By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).
Introduction
Three organizational frameworks overlap conceptually but differ in their activities and objectives:[2]
1. Interest Group: Any association of individuals or organizations united by shared interests, hobbies, professional goals, or other common interests, whether broad or narrowly defined. An interest group need not be a political party.
2. Pressure Group: A politically active type of interest group whose primary objective is to influence government decisions, legislation or public opinion on a specific issue by directly pressuring decision-makers. This may involve organizing demonstrations, conducting media campaigns, or mobilizing public opinion. However, pressure groups do not seek to “take power.”
3. Lobby: An organized group that seeks to influence government officials, legislators, or decision-making processes through direct communication and persuasion. Its activities may include meeting with officials, presenting research, negotiating, and, at times, providing financial support, etc.
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The political literature varies in how it conceptualizes these three categories. US scholarship, in particular, often uses the terms interchangeably when examining influences on public policymaking. European scholarship, however, tends to draw sharper distinctions: every pressure group is an interest group, but not every interest group is necessarily a pressure group. At the same time, “interest group” has become increasingly prevalent as the term has expanded to encompass grassroots campaigns, public relations and policy monitoring. By contrast, “lobby” generally refers to an organized group that pursues a political objective by seeking to influence decision-making on specific issues.[3]
In this study, we use the term “pressure groups” to refer to “Israeli-Jewish-Zionist organizations” that seek to influence Chinese policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in ways that advance Israeli interests. They do so by establishing channels of communication with political authorities, political actors, elites and Chinese society, while seeking to shape or reinforce their positions in line with Israeli objectives. They therefore develop actionable insights and policy perspectives for decision-makers. In this sense, they can be understood as “interest groups” that exert “political pressure” through both direct and indirect means.[4]
First: Historical Overview of Chinese-Jewish, Zionist and Israeli Relations
It is important to note that ties between China and Jewish and Zionist communities predate both the establishment of Israel in 1947 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.[5] This is evident, for example, in a 1920 letter from Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen to N. E. B. Ezra, an Iraqi-born Zionist publisher and founder of the Shanghai Zionist Association, in which Sun praised the organization Ezra had established. Sun’s close ties with US Protestant missionaries, particularly those associated with Christian Zionism, also shaped his views on Judaism. More broadly, these ties formed part of Sun’s efforts to expand China’s international alliances as he sought to counter colonial pressure and secure full national independence. His remarks on political Zionism subsequently became an important reference point for Chinese views of Jewish “nationalism” during the first quarter of the 20th century. In his letter, Sun wrote: “Although their homeland disappeared, the Jewish people have survived to this day…. Zionism is one of the greatest movements of the present time. All lovers of Democracy cannot help but support whole-heartedly and welcome with enthusiasm the movement to restore your wonderful and historic nation.”[6]
This “inaccurate” view of Zionism persisted into the early years of Chinese independence under Mao Zedong. At the time, Mao believed that Jews had historical rights in Palestine and that Arabs, particularly with British support, sought to control the territory. He also viewed the Zionist movement as a national liberation movement. Notably, Israel recognized the PRC in 1950.[7] However, the 1955 Bandung Conference, followed by Mao’s meeting with Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser, marked a major shift in China’s position. China increasingly came to view Israel as part of the Western colonial system.[8] Following Mao’s death in 1976, a pragmatic current gained influence within the Chinese Communist Party. Coupled with the acceleration of Egyptian-Israeli normalization, this shift eventually led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and China in 1992.[9] This, in turn, enabled Israel to strengthen its lobbying networks in China, deepen bilateral ties, and seek to influence China’s broader approach to the Middle East, particularly the Palestine issue.
