By: ‘Atef al-Joulani.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Summary
Recent developments highlight the urgent need for Palestinian unity to overcome internal divisions and fortify the internal front against looming challenges. These include the far-right Israeli government’s accelerated efforts to annex parts of the West Bank (WB), increased pressure to displace Palestinians, heightened fears of implementing former US President Donald Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” and the launch of a new wave of Arab-Israeli normalization.
However, the chances of ending the division are dwindling due to the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership’s persistent rejection of reconciliation efforts and consensus-building, most recently demonstrated by its opposition to forming a Community Support Committee to manage the Gaza Strip (GS). Further challenges include Israeli, US and Arab obstacles.
In light of this, it is essential to explore alternative options and strategies to build national consensus, coordinate efforts and address the challenges of the current stage. Key actions include forming a national consensus committee to manage GS post-ceasefire, establishing a broad political framework that upholds Palestinian principles and defends the legitimacy of the resistance, and reviving Palestinian popular action institutions such as unions, syndicates and popular organizations.
Introduction
Before 7/10/2023, the PA leadership consistently blocked efforts to achieve a national consensus that could end internal divisions and help put the Palestinian political house in order. Demonstrating a clear intent to maintain the status quo, the PA sought to preserve its hegemony over Palestinian decision-making and its monopoly on national institutions, setting obstructive conditions that undermined all reconciliation and consensus initiatives.
After the outbreak of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, numerous calls were issued at the national level to address the repercussions of division and to strengthen the internal front in response to the aggression and brutal genocidal crimes in GS and WB. However, the PA remained intransigent, rejecting calls for reconciliation and thwarting an Egyptian proposal to establish a community support committee to manage the GS post-war. Its clear focus was on ending Hamas’s presence in GS and avoiding what it perceived as a lifeline for Hamas to facilitate a ceasefire agreement. The PA insisted on exclusively administering GS without any form of national partnership.
On 5/12/2024, the PA launched a security operation in the Jenin refugee camp (RC), targeting Palestinian resistance groups in WB in open coordination with the Israeli occupation authorities. This operation further complicated the national scene, raising questions about the prospects for national consensus in the Palestinian arena, particularly in the wake of the GS ceasefire on 19/1/2025.
First: Motivations, Obstacles and Opportunities for National Consensus
New reasons have emerged to achieve a general national consensus and end the Palestinian schism, adding to previous justifications and underscoring its growing importance as an urgent national necessity. However, significant obstacles persist, weakening the prospects of building such consensus.
1.New Motives
The most significant new motives driving the pursuit of reconciliation and consensus are:
• The far-right Israeli government has approved a project to annex large portions of C-areas in WB, which constitute about 60% of its territory, to Israeli sovereignty and has announced the start of its implementation. This move poses a significant threat to the future of WB and the Palestine issue, a danger further heightened by the potential implementation of the “Deal of the Century” plan, approved and announced by former US President Donald Trump on 28/1/2020, during his first term.
• The danger of displacing Palestinians from WB to Jordan has intensified due to the Israeli government’s right-wing policies, which have heavily armed settlers in WB and allowed them to carry out attacks against Palestinians. These actions, aimed at imposing severe security and economic hardships, are creating conditions that make life unbearable for Palestinians, thus paving the way for both forced and voluntary displacement. Moreover, Israeli leaders and Zionist organizations have openly called for Palestinians to leave WB and move to Jordan, with maps submitted by Benjamin Netanyahu and Bezalel Smotrich, published on official Israeli websites, sparking outrage in Jordan and raising concerns among Palestinians.
Furthermore, Trump’s suggestion that Jordan and Egypt absorb approximately 1.5 million Gazans has heightened the risk of displacement, indicating that the prospect of displacement is a consideration for US decision-makers.
• There is an increasing need for a national formula after the ceasefire to address regional and international parties, aiming to mitigate the effects of Israeli war on GS and ensure the completion of reconstruction projects.
• The increasing likelihood of a new wave of Arab-Israeli normalization under the so-called “Abraham Accords,” which Trump announced after his inauguration as one of his main regional projects, poses a significant threat to the future of the Palestine issue and national project.
