Political Analysis: Mounting Pressure to Conclude a Deal in Gaza

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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

Following the end of the military confrontation between Iran and Israel, the assault on Gaza Strip (GS) has once again taken center stage.

Netanyahu may now see a more favorable climate for a deal in GS, especially after his popularity rose following the strike on Iran and the attempted blow to its nuclear program, an operation widely seen as a major strategic success. This shift has given him broader room to maneuver, particularly as the far-right religious bloc’s influence on this issue has diminished. Israel’s Channel 12 has reported signs from officials within the ruling coalition, including Likud, calling for an end to the war on GS, amid a growing belief that Israel is incurring greater costs than any potential gains.

In a recent article, military affairs expert Avi Askhenazi, writing for Maariv, described a growing public sentiment favoring an end to the war. He noted that Israel is mired in the GS quagmire, with its continued presence unjustified, lacking a clear objective, and sustained by an exhausted army. A similar view was expressed by Ariela Ringel Hoffman in Yedioth Ahronoth. Meanwhile, a poll published by Walla! website on 25/6/2025, after the confrontation with Iran had ended, revealed that 67% of the Israeli public supports ending the war on GS.

Pushing in this direction is the fact that the opportunity Trump gave Netanyahu to break the truce and try his luck at crushing the resistance has exceeded three months without producing tangible results. On the contrary, the Israeli military’s use of the most extreme forms of brutality, killing, starvation, displacement, and destruction, has only intensified the humanitarian suffering of innocent civilians in GS while simultaneously exposing the ugly face of Israel and deepening its isolation. This has reached a point where even its traditional Western allies have rejected and condemned these actions, calling for an end to the aggression, with some moving toward recognizing the Palestinian state.

Meanwhile, in light of striking Iran’s nuclear program, Trump increased his desire to accelerate the normalization and peace process in the region. While he believed that crushing Hamas and the resistance would help create a favorable environment for normalization, it became clear that this goal was unattainable, and that prolonging the war on GS would neither allow him to advance his normalization project nor expand the Abraham Accords. Ending the war and reaching a deal became a more viable option. Furthermore, his policy of reducing external support has resulted in withholding a permanent blank check of US military and financial aid to Israel.

Notably, the alternative mechanisms of control and domination that Israel attempted to implement in GS, such as the aid delivery system through a US-based organization “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation,” or efforts to promote, shield and legitimize criminal gangs and mafias (e.g., Yasir Abu Shabab) as substitutes for Hamas, all failed disastrously and proved entirely ineffective. The aid mechanism was used as a tool for “engineering starvation” and as a means of humiliating the people, turning into traps of death. In less than a month, over 510 people were killed and around 3,800 others injured at its distribution points. This mechanism was met with widespread rejection and global condemnation. Meanwhile, the Abu Shabab gang and similar groups lost ground and found no backing except for Israel’s disgraceful cover.

As for the recent escalation in the resistance’s performance and qualitative operations, most notably the Khan Yunis operation, in which the Israeli army acknowledged the killing of seven soldiers and the wounding of 16 others, it strongly underscores the resilience of the resistance more than 620 days into the assault on GS. This coincides with numerous reports of exhaustion within the Israeli army, as well as calls from several military leaders—including former Chiefs of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, Herzi Halevi, and Ehud Barak—to bring the war to an end.

The Israeli Behavior

These developments may prompt Netanyahu to lower his expectations regarding GS and pursue a course more aligned with US preferences and those of his Western allies. Efforts may be made to revive a modified version of the Witkoff proposal, with attempts to improve the Israeli terms compared to the previous truce agreement. The unresolved issues—ending the war, full withdrawal from the Strip, disarmament of the resistance and the removal of Hamas from the Palestinian political scene—will remain tools of pressure, bargaining and blackmail until the very last moment, and until Israel has exhausted all its cards and tactics.

The Palestinian Resistance Behavior

In contrast, after all these sacrifices and having become the hope of the Palestinian people and a global source of inspiration, the resistance has no alternative but to maintain steadfastness and continue resistance. It cannot sign any agreement that would reward Netanyahu for his crimes, but rather will seek to pressure him into being removed from power. Therefore, it is expected that Hamas and the Palestinian resistance forces will aim to:

• Escalate resistance, and increase the costs of occupation on Israel, turning it into a failing operation whose losses increase over time, frustrating Israel from achieving its goals.

• Foil alternative solutions such as Abu Shababs’ gangs and others, while strengthening social cohesion.

• Defeat the “starvation engineering” and the mechanism of humiliation imposed through the aid system.

• Maintain firmness on core principles and fundamentals while showing flexibility on secondary matters, making the end of the war, Israel’s withdrawal from GS, meeting the needs of the Palestinian people, and ensuring that the day after in GS is a purely Palestinian internal affair, guiding principles in any future deal.

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This indicates that the gap still exists and that reaching an agreement may take time. The deal could take a temporary form, a partial one, or be implemented in stages, leaving room for Israel to renege on its commitments whenever it sees fit, or to interpret the agreement to its advantage. This underscores the need for the resistance to demand stronger guarantees, clearer conditions and detailed implementation mechanisms, as well as to scrutinize the wording more carefully. It also means keeping their finger on the trigger.