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By: Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay.[1]
(Exclusively for al-Zaytouna Centre).


The research of Israeli Studies Centers on Arab politics towards Israel distinguishes between two dimensions: the attitudes of Arab regimes towards the Palestine issue and those of the Arab public. Given the autocratic nature of Arab regimes, the Israeli perspective focuses on exploiting regime orientations in the short term, aiming for gradual and systematic changes in public attitudes through media and educational strategies. Additionally, it involves shifting the Arab-Israeli conflict from a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum perspective by infiltrating Arab structures via joint projects, leveraging official Arab policies to align popular trends with Israeli interests.

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>>Academic Paper: Israeli Studies Centers’ Vision for the Post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood Phase … Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay (18 pages, 4.5 MB)

First: The Impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on Israeli Diplomacy

Israeli research centers have noted the significant impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood locally, regionally and globally. This includes factors like the degree of violence and civilian casualties, which are key criteria used by the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Model of 2015,[2] and academic models like the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). These models assess conflict levels in each country and geopolitical region worldwide according to four indicators: “deadliness, danger to civilians, geographic diffusion, and armed group fragmentation.”[3] The ACLED model identified the Gaza Strip (GS) and the West Bank (WB) among the top four conflict zones worldwide, noted for their highly “diffuse” conflict nature and consequent high civilian risk. This has led to a daily death rate in GS surpassing any other major 21st-century conflict, with OXFAM International reporting an average of 250 daily fatalities, approximately 5.7 times higher than the rate in the contemporary Ukrainian-Russian War.[4]

Israeli research centers have recognized the impact of this portrayal on global public opinion, prompting a shift in their studies towards topics that minimize the level of violence exerted by Israel in the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, particularly in GS after October 7, 2023. They notably avoid addressing the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), fearing the repercussions on Israel’s image as a state implicated in genocide, as acknowledged by the highest international judicial authority.[5]

On another front, Israeli studies have noted certain ramifications of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on Israel’s broader strategic approach in international relations and its relations with Arab countries. These ramifications can be summarized as follows:[6]

1. Israeli studies confirm “unprecedented” support from the US and Europe for Israel during Operation al-Aqsa Flood. However, this does not eliminate certain disagreements with Israel, especially concerning Israel’s hesitancy to articulate its post-war strategy. Nonetheless, Arab states are not actively seeking to capitalize on this relative discord between Israel and certain Western powers through concrete measures.

2. Arab governments persist in their commitment to normalize relations with Israel, particularly on strategic matters, upholding treaties, sustaining trade ties, engaging in diplomatic discussions, and refraining from providing strategic backing to the resistance.

3. There is “highly limited” relative confusion in media policies expressing Israeli relations with Turkey, Jordan and Egypt.

4. There has been a relative improvement in the image of the resistance axis in Arab public opinion, alongside Israel’s failure to articulate a clear regional policy against what is perceived as the “Iranian-Russian axis.” This is further highlighted by Arab public opinion regarding the stances of regional and international powers concerning the GS war, as illustrated in the following table:

Table 1: Arab Public Evaluation of International and Regional Positions[7]

Country Arab public’s positive perception of country’s position on GS War
(Good + Very good) %
Iran 48
Turkey 47
Russia 41
China 40
France 10
Germany 9
UK 8
US 3

It is evident that the survey results from 16 Arab countries bolster Iran’s image in the Arab public’s perception, a view not welcomed by Israel. Particularly noteworthy is the survey’s indication that the Arab public’s perception of Iran as a threat to regional stability decreased from 13% to 7% between 2018 and 2024, marking a decline of approximately 54%. This trend is viewed negatively by Israel, highlighting the dual stance within Arab societies between their governments and the general populace.[8]

5. Israel’s lack of a coherent policy in the occupied Palestinian territories, particularly concerning the Palestinian Authority (PA), is apparent. It relies on the PA for security coordination, only to later criticize it for perceived weakness and neglect. Additionally, Israel facilitates the PA’s access to funds and weapons for its security forces but withholds some of its revenues, notably tax income.