2. Obstacles
However, despite the justifications advocating for ending the schism and strengthening the internal front, a set of obstacles has emerged that significantly weaken the chances of achieving this. The most important of these obstacles are:
• The Authority has hardened its position, insisting on thwarting reconciliation efforts and imposing impossible conditions on resistance factions to achieve national consensus, including abandoning their national fundamentals and armed resistance in favor of the PA’s political program based on the Oslo Accords and security coordination. Furthermore, the PA and Fatah insist on unilateralism and hegemony over Palestinian decision-making, seeking to monopolize all national action institutions. The PA is increasingly reluctant to run in elections due to impartial opinion polls revealing a significant decline in its popularity.
• The Israeli side seeks to perpetuate the Palestinian schism and has refused to support any Palestinian reconciliation. It has also threatened to halt cooperation with the PA if the latter pursues an understanding with Hamas and other resistance factions. This hardening of the Israeli stance has intensified due to the growing influence of the extreme right in Israeli political and security decision-making.
• Successive US administrations have maintained a negative stance on Palestinian reconciliation, categorizing resistance movements as “terrorist” and insisting on their disarmament. Unless the Trump administration fundamentally changes its approach to Palestinian affairs, it is likely to follow the same policy.
• Many Arab parties that align with the PA and oppose resistance factions and political Islamist movements hinder Palestinian reconciliation and consensus, which are crucial for integrating these factions into the official Palestinian political system. Instead, they exert pressure to strengthen the PA’s control over WB and GS within the framework of the two-state solution and to eliminate the armed presence of resistance factions.
• The PA’s security campaign against the Jenin RC, coordinated with the Israeli authorities, has severely damaged its image among the Palestinian people and further strained its relations with resistance factions.
• The PA seeks to avoid the burden of rebuilding GS by holding Hamas and the resistance factions responsible for the destruction, aiming to incite public anger against them and pressure Hamas into surrendering its weapons and accepting PA control over the territory.
Given the absence of clear signs of fundamental change in these significant obstacles in the near future, and considering the PA’s stance and increasingly harsh actions in recent years—especially of late—achieving a broad national consensus involving the PA and Fatah seems unlikely in the near term. Therefore, betting on this possibility and narrowing the national effort to this unproductive path is a waste of time, diverting focus from more realistic and effective approaches.
Second: The Options and Paths of National Mobilization Are Necessitated by the Current Stage
The prospects of reaching a general national agreement that includes all major Palestinian forces are likely to be blocked due to the Fatah and PA leadership’s rejection of the proposal for a community support committee to manage the Gaza Strip. This makes it crucial to explore other options and strategies to build broad national consensus and coordinate efforts in response to threats and dangers. Among the most prominent of these options are the following:
1. The establishment of a national administration to manage GS after the ceasefire, composed of nationally and internationally recognized technocratic figures, is agreed upon. This administration will oversee the civilian, daily life, and service aspects of the region, supervise efforts to manage the crossings, and lead the reconstruction of areas destroyed by Israeli aggression, while coordinating with regional and international parties.
In recent weeks, practical efforts have been made to establish this administration in coordination with the Egyptian side. This followed the Fatah and PA leadership informing Egyptian officials of the PLO Executive Committee’s decision to reject the Egyptian proposal to form a “Community Support Committee in Gaza.,” citing concerns that it would perpetuate the division between WB and GS. Egypt expressed its dismay at the rejection, especially after the Fatah and PA leadership had initially agreed in principle to form the committee following multiple meetings and dialogues in Cairo. The rejection came after Hamas officially informed Egypt of its agreement to form the committee.
The Egyptian draft proposal called for forming a committee to manage Gaza Strip’s affairs, with the Palestinian government as its reference point, responsible for areas including relief, addressing the war’s effects, and reconstruction. The committee will be formed through national consensus, and President Mahmud ‘Abbas will issue a decree to appoint its members. It will operate in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in the Palestinian territories.[2]
2. he formation of a comprehensive national framework that upholds Palestinian fundamentals and defends the legitimacy of resistance against occupation in all its forms, comprising various factions, organizations, institutions and independent national elites and figures.
The idea of forming a united Palestinian front was proposed approximately two years ago by national factions and frameworks, sparking extensive discussions and debates among them. In May 2023, the National Dialogue Forum, organized by the Popular Conference of Palestinians Abroad (PCPA) in Beirut, called for the establishment of a united Palestinian national front, grounded in adherence to the fundamentals of the Palestinian people and the adoption of confrontation and resistance as a strategic option for liberation, return and the achievement of the Palestinian people’s goals.[3]
The proposal was stalled at the time due to the reluctance of certain Palestinian factions affiliated with the PLO, fearing it would jeopardize their status as the national authority of the Palestinian people and provoke negative reactions from the PLO leadership. This occurred despite efforts by those advocating for the proposed front to clarify that it was not intended as an alternative to the PLO or meant to provoke any conflict with it.
