By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Introduction
Globalization literature identifies two key perspectives. The first is the Operational Perspective, which focuses on measuring the political, economic, technological, cultural, and social interconnectedness among global actors. This view holds that, despite occasional slowdowns, the historical trajectory reflects a consistent megatrend of increasing global integration.[2] The second is the Normative Perspective, which examines the value of globalization—who benefits most from its evolution, and who has the power to shape it to their advantage. This perspective remains highly contested, driven by deep ideological and value-based debates, etc.[3]
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The above necessitates emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between the two perspectives: understanding globalization as a process, and globalization as a teleology; i.e., as a purposeful trajectory oriented toward achieving certain goals, often benefiting specific actors.
Against this backdrop, several questions arise: Is Israel becoming more engaged in the various dimensions of globalization? Does it prioritize a particular aspect of globalization over others? Do quantitative indicators suggest a rise, decline, or fluctuation in Israel’s global engagement through the mechanisms of globalization? Does Israel perceive certain risks associated with globalization? And how has Operation al-Aqsa Flood affected the levels and patterns of globalization in Israel?
On another note, globalization has blurred the boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs, making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the two. As a result, the field of foreign policy has grown more complex, shaped by a flood of variables and the need to account for the constantly shifting international landscape. This complexity is further intensified by the accelerating interdependence between internal and external dynamics, and the expanding number of actors involved, ranging from states to sub-state entities (such as minorities and civil society in other countries), and supra-state actors (including intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and others).[4]
To illustrate this, consider that the share of global exports in world GDP rose from 10.1% in 1945 to 53.5% in 2017, reaching 62.5% in 2022. In 2024, the value of international trade was approximately $33 trillion, an increase of 3.7% compared to 2023.[5] In this context of increasing external influence on domestic affairs, foreign policy analysis has shifted toward highlighting so-called hybrid[6] variables; factors that generate mutual influence between domestic and external actors, such as religion, ideologies, media, technology, trade, and diaspora communities. A telling example is the role of former Israeli military officers who transitioned into the arms industry. Their involvement has helped strengthen ties between Israeli military institutions and those of other countries, in turn deepening bilateral relations and influencing Israel’s conduct regarding the Palestine issue.[7]
Wars, such as those in the Middle East or Ukraine, also produce effects that blur the line between internal and external dynamics. These include heightened volatility in global financial markets, rising energy prices, declining tourism and travel revenues, disruptions to trade and global supply chains, increased insurance costs, recession risks, inflationary pressures, higher business expenses, and delays in corporate decision-making. Evidence also shows that shocks to inflation and GDP often spill over into other countries during wartime, even those not directly involved.[8]
Many researchers regard the war on Gaza Strip (GS) as a manifestation of globalized warfare. Israeli military operations in GS, triggered by the Palestinian resistance attacks on 7/10/2023, have revealed three central points of international military collaboration: the F-16 fighter jet, the Guided Bomb Unit (GBU), and the Israeli arms manufacturer Elbit Systems. These examples highlight a broader pattern of globalized military exchange, including military aid, ideological support, and the deployment of foreign military personnel. Therefore, Israeli military violence in GS thus operates within a global network of supply, demand and complicity. This makes it difficult to isolate the military dimension of the conflict from the broader phenomenon of the “militarization of globalization,” marked by the deep entanglement of weapons manufacturers and the expansion of their operations across continents. Theoretically, the war on GS is set within the “power-geometries of globalization,” where it is a “‘place’ in which certain important elements of capitalist globalization are organized, coordinated, produced,” thereby getting at something of the global spatialities that are part of Israel’s militarism in Palestine.[9]
Many studies[10] connect the rise of globalization with the global surge of right-wing reactions. The growth of nationalist and religious movements as a response to globalization reflects societies’ desire to protect their historical identities from being dissolved into a global framework that diminishes their uniqueness. This local societal reaction to globalization inevitably influences foreign policy by shaping its arenas of engagement, key actors and the state’s geostrategic choices. Accordingly, the rise of the religious and Zionist right in Israel is intrinsically linked to this broader trend. Thus, globalization should be understood as a “dialectical” phenomenon, in the Hegelian sense.