6. In assessing the performance of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2023, including the post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood period, Israeli foreign policy experts note a decline in satisfaction with its relations with Arab and international countries, as indicated in the following table:[9]

Table 2: Assessment of Israeli Foreign Policy Before and After Operation al-Aqsa Flood

Indicator Approval rating in 2023 incl. post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood
(out of 10)
Approval rating in 2022
(out of 10)
Israel’s global standing 5.03 5.85
The government’s handling of foreign policy 4.82 5.53
The status of Israel’s Foreign Ministry 5 5.4

This indicates that governmental performance in managing foreign policy across its three aspects has declined to 0.55 out of 10.

Second: Assessing Israeli Governmental Performance in Political and

Military Relations with Arab Countries

Israeli studies on this aspect focus on countries holding official ties with Israel, as well as semi-official connections, like those with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Notably, the roles of Egypt and Qatar appear paramount within this sphere, particularly in the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood events. For instance, Israeli studies provide a summary of Egypt’s stance as follows:[10]

1. Preventing the outbreak of a regional war that could impact Egyptian security, from the perspective of the Egyptian authority rather than that of Egyptian society.

2. Reactivating traffic through the Suez Canal due to disruptions in Red Sea navigation, stemming from Yemeni operations against Israeli commercial shipping passing through this sea.

3. Revitalizing the Egyptian tourism sector, which has been affected by regional unrest, especially since tourism and Suez Canal revenues represent central pillars of the Egyptian Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

4. Striving to reinstate the PA role in GS, considering its alignment with Egyptian official policies, while working to prevent the alignment of Egyptian societal inclinations with the armed orientations of Palestinian resistance in Gaza. The Egyptian authorities perceive this resistance as an armed offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement, particularly its Egyptian branch.[11]

An Israeli study outlines how Egypt and Israel would coordinate during and after Operation al-Aqsa Flood to accomplish certain goals by:[12]

1. Developing a joint plan to serve their respective political, security and economic interests.

2. Bridging differing visions for Gaza’s future, and integrating regional and international actors into these efforts, to neutralize Hamas’ military and governance capabilities.

3. Facilitating the gradual and conditional reinstatement in GS of a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” committed to “peace.”

4. Strengthening Egyptian oversight over the Philadelphia Corridor and the Egypt-Sinai border crossings.

5. Crafting an economic incentive package to bolster Egyptian involvement in Gaza, such as involving Egyptian companies in reconstruction projects.

Third: Egypt and the Displacement Issue

Various news reports have discussed two documents concerning the displacement of GS residents outside its borders, particularly to Egypt, whether in Sinai or in new Egyptian cities. One such report was published on 17/10/2023 by the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, an Israeli think tank with ties to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The report’s subtitle makes it clear, “There is at the moment a unique and rare opportunity to evacuate the whole Gaza Strip.” It is noted that the Misgav Institute is headed by former Netanyahu National Security Advisor Meir Ben Shabbat, and the main arguments of the institute’s report are:[13]

1. There is a need for an immediate, viable plan for the resettlement and economic rehabilitation of the entire Arab population in GS, which sits well with the geopolitical interests of Israel, Egypt, US and Saudi Arabia.

2. In 2017 it was reported that in Egypt there were 10 million available apartment units, of which half were built and half under construction. For example, in two of the biggest Cairo satellite cities, “October 6” and “Ramadan 10” there is an immense number of built and empty apartments under governmental and private ownership, as well as empty lots for building that would in total suffice the housing of about 6 million residents.

3. The average cost of a three-room apartment of 95 square meters for an average Gaza family of 5.14 people in one of the two mentioned cities stands at $19 thousand. In calculating the total population that resides in GS, which stands between 1.4–2 million people, it is possible to assess that the amount that would need to be transferred to Egypt in order to finance would be around $5 to 8 billion.