Second: Israeli Pressure Groups in China
Jewish archaeologists have sought evidence of a Jewish presence in China since Jewish communities settled there in the 8th century CE. Although relatively small compared with other Chinese ethnic and religious communities, these communities became increasingly integrated into Chinese society between the 8th and 19th centuries, particularly in everyday social life. Jewish merchants played an important role in this process, especially those who arrived in Hong Kong and Shanghai, as well as Jews who fled to China via the Trans-Siberian Railway from the mid-19th century through the unrest in Russia in the early 20th century and the Bolshevik Revolution. Their numbers increased further in the early 20th century, when China became a refuge for Jews, particularly in light of Sun Yat-sen’s sympathetic views toward political Zionism. The Jewish population in China continued to grow intermittently through the mid-20th century. Following World War II, for example, about 18 thousand European Jews settled there, benefiting from Shanghai’s lack of immigration restrictions. Overall, approximately 40 thousand Jews migrated to China between 1845 and 1950.[10]
However, this pattern of a growing Jewish population reversed after the 1950s. The end of World War II, the establishment of Israel, and the founding of the PRC in 1949 prompted a gradual migration of Jews from China to Israel. Today, only about 2,500 Jews remain in China, whose population exceeds 1.412 billion, most of them concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai. Nevertheless, despite its small size, the Jewish community has contributed to strengthening Israel-China relations as diplomatic ties between the two countries developed. China’s diplomatic recognition of Israel in 1992, in particular, provided greater scope for the community’s activities in China.[11]
Third: Key Israeli Pressure Groups in China
The principal Israeli organizations operating in China as political pressure groups include:
1. Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL):[12]
Headquartered in Israel, SIGNAL was established in 2011 to strengthen ties between Chinese and Israeli academic institutions. Since then, it has organized more than one thousand research forums and academic events, averaging about 60–70 annually. Its activities receive support from US Jewish organizations as well as the Israeli government.
Its main activities include:[13]
a. Facilitating strategic dialogues among research centers and official Israeli and Chinese institutions.
b. Hosting lectures by Israeli experts and “Chinese experts sympathetic to Israel” on various aspects of Chinese society.
c. Promoting cultural exchange between Jewish and Chinese heritage.
d. “SIGNAL Group empowers Israel to address the rise of China and the Indo-Pacific on the world stage,” in order to advance Israeli foreign policy objectives. A hub for capacity building and policy entrepreneurship, SIGNAL Group and its global network are a resource for Israel’s policy community regarding China, the Indo-Pacific and their engagement with the Middle East.” Its “programming in Beijing and with Chinese universities aim to redress misconceptions about Israel and the Middle East. Under the aegis of its ‘Global Israel Initiative,’ SIGNAL Group enhances Israel’s interaction in the Indo-Pacific through bilateral dialogues and minilateral partnerships,” particularly with Chinese societal actors and, more broadly, counterparts across the region. Furthermore, “SIGNAL Group harnesses the knowledge and insights developed through its annual conference, policy roundtables and workshops, research, and Hebrew language quarterly assessment series to impact Israel’s decision-making regarding China and the Indo-Pacific.” It “endeavors to develop fresh policy options to fortify Israel’s geopolitical position by providing tools and creating opportunities to manage more effective relations with China & the Indo-Pacific.” As for the policy initiatives, they “are designed to better enable Israel to navigate the U.S.-China rivalry, engage the Indo-Pacific, and dispel misconceptions in China about Israel and the Middle East.”
The Global Israel Initiative (GII) advances an innovative agenda for Israel as a middle power on the global stage to bolster Israel’s agency and strategic autonomy. The GII seeks opportunities for Israel to forge new coalitions and diplomatic initiatives with partners in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe.” Notably, “SIGNAL Group’s policy work in China includes hundreds of briefings, dialogues and events engaging Chinese diplomats, experts, and scholars with prominent Israeli peers on topical strategic themes regarding China-Israel and China-Middle East affairs.”[14]
Moreover, “SIGNAL Group’s research on China and the Indo-Pacific informs its policy work and contributes to developing actionable insights for Israeli decision-makers. Focusing on China’s role and influence in the Middle East and on Indo-Pacific engagement with Israel and its neighbors, SIGNAL Group’s research taps into its field work and its global network of expertise to augment its findings, policy recommendations, and initiatives.” Concerning universities, “since 2011, SIGNAL Group has cooperated with Chinese universities to establish its signature model of Israel Studies Programs featuring a semester-long training program in Israel for Chinese university lecturers resulting in a course they develop about Israel to teach back home.” More than “75 SIGNAL Group-trained lecturers expose thousands of Chinese students – including future diplomats, business leaders, and Middle East experts – to Israel’s history, society, and regional relations.” Building on the positive results of its activities in China, the Group is “developing customized programs for university cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific.”
