By: Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh.
Does Netanyahu still believe he can reshape the “Middle East,” or has that vision collapsed, particularly in the wake of the Israeli-US war against Iran?
Since 7/10/2023, Netanyahu has consistently presented the reshaping of the Middle East. Indeed, hardly a major speech or public appearance has passed without his reiterating his vision of a “new Middle East.” Just two days after the launch of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, he declared his intention to transform the region. He subsequently reaffirmed this objective following the assassination of Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah, after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, during the war against Iran in June 2025, on the second anniversary of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and again when he launched his second war against Iran… among numerous other occasions.
The Zionist expansionist mindset and the ambition to reshape the Middle East are by no means new. Under Netanyahu, however, this project has acquired a distinctly different character, one rooted primarily in “hard power” and the unabashed use of military force. It represents a clear departure from the more pragmatic and incremental approach that has traditionally characterized Israeli strategy, which has long relied on a process of gradual “expansion and consolidation.”
Accordingly, Netanyahu has never fully embraced Shimon Peres’s vision of a “new Middle East.” While Peres’s project was likewise predicated on securing Israeli regional dominance and influence, it placed considerably greater emphasis on “soft power,” recognizing the constraints of political realities and the strategic imperative of normalization. His vision of regional expansion and influence was structured around three interrelated levels:
First: A geopolitical sphere under direct Israeli control, with a Jewish majority wherever possible.
Second: A security sphere extending to the waters of the Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, representing the broader strategic arena of Israeli influence.
Third: A much wider economic sphere extending beyond these geographic and security boundaries.
Netanyahu, however, framed his approach in contrast to Peres’s vision during an Israeli government session on 15/3/2026. “We are forging a new Middle East here,” he declared, “but not the Middle East through Shimon Peres’s rose-tinted glasses. Rather, a genuinely new order based on strength,” describing the process as a “historic transformation.” While acknowledging his respect for Peres’s vision, Netanyahu argued that its practical implementation was far less achievable. Thus, for Netanyahu, regional change is driven primarily by “hard power” rather than by the idealistic “soft power” approach associated with Peres.
It appears that the overthrow of the Iranian regime was a central component of Netanyahu’s vision for reshaping the Middle East, as suggested by both his own statements and those of Trump during the early stages of the war. According to Sagiv Asulin, a former Mossad official, “A strategic decision to reshape the Middle East had already been made behind the scenes, and that the US objective had shifted from restraining Iran’s nuclear program to overthrowing the Iranian regime.” Israel’s Channel 14 reported these remarks one day before the war began, on 27/2/2026. Furthermore, the Israeli military directive issued on the morning of 28/2/2026, authorizing the war against Iran, indicated that “the objective of the campaign is to bring about long-term regional change … and improve Israel’s strategic balance.”
A Problematic Term:
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly addressing the persistent Israeli, US and broader Western use of the term “Middle East.” This preference is not without ideological significance. The term itself is a contested colonial construct that places Europe at the center of global geography and defines geopolitical boundaries from that perspective. Consequently, it risks obscuring the region’s Arab and Islamic identity. Moreover, there is no scholarly consensus regarding either the geographical boundaries of the “Middle East” or the countries it encompasses. Nevertheless, the term holds particular significance for Israel and its allies because it supports the conceptual integration of Israel into the region and aligns with the broader agendas of the peace process and normalization. From our perspective, the term is methodologically and academically problematic and therefore unacceptable. It is employed here solely for analytical consistency and because it is the terminology used by Netanyahu and others.