4. An encouraging injection to the Egyptian economy at this magnitude would provide an enormous and immediate advantage to the current Egyptian regime. Such money sums, compared to the Israeli economy, are miniscule. The investment of a mere few billions of dollars (even if it is $20 or 30 billion) in order to solve this difficult issue is an innovative, cheap and viable solution.

5. In order for this plan to be enacted, many conditions need to exist in parallel. At the moment, these conditions exist, and it is unclear when such an opportunity will arise again, if at all.

The Israeli outlet Calcalist reported on a separate plan for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza that was being circulated by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry headed by Gila Gamliel. The leaked document was reportedly created for an organization called “The Unit for Settlement – Gaza Strip” and was not meant for the public.[14]

In the plan being proposed by the Intelligence Ministry, Palestinians in Gaza would be displaced from Gaza to the northern Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. In the report, the ministry described different options for what comes after an invasion of Gaza and the option deemed as “liable to provide positive and long-lasting strategic results” was the transfer of Gaza residents to Sinai. The move entails three steps:

1. The establishment of tent cities southwest of GS.

2. The construction of a humanitarian corridor to “assist the residents.”

3. The building of cities in northern Sinai.

In parallel, a “sterile zone,” several kilometers wide, would be established within Egypt, south of the Israeli border, “so that the evacuated residents would not be able to return.” The document calls for cooperation with other countries, in fact “as many as possible,” including Canada, European countries such as Greece and Spain, and North African countries, so that they may “absorb” the Palestinians from GS.[15]

However, according to some Israeli reports, citing The Wall Street Journal, Egypt opposes the restoration of Israeli control over the Philadelphia Corridor, where Israel wants—by utilizing surveillance drones or installing warning systems—to monitor attempts to rebuild smuggling tunnels. Cairo views the deployment of such systems as a clear violation of Egyptian sovereignty.[16]

According to Israeli allegations, there are still 12 tunnels between Gaza and the Sinai Desert.[17] To magnify these concerns within Egyptian authorities, Israeli research centers attempt to promote the notion that the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement in GS and WB is merely an extension of the “military wings” derived from the MB movement, particularly in Egypt during the post-turmoil decade of 2010–2020. This was demonstrated organizationally at a conference in Istanbul in 2022 under the name “The Change Stream.” Additionally, these research centers advocate the idea that Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has galvanized MB wings in the region, especially in Egypt, to emulate it in order to liberate MB detainees in Arab regime prisons.[18]

Fourth: The Israeli Perspective on the Qatari Role

The Israeli perspective, as depicted by Israeli research centers,[19] highlights Qatar’s unique role. Qatar is seen as more committed than other Arab countries to sustaining Hamas, while showing less interest in expanding the PA role. These differing positions between Egypt and Qatar, as emphasized in Israeli studies, advocate for leveraging this divergence both now and in the future.

Moreover, Israeli studies suggest that Qatar refrains from tying its role to political conditions that Israel must fulfill to enhance the relationship between them, unlike the evolving Saudi stance, which gradually moves towards normalization while linking it to certain conditions related to the Palestine issue. Additionally, Israel is hesitant to grant Qatar a leadership role in any arrangements for Arab security forces in GS post-ceasefire.

Fifth: The Future of the Palestinian Political Structure from Israeli Research Centers’ Perspective

Most Israeli studies outline their vision for the post-war phase through a strategy based on the following pillars:[20]

Alternative leadership in GS, with variations among Israeli studies regarding the extent of Hamas’s influence and the scope of the PA role. These studies highlight Israeli benefits of a revitalized PA through the following scenario:

a. Reconstituted and effective PA control capabilities would enable Israel to withdraw from GS, easing its burdens and presenting a more responsive stance to international will.

b. Gaza’s civil affairs would be managed solely by the restructured PA, with no Israeli interference in the lives or affairs of Palestinian residents.