SIGNAL Group strives to foster greater understanding of Chinese statecraft and the evolving strategic terrain of the Indo-Pacific with a focus on cultural intelligence. To that end, in 2023, SIGNAL Group launched the Goodman Fellowship, an executive training program focusing on experiential learning for mid-level civil service managers responsible for shaping Israel’s China and Indo-Pacific policy. This program, which seeks to cultivate a cadre of experts across various government sectors, includes study tours to Beijing and other locations to gain firsthand insight into China’s domestic affairs.
These activities have yielded several outcomes:
a. Despite Israeli criticism, particularly at international conferences since 2021, of China’s human rights record in Xinjiang, where China’s Uyghur Muslim population is concentrated, as well as the continued exchange of official Israeli and Taiwanese visits, China’s growing pragmatism has not led it to impose comparable punitive measures on Israel.[15] This outcome cannot be separated, without overstating the case, from SIGNAL’s activities.
b. Before SIGNAL Group, there were no institutionalized Israel Studies Programs (ISPs) in Chinese universities. Today, universities spanning across the country, from Chongqing to Beijing and Shanghai, offer ISPs. Every year, more than two thousand students at China’s universities opt to take Israeli Studies courses.[16]
c. Holding annual conferences on Israel-China relations: SIGNAL Group’s Annual Conference Series on Israel’s China Policy was inaugurated in 2016 and expanded in 2023 to include the Indo-Pacific. While specific themes vary every year, the mission of the conference series is to inform Israeli strategic thinking on evolving relations with China and the Indo-Pacific arena. To that end, the conference draws together senior Israeli and international participants from government, business, academia and think-tanks to assess Israel relations with China and the Indo-Pacific, the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and their impact on the Middle East. The latest was the ninth annual conference titled “China, Israel, and the Post-October 7 Middle East.” It examined “the recalibration of China’s posture in the Middle East and its policy toward Israel following Israel’s intelligence and operational successes that are reshaping regional dynamics,” from Lebanon and Iran to Syria and Gaza. According to SIGNAL, these shifts have brought the China-Israel relationship to a critical juncture, following their low point in the immediate aftermath of October 7. With efforts underway to restore ties, the conference examined the trajectory of bilateral relations, assessed Israel’s strategic options amid evolving regional and global shifts, and considered China’s growing role in the Middle East, its ambition to lead the “Global South,” and intensifying U.S.-China competition under President Trump’s second term. The conference also shed light on Israel’s Indo-Pacific future, particularly amid renewed momentum behind the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). SIGNAL highlighted the growing interest of Indo-Pacific powers, including India, Japan, and South Korea, in engaging and collaborating with Israel as a significant opportunity. It argued that Israel’s most effective strategy for navigating China’s rise and U.S.-China competition is to operate as a middle power with a strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific.[17]
All of the above is closely linked to the commercial and technological relations that have fostered a favorable environment for Jewish pressure groups to operate within both Chinese society and government. Accordingly, it is difficult for us to say that Israel’s lobbying activities in China and the field of academic/cultural diplomacy are just a unilateral propaganda activity. China is enthusiastic about improving its relations with Israel due to its national interests. Israel’s desire that its technologies be used by China economically and militarily causes the Chinese side to have a favorable view of these lobbying activities. Moreover, Israel is becoming a shining star in China’s Middle East policy. China, which has established good relations with Arab countries and Iran for many years, has diversified its Middle Eastern policies by making Israel an important station of the Maritime Silk Road Project. This high level of interaction has brought cultural and academic partnerships. Israel has increased its investments in China by utilizing this smooth atmosphere.