Globalization poses complex challenges for adapting to external changes, especially when some parties have no role in driving those changes. While it can offer opportunities for adaptation, it often imposes constraints and developments that negatively affect states uninvolved in their making. In today’s globalized world, the ripple effects of major events inevitably reach all actors. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, for instance, played a strategic role in reshaping the Middle East, forcing Israel to confront its consequences. Iran shifted from a strategic asset under the Shah to a strategic liability after the revolution, leading to the ongoing bloody confrontations between the two sides. A similar dynamic followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, which significantly influenced Israeli foreign policy, most notably through the mass immigration from former Soviet republics, which brought in newcomers equivalent to 17% of Israel’s population, many of them highly skilled and scientifically trained.[11] Likewise, China’s steady turn toward pragmatic politics has clearly shaped its position on Israeli policy.
This prompts a central question: To what extent is Israel integrated into all facets of globalization? Is its engagement with the various sub-indicators occurring at a consistent pace? And what are the implications of each scenario, particularly for Israeli foreign policy?
First: Measuring Globalization and Its Application to Israel[12]
Measuring a complex phenomenon like globalization remains a subject of considerable debate.[13] Nonetheless, most prevailing models assess globalization through three primary indices, each comprising a set of sub-indices, as shown in the table below:
Table 1: Central and Sub-Indices for Assessing Globalization
| Central Indices | Sub-Indices |
| Economic |
• Trade flow index: These include the volume of foreign trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment, and income payments to foreign entities, all expressed as a percentage of GDP. • Trade restrictions: These encompass hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade, and capital account controls. |
| Political |
• Number of embassies abroad |
| Social |
• Personal contacts: This includes international telephone traffic, transfers (per cent of GDP), international tourism, average phone call costs, and Foreign Population (percent of the total population). • Information flows, through main telephone lines, cable TV, daily newspapers, and radio broadcasts, measured per 1,000 people, along with internet subscriptions and internet users as a percentage of the population. • Cultural proximity is also considered, reflected in indicators such as the number of foreign books and foreign restaurants in the country. |
The table indicates that the core pillars of globalization are the economic, political, and social indices, with some models adding the environmental index or subsuming it under the economic category. These central indices are further divided into 43 sub-indices[14], meaning that a country’s overall globalization score reflects its level of engagement in global affairs across political, economic and social dimensions, while also identifying which of these dimensions represents its deepest integration. In this context, monitoring Israel’s position within globalization metrics becomes essential for understanding how the interplay between central and sub-indices may signal the likelihood of success or failure in its foreign policy.
Second: Israel and Globalization Indices[15]
Israel’s existence as a political entity can be seen as a product of globalization, as it comprises a globalized society made up of people from dozens of countries and diverse cultures.[16] These social foundations have fostered Israel’s deep integration into global economic, social and political systems. Although Jews represent only 0.2% of the world’s population, they hold 1.1% of global wealth,[17] 5.5 times their demographic share, highlighting both their strong connection to and active role in economic globalization. Politically, Israel maintains diplomatic ties with 165 countries,[18] is a member of dozens of international organizations, and has signed over 150 international treaties, making it a key participant in advancing globalization.[19]
The global dispersion of Jews creates what some describe as a “globalized tribe,” which Israel actively engages to serve its strategic interests, functioning in many ways like a multinational corporation coordinating its global branches. This dynamic is echoed in a 2001 research paper by the World Jewish Congress, which identified Jews as “among the drivers of globalization.” Some scholars have even drawn links between the emergence of the world’s first multinational corporation (The Dutch East India Company, founded in 1602) and Jewish influence, particularly after Jews gained control of the company by the end of the 17th century, positioning them as among the earliest catalysts of globalization.[20]
However, Israel faces three fundamental challenges with globalization:
1. Globalization tends to dissolve local particularities in favor of broader cultural and ethnic frameworks. This clashes with Judaism, which particularly in some Orthodox traditions is a “closed” religion that does not readily accept converts. Jewish identity is often limited to those born to a Jewish mother or, in other interpretations, to those who undergo a complex conversion process.[21] Such exclusivity runs counter to globalization’s emphasis on fluid and inclusive cultural identities.