c. Israel will maintain external oversight of GS for a defined period, to be mutually agreed upon as part of an interim arrangement. Deployment of a multinational force could help rehabilitate GS and mitigate friction within the population. However, Israel would reserve the authority to pursue suspected “terrorists,” as outlined in the Oslo Accords.

d. WB and GS will be unified under a single government. Their future will be determined after the period of rehabilitation and consolidation of the renewed authority, by disarming the resistance, in the spirit of President Joe Biden’s outline.

e. A governmental vacuum in GS must be avoided to prevent forces hostile to Israel from retaking control.

f. Israel will avoid establishing new realities on the ground during this interim period.

g. Candidates for senior positions in the new PA will be required to meet a number of conditions before taking office:

• Recognition of Israel as a sovereign state and affirmation of Israel’s right to exist in security, even if when candidates are members of Islamic movements.

• A commitment to the PA’s monopoly on the use of force and/or possession of weapons, and to a prohibition of militias or any armed non-governmental organizations.

• A declaration of opposition to any form of armed or violent struggle against Israel.

• Demilitarization of the territory controlled by the renewed PA, with the exception of agreed-upon weapons necessary for enforcing law and order.

h. Security wise, the revitalized PA security apparatuses are required to redefine with Israel the objectives of security coordination, expanding it to include GS and involving individuals not affiliated with the security apparatuses established since 2007, during the period of Gaza’s resistance rule. They also are required to increase the budgets allocated to these agencies.

i. Revising the educational curricula to remove hostile content concerning Israel, as well as enshrining the independence of the judiciary.

j. Regionally, Israeli studies broadly focus on three dimensions:

• Exploiting Arab political differences, particularly on specific issues, notably attitudes towards Arab religious movements, primarily the MB movement.

• Influencing the stances of Arab countries sympathetic to the resistance axis.

• Amplifying the Iranian threat to Arab states.

k. Internationally, Israeli studies widely lean towards the following trends:

• Exclusion of any internationally sympathetic powers to the resistance from participating in committees or negotiations discussing post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood phase.

• Continuation of pressure to marginalize the roles of the UN and international judiciary, particularly the ICJ and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

• Preparedness for media activities aimed at hindering shifts in international public opinion towards criticizing Israeli policies, especially in the US and the European Union (EU), as well as in international non-governmental organizations. An Israeli study center noted that in the US, there were 1,625 protests supporting Palestine, between 7/10/2023 and 9/2/2024, compared to 283 supporting Israel.[21]

2. The Economic Role: Israeli Research Centers Approach this Aspect Through:

a. Financial support for the GS reconstruction. Most Israeli studies emphasize linking reconstruction in WB and GS with political changes, as described earlier. This approach often involves using military pressure and financial leverage to tie reconstruction funds to political positions, as outlined in the preceding political role.

b. Considering easing the fears of Arab investors in the reconstruction process from the resurgence of violence that could jeopardize their economic interests. Israel should link the provision of aid to GS to Arab policies that demonstrate increased openness towards Israel and are more restrictive regarding the likelihood of resuming resistance against Israel in subsequent periods.

3. Points of divergence and convergence between various conflict settlement plans from Israeli research centers’ perspective:

When assessing Arab, international and Israeli efforts for conflict resolution in the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, we identify points of divergence and convergence among these initiatives, aiming to understand how to effectively utilize and address them. In terms of differences, potential settlement scenarios have been outlined as follows:

a. Concerning the role of Hamas: Most Arab parties are open to “some form” of Hamas involvement, which Israel and the US oppose. The Qatari perspective advocates for a more significant role for Hamas than what Arab countries with relations with Israel advocate.

b. The PA return to GS: Most non-aligned Arab countries see the necessity for the PA to have a central role, which Israel accepts, provided that this authority undergoes profound changes.

c. A discrepancy exists between the stances of the US and Israel regarding the PA. The US views it within the context of a two-state solution, whereas Israel mentions vaguely “local elements” for GS governance, devoid of any direct link to a definitive resolution. An Israeli study suggests that the two-state solution poses existential risks for Israel due to:

• The Palestinian community has a historical commitment to the liberation of Palestine, as expressed in Palestinian documents.