In addition, educational and cultural activities are elements that increase Israel’s effectiveness in China and mobilize cultural interaction independent of its diaspora. Developments in areas such as student exchange programs, academic education programs and touristic activities have affected the cooperation between the two countries positively. Having made many strides in education in China, Israel has encouraged the opening of many academic programs to introduce itself. Departments and centers on Israeli, Judaic and Hebrew studies have been opened in prestigious academic institutions in China, such as Nanjing University, Henan University and Shandong University. Furthermore, in addition to 100 post-doctoral fellowships per year at Israeli educational institutions, 350 undergraduate scholarships are allocated exclusively to Chinese and Indian students. According to numbers in 2017, there were one thousand Chinese exchange students taking classes in Israel. On the other hand, Israeli educational institutions are expanding their campuses into China. In 2014, Tel Aviv University established an innovative research and education center with Tsinghua University. In 2015, Technion University, one of the leading universities in the field of engineering in Israel and the world, became the second institution with an independent education program in China by establishing the Guangdong Technion–Israel Institute of Technology University, after Moscow State University. In 2016, Ben-Gurion University opened a joint entrepreneurship and innovation center with Jilin University, while Haifa University built a joint laboratory in the fields of ecology, big data, biomedical and neurobiology at East China Normal University.
In addition to educational activities, tourism volume is another factor that increases Israel’s cultural appeal. In 2017, the number of Chinese tourists to Israel was around 123 thousand. There are also direct flights from Tel Aviv to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Chengdu. The growing economic relationship between Israel and the PRC has also fostered greater cultural interaction. Israel, in turn, promotes Jewish culture, drawing on the centuries-old Jewish presence in China. Although the economic and political partnership between Israel and China prompted reactions from the U.S., the two countries are continuing their investments, underscoring the importance of this relationship. Israeli pressure groups seek to facilitate and further develop these ties to achieve more effective and sustainable outcomes.[18]
2. Penetration through Publications and Academic Institutes:
Beyond the activities of SIGNAL discussed above, another noteworthy phenomenon promoted in Chinese scholarship is “admiration for the Jewish model and Israel,” or Philosemitism,[19] through academic publications. This approach links the history of Jewish communities that lived in Shanghai at various historical periods to the broader Chinese civilizational narrative, emphasizing themes such as “Jewish intelligence, scientific achievement, leadership in business and financial management, Israel’s technological development, and its emergence as a model of power despite its small size.” More broadly, this narrative seeks to move beyond viewing Israel primarily through the Arab-Israeli conflict and instead present it as an attractive model in the very areas highlighted above.
Founded in 1992, Nanjing University’s Institute for Jewish and Israel Studies has become a key institutional link between Israel and China, particularly in the field of Jewish studies.[20] One of China’s leading scholars in this field is Xu Xin, who visited Israel in 1988, before the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. He founded the Institute for Jewish and Israel Studies, originally established as the Center for Jewish Cultural Studies and has played a central role in developing ties with Jewish and US organizations that support Israel and fund academic projects in Jewish studies. He also maintains contact with Israeli diplomatic missions and encourages his students to study and conduct research in Israel.[21] In recognition of these efforts, the Israeli Consulate in Shanghai awarded him a prize for excellence in Jewish studies and Chinese-Israeli educational exchange.[22]
There is also a prominent Chinese scholar, Yiyi Chen, who specializes in Hebrew and Jewish studies in China and has consistently advocated greater attention to this field. He has also sought to expand the segment of Chinese society that views Israel relatively positively. Chen has noted that scholars in this field provide the Chinese government with research papers on the Middle East and the region’s peace processes.[23]
Also noteworthy is Fu Youde, a professor of philosophy and Jewish studies at Shandong University and founder of its Center for Judaic and Inter-Religious Studies. He is known for his comparative work on Confucian and Jewish traditions, as well as for translating works by Jewish philosophers, including Maimonides, into Chinese. He also helped promote a partnership between Shandong University and Tel Aviv University, which eventually led to the establishment of the Joint Institute for Jewish and Israeli Studies.
