Strategic Assessment (142): Palestinian Engagement with the Trump Plan and the UN Security Council Resolution on the Future of Gaza

Reading Time: 16 minutes

By: Majid Ibrahim Abu Diak.[*]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).

Summary

This assessment examines how Palestinians have responded to Donald Trump’s plan and UN Security Council Resolution 2803 on the future of Gaza Strip (GS). Adopted with strong US pressure to halt the war and contain its regional repercussions, the resolution also sought to facilitate Israel’s international reintegration. However, despite ending the genocidal war, it entails serious risks, most notably the imposition of an international trusteeship over GS through a “Board of Peace (BoP)” and an international military force; efforts to disarm the resistance; the conditioning of reconstruction on political and security requirements; the subjection of GS to Israeli domination and coercive leverage; and its effective separation from the West Bank (WB).

The resistance, led by Hamas, signaled conditional acceptance of a ceasefire while firmly rejecting both international trusteeship and disarmament. By contrast, the Palestinian Authority (PA) welcomed the plan without articulating a clear critique of its inherent risks, while simultaneously seeking to assume governance of the GS.

The assessment examined four potential scenarios for Israeli conduct and concluded that the two most plausible were, first, an effort to legitimize the occupation by converting a transitional arrangement into a permanent reality, and second, a scenario of partial de-escalation achieved through an incomplete Israeli withdrawal accompanied by a limited easing of the blockade, while key instruments of political and security coercion remain in place. Concurrently, the assessment identified three potential Palestinian responses. The first envisages the attainment of Palestinian unity capable of imposing its own conditions and strategic vision on the proposed plan in a manner consistent with the supreme interests of the Palestinian people. The second entails a partial convergence between the PA and the plan, whereby the PA positions itself as a cooperative alternative, acceptable to both Arab and international actors, to replace the resistance in administering GS. The third scenario involves the establishment of a genuine national partnership and the process of putting the Palestinian political house in order. Ultimately, however, the assessment leaned toward the second scenario, deeming it the most realistic in the short term, albeit also the most detrimental.

Accordingly, it recommends the unification of the Palestinian position and a calibrated, pragmatic engagement with the plan to minimize its harmful effects, while prioritizing the supreme interests of the Palestinian people and upholding the unity of the land, the right to resistance, and the protection of civilians. Furthermore, it calls for strengthening the resilience of the Palestinian people in the WB and Jerusalem, confronting policies of land confiscation and Judaization, and consolidating an Arab and Islamic position opposed to such measures.

Introduction

UN Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted on 17/11/2025 and endorsing US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire plan for the GS, constituted the culmination of an initiative launched by the US president following the failure of the Israeli attack targeting the negotiating delegation in Qatar on 9/9/2025. This episode led Trump to a firm conviction that decisive intervention was necessary to curb Israeli escalation, which threatened to undermine his longer-term strategic objectives in the region and beyond.

At the same time, the initiative sought to extricate Israel from its deepening international isolation resulting from the continuation of the genocidal campaign against the GS. In this context, the US president conveyed an unambiguous message to Israel when he stated on 2/9/2025, “They may be winning the war, but they’re not winning the world of public relations,” adding that “They’re gonna have to get that war over with… It is hurting Israel.”

This growing pariah status was, in turn, closely linked to Israel’s systematic targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in the GS, reflecting its profound failure to subdue the resistance or to secure the release of its captives by force.

Nonetheless, the plan simultaneously treated the resistance in GS as if it had been defeated, portraying the Strip as a devastated territory in need of international reconstruction. Within this framing, Palestinian concessions, including acceptance of international trusteeship and burdensome conditions, were presented as necessary prerequisites for ending the conflict.

Furthermore, the plan was situated within a broader strategic agenda, reflecting the US administration’s objective of closing the Gaza file to facilitate the revival of the Abraham Accords initiated by Trump during his first term. Success in this endeavor would not only advance Israel’s regional integration but also allow the US president to redirect focus toward countering China’s rising influence and contribute to efforts to resolve the Russia–Ukraine war.