• It is illogical to talk about a demilitarized Palestinian state because demilitarization applies to territories, not states. There is no sovereign state without arms, akin to the Westphalian model.

• The possibility of a coup in the future Palestinian state could lead to a new authority reneging on the previous commitments of the deposed PA.

• Certain Israeli scholars argue that instability within Israeli society is poised to erupt post-war, attributable either to Netanyahu’s policies or to international and regional conflict resolution endeavors.[22]

d. Arab Involvement in GS: Gulf countries with ties to Israel seem less decisive in delineating their involvement, evidently wary of hastily assuming a political-security role that could potentially align them with Egypt against Hamas. Nonetheless, Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, exhibit clearer transparency in embracing a reconstruction role in Gaza.

e. Divergence between the US and Israel arises concerning geographical alterations in GS. While the US opposes such changes, Israel aims to establish a “security perimeter” around GS, aimed at isolating the territory from the external world.

The normalized Arab nations and Israel share the following aspects:

a. The PA involvement in GS, whether through leadership changes under ‘Abbas or the establishment of a technocratic administration led by figures such as Salam Fayyad.

b. Initiatives to undermine Hamas, particularly through potential agreements for hostage releases, reduction of Hamas’s military capacities, and enforcement of security measures to guarantee Israeli security in the medium to long term. This prompts deliberations among Arab nations, particularly Gulf states, regarding two suggestions: one proposing the “expulsion” of Hamas leaders from GS or the disarmament of Hamas, aligning it with the new Palestinian administration.

c. Arab-Israeli normalization, a policy advocated by Saudi Arabia, contingent upon several bilateral conditions with the US. These conditions include permitting Israel to pursue a peaceful nuclear program, forging a mutual defense pact, supplying it with advanced weaponry from the US, and resuming Israeli negotiations aimed at resolving the Palestinian conflict.

Sixth: The Inclinations of Israeli Public Opinion Regarding Official Policies and the Viewpoints of Research Institutions

Table 3: Jewish Public Opinion Trends on Issues Related to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood[23]

Issue Percentage (%) Notes
Priority of hostage release 51% The pressure on the government regarding this matter is moderate
Priority of toppling Hamas 36% The majority does not consider it a priority
Reject the establishment of a Palestinian state in return for normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia 59% It seems that the Israeli society believes that Saudi Arabia will normalize relations without the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Israel should act in coordination with the Americans in making war decisions 38% 49.5% think that Israel should act only in accordance with the judgement of Israel’s leadership
Oppose a hostage deal in exchange for releasing all Palestinian prisoners 60% This is consistent with the priority of hostage release
Refuse the return of the Gaza Envelope residents to their settlements at the moment 52% An indication that security fear remains
Believe it is the right time to investigate the intelligence failure regarding October 7 46% This percentage is substantial and raises concerns for Netanyahu
Favoring an all-out attack against Hezbollah Throughout the war stages, the percentage varied from 48% to 59%. The percentage consistently rises month by month as the war progresses
Dissatisfaction with the government’s service sector during the war 41% The government justifies it due to wartime conditions
The most worrying issues for the public in the short term 53% security situation
36% the high cost of living & housing prices
These results are consistent with previous data
Confident that Israel will win the war November 2023: 78%
January 2024: 61%
Those not sure if Israel will win increased from 26% to 39%

Analysis of Israeli public sentiment, as documented by Israeli research institutions, yields several conclusions:

• There is a notable lack of consensus among various sectors of Israeli society on most issues. ‌

• Confidence in the prospect of winning the GS war has diminished by 17%.