2. Secularism and economic-technological interdependence are key forces driving globalization. This trend erodes the religious foundation upon which Israel built its “historical justification.”[22] In this context, the vision of former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres clashes with the broader logic of globalization. Peres argued that “nations should live separately as political entities but together as economic units.”[23] Yet this view is at odds with the notion that organic interdependence—economic and technological—weakens mechanical bonds such as religion and language, as suggested by Émile Durkheim and both classical and contemporary theories of functional integration.[24] Some researchers and Jewish religious figures go further, linking the gradual and quiet rise in anti-Israel sentiment to the belief among those harmed by globalization that Jews are centrally involved in producing its burdens, given their association with the financial networks driving economic globalization. Simultaneously, a current within the Jewish community views globalization as promoting values that conflict with Jewish heritage. This convergence of cultural and economic opposition to globalization fuels broader resentment.[25] Elements of this perspective appear in the views of Shimon Peres, who argued that the “Jews are traditionally the people of the book, but in today’s world the book must fight its own against the screen. The depth of the book must compete against the speed of the screen…The screen, of course, has clear advantages in this struggle.” He adds, “The conflict shaping up as our century nears its close will be over the content of civilization, not over the territory they occupy.”[26]
3. Globalization assumes behavioral consistency with membership in international organizations. Given that Israel is the most defiant state when it comes to complying with the decisions of international political institutions, this places it in direct contradiction with one of globalization’s core mechanisms. To illustrate this, from 2006 through 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted 170 resolutions against Israel and 77 against other countries. During the same period, the UN Human Rights Council issued 108 resolutions condemning Israel, while the rest of the world received 74.[27] Moreover, the rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) following Operation al-Aqsa Flood further reinforced the image of Israel’s defiance of the norms of political globalization.
Adding to all this is Israel’s growing international isolation, as demonstrated in our previous study on its international status.[28] This suggests that Israel’s relationship with globalization is fraught with economic, social and political challenges. It reinforces our critique of Shimon Peres’s vision, which attempts to separate political from economic globalization, an illusion that leads to premature conclusions. A prominent example is the prediction made by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan just five days before Operation al-Aqsa Flood. At the time, Sullivan claimed that “the Middle East is quieter today than it has been in two decades,” attributing this to the economic normalization between Arab states and Israel. From that assessment, he derived a vision of the US role in globalization.[29]
Yet Operation al-Aqsa Flood exposed the region’s underlying instability, shattering the illusion of calm. Its shockwaves reverberated across the globe, disrupting both central and sub-indices of globalization, including within Israel itself.
A close examination of globalization indices at both the regional and global levels following Operation al-Aqsa Flood reveals the difficulty of isolating its various dimensions and highlights how these dimensions intersect and influence one another. The following globally impacted areas illustrate this interconnection:
• Air, land and maritime transportation.
• International trade flows, particularly between the region and the world or between Israel and other countries, which have been disrupted by military confrontations in and around the Red Sea, affecting both the volume of trade reaching Israeli ports and traffic through the Suez Canal.
• Migration rates from the region, especially in Israel.
• Fluctuations in the exchange rates of certain national currencies.
• The scale of political mobilization at both regional and international levels.
• The widening scope of legal actions by various states, whether through sanctions or in response to international court rulings.
• Shifts in global public opinion.
• The intensification of military globalization in the region and beyond.
Third: The Mega Trend of Israeli Globalization Indicators from 1970 up to before Operation al-Aqsa Flood
The period from 1970 to the end of 2022 (52 years) can be divided into three phases (see Chart 1):
1. First phase, 1970–1995: There is a noticeable upward trend in the globalization index, albeit with some fluctuations. This initial rise appears to be driven by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the influx of Jewish migration to Israel (social globalization). It also reflects the aftermath of the First and Second Gulf Wars, followed by the effects of Arab normalization with Israel; specifically, the Israeli treaties with Egypt (1979), the Palestine Liberation Organization (1993), and Jordan (1994). These developments collectively strengthened political and economic globalization on the Israeli side.
2. Second phase, 1995–2005, witnessed the Second Intifadah (2000) and the growing spread of armed Islamic organizations. Most researchers also consider this period to mark the height of liberalization in the Israeli economy,[30] paving the way for deeper integration into international markets and the broader currents of globalization. Between 1996 and 2005, the index saw a significant surge, peaking in 2005.