Likewise, activities at Henan University merit attention, particularly those of Professor Hu Hao, deputy director of its Center for Israel Studies and a specialist in modern Jewish history and antisemitism. He was a visiting scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is also active in Chinese associations focused on Jewish studies.[24]
There is also an intellectual elite with close ties to China’s political circles. Among them is Professor Huang Renwei, a prominent member of the academic and advisory council of SIGNAL, discussed above. He has worked at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) and served as deputy director of the Shanghai Center for International Studies, where he also advised on issues such as Taiwan.[25]
Another notable figure is Professor Sun Degang of Fudan University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES). He places particular emphasis on technological ties with Israel and has strongly advocated expanding China-Israel relations, especially in the technological sphere.
Some Chinese intellectuals have likewise expressed support for Israel on various issues. One example is Professor Zhou Xiaozheng, a sociology professor at Renmin University, who authored an article titled “Israel Is Definitely a Good Country,” in which he defended Israel’s military conduct and linked Israeli behavior to the notion of “Jewish intelligence.” Alice Xin Liu later discussed the article in her piece, “Israel: A Country Which Deserves Our Deep Respect.”[26]
3. StandWithUs (SWU) group
SWU is a pro-Israeli American advocacy group that has sought since 2009 to establish a branch in China. After years of tentative public diplomacy and initial outreach, the effort eventually succeeded, particularly as its leadership recognized China’s growing international stature and viewed it as “a country in which we can make a difference,” according to SWU’s Director Michael Dickson.[27] He saw the SWU playing a major role in combating “misinformation in the Chinese media about Israel” and “Islamic anti-Israel propaganda on university campuses.” This would be accomplished, according to Ayala Sherman-Oren, the SWU-Asia director, by “utilizing social media, university programs, and networking events” that would serve “to connect and cultivate relationships between Israel’s and Asia’s business professionals and social leaders” – effectively, “the next generation of the Chinese leadership.”[28]
4. Other Organizations Influencing Chinese Society, Elites and Policymakers
Other organizations also seek to influence Chinese society, elites and policymakers. These include the Israel-Asia Center, which works across Asia while focusing particularly on key countries such as China and engaging with Chinese political and economic leaders. The American Jewish Committee (AJC), meanwhile, seeks to strengthen Israel’s standing in Chinese public discourse, particularly on university campuses.[29]
Fourth: The Impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on These Institutions
Beijing’s refusal to condemn the Palestinian resistance or its actions during Operation al-Aqsa Flood had implications for the activities of Israeli pressure groups, particularly SIGNAL. These effects can be summarized as follows:[30]
1. A cooling of diplomatic relations with Israel: SIGNAL described the period following 7 October 2023 as a major turning point, arguing that Operation al-Aqsa Flood marked “the first Middle East war in an era of great-power competition.” It further argued that Beijing’s attempt to maintain neutrality would complicate traditional academic and strategic cooperation between China and Israel. Accordingly, SIGNAL called for Israel to broaden its strategic focus toward the Indo-Pacific rather than concentrate primarily on bilateral relations with Beijing. It also advocated initiatives to help Israel develop ties with other like-minded middle powers in the region, particularly India. This approach was reflected in the GII discussed above.
In this regard, Dale Aluf, then director of research at SIGNAL (2017-2024), interpreted China’s position toward Israel following Operation al-Aqsa Flood. He criticized Beijing’s continued support for a two-state solution while refusing to designate Hamas as a “terrorist organization.” Nevertheless, he noted that, one year after Operation al-Aqsa Flood, China’s political rhetoric had begun shifting toward a more neutral position. He cited, in particular, an October 2024 statement by China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, who said “that the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people should be realized, and Israel’s reasonable security concerns should also be taken seriously.” Aluf attributed this position to pragmatism, arguing that the continuation and expansion of the war is not in China’s interest because the conflict threatens regional stability, disrupts energy supplies, increases the US military presence in the region, and affects China’s interests in Israel.[31]
2. Shifting the focus of SIGNAL’s annual policy conferences from celebrating the growth of Israel-China bilateral exchanges to examining how China’s partnerships with actors such as Iran and Russia affect Israel’s national security. Accordingly, the regional environment following Operation al-Aqsa Flood intensified Israeli concerns about closer ties among powers whose broader strategic orientations diverge from Israel’s and challenge the US position in the region, with potential strategic consequences for Israel.