Concurrently, the initiative aligned with Trump’s self-styled image as a “peacemaker” worthy of the Nobel Prize prior to the completion of his second term. Consistent with this, the plan’s first provision called for the release of all Israeli captives.

The plan, and its subsequent endorsement by the Security Council, reflected the prevailing weakness and paralysis of the Arab and Muslim world, which effectively precluded the use of Russia’s veto. Eight Arab and Muslim countries supported the US president’s plan, enabling its passage in the Security Council, while Russia and China opted merely to abstain.

Nevertheless, countries such as Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye continue to register reservations regarding the plan, particularly concerning the authority of the BoP, the role of the international force, and the issue of disarming the resistance.

Implications and Risks of the Resolution for the Palestine Issue and the Resistance

The US president’s 20-point plan proposes the establishment of an international BoP to administer GS until the end of 2027, with the possibility of extension by Security Council decision. This body would supervise the formation of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee and mandate an International Stabilization Force (ISF) tasked with ensuring security in GS and disarming the resistance. Moreover, the resolution provides for reconstruction funding to be managed through international institutions, such as the World Bank, and calls for the formation of a Palestinian apolitical implementation committee, subject to the oversight of international bodies to guarantee alignment with the requirements and conditions of the transitional phase.

The resolution entails several significant risks:

1. BoP could effectively exercise trusteeship over the Palestinian people by overseeing the technocratic government, managing the Palestinian police, and controlling the distribution of aid.

2. The ISF may directly intervene in Palestinian affairs, including efforts to disarm the resistance or the “decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups.”

3. The plan seeks to legitimize the ongoing authority of the BoP through US support rather than Security Council mechanisms, with no defined timeframe for its mandate and the possibility of extending its powers until the end of 2027.

4. The plan proposes “establishing a credible path to Palestinian self-determination and statehood,” drawing on the joint French–Saudi proposal, which envisions the PA conducting transparent general and presidential elections within one year of a ceasefire in GS. Yet, it simultaneously conditions this trajectory on the PA’s completion of its reform program, effectively rendering the process contingent upon US and Israeli requirements. Consequently, the PA faces sustained pressure to cooperate on security matters against its own people in the WB to fulfill these conditions, a dynamic that risks undermining Palestinian unity.

5. The implementation of the plan may be confined to its first phase, given Israel’s ongoing daily violations, including attacks on Palestinian civilians and repeated breaches of the “yellow line,” which could effectively consolidate Israeli control over 53% of GS in the absence of guarantees for full withdrawal.

6. Israel’s persistent restrictions on the entry of sufficient aid, coupled with severe limitations on shelter materials such as tents and mobile homes, constitute violations of the plan and further exacerbate the humanitarian plight of Palestinian civilians.

The continuation of this trajectory risks transforming the war on GS from one of genocide into a conflict of subjugation and domination, alongside intensified pressures in the WB and Jerusalem, manifested through accelerated settlement expansion, Judaization and land confiscation.

This situation carries profound risks, including the potential fragmentation of GS, given the absence of commitments to a full Israeli withdrawal, a halt to annexation and Judaization in the WB, or a genuine pledge toward a Palestinian state that preserves territorial unity.

Accordingly, the resolution neither ends the war nor establishes a reliable pathway to a political solution; instead, it enables Israel to consolidate facts on the ground through force and domination, exploiting the US-led initiative to conclude the conflict without offering meaningful commitments to the Palestinian side.

Resistance and PA Responses to the Plan

On 3/10/2025, Hamas, representing the resistance, responded to Trump’s plan by agreeing to the release of all Israeli captives, both living and deceased, and to the transfer of governance of GS to a Palestinian technocratic authority grounded in national consensus and supported by the Arab and Muslim world. Nonetheless, Hamas stressed that the future of GS and the rights of the Palestinian people must be determined within an inclusive Palestinian national framework, in which it would participate fully and responsibly.

