Political Analysis: Gaza Strip and the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding

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By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.

Although Gaza Strip (GS) is not mentioned in any provision of the US–Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the two parties on 18/6/2026, Gaza, and the Palestine issue more broadly, remained embedded in the background, priorities and future trajectories of the evolving regional landscape.

Contrary to the declared US and Israeli objectives of toppling the Iranian regime, installing an allied government in its place, dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, subordinating Iran, and advancing the formation of a new Middle East that would usher in an “Israeli era”… none of these objectives was achieved… Rather, both the US and Israel have moved further away from, and become increasingly frustrated by, the prospect of attaining their goals.

It is true that Iran suffered significant losses through the targeting of its political and military leadership and its scientists, and that substantial parts of its nuclear, missile and naval capabilities, as well as its infrastructure, were struck. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime maintained its cohesion and effectiveness, succeeded in restoring and replenishing much of its military capacity, witnessed greater popular solidarity in the face of external aggression, and managed to “purge” its domestic front of large numbers of “agents” and supporters of the counterrevolution.

At the same time, Iran compelled the US to end the war, lift the blockade on Iranian ports, and pave the way for economic conditions substantially better than those that existed before the war.

This included permitting unrestricted oil exports, a US commitment to provide no less than $300 billion for Iran’s reconstruction in cooperation with regional partners, and the lifting of sanctions and release of frozen Iranian funds and assets as part of a final agreement. Iran also succeeded in linking the end of the war against it to a ceasefire in Lebanon, while the agreement amounted to de facto US recognition of Iran’s regional role. As for Iran’s commitments regarding the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program, no substantive new obligations were imposed, with future arrangements and agreements left to subsequent negotiations.

This helps explain the profound frustration within both the governing coalition and the opposition in Israel. Many regarded the outcome as a major strategic failure for Israel, arguing that Netanyahu’s “adventure” in attacking Iran had failed to deliver its intended results, leading to widespread calls for his resignation.

Implications for GS:

There are two competing scenarios regarding the potential implications for GS.

Scenario One suggests negative consequences. It assumes that Iran’s shift from confrontation toward accommodation and regional and international integration would lead it to prioritize domestic development and reconstruction. This, in turn, would reduce its engagement in confronting the Israeli project and weaken its regional focus. As a result, the Palestine issue would likely decline in Iran’s hierarchy of priorities, particularly given the heavy costs it has incurred and the presence of regional states that have normalized relations with Israel and are allied with the US.

However, this scenario also assumes that even if Iran maintains its principled stance toward the Israeli occupation, GS, Jerusalem, and Palestine and its people, such support would increasingly be confined to the political and media spheres, with further distancing from military and financial support for resistance.

It further assumes stronger prospects for Israeli–US unilateral dominance over GS and the Palestine file, including attempts to erase it, alongside an accelerated drive toward Arab–Islamic normalization with Israel. This would imply an increasing tendency to treat GS primarily as a humanitarian relief issue, rather than as a political question or one of liberation from occupation.

Scenario Two states that:

• As long as Iran has established itself as an indispensable regional actor,

• and as long as the assumption of regime change on which many had relied has collapsed,

• and as long as Israel’s ambitions for a “new Middle East” have “evaporated,”

• and as long as Israel’s value as a potential strategic ally has significantly declined in the eyes of Gulf and regional states,

• and as long as the US, despite its “great power” status, has failed to secure the Strait of Hormuz or fully protect its allies,

• and as long as Iran has emerged from the war with a more hardline and resolute leadership, a stronger willingness to avenge perceived affronts to its dignity, leadership and Supreme Leader, and an expanded role for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),

• and as long as it has succeeded in replenishing much of its military capabilities,

• and as long as it has managed to impose a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon under the MOU, while remaining prepared to return to war and strike Israel if Israeli aggression in Lebanon continues,

• and as long as the value of the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance has increased within Iran’s national security calculations,

all of this sends a clear signal that Iran continues to assign significant weight to its allies and regional considerations, and that the prospect of Iranian internal “retrenchment” remains unlikely.

Accordingly, Iran has clearly recognized, following the intense assault on the core of its political system and the killing of its leadership, the scale of the Israeli threat. As a result, treating Israel as an “enemy” and engaging in “direct confrontation” has acquired a concrete and operational dimension; consequently, confronting the Zionist project is no longer a tactical matter, nor one that can be postponed. This, in turn, enhances the importance of Palestinian resistance and its support as a first line of defense against the Zionist project and its regional extensions. At the same time, the lifting of sanctions on Iran, the inflow of investment, and improvements in its economic conditions would relieve external economic pressures and increase its financial surplus. This would place Iran in a stronger position to safeguard its national security and rebuild and support its network of allies.

Accordingly, an understanding among Israeli political, expert and military circles of the implications of Scenario Two appears to have fueled expressions of anger and frustration. It may also have contributed to the escalation of Israeli aggression against Lebanon in an attempt to derail the MOU, as well as to further escalation in GS. While Netanyahu is likely to seek to outrun time in order to secure some form of achievement ahead of the upcoming Israeli elections, polling data suggests that he may ultimately be overtaken by events, burdened by a record of extensive destruction and genocide, as well as a strategic failure to achieve declared objectives. This does not imply that the opposition, if it comes to power, would necessarily offer a better alternative; however, it may adopt a more pragmatic approach to realities on the ground, while avoiding confrontation with Trump, who seeks to advance the MOU as well as the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) in GS. In this context, US pressure reportedly helped prevent an imminent Israeli attack aimed at reoccupying what remains of GS, leading Israel to cancel the operation, at least temporarily. Moreover, Israel’s efforts to improve its international image (in an environment of growing isolation and widespread global hostility) may compel it to ease pressure on GS, particularly in humanitarian and living conditions.

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Finally, in the short term, developments may lean toward an Iranian preference for de-escalation regarding GS and Palestine, in the hope of advancing the implementation of the MOU and benefiting from its outcomes, particularly over the next sixty days. However, the second scenario may become more likely in the medium and long term.

Regional instability and ongoing processes of formation and reconfiguration are expected to continue, opening space for a number of opportunities. Among the most notable is the erosion of Arab confidence in the benefits of relations with Israel and the growing perception of the risks of expansion and hegemony, which would generate better common ground for relations with Palestinian resistance forces and for support for GS and the Palestine issue more broadly, including Iran. At the same time, there is a clear awareness that significant risks remain, not least the persistence of regimes that do not learn from the lessons of history!!