A Premature Declaration of Victory:
In addition to Netanyahu’s ideological background, he is also driven by a deep personal ambition to present himself as a “great leader” who delivered a “historic victory” for Zionism. He seeks to be remembered as the figure who defeated Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, weakened Iran, expanded normalization agreements, and reshaped the Middle East. Achievements that he views as central to his political legacy and as placing him alongside David Ben-Gurion and other prominent Zionist leaders
This ambition explains Netanyahu’s persistent preoccupation with projecting a sense of accomplishment and declaring victory. Since October 2025, he has moved beyond merely speaking of his goal of reshaping the Middle East; he has increasingly portrayed this objective as one that has already been achieved. His rhetoric became even more confident and assertive after launching the war against Iran this year. On 29/3/2026, he declared, “I said we would change the face of the Middle East, and we have done so.” He reiterated this message on 19/4/2026, stating, “We have passed a major test; we have changed the face of the Middle East.” Five days later, on 24/4/2026, he again returned to the theme, declaring, ” “I promised you that we would change the face of the Middle East, and that is exactly what we are doing. First and foremost, in Iran.”
However, does Netanyahu’s record of achievements justify the claim that he has fundamentally transformed the face of the region and ushered in an “Israeli era” in the Middle East?! Has he genuinely accomplished the strategic objectives he set out to achieve?
Opposition leader Yair Lapid challenged Netanyahu’s assertions on 31/3/2026, dismissing them as another example of what he described as Netanyahu’s “arrogant speeches” that say “I changed the Middle East… and in the end it always turns out it hasn’t changed.”
Toward an Objective Assessment:
An objective assessment drawing on strategic analysis and futures studies methodologies, including trend analysis, driving forces analysis, cross-impact analysis and evaluations of the behavior of major actors, reveals a set of broader dynamics that challenge the assertions made by Netanyahu and his government. The cumulative impact of these trends suggests that the prospects for sustained Israeli regional dominance have, in fact, weakened compared with the situation on 7 October 2023. The following are the most significant indicators:
First: Developments that have been more favorable to Israel:
1. Israel continues to enjoy military, intelligence and technological superiority, as well as significant destructive capabilities, reinforcing its geopolitical position as a major regional actor. However, these advantages have not enabled it to achieve full regional dominance or impose its will.
2. The US remains the region’s dominant power and primary military and security partner, while Israel continues to be a cornerstone of US regional policy, serving Israeli strategic interests.
3. Israeli society has moved significantly to the right and continues to support the expansion of Israeli influence and dominance, including confronting resistance movements and Iran.
4. Israel has inflicted significant damage on resistance forces and the Axis of Resistance. It has killed or assassinated numerous senior political and military figures within Hamas, Hizbullah, Iran and Yemen, while causing widespread destruction in Gaza Strip (GS) and southern Lebanon, and delivering severe strikes against targets in Syria, Yemen and Iran.
5. Israel expanded its territorial reach and strengthened its presence in the GS, southern Lebanon and southwestern Syria.
6. Israel projected an image of overwhelming dominance, demonstrating considerable military and intelligence capabilities and inflicted a form of “searing of consciousness” upon many. Nevertheless, it failed to change people’s deeply rooted attitudes of resentment and hostility toward it.
7. Israel made a step toward normalization with Lebanon through the memorandum of understanding signed with the Lebanese government.
Second: Factors Indicating Israel’s Failure to Reshape the Middle East:
1. The Palestine issue: Contrary to Israel’s objective, efforts to erase and marginalize the Palestine issue have failed. Instead, Palestine has regained a central position in regional and global attention.
2. Hamas and Palestinian resistance: Despite suffering severe blows, Hamas and the Palestinian resistance have neither been eliminated nor marginalized. They remain active actors in the Palestinian political equation, with Hamas maintaining significant popular support among Palestinians.
3. Hizbullah and Lebanese resistance: Despite sustaining severe blows, Hizbullah and the Lebanese resistance have neither been eliminated nor marginalized. They remain influential actors in Lebanon, retain substantial military capabilities, and continue to enjoy strong support within their constituency.
4. Iran: Israel and the US failed to overthrow the Iranian regime or marginalize its regional role. Despite major losses, Iran has consolidated its position as a key regional actor, a reality acknowledged even by the US. It has also secured better economic prospects, greater leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, an expanded role for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), alongside a more hostile regional posture toward Israel.