3. Maintaining informal channels of communication: Despite official tensions and their repercussions, Israeli pressure groups, particularly SIGNAL, have continued informal dialogues to monitor Chinese academic and political perceptions of Israel following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, amid an environment in which “China-Israel relations have significantly deteriorated due to the conflict.”
Conclusion
The findings of this study demonstrate how organized civil society actors can complement formal diplomacy regardless of the target environment, whether hostile, friendly, allied or neutral. Such support is a key function of pressure groups. Although historical ties between Jews and China have been limited, and the political distance between Israel and China is greater than that between China and the Arab world in general and Palestine in particular, Israeli diplomacy has nevertheless remained engaged in this arena. It has pursued a quiet effort to develop a sustained presence there, guided by an assessment of what is possible, feasible and desirable in advancing Israel’s national interests. This study has highlighted some aspects of this approach.
These findings underscore the need for Arab and Palestinian diplomacy to strengthen its own mechanisms while drawing on several enabling factors, including:
1. The largest and most influential segment of China’s political establishment remains relatively receptive to Palestinian demands. This warrants engagement with leaders in this camp and efforts to reinforce these positions through coordinated outreach. Such efforts could involve systematic research on the ruling party’s political elite to identify, first, those most sympathetic to Palestinian demands and, second, those more closely aligned with Israeli positions, including figures discussed in this study, with the aim of encouraging a less pro-Israel stance.
2. China’s Uyghur Muslims, given their familiarity with Chinese society, represent an important constituency of about 12 million people that could serve as a bridge between China, the Arab states and Palestine. Organized bodies could help coordinate efforts to narrow the political gap between Palestine and China. At the same time, such engagement should avoid interference in China’s internal affairs, particularly given their relationship with the Chinese government. This is particularly relevant given the presence of influential Muslim figures within the political establishment, including Erkin Tuniyaz, head of government of the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang region, who served on the Communist Party’s Central Committee until 2022, as well as other Uyghur figures serving on the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Xinjiang Committee.[32]
3. Public opinion surveys in China reportedly indicate broad support for Palestine and Hamas. Social media studies likewise suggest that some Chinese commentators draw nationalist parallels between Hamas fighters and Chinese fighters who resisted the Japanese occupation. At the same time, there is little evidence of significant public sympathy for Israeli casualties. Conspiratorial and antisemitic rhetoric has also appeared in online comment sections, including accusations against Jewish groups and hostile historical comparisons.[33] This, in turn, underscores the need to sustain and strengthen the environment of support for Palestine through permanent, organized institutions aligned with the political orientations of the Palestinian resistance.
