeli assessment that it cannot secure its future unless it “clips” Iran and its allies in the region, establishing a “state of normalization” in the strategic environment surrounding Israel to ensure its security and stability. This scenario assumes the presence of US support or that the US would be drawn into the war alongside Israel. However, this outcome remains unlikely at present, despite Israel’s “playing with fire,” which may push towards such a scenario. This is particularly evident given Israeli discussions about targeting the Iranian nuclear program and delivering severe military and economic strikes against Iran. Nonetheless, Iran and its allies do not seek a regional war, and regional powers, along with the US and its Western allies, are hesitant to become “involved” in such a conflict, the outcome of which remains uncertain.
Conclusions:
The expected trajectories currently seem to oscillate between the first and second scenarios. Israel may be attempting to combine both approaches through a “wave-like” pattern of escalating and de-escalating the war, along with a limited, calculated ground incursion to seize control of strategically “soft” areas. These areas could then be used as leverage in negotiations before the war comes to an end.
Overall, the Israeli army, which is exhausted, depleted, and has failed to achieve its objectives in GS after more than 360 days of fighting, is incapable of mustering the human and logistical resources needed for a ground invasion involving 80–120 thousand soldiers. It is also unable to control areas in southern Lebanon, which are significantly larger than GS and where the resistance is already well-prepared and equipped to confront and effectively repel any invasion.
Hizbullah remains an ideological party with a broad popular, organizational and military base. It has made it clear that it continues to link its rocket strikes to the cessation of the war on GS.
Hizbullah is capable of sustaining the conflict for extended periods, gradually exhausting Israel. It can also expand its targeting of Israeli positions, intensifying Israeli losses and increasing the number of Israeli displaced persons. Additionally, the Arab and international community opposes the expansion of the war and fears its repercussions, which will heighten pressure on Israel and further isolate it.
Netanyahu may be attempting to “test his luck” in achieving a decisive breakthrough against Hizbullah by mobilizing his resources. However, indications suggest that if he proceeds, his losses will accelerate. This could hasten the collapse of his government and even bring down the theories and illusions upon which Israel was founded.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/10/2024
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