Seventh: Research Centers’ Recommendations

In a previous study we conducted regarding the role of Israeli research centers in Israeli decision-making, we discovered that the “degree of congruence between the recommendations of the higher-ranking Israeli think tanks and the state’s strategic policies is clearly high.”[24] Based on this, we point out the key recommendations that have been consistently highlighted in the majority of the Israeli studies mentioned earlier, as follows:[25]

1. Israel must accomplish the following objectives before agreeing to a ceasefire:

Controlling the Philadelphia Corridor between Egypt and GS.

Implementing interim governance in GS while Israeli forces are present in the area. This governance should consist of Palestinians selected by Israel, tasked with dismantling the political resistance and Hamas-affiliated elements from Palestinian society.

Disarming Palestinian resistance factions in GS.

Establishing a buffer zone around Gaza.

2. The Israeli government should develop a strategy grounded first and foremost on points of agreement with Arab normalization states, including Saudi Arabia.

3. The government must take into account the gap between Israel and certain Arab countries, particularly regarding the nature of the future authority in GS and its implications for Israel’s security.

4. Efforts should be made to coordinate the European and US positions to weaken Hamas.

5. There should be efforts to weaken the relationship between Hamas and Qatar, while also exerting pressure on Qatar to align more closely with the stances of the normalization countries.

6. Establishing a connection between the development of the PA and the Saudi-Israeli relationship, ensuring that steps in both domains progress concurrently.

7. It is imperative for Israeli officials to exercise restraint in their statements, avoiding any reinforcement of the ICJ’s accusation against Israel for committing crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it is crucial to maintain diplomatic communication with countries worldwide to mitigate the impact of the ICJ’s stance on Israel’s image.

8. Researchers at Israeli research centers are not inclined to consider the possibility of leveraging Arab-Chinese and Chinese-Iranian relations to persuade the Houthi movement in Yemen to cease their attacks on maritime trade in the Red Sea destined for Israel.[26]