Musa Abu Marzuq, a senior Hamas leader and head of its international relations, explained the rationale behind this position by emphasizing that “the priority is to stop the war and the massacres; from this perspective, we responded positively to the plan proposed by the US president.” He nevertheless qualified this stance by noting that Hamas accepted the plan in principle, under its main headings, while its implementation would require further negotiation. This approach was intended to avoid signaling outright rejection that might impede its application.

By contrast, Trump deliberately framed Hamas’s response as full approval, despite its conditional nature and its limitation to the first phase of the plan. He subsequently publicized this alleged “approval” on the Truth Social platform and moved swiftly to advance the plan in the UN Security Council, applying considerable pressure on influential Arab and Muslim countries to secure their support within the Council.

Palestinian factions endorsed Hamas’s response to the US proposal, characterizing it as a “responsible national position” reached after extensive consultations among them, and calling on all parties to complete the necessary steps to expedite an end to the aggression.

They further urged the PA to immediately fulfill its assigned responsibilities, including convening an urgent national meeting to discuss implementation mechanisms for transferring the administration of the GS to an independent Palestinian body, as well as to address the broader national agenda at this critical juncture in Palestinian history.

Palestinian President Mahmud ‘Abbas welcomed the US president’s announcement of an end to the war in the GS. The PA also declared its full readiness to cooperate in implementing the resolution and to assume comprehensive responsibility for the GS within the framework of the unity of land, people, and institutions, affirming that the Strip is an integral part of the State of Palestine.

Consequently, the Palestinian position converged on acceptance of a ceasefire. Nevertheless, while the resistance conditioned any engagement with international trusteeship on broad Palestinian consensus, the PA largely bypassed this issue, instead emphasizing the linkage between the WB and the GS to assert its claim to govern GS and to exclude Hamas from participation in that process.

However, the positions of the Palestinian factions became more clearly articulated following the Security Council’s adoption of the Trump plan on 17/11/2025. Hamas argued that the resolution “imposes an international trusteeship over the GS, advances objectives that Israel failed to achieve through its brutal genocidal war, detaches the GS from the broader Palestinian geography, and seeks to impose new faits accomplis.” Moreover, it contended that assigning the international force operational roles within the GS, including the disarmament of the resistance, undermines that force’s neutrality and effectively transforms it into a party to the conflict in Israel’s favor. This assessment was echoed by Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI) and other resistance factions.

By contrast, and despite the clarity of factional positions on the Security Council resolution, the PA has refrained from advancing any substantive assessment or explicit criticism, despite the fact that the resolution imposes conditions on the PA’s eligibility to govern the GS, encroaches upon Palestinian sovereignty, and seeks to detach GS from the WB.

It is equally apparent that the PA continues to bet on exclusive control over the GS, while rejecting any form of power-sharing with other Palestinian forces, most notably Hamas. This approach has been bolstered by the political support it received at the Extraordinary Arab–Islamic summit convened in Riyadh on 12/11/2024. Consequently, the PA has maintained, and continues to maintain, that the technocratic government designated to administer the GS must remain under its sole authority.

The Trump Plan: Where Is It Headed?

Forecasting the trajectory of the Trump plan following its adoption by the UN Security Council is challenging, particularly as its authority derives largely from US power rather than from Security Council mechanisms under Chapter VII. Nonetheless, current developments, especially considering the positions of both the Palestinian forces and Israel, indicate that its implementation is likely to encounter significant obstacles.

A primary challenge lies in Israel’s continued violations, including the targeting of civilians and pursuit of resistance members and leaders, justified as responses to attacks inside and beyond the “Yellow Line.” Crucially, the US has exerted no effective pressure to halt these breaches.

The BoP similarly faces strong Palestinian opposition regarding its role and legitimacy. Resistance factions contend that its mandate should be confined to ensuring implementation of the Trump plan and the uninterrupted delivery of agreed aid. Yet the Council’s founding resolution assigns it broader powers, including oversight of the international force responsible for disarming the resistance and supervision of the technocratic apolitical Palestinian committee.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan endorsed this perspective, stating on 13/12/2025 that the proposed BoP in GS must address the security challenges created by Israel, while also accusing Israel of violating the ceasefire agreement.