3. Third phase, 2006–2022, prior to Operation al-Aqsa Flood: This phase saw a nearly linear decline, eventually returning by its end to levels close to those before 2000, as shown in Chart. This trend appears to be driven by the global economic recession of 2007–2008, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 2006 war in Lebanon. More recently, the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, since October 2023, have affected all sectors of Israeli society.[31] In terms of international and regional ranking,[32] Israel ranked 39th globally (out of 182 countries), with an average score of 76.1% between 1970 and 2022. Notably, in 2023, it rose to 39th globally, with an average score of 76.45%.[33]
Chart 1: Overall Globalization Index in Israel 1970–2022[34]
When examining the central indices of Israeli globalization, the following stands out:
1. Economic Globalization Index (Chart 2):[35]
Israeli economic globalization, the most influential of the globalization indicators, followed an almost linear upward trend until around 2005. It then began to decline, falling from a peak score of 78.09 to 72 points by 2024. Notably, this downturn began nearly two decades before Operation al-Aqsa Flood, suggesting that the Operation acted as a catalyst rather than the root cause of the decline. Nevertheless, immediate post-Operation economic assistance from the US helped absorb much of the shock to Israel’s economic sectors, including tourism, foreign trade and external investment, etc. Estimates of US military aid to Israel vary, ranging from $12.5 billion to $17.9 billion by the end of 2024, increasing to $22 billion in the first months of 2025.[36] It is also worth noting that Israel’s decline in this area was partly influenced by the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (SRTI), as Israel is among the countries that have exceeded typical thresholds by imposing growing restrictions on this type of international trade,[37] an outcome closely linked to the impact of the Operation al-Aqsa Flood.
Chart 2: Economic Globalization Index in Israel 1970–2022
2. Political Globalization Index (Chart 3):[38]
Quantitative analysis reveals a marked rise in political globalization, gaining nearly thirty points between 1970 and the onset of the 2007–2008 global crisis. This upward trend then reverses, with a steady decline continuing through the economic downturn and into the period immediately preceding Operation al-Aqsa Flood.
Chart 3: Political Globalization Index in Israel 1970–2022
Social Globalization Index (Chart 4)
Chart 4: Social Globalization Index in Israel 1970–2022[39]
The decline in the social globalization index appears to align roughly in timing with the economic and political indices, reaffirming the overall downward trend in globalization.
4. Comparing Globalization Indices Before and After Operation al-Aqsa Flood
Table 2: Globalization Indices Before and After Operation al-Aqsa Flood[40]
| Globalization Index |
2022 | Global ranking |
2023 | Global ranking |
2024 | Global ranking |
| Overall | 76.1 | 39 | 76.45 | 39 | 76.1 | 39 |
| Political | 73.98 | 68 | 74.13 | 71 | 73.98 | 68 |
| Economic | 72.01 | 45 | 71.32 | 47 | 72 | 50 |
| Social | 82.32 | 27 | 83.9 | 34 | 82.32 | 27 |
Fourth: The Analysis
Table 2 show that Israel’s political globalization index consistently exceeds the global average. Until 2019, Israel ranked 72nd globally and 4th in the Middle East.[41] This rise appears linked to growing Arab openness to normalization, including international agreements with most Gulf countries, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, and some relations nearing de facto recognition with Oman, Qatar and Mauritania. Furthermore, the majority of Muslim countries in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) recognize Israel, increasing the number of Israeli embassies abroad. This likely explains the growth in diplomatic missions and international agreements before Operation al-Aqsa Flood, propelling Israel to 34th place globally in the diplomatic globalization index.[42]
However, the period following the outbreak of the war after Operation al-Aqsa Flood had a negative impact, as Israel dropped three ranks, and its political globalization index declined by approximately 0.15 points in the first year of the war.[43] This decline appears to be linked to the severing of diplomatic ties with Israel or the withdrawal of ambassadors by eleven countries, in addition to growing calls for punitive measures against Israel and the eruption of mass protests, especially following international court rulings against it.[44] Furthermore, internal political developments in Israel also contributed to the drop in the political index, including declining levels of freedom of expression, restrictions on political protests, and a weakening of civil society protections. Moreover, political instability widened, particularly after Operation al-Aqsa Flood, as Israel’s image deteriorated in global public perception.
Researchers point to several reasons behind the political instability in Israel since the late 1990s:
1. The significant diversity within Israeli society, which encourages the formation of numerous sectoral parties based on religion, origin or shared interests.