[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] Interest Groups vs. Pressure Groups: Definitions and Functions, site of PolSci.Institute, 21/2/2026, https://polsci.institute/comparative-politics/interest-groups-vs-pressure-groups-definitions-functions/
[3] For a discussion of the distinctions among these groups, see George C. Edwards III, Frances E. Lee, and Eric Schickler (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 598–617. See also Moira Byrne, “Pressure Groups and Social Movements,” in Peter Chen et al., Australian Politics and Policy (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2019), https://open.sydneyuniversitypress.com.au/9781743326671.html
[4] The literature generally distinguishes among these three concepts by defining interest groups according to their objectives, whether political or nonpolitical; pressure groups according to the means used to pursue those objectives, particularly direct or indirect political influence; and lobbies according to their predominantly direct influence on high-level decision-making bodies. These distinctions, however, often overlap in practice. For an important study of these distinctions, see Alberto Bitonti, “Lobbying, lobby, lobbyist, interest and pressure groups: definitions and conceptual problems,” Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo journal 24, no. 3, 2022, pp. 463–478, https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.17394/105096
[5] Yossi Katz, “The Jews of China and their Contribution to the Establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine in the First Half of the Twentieth Century,” Middle Eastern Studies journal, vol. 46, no. 4, 2010, https://cris.biu.ac.il/en/publications/the-jews-of-china-and-their-contribution-to-the-establishment-of–4
[6] The references vary in the letter’s length and number of paragraphs, with some including passages absent from others. Zack Rothbart, Lost letter on Zionism from ‘Father of the Chinese Nation’ surfaces, site of The Jerusalem Post newspaper, 11/2/2021, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/lost-letter-on-zionism-from-father-of-the-chinese-nation-surfaces-658557; and Aaron Shai, China and Israel: Chinese, Jews; Beijing, Jerusalem (1890–2018) (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2019), pp. 38–39.
[7] Yitzhak Shichor, “Chinese-Israeli Relations in a Middle Eastern Context: Retrospect and Prospects,” Mediterranean Quarterly journal, vol. 26, no. 1, April 2015, pp. 137–151.
[8] Yitzhak Shichor, “Out of Proportion: Israel’s Paradox in China’s Middle Eastern Policy,” Middle East Policy journal, vol. 32, no. 1, February 2025, pp. 54–73.
[9] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “Cautious Engagement: Will Politics Constrain China’s Role in the Middle East,” Al-Siyasa al-Dawliya journal, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, no. 207, January 2017, pp. 25–30.
[10] Selim Han Yeniacun, Israel set to increase its soft power in China, site of Anadolu Agency, 8/2/2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-israel-set-to-increase-its-soft-power-in-china/1728042; and Roman Malek (ed.), Jews in China: From Kaifeng to Shanghai (Routledge, 2000), passim. At more than 722 pages, this substantial volume is an important reference on the history of Jewish settlement and migration to China. It traces successive migration waves, focusing particularly on Kaifeng, policies toward Jewish integration, and Jewish sites and material remains, including synagogue, etc.
[11] Selim Han Yeniacun, Israel set to increase its soft power in China.
[12] About, site of SIGNAL Group, https://signal-group.org/about/; and Hiddai Segev, China’s Ambivalent Attitude Towards Judaism, site of Middle East Institute, 2/7/2018, https://mei.edu/publication/chinas-ambivalent-attitude-towards-judaism/
[13] About, SIGNAL Group, https://signal-group.org/about/
This website provides details of its activities, including research, seminars, publications, conferences and other initiatives.
[14] Ibid.; and see Global Israel Initiative, SIGNAL Group, https://signal-group.org/global-israel-initiative-gii/
[15] Tommy Steiner, The Price of China’s Arms Support for Iran: Could Israel Raise It?, SIGNAL Group, 1/7/2026, https://signal-group.org/articles/the-price-of-chinas-arms-support-for-iran-could-israel-raise-it/
[16] Israel Studies Program, SIGNAL Group, https://signal-group.org/israel-studies-program/
[17] 9th Annual Conference on Israel’s China Policy: China, Israel, and the Post-October 7 Middle East, SIGNAL Group, 29/5/2025, https://sino-israel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Program-Agenda-SIGNAL-PolCon-2025-Final.pdf; and Annual Conferences, SIGNAL Group, May 2025, https://signal-group.org/recent-events/conferences/
[18] Selim Han Yeniacun, Israel set to increase its soft power in China. For Israeli and Chinese public opinion, see Roy Ben Tzur, From Curiosity to Skepticism: Israeli Public Opinion on China, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), December 2024, https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/ben-zur/; and Mohammed Al-Sudairi, The Growing Phenomenon of Pro-Israeli Advocacy in Chinese Academia, site of Jadaliyya, 23/9/2014, https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/31251
[19] Mary Ainslie, “Chinese Philosemitism and Historical Statecraft: Incorporating Jews and Israel into Contemporary Chinese Civilization,” The China Quarterly journal, vol. 245, March 2021, pp. 208–226.