Developments in the BoP composition have reflected the influence of Arab state pressure. According to the Financial Times, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair “has been dropped from consideration for Donald Trump’s “board of peace” in Gaza, following objections from several Arab and Muslim states.”

According to Financial Times and the US outlet Axios, Nikolay Mladenov, the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, is expected to serve as the alternative candidate to lead GS during the second phase of the post-war implementation. Nonetheless, Blair “is expected to sit on the executive committee alongside Kushner and Trump adviser Steve Witkoff, along with senior officials from Arab and western countries,” indicating that his exclusion is not absolute. As of this writing, the identities of the other council members remain unknown.

With regard to ISF, mediating states have stressed that its mandate should be strictly limited to separating Palestinian and Israeli forces and ensuring the maintenance of the ceasefire. Türkiye has expressed its readiness to participate, a position endorsed by the US as a means of moderating Hamas’s stance. Nonetheless, Israeli statements have categorically rejected such involvement.

In this context, a joint Qatari–Egyptian statement issued on 9/11/2025 called for clearly defining ISF’s mandate and authority in GS, in a manner that supports early recovery and reconstruction efforts. This position was subsequently reaffirmed at a Qatari–Egyptian meeting held in Doha on 6/12/2025. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr ‘Abdelatty further emphasized the necessity of deploying international forces, noting that “one party, Israel, violates the ceasefire daily; hence, the presence of observers is essential.” He also emphasized that the Rafah land crossing “will not serve as a gateway for displacement, but solely to deliver humanitarian and medical aid to Gaza,” in response to Israel’s unilateral announcement to open the crossing for the exit of Palestinians.

Meetings have been scheduled in Doha to coordinate the operations of the international forces. On 12/12/2025, US officials informed Reuters that ISF “would not fight Hamas,” and lots countries have expressed their willingness to contribute. This arrangement reflects the initial deployment plan, which positions the forces beyond the Yellow Line under Israeli control, thereby avoiding direct engagement with Hamas.

Axios reported that “Two Israeli officials said UN Ambassador Mike Waltz… told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials that the Trump administration is going to lead the ISF and appoint a two-star general as its commander.”

Although the US president declared that the ISF in GS would be deployed “very soon,” states remain reluctant to participate, fearing potential confrontation with the Palestinian factions. The weeks following the ceasefire have underscored that Hamas retains significant military capabilities and continues to exert control over critical aspects of civilian life in GS.

While an agreement was reached to establish a technocratic Palestinian government, excluding both Hamas and the PA, and secured the endorsement of Egypt as well as the Extraordinary Arab–Islamic summit in Riyadh in 2024, the Trump plan seeks to link this government to the BoP. This linkage is firmly rejected by the Palestinians and approached with caution by mediating states.

It is noteworthy that the formation of this government resulted from intra-Palestinian dialogues facilitated by Egypt, following the PA’s refusal to form a unified Palestinian leadership to manage the forthcoming phase, including preparations for legislative and presidential elections encompassing all Palestinians.

Scenarios for the Israeli Approach to Gaza

Scenario One: The formalization of occupation, effectively converting the transitional situation into a permanent one. This would entail maintaining control over more than half of GS (beyond the “yellow line”) under the pretext that Hamas has not relinquished its weapons and that Israeli conditions for administering GS have not been fulfilled. Simultaneously, the blockade would persist, accompanied by targeted military strikes and limited incursions into areas under Palestinian control, thereby ensuring the continuation of the existing status quo. However, this position is likely to face US opposition, as Trump is expected to pressure Israel to implement the second phase of the agreement in order to promote the Abraham Accords and refocus US strategic attention on the Ukrainian, and subsequently the Chinese, files, the latter being the administration’s top priority.

Scenario Two: A scenario of partial easing under US pressure would entail an incomplete Israeli withdrawal from GS, accompanied by a limited relaxation of the blockade and facilitated entry of humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials. However, Israel would continue to enforce the plan by conditioning the composition of the technocratic government and the Palestinian police, thereby confining their presence to specific areas and permitting only a limited deployment of international forces with primarily monitoring roles, without direct engagement with the resistance.