2. Cultural shifts resulting from the adoption of a utilitarian global outlook that has begun to spread within Israeli society and influence voting patterns.
3. The multiple scenarios for dissolving the Knesset, particularly given the inability to form a majority government without alliances with small parties that often exploit this leverage to extract concessions from larger blocs.
4. A steady increase in the number of political parties, coupled with a decreasing interval between Knesset elections.[45]
These factors, both collectively and individually, have contributed to the inability to form a stable government with enough electoral strength to lead sustained political processes. This has had a direct impact on foreign policy and, by extension, on political globalization. In Israel, there is a clear public perception of declining performance in foreign affairs, evident at both the general governmental level, where ratings dropped from 5.53 out of 10 in 2022 to 4.8 in 2023, and at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which declined from 5.4 to 5 over the same period.[46]
Fifth: Future Trajectory
Available data indicates that the first year of Operation al-Aqsa Flood (2024) had a negative impact on Israel’s economy, particularly in certain indicators of economic globalization. Around 1,700 millionaires left the cities of Tel Aviv and Herzliya following the outbreak of the operation, compounding existing concerns, especially among the wealthy, about the revival of judicial reforms. As a result, Tel Aviv dropped to the bottom of the list of the world’s top 50 cities for millionaires, ranking 48th, moving down one notch from last year, according to the annual World’s Wealthiest Cities Report. The 2025 report, prepared by Henley & Partners, which tracks global private wealth migration trends, in collaboration with the global data intelligence firm New World Wealth, revealed that the number of high-net-worth individuals or millionaires residing in Tel Aviv and Herzliya declined to 22,600, down from 24,300 the previous year. The wealth migration report noted that “Israel has dropped out of the top inflows list for the first time. This represents a major turnabout as Israel has been ranked among the Top 10 destinations for migrating millionaires for several decades” prior to Operation al-Aqsa Mosque. Each year, Henley & Partners lists the twenty countries that attracted the highest number of wealthy individuals. In 2023, Israel ranked twelfth, with 600 additional high-net-worth individuals settling there, down from eighth place in 2022. This indicates that Operation al-Aqsa Flood has contributed to a decline in the number of affluent investors seeking stability in Israel, as many have begun relocating their capital to safer destinations. In effect, Operation al-Aqsa Mosque not only shattered Israel’s image as a safe haven but also cast a shadow over its economic achievements, particularly in the high-tech sector, which relies heavily on funding from these wealthy investors to support its startup ecosystem.[47]
As a result of the above, the contribution of foreign investment to GDP growth has declined, falling during the war from a positive 1.6% to a –1.5%. It is projected to reach –0.5% in 2025 and 1.1% in 2026, thus remaining below its 2023 level. Meanwhile, Israel’s exports dropped from 1.1% in 2023 to –5.6% in 2024, while imports decreased from 7.5% in 2023 to –0.4% in the first year of Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[48] However, most other domestic economic indicators tend to show gradual improvement throughout 2025 and 2026, provided the international situation remains unchanged.[49]
The regional and international landscape is marked by significant fluidity, with numerous possible trajectories, particularly concerning political stability, due to global challenges such as Ukraine, Taiwan, the aftermath of Trump-era trade wars, and the outcomes of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. Added to this are potential internal shifts in Israel, amid growing domestic tensions. Measurement models show that Israel’s stability had already been declining prior to Operation al-Aqsa Flood: since 2019, its stability index fell from –0.82 to –1.46 in 2023.[50]
Some measurement models estimate that the violence resulting from military confrontations has negatively impacted the Israeli economy by up to 40%. This figure rises to 61% when factoring in not only direct military violence but also the effects of displacement, care services, and non-economic civil activities. As a result, Israel ranked among the ten most unstable countries in the world in 2024. Regionally, the average stability index stood at –2.423, while Israel’s score dropped to –3.115, marking a 0.297-point decline from 2023 and pushing it down 11 places in the global rankings.[51] This instability has been mirrored in the steady decline of Israel’s economic growth rate: from 6.3% in 2022 (before Operation al-Aqsa Flood) to 1.8% in 2023, and just 1% in 2024.[52]
If we add to that the aforementioned decline in both political and social globalization, Israel will, over the next five years, face increasing difficulty in reverting to the use of traditional globalization indices to repair what has unraveled since Operation al-Aqsa Flood, especially since this operation deepened the decline that was already underway prior to it.