The need for national alignment and a broad political framework has become more pressing following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, as challenges to the resistance project continue to grow. It is crucial to coordinate efforts to defend the resistance and counter plans targeting its legitimacy, existence and weapons. Furthermore, confronting the threats posed by the Israeli extremist right wing, particularly in relation to the annexation plan and the potential implementation of Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” is vital. This is further compounded by the possible repercussions of a large wave of normalization that Trump claims to be launching soon.
3. The revitalization of Palestinian popular action institutions, such as popular associations and unions, which were disrupted following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the establishment of the PA in 1994, is crucial. These institutions entered a state of paralysis and ineffectiveness, diminishing in favor of PA institutions. As a result, they have “lived in a state of weakness, entrenchment, and lack of renewal after various phases and accumulations, which has negatively impacted the social environment that once supported them.”[4]
Recognizing the significant changes in the Palestinian, Arab and international political landscape, which have added challenges to reviving certain popular institutions, it is clear that the continued paralysis of national institutions harms the Palestine issue. This stagnation weakens the ability of Palestinians, dispersed across numerous countries, to mobilize Arab and international support for their rights.
While Palestinian communities have become more active internationally in recent years, with initiatives like the European Palestinians Conference emerging, there remains a need for more grassroots efforts focused on specific sectors, such as unions and associations for Palestinian students, women, intellectuals, writers and journalists.
Third: Recommendations
Given the need to build national consensus to address the urgent and growing challenges of the current stage, and recognizing the significant obstacles that hinder ending schism and achieving a comprehensive national agreement among all Palestinian parties, the strategic assessment recommends the following:
1. Adhering to the option of ending schism and strengthening the internal front, while responding to national, Arab and international initiatives and efforts in this regard, without relying on strong chances of success within the existing conditions. At the same time, seeking to activate alternative options for the Palestinian people to build national partnerships and consensus, coordinate efforts to confront challenges, and mobilize regional and international support for the Palestine issue.
2. Continuing efforts to establish a consensus national committee for managing GS after the ceasefire. This initiative aims to address the challenges of the current stage, facilitate recovery from the war’s effects, and strengthen communication with regional and international stakeholders in the upcoming phase.
3. Capitalizing on the atmosphere generated by Operation al-Aqsa Flood, during which coordination between resistance factions in GS and WB strengthened, with the aim of forming a broad national political framework that defends the legitimacy, existence, and weapons of the resistance, while preserving the fundamentals of the Palestine issue.
4. Launching thoughtful and realistic initiatives to activate Palestinian unions, syndicates and popular institutions, including those representing students, women, writers, intellectuals and journalists, in order to overcome the paralysis in national and popular institutions and enhance the effectiveness of specialized grassroots efforts.
5. Adopting initiative and action to implement national consensus projects, fostering openness, and expanding cooperation and coordination to encompass a broad national spectrum, while avoiding any forms of hegemony, exclusivity, or imposition of guardianship on various institutions and frameworks.
[1] Writer, researcher and editor-in-chief of Assabeel newspaper, Jordan. An expert in Palestinian and Jordanian political and strategic affairs, he has published hundreds of articles, political analyses, situation assessments and working papers, complemented by his active presence in audio-visual media.
[2] Why Fatah Refuses to Form a “Community Support Committee” in Gaza?, site of Arabi21, 15/12/2024, https://arabi21.com/story/1648212
[3] The National Dialogue Forum calls for forming a unified national front and adopting the option of confrontation and resistance as a strategic choice, Quds Press Agency, 21/5/2023, https://qudspress.com/50665
[4] Hamdi Ali Hussein, “Palestinian Popular Unions after Oslo: Transformations of Role and Status,” in Ahmad Atawneh and Hassan Obeid (eds.), Studies in the Transformations of Post-Oslo Palestine Society (1): The Actors and the Palestinian Institutions (Istanbul: AlSharq Strategic Research and Vision for Political Development, 2023), pp. 245–267.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 29/1/2025
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