Scenario Three: A comprehensive easing, entailing a full or near-complete Israeli withdrawal, unrestricted entry of aid, goods and reconstruction materials according to agreed terms, and the formation of a technocratic government acceptable to all parties. It would also involve the full deployment of Palestinian police throughout the territory, the establishment of a mutually acceptable framework regarding the resistance’s weapons, and a manageable arrangement concerning BoP and ISF, acceptable from both Palestinian and wider Arab perspectives.

Scenario Four: The failure of the Trump plan could precipitate a resumption of Israeli military aggression against GS, with attempts to seize fully the areas controlled by the resistance, effectively returning GS to a state of war and confrontation. Such a scenario would likely entail efforts to enforce displacement within GS, accompanied by renewed international mobilization against Israeli measures and policies.

As of this writing, the most probable outcomes in the near term appear to fall between Scenarios One and Two. However, the third scenario seems plausible only if significant changes occur, such as Israeli elections removing Likud and the religious right or increased pressure from Trump on Israel.

In contrast, the fourth scenario is unlikely, as the plan has UN Security Council approval, and blocking it would anger the US president. Furthermore, the Israeli government seeks to avoid derailing the plan to maintain Trump’s favor, especially since Netanyahu aims to secure his support for potential strikes against Iran, requiring at least partial implementation of the plan in GS.

Potential Palestinian Responses

First Potential Response: The realization of comprehensive national unity, encompassing Fatah, Hamas and all other Palestinian factions, across all principal issues addressed by the Trump plan and the Security Council resolution. This would entail a collective rejection of the BoP and any engagement with it, even if established; a firm insistence that the formation of a technocratic government remain an exclusively Palestinian decision; the designation of the ISF solely as a buffer along ceasefire lines, without authority to intervene in disarming the resistance; and the establishment of a framework for managing the resistance’s weapons that is acceptable to all Palestinian factions.

Second Potential Response: The PA in Ramallah partially aligns with both the Security Council resolution and the Trump plan, while selectively accommodating certain demands of the resistance. It seeks to present itself as an alternative to Hamas and the other Palestinian forces in governing GS, marginalizing them from decision-making and excluding them from meaningful political participation. The PA would also be prepared to exert pressure for their disarmament and cooperate with Israel, as well as with Arab and international actors, to demonstrate its capacity to fulfill Israeli conditions. Concurrently, the PA would aim either to supplant the BoP or render it largely symbolic, assume control over the technocratic government, oversee security in GS directly, and restrict the operational scope of the ISF.

Third Potential Response: The realization of the first scenario, supplemented by a broader effort to put the Palestinian political house in order and to institutionalize genuine power-sharing among all Palestinian factions in national decision-making. This would entail the establishment of a transitional leadership mandated to oversee the reconstitution and re-election of Palestinian representative bodies, including the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the PA.

The first potential response appears unlikely, given the PA’s current stance, yet it remains under consideration. Practical challenges stem from the leadership’s reluctance to adopt firm positions under Israeli, US and normalization-related pressures, although it remains plausible as it reflects the minimal core of Palestinian national interests and may secure Arab acceptance, and possibly international support, as a less risky pathway out of the “GS impasse.” Importantly, it does not require the PA or PLO leadership to relinquish institutional positions or incur political costs associated with putting the Palestinian political house in order.

By contrast, the third potential response remains largely unattainable under current Palestinian, Arab and international conditions, particularly in light of persistent efforts to criminalize the Palestinian forces and dismantle their weapons. It is further constrained by the continued leadership of Mahmud ‘Abbas over both the PA and the PLO, given the prevailing governing approach under which decisions are made. Accordingly, the second potential response remains viable and is even considered likely in the near term, with the PA potentially seeking to promote and test it.