5. Israel’s image as a reliable power and indispensable security guarantor for its regional allies has declined, while its deterrence has been weakened and its credibility undermined. This is particularly evident in its failure to crush the resistance or impose its will after two years of war and genocidal violence against the besieged and devastated GS, as well as its failure to achieve its declared objectives in Lebanon and Iran. These setbacks have eroded confidence in Israel among countries that have normalized or are considering normalization.
6. The normalization process, a key pillar of efforts to establish a “new Middle East,” has lost significant momentum, while advancing the “peace process” has become increasingly difficult. This is largely due to the Israeli genocide in the GS, growing official and public Arab concerns over Israeli regional ambitions, and heightened fears regarding the implications of Israeli dominance for Arab national security. These concerns are particularly evident in relation to the potential displacement of Palestinians and its repercussions for Egypt and Jordan, as well as the risk of unequal partnerships built on a hierarchical relationship between a dominant power and dependent actors.
7. Key regional states have sought to strengthen their mutual relations to safeguard their national security, as reflected in the evolving ties among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and Egypt. Such developments enhance regional self-reliance and contribute to reducing dependence on Israel.
8. Regional states have increasingly sought to diversify their security and military partnerships, particularly through arms purchases from China and Russia. Although this shift remains limited, it reflects a gradual effort by these states to reduce their military and security reliance on the US. As a result, Israel’s traditionally central role in the regional security architecture has been weakened, along with its influence over the management of regional security affairs. This trend poses a challenge to Israel’s aspirations to reshape the Middle East under its leadership.
9. The US has shown less alignment with Netanyahu’s efforts to overthrow the Iranian regime, pursued a separate memorandum of understanding with Iran despite Israeli opposition, and increased pressure on Netanyahu regarding Gaza and Lebanon amid the growing influence of pro-Palestine movements and opposition to war with Iran in the US.
10. Israel’s global image has deteriorated, and its narrative has significantly declined, with Israel increasingly perceived as a pariah state. The global spread of the horrific images of the genocidal war on the GS, the referral of Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and several of its leaders to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the erosion of the “core” of Western European support for Israel amid growing European criticism of its conduct have further undermined its international standing.
11. Arab public opinion has remained overwhelmingly opposed to Israel, with Operation al-Aqsa Flood further intensifying anti-Israel sentiments and widening the gap between Israel and genuine normalization in the region.
12. The war has produced a more unstable regional environment rather than greater stability under Israeli influence.
13. Despite its strong right-wing orientation, Israeli society remains unwilling to absorb substantial costs. It is highly sensitive to human casualties, military losses and economic burdens, while continuing to grapple with deep secular–religious divisions, identity crises, leadership challenges, and competing approaches to managing the conflict.
14. Recent Israeli public opinion polls, including those conducted over the past two years, suggest that Netanyahu and his coalition are likely to lose the upcoming Knesset elections in October 2026, with the opposition expected to emerge victorious. This indicates a growing tendency within Israeli society to view Netanyahu’s record, and his claimed “achievements” in his wars and efforts to reshape the Middle East, in increasingly negative terms.
Conclusion:
The cumulative weight of these trends, the analysis of the driving forces shaping the “Middle East,” and the cross-impact analysis of key actors and influential factors demonstrate that the overall trajectory is toward diminishing the prospects for Israeli regional dominance. Most of the driving forces have not developed in the direction envisioned by Netanyahu and his government. Instead, the “New Middle East” has increasingly become a “dependent variable” shaped by a range of factors that are partly or entirely beyond Israel’s control. Consequently, Israel is unable to “engineer” the Middle East according to its own will. More importantly, Israel is now further removed from its ability to shape the regional order than it was before 7 October 2023, with a significant decline in the prospects for achieving this project.
Overall, the prevailing trajectory suggests that Netanyahu is unlikely to achieve the ambitions he has pursued. His political legacy will most likely be defined not by his elevation as a “historic leader,” but by the crises his policies have generated, including potential long-term negative repercussions for the Zionist project itself.
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 4/8/2026
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