The above data underscores the dangers of any Arab or Muslim state normalization with Israel, as Israel seeks to offset its global losses, reflected in globalization indices, by securing regional gains, particularly with Arab countries. This strategy aligns with Shimon Peres’s idea, as previously mentioned, of separating political globalization from economic globalization. This approach is evident in official Arab conduct: during the first year of the war, military imports from Israel by normalizing Arab countries, especially the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, rose to $1.8 billion, equivalent to 12% of Israel’s total arms exports in 2024.[53] Civil trade also increased with five Arab countries and 15 Muslim countries over the same period.[54] This indicates that Arab normalization helped compensate Israel for some of its losses in globalization indicators.
[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] Globalisation – have we reached a turning point?, site of Churches, Charities and Local Authorities (CCLA), 13/9/2022, https://www.ccla.co.uk/insights/globalisation-have-we-reached-turning-point
[3] To review the main themes in the ideological debate on the phenomenon of globalization, see the details in: Calance Madalina, “Globalization and The Conspiracy Theory,” Procedia Economics and Finance journal, vol. 23, 2015, pp. 677–681.
[4] For a detailed examination of how external factors (political, economic, military, environmental, social, cultural, sports-related, and others) shape a state’s foreign policy, along with the relevant measurement approaches, see Aron Raymond, “Foreign Policy and Globalization Theory: The case of Israel,” International Politics journal, vol. 48, no. 6, site of City Research Online, 16/7/2015, https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/6709/1/Aran_Foreign%20Policy%20and%20Globalization%20Theory_Open%20Access.pdf; Iliana Olivié and Ignacio Molina, Estudio Elcano 2 – Elcano Global Presence Index (IEPG), site of Elcano Royal Institute, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/monographs/estudio-elcano-2-elcano-global-presence-index-iepg; and Mina Yakop and Peter A.G. Bergeijk, Working Paper
No. 478: “The Weight of Economic and Commercial Diplomacy,” site of International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), August 2009, https://scispace.com/pdf/the-weight-of-economic-and-commercial-diplomacy-mj8xh81rd7.pdf
[5] Assaf Razin, “Globalization and Global Crises: Rest of the World vs. Israel,” Working Paper 28339, site of National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2021, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28339/w28339.pdf
World Trade to GDP Ratio, site of Macrotrends, https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/wld/world/trade-gdp-ratio; and Global trade hits record $33 trillion in 2024, driven by services and developing economies, site of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 14/3/2025, https://unctad.org/news/global-trade-hits-record-33-trillion-2024-driven-services-and-developing-economies
[6] Katharina McLarren and Bernhard Stahl, “How States Punch above Their Weight: Introducing Hybrid Actorness as Expanded Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Analysis journal, Vol. 21, Issue 1, January 2025, pp. 12–16.
[7] Aron Raymond, “Foreign Policy and Globalization Theory: The case of Israel,” International Politics, vol. 48, no. 6, 16/7/2015.
[8] Peterson K. Ozili, “Impact of the Israel-Hamas War on the global economy,” site of Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), 2025, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/123297/1/MPRA_paper_123297.pdf
[9] Mohamed El‑Shewy, Mark Griffiths and Craig Jones, “Israel’s War on Gaza in a Global Frame,” Antipode journal, vol. 57, Issue 1, 2025, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/anti.13094
[10] For details on this topic, see Fred Aja Agwu, Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization, Populism and Nationalism: A New Geopolitical Landscape (Singapore: Springer Verlag, 2021), pp. 1–56.
[11] Assaf Razin, “Israel’s Immigration Story: Globalization Lessons,” Working Paper 23210, National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2017, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23210/w23210.pdf
[12] 2023 KOF Globalisation Index, site of KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2023, https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2023/KOFGI_2023_method.pdf; and KOF Globalisation Index, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html
[13] For more details on the challenges of measuring globalization indicators, defining them, assigning weights, and using mathematical formulas to derive results and rank countries by their level of globalization, and for an overview of six models most commonly used by researchers in the field, especially the KOF Globalisation Index, which began measuring globalization in 1970, see Julia Zinkina, Andrey Korotayev and Aleksey I. Andreev, “Measuring globalization: Existing methods and their implications for teaching Global Studies and forecasting,” Campus-Wide Information Systems, vol. 30, No. 5, 2013, pp. 321–339; and Israel, Political Globalization Index, site of Maxinomics, https://www.maxinomics.com/israel/political-globalization-index
Regarding the weights of the indicators used by KOF for measurement, see KOF Globalisation Index, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html
The measurement models employ a normalization process by converting each variable into an index scaled from 1 to 100, where 100 is assigned to the maximum value of a specific variable over the whole sample of countries and the entire period of time. Principal component analysis is conducted using a rolling 10-year data window to determine the time-varying weights of major variables. While the weights of individual variables can change over the years, the weights of the sub‐indices are held fixed over the time horizon. The sub‐indices themselves are aggregated to higher ranked indices using equal weights.