Such a course, however, risks deepening Palestinian weakness and fragmentation, while simultaneously intensifying pressure on the resistance. Moreover, the PA’s capacity to act “by proxy” on behalf of Israel in disarming the Palestinian forces appears limited and fraught with a high likelihood of failure, particularly in light of widespread Palestinian resentment and opposition to assuming such a role. This, in turn, could further undermine the PA’s standing, potentially paving the way for a movement led by Palestinian resistance forces aimed at establishing a comprehensive national program focused on safeguarding the resistance and its achievements, strengthening national steadfastness, and confronting plans of tutelage and occupation.

Recommendations and Proposals for Confronting the Plan

In sum, the assessment demonstrates that the implementation of the Trump plan in its current form would cause significant harm to the Palestine issue, drawing it into a framework of international trusteeship and rendering it contingent upon the Israeli position. This position seeks to undermine the Palestine issue through annexation, Judaization and displacement in WB and GS, while simultaneously working to block progress toward the plan’s second phase, which stipulates a subsequent Israeli withdrawal from the GS.

Accordingly, given the strong momentum and US backing behind the plan, the most viable role for Palestinians lies in minimizing its detrimental effects on both the Palestine issue and the Palestinians. This can be achieved by exploiting the plan’s ambiguities and general provisions, leveraging the Palestinian forces’ capabilities on the ground, drawing upon Arab states’ cautious stances regarding certain aspects of implementation, and urging the guarantor states to enforce compliance with the ceasefire and restrain ongoing Israeli violations.

Undeniably, Palestinian political unity represents a critical source of strength in countering the plan’s ramifications, which also seek to undermine the PA’s role and legitimacy. Therefore, it is imperative, at a minimum, to coordinate Palestinian positions around the plan, with a view toward developing a comprehensive national strategy that consolidates the ceasefire, delineates the civilian role of the technocratic government within a national consensus supportive of its effectiveness, free from foreign trusteeship, and establishes a national program backing the resistance in all its forms. Such measures are essential, as the resistance remains the most effective instrument for countering Israel’s settlement, annexation, and displacement initiatives in both WB and GS.

Palestinian Response: Key Proposals

1. At this stage, the foremost Palestinian objective should be to prevent a renewed war in GS, while simultaneously ensuring that Israel does not perceive Palestinian options as constrained or interpret their position as one of surrender or retreat.

2. Palestinians should resist pressures for disarmament or the expansion of the international force’s mandate beyond its role in maintaining “peace” and facilitating a complete Israeli withdrawal from GS. This could be achieved by promoting a multi-year ceasefire framework in GS, incorporating reciprocal commitments from both parties and underpinned by Arab, Muslim and US guarantees for both sides.

3. Reject the disarmament of the Palestinian resistance, while demonstrating flexibility in managing the weapons issue within a Palestinian domestic framework, employing adaptable approaches that could garner Arab support and potentially gain limited US acquiescence.

4. Avoid direct confrontation with ISF, instead seeking to cooperate with it to protect civilians and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, while linking its presence to a clear pathway toward ending the occupation and leveraging it as a protective umbrella for the Palestinian people against Israeli attacks.

5. Uphold the demand for a complete Israeli withdrawal from GS, insisting on the phased implementation of this withdrawal in accordance with the provisions outlined in the proposed plan.

6. Maintain pressure for the swift implementation of the agreement, advancing to the reconstruction phase, and ensuring that aid and shelter materials for the Palestinian people are delivered through established UN mechanisms.

7. Capitalize on the provisions concerning the ISF, particularly those affirming its subordination to international law, while underscoring that, under international law, peoples possess the inherent right to resist occupation.

8. Treat the technocratic government as a temporary measure designed to culminate in elections or a broader national consensus.

9. Enhance the resilience of the Palestinian population in the WB and Jerusalem, actively countering policies of land confiscation and Judaization, while consolidating the Arab and Islamic position opposed to such measures.

10. Reaffirm that GS, WB and Jerusalem constitute a single, indivisible entity.

11. Ensure that responses to the plan are grounded in national consensus, incorporating the perspectives of independent figures and clans, and presenting their positions on the BoP, ISF and disarmament as reflective of the broader Palestinian populace.

12. Sustain continuous advocacy on the issue of prisoners, mobilizing popular support and strategically escalating both domestic and international efforts to secure their release.