[20] For an academic perspective on the history and development of Israeli-Chinese relations, see “International Forum for the 30th Anniversary of the Sino-Israel Diplomatic Relations,” site of Center for Judaic and Inter-religious Studies of Shandong University, 15/5/2022, https://www.cjs.sdu.edu.cn/__local/0/3E/15/AA9999897CF7ED9C4BA123BCCE6_C0A350EB_11274B.pdf
[21] For details, see David Harris and Rebecca Zeffert, China at 60 Series: Interview with Prof. Xu Xin, site of Israel-Asia Center, 1/11/2009, https://israelasiacenter.org/op-eds-and-articles/china-at-60-series-article-6/
[22] Professor Xu Xin of our department was awarded the “Outstanding Contribution to the Study of Jewish Culture and Educational Exchanges between China and Israel” by the Consulate General of Israel in Shanghai, site of NanJing University (NJU) School of Philosophy, 16/5/2023, https://philosophy.nju.edu.cn/info/1017/1914.htm
[23] Interview with Dr. Yiyi Chen on Hebrew/Jewish Studies in China and Sino-Israel Relations, site of Middle East Institute, 1/4/2013, https://mei.edu/publication/interview-dr-yiyi-chen-hebrewjewish-studies-china-and-sino-israel-relations/
[24] Professor Hu Hao, site of The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, https://isgap.org/about/international-academic-board-of-advisors/professor-hu-hao/
[25] Board of Academic and Expert Advisors, SIGNAL Group, https://cn.sino-israel.org/board-of-academic-expert-advisors/
[26] Alice Xin Liu, Israel: A Country Which Deserves Our Deep Respect, site of Danwei, 22/1/2009, https://laodanwei.org/wp/foreign-affairs/a_country_which_deserves_our_d.php
[27] Mohammed Al-Sudairi, An Israeli Lobby in China?, site of The Diplomat, 30/4/2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/an-israeli-lobby-in-china/
[28] Ibid.
[29] For further details on the activities of these organizations, see Ibid.
[30] For further details, particularly on their impact on the international conflict environment, see Koh Ewe, How China Could Play a Key Role in the Israel-Hamas War—and Why It’s Not, site of Time magazine, 18/10/2023, https://time.com/6325352/china-israel-hamas-war/; and Wang Zhehui, “China’s Shift in Attitude towards Israel after the 7 October 2023 Hamas Attacks,” China: An International Journal, vol. 24, no.1, February 2026, pp. 40–62.
[31] Dale Aluf, What to make of China’s softening rhetoric on Israel, Gaza War, site of Al-Monitor, 21/10/2024, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/10/what-make-chinas-softening-rhetoric-israel-gaza-war
[32] Understanding how officials move through different levels of authority within the Chinese Communist Party is essential for developing engagement strategies, particularly toward emerging leaders with strong prospects for advancement. For further discussion, see David A.Meyer, Megha Ram and Laura Wilke, “Circulation of the Elite in the Chinese Communist Party,” Journal of East Asian Studies, vol.16, no.1, March 2016, pp.147–184; and Xiaowei Zang, “Ethnic Representation in the Current Chinese Leadership,” The China Quarterly journal, vol. 153, March 1998, pp. 107–127.
[33] See details on these aspects in: Wang Zhehui, “China’s Shift in Attitude towards Israel after the 7 October 2023 Hamas Attacks”; Patricia M. Kim, Kevin Dong and Mallie Prytherch, Chinese narratives on the Israel-Hamas war, site of Brookings Institution, 22/1/2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-narratives-on-the-israel-hamas-war/; Grant Rumley, Rebecca Redlich and Claudia Groeling, Tracking Chinese Statements on the Hamas-Israel Conflict, site of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3/11/2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-chinese-statements-hamas-israel-conflict; and Roy Ben Tzur, From Curiosity to Skepticism: Israeli Public Opinion on China.
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