[14] 2024 KOF Globalisation Index: Variables description, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2024/KOFGI_website_structure_variables2.pdf
[15] Israel: Overall Globalization, site of The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Israel/kof_overall_glob
[16] Total Immigration to Israel by Country of Origin (1948–Present), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-immigration-to-israel-by-country-of-origin; and site of Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 1/9/20216, https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/2016/2.ShnatonPopulation/st02_08x.pdf
[17] Christians hold largest percentage in global wealth: Report, site of Deccan Herald, 14/1/2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20170323035553/http://www.deccanherald.com/content/453467/christians-hold-largest-percentage-global.html6
[18] Countries that recognize Israel 2025, site of World Population Review, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-israel
[19] Treaties of Israel, site of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Treaties_of_Israel
[20] Rabbi Ari Kayser, Jews: The Global Tribe, site of Aish UK, https://www.aish.org.uk/content-article/jews_the_globaltribe
[21] Conversion to Judaism, site of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/judaism/beliefs/conversion.shtml; and Emily Harris, In Israel, A New Battle Over Who Qualifies as Jewish, site of NPR, 10/10/2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/10/10/445343896/in-israel-a-new-battle-over-who-qualifies-as-jewish
[22] Ann-Kathrin Biewener, “Secularization in the Holy Land: Challenges for the State Secularism and nationalism in Israel,” International Relations and Diplomacy journal, vol. 4, n. 11, November 2016, pp. 718–728.
[23] Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), p. 319.
[24] Mechanical and Organic Solidarity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/mechanical-and-organic-solidarity
[25] You may refer to the following source for a detailed discussion among Jewish rabbis on the challenges of globalization in Israel: Ira Rifkin, Jews & Globalization, site of My Jewish Learning, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/jews-globalization
[26] Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 357.
[27] 2024 UNGA Resolutions on Israel vs. Rest of the World, site of UN Watch, 3/11/2024, https://unwatch.org/2024-unga-resolutions-on-israel-vs-rest-of-the-world
[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Israel’s International Status Indicators, site of Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 30/4/2025, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2025/04/30/academic-paper-operation-al-aqsa-flood-and-israels-international-status-indicators/
[29] Jake Sullivan, The Sources of American Power, A Foreign Policy in A changed World, Foreign Affairs magazine, 24/10/2023, pp. 22–28.