[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.
[2] Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, “Measuring violence in war-torn countries: A political challenge for development, peace and security,” Statistical Journal of the IAOS, International Association for Official Statistics, vol. 39, 2023,; Taylor B. Seybolt, “Appendix 1C. Measuring violence: an introduction to conflict data sets,” site of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ; and Bastian Herre, “How do researchers measure armed conflicts and their deaths?,” site of Our World in Data, 13/10/2023,
[3] See details on the conflict in Gaza Strip and the West Bank in ACLED Conflict Index: Ranking violent conflict levels across the world, site of The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), January 2024,
[4] Daily death rate in Gaza higher than any other major 21st Century conflict – Oxfam, site of Oxfam, 11/1/2024,
[5] Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Tammy Caner, “The Decision of the Court in The Hague—A Practical Achievement but also a Warning Sign,” site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 11/2/2024,
[6] Roee Kibrik and Orni Livny (eds.), “Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies,” Issue No. 12, July–December 2023, site of The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (Mitvim).
[7] Arab Center Washington DC (ACW), in cooperation with The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), conducted a survey of public opinion, between 12/12/2023 and 5/1/2024, in 16 Arab countries, representing more than 95% of the population across the Arab region. See details in Arab Public Opinion about Israel’s War on Gaza, site of Arab Center Washington DC (ACW), 8/2/2024,
[8] Check the confirmation of these results in: Michael Robbins et. al., How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views, site of Foreign Affairs magazine, 14/12/2023,; and Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (90), site of Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), 13/12/2023,
[9] The Israeli Foreign Policy Index, Mitvim,
[10] Yoel Guzansky, Ofir Winter and Inbar Noy-Freifeld, ““The Day After”: Regional Outlines and Post-war Gaza Strip,” INSS, 1/2/2024,
[11] Yoel Guzansky and Ofir Winter, “Two are Better than One: The Role of Qatar and Egypt in Gaza,” INSS Insight No. 1636, INSS, 25/8/2022,
[12] Ofir Winter, Morr Link and Adam Sharon, “Navigating Post-War Realities: The Road Ahead for Israel and Egypt,” INSS Insight No. 1794, INSS, 6/12/2023,
[13] See details in Jonathan Ofir, Israeli think tank lays out a blueprint for the complete ethnic cleansing of Gaza, site of Mondoweiss, 23/10/2023,; and Israel: think tank linked to Netanyahu promotes ‘unique opportunity’ to ethnically cleanse Gaza, site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 24/10/2023,
[14] Jonathan Ofir, Israeli think tank lays out a blueprint for the complete ethnic cleansing of Gaza, Mondoweiss, 23/10/2023.
[15] Ibid.
[16] The negotiations are stuck: this is the dispute between Israel and Egypt regarding the Hamas smuggling axis, site of ynet, 7/1/2024, (in Hebrew)
[17] Dov Lieber, Summer Said and Abeer Ayyoub, Israel Says It Plans Ground Offensive Into City on Border With Egypt, site of The Wall Street Journal, 6/2/2024,; and site of Daily Alert,
[18] Michael Barak, “Special Report: The 7/10 Massacre of Hamas as an Inspiration Model for the “Change Stream” (“Tayyar al-Taghyir”) in the Muslim Brotherhood,” site of International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), December 2023, pp. 5–7.
[19] See the Israeli vision of the Qatari role in: Michal Yaari, “Israel and Qatar Relation nurtured by The Palestinian Issue,” Mitvim, March 2020, pp. 4–12.
[20]See details in the following studies and reports issued by Israeli studies centers: Yohanan Tzoreff, “Policy Paper: What is A Revitalized Palestinian Authority,” Mitvim, January 2024,; Yoel Guzansky, Ofir Winter and Inbar Noy-Freifeld, ““The Day After”: Regional Outlines and Post-war Gaza Strip,” INSS, 1/2/2024; Udi Dekel, “To Meet the War’s Objectives, Controlling Northern Gaza is Essential,” INSS Insight No. 1819, INSS, 25/1/2024,; Chuck Freilich, “The War in Gaza Postponed the Emerging US–Israel Crisis, but Intensified It,” INSS Insight No. 1822, INSS, 30/1/2024,; and Louis René Beres, “After the Gaza War: Why Palestine Would Be a Lawless and Militarized State,” The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA Center), Perspectives Paper No. 2,256, 18/1/2024,
[21] Swords of Iron: An Overview, Data Analytics Desk, INSS,
[22] Yaakov Katz, When the war in Gaza stops, the political war in Israel will begin, site of The Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), 3/2/2024, (cited from The Jerusalem Post newspaper, 2/2/2024)
[23] These conclusions were drawn from Israeli opinion polls carried out by the Israeli Institute for Democracy and the Jewish People Policy Institute from the onset of the war until the completion of this research. To delve deeper into the specifics of these surveys, see Site of The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI),; and JPPI Israeli Society Index, January 2024, JPPI,
[24] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Role of Think Tanks in Israeli Decision-Making, site of Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 11/1/2024,
[25] While preparing this study, the researcher endeavored to gather commonly agreed-upon points from Israeli studies (occasionally differing in some details) with the aim of delineating the general direction of Israeli strategic thinking regarding our study’s subject. It is worth noting that this study closely correlates with our findings during monitoring, see Miri Eisin, After the War: Five Key Challenges for Israel, ICT, 3/1/2024, (cited from Maariv Online); and see Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Tammy Caner, “The Decision of the Court in The Hague—A Practical Achievement but also a Warning Sign,” INSS, 11/2/2024.
[26] Galia Lavi, “The Limitations of Chinese Influence in the Middle East,” INSS Insight No. 1827, INSS, 18/2/2024,

Click here to download:
>>Academic Paper: Israeli Studies Centers’ Vision for the Post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood Phase … Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay (18 pages, 4.5 MB)

Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 4/3/2024

The opinions expressed in all the publications and studies are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of al-Zaytouna Centre.

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