[30] Zvi Eckstein and Tamar Ramot-Nyska, “Twenty years of financial liberalization in Israel: 1987–2007,” site of Bank for International Settlements, 2008, https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap44o.pdf
[31] Arthur Sullivan, Israeli economy moves toward normality despite the war, site of Deutsche Welle (DW), 24/4/2024, https://www.dw.com/en/israeli-economy-moves-toward-normality-despite-the-war/a-68901300
[32] Economic globalization–Country rankings, The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/kof_econ_glob/MENA
[33] Top 50 countries in the Globalization Index 2023, site of Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268168/globalization-index-by-country
[34] Israel: Overall Globalization, The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Israel/kof_overall_glob/
It is essential to recognize the difference between measurement models, which necessitates relying on a specific model due to the variation in measurement methods, see comparison with: Leading countries in the globalization index field of political globalization 2023, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268169/index-for-political-globalization
[35] Israel: Economic globalization, The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Israel/kof_econ_glob/
[36] Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, U.S. Aid to Israel in Four Charts, site of Council on Foreign Relations, 13/11/2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts; and US has spent $22B supporting Israel’s military since October 2023, site of Anadolu Agency, 31/12/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-has-spent-22b-supporting-israel-s-military-since-october-2023/3439052
[37] Israel: Services Trade Restrictiveness Index, site of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2025, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/services-trade-restrictiveness-index/oecd-stri-country-note-isr.pdf
[38] Israel: Political globalization, The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Israel/kof_pol_glob/
[39] Israel: Social globalization, The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Israel/kof_soc_glob/
[40] It is noticeable that some measurement models round figures to the nearest whole number, while others retain the decimal values. However, our comparison showed that these differences are not significant, which led us to adopt average values including decimals. Moreover, some indices cover the period only up to 2019 or present overall globalization scores without detailing the three dimensions—economic, political, and social. To address this and ensure consistency in measurement, I applied statistical normalization to the values of the different variables. For details, see:
Leading countries in the Globalization Index field of economic globalization 2023, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268171/index-of-economic-globalization; KOF Globalisation Index, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html; Israel, Economic Globalization Index, Maxinomics, https://www.maxinomics.com/israel/economic-globalization-index; Israel, Social Globalization Index, Maxinomics, https://www.maxinomics.com/israel/social-globalization-index; Israel, Political Globalization Index, Maxinomics, https://www.maxinomics.com/israel/political-globalization-index; Top 50 countries in the Globalization Index 2023, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268168/globalization-index-by-country; and Israel: Overall Globalization, The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Israel/kof_overall_glob/
[41] Israel, Political Globalization Index, Maxinomics, https://www.maxinomics.com/israel/political-globalization-index
[42] Network Map, Global Diplomacy Index, site of Lowy Institute, https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/
[43] See quantitative details on the number of diplomatic missions, consulates and related entities, in Rankings, Global Diplomacy Index, site of Lowy Institute, https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/country_ranking
[44] The Diplomatic Off‑Ramp After Israel’s Invasion of Gaza, site of TIME, 31/10/2023, https://time.com/6330197/diplomacy-israels-invasion-of-gaza; After Colombia, now Turkey: Which other nations have cut ties with Israel over Gaza war?, site of Firstpost, 3/5/2024, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/colombia-turkey-nations-israel-gaza-war-13766667.html; and Nine countries are launching legal action against Israel over Gaza war, site of Global Voices, 3/2/2025, https://globalvoices.org/2025/02/03/nine-countries-are-launching-legal-action-against-israel-over-gaza-war
[45] Erez Cohen, “Political instability in Israel over the last decades–Causes and consequences,” Cogent Social Sciences, vol. 10, Issue 1, 2024, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2023.2293316#d1e1126
[46] Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (Mitvim), “Israeli Foreign Policy Index 2023: Findings of the Mitvim Institute Survey,” site of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, September 2023, https://israel.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Israeli_Foreign_Policy_Index_2023.pdf
[47] “The Henley Private Wealth Migration Report 2024,” site of Henley & Partners, https://www.henleyglobal.com/publications/henley-private-wealth-migration-report-2024; and Tel Aviv drops in global ranking of top 50 wealthiest cities as millionaires decamp, site of The Times of Israel, 8/4/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/tel-aviv-drops-in-global-ranking-of-top-50-wealthiest-cities-as-millionaires-decamp
[48] “OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2025,” OECD, 2/4/2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-israel-2025_d6dd02bc-en.html
[49] “OECD Economic Outlook,” OECD, Volume 2024 Issue 2, December 2024, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/economic-outlook/eo116/EO116_Annexes_E.pdf
[50] Israel: Political stability, The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Israel/wb_political_stability
[51] Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World (Sydney: IEP, June 2024), https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf
[52] OECD sees Israel economy grow above global average in 2025, warns of high cost of living, The Times of Israel, 2/4/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/oecd-sees-israel-economy-grow-above-global-average-in-2025-warns-of-high-cost-of-living
[53] Sumit Ahlawat, Israel’s Military Export Breaks Record! Arab Countries Emerge One Of Top Importers, Europe Stays No.1 Market, site of The EurAsian Times, 6/6/2025, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/israels-military-exports-break-record-arab/
[54] Mamdouh Al‑Wali, Israel continues to increase trade with Arab and Muslim world, site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 6/11/2024,https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241106-israel-continues-to-increase-trade-with-arab-and-muslim-world
| Click here to download: >> Academic Paper: Globalization Challenges in Israel and the Impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood… Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay (19 pages, 1.8 MB) |
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